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Abstract
This thesis examines the dimension of normative power in Germany's foreign policy and the 
extent to which the contours of a changing German international identity have transformed 
the parameters of that normative power It studies how foreign policy has moved between a 
logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequentialism in Germany’s motivations for 
political action. The thesis is informed by social constructivism and liberal institutionalism, in 
that it starts from the premise that German foreign policy is inherently shaped by identity and 
institutions.
Whereas most academic work emphasizes continuity in foreign policy after unification, 
this thesis argues that Germany's foreign policy has changed significantly between 1997 
and 2007. This happened because policy-makers reformulated Germany’s international 
identity thereby shaping a new framework for foreign policy. This remaking of identity 
diminished the country's predominantly normative orientation and reinforced a more 
utilitarian approach for foreign policy-making. The thesis attempts to show how this 
remaking of identity was conducted and how identity change preceded the shift in the realm of 
foreign policy.
The empirical part of the thesis compares the foreign policies of the governments of 
Chancellors Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schroder and Angela Merkel in the period from 1997 
to 2007. To do so it examines four case studies which are representative of the transformation 
in German post-unification foreign policy: Germany's new security policy; the 
Europeanization of Germany’s European policy regarding the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP); bilateral relationships with France and the United States, and 
Germany's quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. These four 
policy domains all involve fundamental choices about Germany's foreign policy identity, and 
the nature of Germany's normative power at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
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CHAPTER 1: The remaking of Identity and foreign policy in post-unified 
Germany
1.1. Introduction: Germany’s international identity and interests in foreign policy
Questions of identity and power are at the centre of the study of politics. In international 
politics, countries relate to other countries through their state identity and their power 
potential. This is done mostly through foreign policy. Between 1949 and 1990 the 
foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was known more for its low key 
international politics than for power politics, despite having achieved strong economic 
development and social and political stability. This suggests that measurable factors 
alone, such as economic, military and political capabilities are not sufficient to explain a 
country’s exterior actions but rather that a state’s identity also plays a role in shaping 
foreign policy. Thus identity indicators need to be incorporated as a significant 
denominator to understand the behaviour of a state towards its exterior.
While Germany has always had a complex relationship with the concept of 
power, it has, during the Cold War, managed to acquire normative power, a different but 
effective sort of power within the Euro-Atlantic constitutional order. Because this 
normative power was recognised as legitimate and effective, the path towards Germany 
consolidating itself as a state with a multilateral Europeanized and transatlanticist 
identity was substantially facilitated. While indicators of identity are prone to continuity 
and tend to evolve slowly over time they can sometimes change more abruptly. The 
period from 1998 to 2005 was such a path redefining moment which reoriented the 
contours of a changing German international identity and transformed the parameters of 
Germany’s normative power. This happened because policy-makers reformulated 
Germany’s identity thereby shaping a new framework for foreign policy. Between 1998 
and 2005 the remaking of identity indicators gradually produced shifts in the sources of 
German foreign policy diminishing the country’s predominantly normative orientation 
and reinforcing a more utilitarian approach to foreign policy-making.
Germany’s defeat marking the end of the Second World War was a founding 
moment for the construction of its post-war identity. 8 May 1945 marked not only the 
end of the war in Europe, but also a ‘day of liberation’ for the German people as 
Richard von Weizsacker, then president of the FRG put it in a landmark speech in
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1985.1 Germans could now decide who they wanted to be, and define their interests in 
accordance with the new identity. After the Second World War "the choices [Germany] 
made were essentially about the kind of country [it] wanted to be. Interests and policies 
flowed from that and not the other way round’ (Cooper 2003:135). After 1949 the 
Federal Republic of Germany developed a new identity created through international 
interaction and the decisive input given by its new partners within the Atlantic Alliance 
and the European Community. Germany’s ‘commitment to multilateralism both as an 
idea and as a means to achieve specific policy goals [became] firmly embedded in 
German elites’ (Bulmer 1997:67). This new state identity was characterised by 
principles of normative multilateralism with a strong emphasis on diplomacy, 
institution-building and economic development.
By promoting political trust in interactions with its Western partners, the Federal 
Republic developed self-confidence, particularly when those interactions induced 
successes. Foreign policy successes were not only seen as a consequence of a ‘national’ 
element or the pursuit of purely ‘national’ interests. The centrality of the international 
element in foreign policy was a distinctive feature of the old Federal Republic. This, 
according to William Paterson, reflected ‘the Federal Republic’s genesis as more a 
foreign policy in search of a state than a state in search of a foreign policy’ (Paterson 
1994:127). Therefore, in its initial years, the Federal Republic’s foreign policy was 
itself constitutive of Germany’s post-war identity, shaping its basic contours and paving 
the way for what was to transform gradually from normative constraints into normative 
power.
While the end of the Cold War brought structural change, the continuity of 
institutions and their role as ‘binding institutions’ (Ikenberry 2001) guaranteed a 
balanced transition to the post-Cold War world. The precondition for German 
unification was to reinforce the institutional continuity embedding the unified actor in 
NATO and EU structures and strengthening its special relationships with the US and 
France. Thus the formula for German unification was the continuity of its multilateralist 
diplomacy through multilateral institutional structures, and the consolidation of the 
post-1945 liberal constitutional order in an ever expanding European Union and NATO.
The double retraction from Europe of both post-Soviet Russia, and, after 11 
September 2001, partially also of the United States, have put Germany, eighteen years 
after its unification, in a new position of power. An undefined new system falling
1 Speech by the President o f the Federal Republic o f Germany, Richard von Weizsacker, before the German 
Bundestag, on 8 May 1985, marking the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. 
http://www.bundestag.de/geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/dok08.html
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between global unipolarity with American preponderance and multipolarity among 
regional great powers succeeded bipolarity with its Euro-Atlantic core and superpower 
rivalry. Thus the end of the Cold War represented a dual challenge for German policy­
makers in that their country faced a new position as one of Europe’s key powers at the 
same time as European unification was paving the way for the EU itself to gradually 
emerge as a foreign policy actor. The challenge for policy-makers was how to deal with 
the simultaneous emergence of these apparently contradictory reflexes. To assure 
compatibility between them Kohl, Schroder and Merkel followed a ‘two-lane policy 
approach’ regarding foreign policy. On one ‘policy lane’, Germany maintained its 
multilateralist diplomacy of institutional continuity in the EU and NATO, promoting the 
institutional enlargement of both organizations. On a second ‘policy lane’, policy­
makers began to accept that the increase of Germany’s new position as a potential 
European power placed new expectations and responsibilities upon it as an individual 
policy actor. The three governments have reacted differently; most of the time policy­
makers pursued both policy lanes, with strong momentary intersections between both; 
occasionally, preference of one policy lane over the other came to the fore. The question 
now was whether Germany would maintain normative power and multilateralism as the 
primary sources of its foreign policy and whether it would continue to concert its 
actions with its partners in the prevailing institutional structures or prefer to use a more 
individual policy lane.
1.2. Thesis purpose, argument and contribution
This thesis examines the dimension of normative power in Germany’s foreign policy 
and the extent to which the contours of a changing German international identity have 
transformed the parameters of that normative power thereby changing foreign policy. It 
theorizes the dynamic articulation between identity and foreign policy through the study 
of normative power by focusing on how changes in foreign policy interests have been a 
reflection of Germany’s changing identity. Hence it articulates identity as a key 
indicator of political change (March and Olsen 2004:11) and resorts to constructivism as 
a plausible theoretical framework.2 The aim of the thesis is to present a theoretically
2 Constructivism argues that ideational, non-material elements such as identities and norms are 
constitutive o f state action. Because reality is socially constructed, structures are a reflection o f and 
created through discursive practices and habituation processes. In constructivism, institutions develop a 
logic of their own, existing as a normative framework for a state’s actions which shapes a state's political 
behaviour. State interests and identities are not a priori given, and are mutually constitutive o f each other, 
coexisting in a state o f anarchy shaped by states themselves. A constructivist interpretation o f foreign
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informed study of German foreign policy between 1997 and 2007 to understand how 
German identity has shaped foreign policy actions and to explain German foreign policy 
in a period of change. Thus it explores the extent to which policy-makers have 
maintained, diminished or increased Germany’s normative power.
What did Germany do with the normative power it acquired during the Cold 
War, when Germans had an ‘aversion to power politics’ (Wallace 2007:8)? Did 
normative power, between 1997 and 2007, continue to shape political actions, constrain 
or empower German policy-makers to pursue other avenues by facilitating the 
continuous recovery of more traditional attributes of power?
Whereas most academic work emphasizes continuity in foreign policy after 
unification, this thesis aims to explain change rather than continuity and how changes in 
the contours of identity and the meaning of normative power have produced changes in 
Germany’s foreign policy. This happened because policy-makers reformulated 
Germany’s international identity thereby shaping a new framework for foreign policy. This 
remaking of identity diminished the country's predominantly normative orientation and 
reinforced a more utilitarian approach for foreign policy-making. The thesis attempts to show 
how this remaking of identity was conducted and how identity change preceded the shift in the 
realm of foreign policy.
The thesis argues that it is Germany’s identity and normative power which are at 
the centre of the explanation for Germany’s foreign policy behaviour after unification. 
While multilateral institutions paved the way for a smooth transition to a post-bipolar 
world in the Euro-Atlantic area, Germany’s foreign policy identity as a multilateralist 
and Europeanized actor mitigated the burden of expectations and reduced the 
unpredictability that comes at times of major power shifts. Its normative power assured 
the transition to become a fully sovereign state in the Western community of 
democracies. Thus in the case of Germany the question was not so much the paradox of 
continuity but rather the paradox of change. If institutions, principles of multilateralism 
and normative power had located Germany firmly in the Euro-Atlantic area, why did a 
domestic impulse lead decision-makers to change the sources of normative power and 
embark on a policy, after 1998, of a new self-assertiveness, claiming power parity with 
its peers, and risking the traditional normative multilateralism which had embedded 
Germany so smoothly in the institutional structures it valued?
policy assumes that norms and identities form the ideational structure for state action and precedes, 
shapes and creates interests. Thus the material structure o f the international system acquires meaning 
through its contextualisation into the social and ideational structure. E. Adler (2002). ‘Constructivism and 
International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds. Handbook o f  
International Relations, London: Sage, 95-118.
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While between 1997 and 2007 Germany’s normative power continued to be one 
of the most important sources of German foreign policy, the purpose of normative 
power changed, from a traditionally value-shaped policy towards a more instrumental 
use. Identity and the sources of normative power were remade, on the basis of a 
transition from a logic of appropriateness for political action towards a logic of 
consequentially.3 Chancellor Schroder acted as an agent for change, and articulated 
these changes initially in Germany’s European policy, later in Germany’s alliance 
partnerships with France and the U.S., and in Germany’s policy regarding a permanent 
United Nations Security Council seat, at times preferring unilateral positions to the 
traditional multilateral ones. After 1998 there was a shift, sometimes gradual, 
sometimes abrupt in the positioning of existing norms within the wider context of 
Germany’s normative power. Chancellor Schroder introduced a new norm of power 
parity into the foreign policy agenda. This new norm in itself did not contradict the 
traditional norm of multilateralism, and a normative conception of international politics. 
But it remade the policy coordinates for it relocated the importance of other norms in an 
overall more assertive foreign policy. While continuity prevailed in foreign policy 
discourse and practice, the usage, instrumentality and validity were reshuffled. 
Chancellor Merkel has inherited these changes and has tried to maintain some while 
rebalancing others.
Thus the transformation of the indicators of German state identity occurred 
mainly between 1998 and 2005 when domestic political actors rather than the 
international system (systemic change) induced a critical juncture for change (Jeffery 
and Paterson 2003). A critical juncture is seen here as a moment which affects the 
contours of interests, identities and institutions, producing transformation. In the case of 
Germany this change was agent induced -  it occurred consciously at the level of the 
highest agents of the state and it was domestic in origin rather than structural. Domestic 
elites, starting with Chancellor Schroder himself have acted as ‘entrepreneurs for 
change’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001) in redefining Germany’s role in foreign policy 
and in pursuing what Schroder called the ‘enlightened self-interest of German foreign 
policy’ (Schroder 1999b).
As whom German leaders wanted to see their country perceived of -  namely as an
3 These are the two basic logic o f action by which human behaviour is interpreted. In the logic o f  
appropriateness ‘action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations o f  that identity 
or role to a specific situation. The pursuit o f purpose is associated with identities more than with interests, 
and with the selection o f rules more than with individual rational expectations. (...) In the logic of  
consequentiality or expected consequences ‘politics is seen as aggregating individual preferences into 
collective actions by some procedures o f  bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation, and exchange’ 
(March and Olsen 1998:950-951).
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equal country -  had consequences on foreign policy actions. Alluding to Germany’s 
normative power, Cooper considers that Germany had ‘a considerable influence on 
those around it -  more so perhaps than Britain or France, though both of these had a 
more active foreign policy in the classical sense’ (Cooper 2003:135-136). What is 
remarkable for someone actively involved in current EU policy-making is the 
suggestion that
‘Not only is identity more important than interest in determining policy 
when it comes to the big strategic decisions; it may also be the case that, in 
the long run, identity has more influence on others than foreign policy more 
conventionally conceived. What you are may be more important than what 
you do.’ (Cooper 2003:136)
While identity and interests are often mutually constitutive, there are instances when 
one predominates over the other. Instead of mutual constitutionality, research will show 
that from 1997 to 2007, changes in German identity and the redefinition of sources of 
identity have been decisive in shaping interests and policy decisions and in most cases 
interests have flown from identity rather than the other way around. While specific 
coordinates of foreign policy prevail, the overall strategic dimension has led to changes 
in Germany’s self-awareness of foreign policy. The empirical study will show how the 
exercise of foreign policy was intrinsically combined with the need for German political 
leaders to project political positions in a new international context. While Chancellor 
Kohl wanted to portray what remained similar to the old Federal Republic, Chancellor 
Schroder was keen to assert what was new about Germany’s international position. 
While the contrast between Kohl and Schroder was striking, Chancellor Merkel is 
combining more of both than at first meets the eye.
To give a comprehensive view of German post-Cold War foreign policy the 
period under research extends from 1997 to 2007 and presents a comparative analysis of 
the last two years of the Kohl government, the eight years of the Schroder government, 
and the first two years of the Merkel government. This is done for two reasons. First, 
debates on foreign policy and changes in policy-making suggest that transformations 
began to materialize in 1997. In European policy member states signed the Amsterdam 
Treaty in July 1997, opening the way for the first accession negotiations in December 
1997, when the European Council meeting in Luxembourg set a time table for the 
enlargement process. Internally the SPD changed its party political approach on foreign 
policy at its party congress in December 1997. Regarding UN Security Council reform, 
the Razali proposal, the first reform proposal on the UN table, and which opened the
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way for Germany’s successive negotiating tactics, was put forward in 1997. Secondly, 
the years researched juxtapose three different approaches in defining a post-Cold War 
German foreign policy. In the face of international change Chancellor Kohl hold on to 
foreign policy continuity in European and transatlantic politics; Chancellor Schroder 
chose to remake German identity changing basic foreign policy parameters. Chancellor 
Merkel is trying to balance between both continuity and change, with a bigger margin of 
manoeuvrability than any o f her predecessors. This allows for an argument whose 
justification is more widely-spanned than if  it were limited to only one or two 
chancellorships.
The thesis’ findings rest on conceptual and empirical research. They are a 
combination of empirical data gathered through interviews and primary sources, and 
through the analysis of concepts and their usage in German politics.4 Eighteen 
interviews were conducted with German politicians, diplomats and foreign policy 
experts in the years 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2005 in Berlin, London and Lisbon.5 The 
basis for choosing the interviewees was their political experience in German foreign 
policy. Through discursive analysis, interviews and by comparing the discursive 
contents with actual policy practice the thesis articulates changes induced by the 
political leadership. The analysis of major Bundestag debates highlight shared as well as 
contested conceptions of state identity.
The thesis’ contribution to knowledge lies in its examination of Germany’s 
international identity to explain change in German foreign policy from 1997 to 2007. 
Most analysis on German foreign policy tend to follow a dividing line between neo­
realism, which emphasizes policy change through structural adaptation, and liberal 
institutional or constructivist accounts which tend to underline policy continuity. There 
are few systematic constructivist accounts of a transforming state identity and its 
implications for foreign policy. Those which have presented an identity based 
explanation for German foreign policy have done so to explain continuity, often 
suggesting the persistence of state identity (Maull 2006a) due to a path of continuity 
with a highly normative foreign policy (Rittberger 2001). This thesis, by contrast, is 
informed by constructivism and liberal institutionalism, but rather than explain 
continuity it aims to explain foreign policy change. The aim is to discern change and 
confer legitimacy on the usefulness of the concept of a state’s identity as an addendum
4 The primary sources are listed separately from the secondary sources at the beginning o f the 
bibliography on p. 235.
5 A list o f the interviews conducted, with the party affiliation and departmental responsibility o f the 
interviewees is included in the bibliography o f the thesis, on p. 233. When the name o f the interviewee is 
not mentioned, confidentiality was asked for by the interviewee.
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to understanding a country’s foreign policy and behavioural change. Thus the thesis 
aims to rescue constructivism from being confined to explaining patterns of identity 
continuity only.
A second element of originality is the emphasis given to domestic politics as 
factors to explain changes in identity. Domestic politics, Checkel has argued ‘plays a 
key, if undertheorized role, in any socialization dynamic or process of identity change in 
the EU’ (Checkel 2006:25). Given constructivisms’ relative neglect of the domestic 
sources of foreign policy the thesis focuses on the effects of foreign policy identity on 
state action rather than on the effects o f the international social structure on state 
identity.
Finally, the thesis will contribute to the more general literature on identity and 
foreign policy, on the one hand, and constructivism and change on the other.
1.3. Thesis structure
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. The introduction presents the argument and 
contextualizes the literature review. The second chapter presents the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. It articulates the interaction of identity and foreign policy, 
problematises the concepts of change and normative power, and analyses logics of 
political action. The third chapter refers to the domestic context and the ways in which it 
has shaped foreign policy. It focuses mostly on how German politicians debated foreign 
policy issues after unification and how much policy-makers, as agents for change, have 
assumed a transformational role.
With chapter four begins the second and more empirical part of the thesis which 
compares the foreign policies of the governments of Chancellors Helmut Kohl, Gerhard 
Schroder and Angela Merkel in the period from 1997 to 2007. To explore the substance 
of German foreign policy practice and how Germany’s normative power has evolved it 
examines four policy domains which are representative of the transformation of German 
post-unification foreign policy: Germany's new security policy; the Europeanization of 
Germany’s policy regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); bilateral 
relations with France and the United States, and Germany's quest for permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council.
Building on both the theoretical and domestic contexts of the first part, chapter 
four analyses the changes which have occurred in Germany’s security policy and shows 
how they can be related to the question of identity and normative power. The fifth
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chapter deals with the European dimension of German foreign policy and how 
Europeanization has affected post-unified Germany. Chapter six then analyses the Euro- 
Atlantic dimension of German foreign policy by focusing on Berlin’s bilateral 
relationships with France and the United States. The ensuing chapter takes the analysis 
out of the Euro-Atlantic area onto the United Nations domain and examines the 
motivations behind Germany’s attempt to become a permanent UNSC member. Each of 
these four chapters tests the possibility of a new security identity, a new Europeanised 
identity, a new bilateral and transatlantic identity and ultimately, a new, more global 
(“UN”) identity. Finally, chapter eight concludes the thesis’ argument and hints at ways 
in which Germany’s changed foreign policy identity affects the contours of European 
order.
Two caveats should be established from the outset. First, studying a country’s 
foreign policy through its identity does not equal an idealist approach, a commitment to 
the idealist current of International Relations according to which states engage only in 
co-operative behaviour and share an identical interest in peace (Carr 1991:51). While 
social constructivists generally support the liberal notion of progress in International 
Relations (Wendt 1999:10) they posit that reality is socially constructed, and states 
interact not only in a materialist world, but also in an ideational world where identities 
and norms are constitutive of state action. Identities and interests are not given but are 
constitutive of one another in a neutral context of mutuality. Neither does 
constructivism judge that interests are ‘bad’ Realpolitik and identity ‘good’ politics, nor 
does it preclude a military dimension to a state’s foreign policy. It asserts, however, that 
states tend to follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ according to given international norms 
in the pursuit o f their policy aims and to standards of appropriateness which states 
define among themselves. This thesis takes issue with constructivisms’ overemphasis on 
the logic of appropriateness. While it accepts that a logic of appropriateness has shaped 
most of German foreign policy, it suggests that ‘ideational factors have normative as 
well as instrumental dimensions’ (Ruggie 1998b:33) and argues with liberal 
institutionalism that the ‘logic of consequentially’ has increasingly been introduced into 
German foreign policy, foremost by domestic political actors who have induced these 
changes.
Secondly, and in a similar vein, normative power does not equate altruistic 
politics. Through normative power a state acts according to a given set of norms 
accepted by a wider community of states, and projects strategic interests. The question 
is not whether such strategic interests exist, but rather what the purpose and
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effectiveness of such power projection is. If the state has been successful in employing 
its normative power to the benefit o f the spread of international norms, strategic 
interests are only partially significant in a policy-makers consideration. However the EU 
itself 'has exhibited security-conditioned specificities’ in the promotion of norms and 
values outside of Europe, suggesting that sometimes ‘instrumental choices are made 
within a range of common normative understandings' (Youngs 2004:431). Thus 
focusing on normative power does not preclude that sometimes norms are projected 
internationally for strategic interests.
1.4. Continuities and changes in German foreign policy: a literature review
1.4.1. From unification to the Kosovo war
There was a prolific amount of publications on German foreign policy during the 
1990s.6 In the first post-unification decade most focused on foreign policy continuity 
and change, on Germany’s basic strategic orientation and on suggestions as how to 
change (improve) Germany’s role in the world. Out-of-area military missions and the 
war in Bosnia confronted Germans with the need to debate their security policy. The 
predominant line of enquiry was to establish the parameters of institutionalised 
mechanisms to explain the paradox of continuity, or to suggest ways in which Germany 
could follow a path towards policy ‘normalization’.
The debates on foreign policy centred on proponents of policy ‘normalization’ 
and supporters of the path of continuity.7 The first group of academics focused on 
policy normalization. Amulf Baring, Christian Hacke, Gregor Schollgen and Hans Peter 
Schwarz considered that normalisation meant recapturing traditional great power 
instruments and allowing for concepts like national interest and power to be
6 See, for example, Wilfried von Bredow, Thomas Jager (1993). Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik. Nationale 
Interessen in Intemationalen Beziehungen, Opladen: Leske+Budrich; Philip Gordon (1994). ‘The 
Normalization o f  German Foreign Policy’, Orbis; Christian Hacke (1993). Weltmacht wider Willen. Die 
Aussenpolitik der BRD; Karl Kaiser, Joachim Krause, eds. (1996). Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik,
Band 3: Interessen und Strategien, Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag; Karl Kaiser, Hans Maull, eds. 
(1995). Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, Band 2: Herausforderungen, Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag; 
Karl Kaiser, Hans Maull, eds. (1994). Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, Band I: Grundlagen, Miinchen: 
R. Oldenbourg Verlag; Hans-Peter Schwarz (1994). Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Ruckkehr 
auf die Weltbiihne, Berlin: Siedler Verlag.
7 On the debates on German foreign policy during the 1990s see Gunther Hellmann (1996). ‘Goodbye 
Bismarck? The Foreign Policy o f Contemporary Germany’, The Mershon International Studies Review,
40 (1), pp. 1-39; Josef Janning (1996). ‘A German Europe -  A European Germany? On the debate over 
Germany’s foreign policy’, International Affairs 72 (1); Hartmut Mayer (1997). ‘Early at the beach and 
claiming territory? The evolution o f German ideas on a new European order’, International Affairs, 73 
(4), 721-737.
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reintroduced into Germany's political discourse (Baring 1994; Hacke 1993; Schollgen 
1993; Schwarz 1994). Through the pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy, Germany 
would recover its status as a potential great power (Schollgen 1993), as Europe’s central 
power (Schwarz 1994) and accept international responsibilities commensurate with its 
regained position. They supported institutional enlargement towards Eastern Europe for 
stability reasons favouring widening over institutional deepening but rejected a federal 
Europe and were sceptical towards supranational institutions. For Germany to play a 
leading role (‘Fuhrungsrolle’) in the European Union the Franco-German relationship 
would become secondary (Schwarz 1999b). These authors were critical of the Kohl 
period for failing to take German interest sufficiently into account and for not 
perceiving Germany as a great power (Hacke 1993). The main policy recommendation 
of this group was that due to new conditionalities and constraints, Germany should 
accept international responsibilities proportional to its power status and pursue a more 
assertive foreign policy. However, Germany’s Western integration in the EU and 
NATO and enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe should remain the foundation of 
this new more assertive foreign policy.
These expectations did not resonate in the wider German society and the 
argument for a normalisation represented the exception in the wider academic 
landscape. Although these authors were historians their claims were in line with 
International Relations (neo)realist thinking which suggested changes in alliance 
allegiances, a tendency towards unilateralism and a retreat from institutionalism and 
integration.8 Neorealism saw ‘the keys to war and peace (...) more in the structure of 
the international system than in the nature of the individual states’ (Mearsheimer 
1990:9). Thus the shift in the international balance of power at the end of the Cold War 
would free Germany to embark on a power trajectory based on a more assertive or even 
aggressive foreign policy. Germany would now increase its power capabilities and 
become a nuclear power because of structural constraints; any other outcome was 
improbable since ‘for a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural 
anomaly’ (Waltz 1993). Thus change in Germany’s power position because of 
international structural transformation was the main argument for neorealist theory.
While this approach was well suited to explain part of the Federal Republic’s 
foreign policy during the Cold War as a reflex of systemic changes in superpower
8 Richard Ned Lebow (1994). ‘The Long Peace, the End o f the Cold War, and the Failure o f  Realism’, 
International Organization, 48/2, pp. 249-277. For a defense o f realism in explaining the end o f the Cold 
War, see William C. Wohlforth (1994). ‘Realism and the End o f  the Cold War’, International Security, 
19/3, pp. 91-129.
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relations, neorealism had a hard time coming up with a plausible explanation at the end 
of the Cold War not only for the peaceful end of bipolarity, and the absence of a 
hegemonic war, but with justifying the negotiated unification of Germany, the 
continuity of multilateralism and institutional commitments. This helps explain why 
Baring, Hacke, Schollgen and Schwarz did also not find much resonance with the political 
elite during the 1990s.
The second group of academics and policy experts studied what most called the 
‘paradox of continuity’. In the face of the structural change that neorealists enumerated 
what explained Germany’s persistence in existing institutions, alliances and its own 
position as an embedded multilateralist country striving to continue deepening and 
enlarging European unification? Was German foreign policy impervious to change?
These policy analysts considered that there was continuity in foreign policy 
since Germany did not question the core foundations of its post-war diplomacy. Most 
German authors, particularly in the realm of political science and international relations 
discerned foreign policy continuity based on multilateralist and integrationist orientation 
and embeddedness in international institutions as two basic foreign policy principles. 
Gunther Hellmann, Josef Janning, Joachim Krause, Hanns Maull, Thomas Risse, Volker 
Rittberger, among others, started from the premise that Germany willingly pursued a 
strategy of self-binding based on multilateralism and European integration. Questioning 
the determining power of the international structure on state actions, they agreed that 
Germany’s strong embeddedness in international institutions had influenced the 
definition of state interests. During the Cold War Germany had become a multilateralist 
and Europeanized state, firmly embedded in the European integration process and the 
wider transatlantic community; after unification there was no plausible justification for 
why Germany should change its diplomacy.
This line of thinking was congruent with the liberal institutionalist approach. 
Because of limitations of sovereignty Germany’s foreign policy was conducive to being 
interpreted through this approach where a strong reflexive multilateralism in European 
policy shaped Germany’s interests (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000:52). Even 
Germany’s first time offensive military participation in the war in Kosovo, a NATO 
operation against Serbia without a UN mandate, was seen by most as a confirmation of 
Germany’s civilian power status (Maull 2001) rather than a negation of it.
After 9/11, however, neorealist authors felt once again vindicated by their 
explanations a decade earlier, and new neo-realist accounts began to emerge to explain 
foreign policy post-9/11 (Hyde-Price 2006). For Schwarz Germany’s participation in
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the war Kosovo suggested that the arguments put forward by the normalisationists were 
finally being put into practice. Schwarz considered the Red-Green governments’ 
participation in the Kosovo war ‘conceivably the strongest confirmation of loyalty 
towards NATO and the United States’, and the recognition that Germany was now ‘as 
normal as other countries regarding questions of military interventions’ (Schwarz 
1999b:6).
1.4.2. From the Kosovo war to the transatlantic crisis: The end of Germany’s 
foreign policy consensus
But Germany’s position regarding 11 September 2001, the US policy against 
international terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq launched a new debate on Germany’s 
international role and security policy. Berlin’s opposition to the US led military 
intervention in Iraq in 2002-03 was the catalyst for a new debate on German foreign 
policy among policy analysts for it represented an unexpected departure from 
established patterns of German foreign policy behaviour.9 More significantly, the 
transatlantic crisis triggered the end of Germany’s foreign policy consensus inherited 
from the Cold War years.
Now the debate was about policy instruments, relationships with partners and 
about questions of alliance allegiance, unilateralism and multilateralism. Berlin’s refusal 
to support Washington, its traditional alliance partner, in its decision to go to war in Iraq 
in 2002-2003 represented a departure from Germany’s traditional transatlantic 
multilateralism. Whereas during the 1990s most analysts debated the paradox of 
continuity, they were now confronted with the paradox of change.
The end of the domestic foreign policy consensus can be well observed in the 
three groups of arguments which emerged. A first group of academics and policy 
analysts approved of the governments’ new international position, thus applauding 
foreign policy change. A second group also identified more elements of change than 
continuity but cautioned that this was the wrong turn for German diplomacy. Finally, 
there were those academics and policy analysts who continued to recognize continuity 
in foreign policy. What is striking especially in the first two groups is the mixture of 
experts of different political convictions within the same group, which only reinforces
9 On the debates on foreign policy, see Hanns Maull (2006). ‘Introduction’, in H. Maull, ed. Germany’s 
uncertain Power: Foreign Policy o f  the Berlin Republic, Palgrave Macmillan, 1-12, and Thomas Risse 
(2004). ‘Kontinuitat durch Wandel: Eine “neue” deutsche Aussenpolitik?’, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, 11, 24-31.
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the argument of a crumbling foreign policy consensus. The next section examines the 
divergent positions, picking two or three representative figures of each group.
1.4.2.1. Support for Schroder’s foreign policy change: Gregor Schollgen and Egon 
Bahr
The first group includes authors supportive of the Schroder governments’ new 
assertiveness and foreign policy normalization. Gregor Schollgen and Egon Bahr were 
among the most outspoken advocates of Germany’s return of normalcy. Coming from 
opposite political spectrums these authors had argued during the 1990s that Germany 
should redefine its position in Europe and pursue a foreign policy more in tune with its 
national interests. Their claim for a greater leadership role internationally was closely 
linked to the question of whether such new assertiveness could be done through 
unchanged relationships with France and the US, and other allies, and whether the 
means for achieving such a role also remain the same.
Gregor Schollgen argued that the end of the Soviet Union inevitably had brought 
about the end of the transatlantic era (Schollgen 2003a and 2003b). Following 
unification and the recovery of sovereignty, Germany should become more self- 
confident and assertive. Part of the problem until 1998 was that the process of 
‘ Vergangenheitbewaltigung’ (dealing with the past) had excessively concentrated on the 
period between 1933 and 1945 and not included the rest of German history.10 Hence 
Schollgen approvingly termed Schroder’s foreign policy as ‘Germany’s return to the 
world stage’ as a European great power in what he described as an act of political 
emancipation (Schollgen 2003b). The author praised Schroder’s opposition to the US 
policy on Iraq as a ‘radical departure from Germany’s foreign policy tradition’ allowing 
for an ‘unexpected German leadership role as a counterweight to the U.S.’ (Schollgen 
2003b: 130). The ‘existential questions for the German nation’, as the Chancellor put it, 
were decided in Berlin and nowhere else, i.e. Washington (Schollgen 2003b: 129). In 
2005, Schollgen considered that Germany now had ‘the possibility to choose other 
partners in critical situations without serious risks’ (Schollgen 2005:7). Schroder had 
revealed leadership and ‘led the Germans to the new world political reality’ taking 
advantage of the new margin of manoeuvrability produced by the Iraq crisis. In this the 
Red-Green government had followed a foreign policy commensurate with the weight of 
a country that could rely on the trust that the world had given it (Schollgen 2005:7-8). 
That a conservative historian such as Schollgen applauded the more assertive foreign
10 Conversation with the author, London, January 1998.
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policy of a social democratic Chancellor as ‘Germany’s return to the world stage’ 
highlighted the significant change in the fault lines of the German foreign policy 
coordinates, and even caused for some analytical confusion (Veit 2006:47).
In a similar tone, albeit from a different political angle, former SPD ideologue 
Egon Bahr welcomed that the war in Iraq had finally ignited a passionate debate in 
German society about power and political interests (Bahr 2003:9). He qualified 
Schroder’s use of the expression ‘German way’ as ‘natural and normal’ in that the 
country now pursued its legitimate interests without feeling paralysed by its own past 
(Bahr 2003:137). Normality for Bahr also meant that Germans developed a normal 
relationship to the nation and accepted a feeling of national identity 
(Nationalbewufttsein), for ‘the feeling of national identity was the new European 
normality’ (Bahr 2003:136-37). Even though Bahr promoted a left-nationalist position 
he tried to justify Germany’s new national assertiveness through a European line of 
argumentation.
Germany’s future lied in its continuous commitment to the EU, which implied 
its distancing from the United States. This was a logical consequence of Germany’s new 
normality, and goes in line with Bahr’s traditional sceptical view of Washington’s role 
in German politics. ‘The idea of the West’, he stated, ‘was not the monopoly of the 
United States. The idea of the West can also develop in a European way.’ The unity of 
the West had been a priority of the old world. Now Europe and the US would gain more 
from a Europe capable of presenting its own alternative visions, even if still through a 
division of labour with America (Bahr 2003:133-134).n
1.4.2.2. Criticism of Schroder’s foreign policy change: Hans Peter Schwarz and 
Gunther Hellmann
The second group identified change in German foreign policy but criticized the 
Schroder government for weakening Germany’s stance in international politics and both 
its traditional alliances, the German-French and the German-American, provoking the 
double European and a transatlantic crisis. Its proponents argued that change would 
imply a partial renationalisation of foreign policy and the assertion of power normality. 
Preference for increased unilateralism, a more selective multilateralism, and an 
inclination towards new bilateral relations, for example with Russia were signs of such a 
change. This would be most visible if Germany pursued ‘global ambitions’ (Mayer
11 Bahr’s call for a new normality was not new. Already in 1999 he argued for it in the context o f a 
German domestic debate on the speech by the writer Martin Walser in 1998 on the handling o f  the 
question o f Germany’s past. This will be dealt with in chapter 3.
26
1997) with the aim to become a global nuclear power (Mearsheimer 1990 and Waltz 
1993).
Academics and policy analysts like Hans-Peter Schwarz and Gunther Hellmann
represent the critical view of foreign policy change, even though Schwarz advocated a
post-Bonn foreign policy and Hellmann, in contrast, welcomed the return to Bonn’s
foreign policy foundations. While Schwarz saw Schroder follow his claims for a foreign
policy of asserted national interests, he disagreed with the conduct and style the
Chancellor pursued, and more importantly, criticized Schroder’s distancing from
America after 2002. He suggested that because unification had been achieved ‘thanks
mainly to American support’ Germany’s new role as the central power in Europe’
12should be done in tune with the German-American alliance (Schwarz 2004:540).
Schwarz spoke of a weakened Germany in the face of Berlin’s pretension of 
leadership, together with Paris, against Washington. For Schwarz ‘Europe can not 
become a unified foreign and security actor against the United States’ (Schwarz 
2003:24). Having praised Germany’s role in the Kosovo war, for breaking a security 
policy taboo and positioning Germany among other normal countries, Schwarz was now 
critical of the governments’ handling of relations with Washington and European allies 
and the dangers of estrangement that they produced.
Gunther Hellmann was one of the staunchest critics of the Schroder-Fischer 
governments’ foreign policy cautioning against what he called the “power political re­
socialisation” of foreign policy and a ‘compulsion towards big politics’ (Hellmann 2004 
and 2005). Lamenting the rupture with the previous government’s foreign policy and 
the wish to rid Germany of the constraints of the past generation Hellmann criticized the 
Red-Green governments’ move away from Kohl’s self-binding policy in European 
institutions. The traditional impulse between self-containament (Selbstbeschrankung) 
and self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung) (Haftendom 2001) had been replaced by a more 
assertive discourse informed by words such as ‘foreign policy self-confidence’, 
‘enlightened self-interest’, ‘adulthood’, and ‘normal’. Despite aspiring to be a great 
power Germany was no more than a middle power lacking the necessary material 
resources (Hellmann 1998). Hellmann identified an ‘expansive strategy’ in German
12 In 1985 Schwarz made the case that the ‘tamed Germans’ had made a trajectory from an obsession 
with power to a forgetfulness o f power, unable to define national interests (Schwarz 1985). For Schwarz, 
Germany should maintain close security links to the United States, continue with a market economy 
system and learn to define more precisely the future Europe.
13 The political scientist Christian Hacke has argued similarly for a continued German-American 
relationship. His main criticism was that Germany still lacked understanding o f foreign policy 
connections to define an overall strategy and has therefore not yet found its role in a globalised world. 
Christian Hacke (2006). ‘Mehr Bismarck, weniger Habermas’, Internationale Politik, 61(6), 68-76.
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foreign policy based on new political goals and a new style (Hellmann 2002a:9) where 
Germany’s overall power had increased. The author argued that because Germany’s soft 
and hard power resources had grown, the world expected German leadership. ‘Germany 
is perceived to be more powerful, and because of that alone it is more powerful’ 
(Hellmann 2002b:7). But high flying appearances on the world stage have rarely served 
the substance o f Germany’s interests well, like its untimely claim for a permanent UN 
Security Council seat (Hellmann and Wolf 2004). Considering ‘the collapse of German 
influence and standing in European and world affairs over Berlin’s refusal to participate 
in any military action against Iraq’ (Hellmann 2003), Hellmann cautioned Germany to 
abstain from its new power political discourse (Hellmann 2005).
1.4.2.3. The persistence of continuity: Hanns Maull and Thomas Risse
Finally, the largest group advocates foreign policy continuity. They also agreed on what 
continuity meant. Germany upheld its multilateral diplomacy by staying institutionally 
committed to the integrationist policies of the European Union and to NATO’s alliance 
commitments, privileging bilateral relations with France and the United States, keeping 
its policy focus in the euro-Atlantic area and relating to Russia in a multilateral Western 
framework. Even in the realm of security policy most agreed that Germany was 
adapting to NATO and Bundeswehr reform rather than undergoing a radical departure 
from established norms.
But they presented different reasons for continuity. For some, embedded 
institutionalism and the pursuit of milieu shaping goals best explained continuity 
(Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000). For others continuity was due to Germany’s 
Europeanized identity (Banchoff 1999b; Marcussen et al. 1999; Goetz 1996; 
Katzenstein 1996 and Risse 2004) or its role as a civilian power (Maull 1990; Hamisch 
et al. 2001; Tewes 2002). Others still explained continuity on the basis of normative 
domestic and international frameworks, multilateral commitments and a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (Rittberger et al. 2001), or because of a stable antimilitarist culture 
(Berger 1998).
Hanns Maull and Thomas Risse were two policy experts arguing that continuity 
prevailed over change in the foreign policy of the Berlin Republic. For Hanns Maull 
neither unification nor the Bundeswehr’s participation in Bosnia or Kosovo had 
seriously undermined the civilian power concept, and power politics remained aloof to 
the German foreign policy establishment. In the face of the dramatic international 
changes, European and transatlantic institutions underwent more change than the
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Federal Republic itself, where ‘change has merely represented modifications in detail’ 
and continuity has prevailed in Germany’s core aims and strategies (Maull 2006a:23).
Maull argued that albeit the wars in Kosovo, in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
Germany’s international identity remained that of a civilian power, a state which acts 
according to multilateral cooperation, conflict resolution and a will to civilise 
international politics (Maull 1990). While Maull acknowledged ‘a rhetoric of a new 
self-confidence and articulation of “German interests’” he argued that Berlin’s lack of 
foreign policy successes did not reflect a new German ‘Machtpolitik’ (Maull 2004c: 12). 
He persists in considering Germany a civilian power considering that its behaviour 
during the Iraq crisis did not amount to an end of policy continuity (Maull 2006a: 10).
Thomas Risse argued that while Germany’s foreign policy goals remained on a 
path of continuity, the means to achieve them had changed, such as the Bundeswehr 
interventions in out-of-area regions (Risse 2004). Like Maull, Risse considered that 
Germany continued to be a civilian power whose disputes with the Bush administration 
were precisely an attempt by the Schroder government to re-affirm its position as a 
civilian power rather than turning away from it. Analysing continuity versus change in 
the domains of European policy, transatlantic relations and international interventions, 
Risse concluded that while in its European policy Germany has been a pro-active policy 
actor, in the latter two it has revealed a more reactive style of policy (Risse 2004).
But albeit the continuity argument, Maull was critical of the state of German 
foreign policy. Whereas he identified a crisis in German foreign policy, he attributed it 
to a weakening of the importance of foreign policy rather than a renationalisation of 
foreign policy as Hellmann did, criticizing a departure from foreign policy tout court 
rather than a return to a perceived power politics. This weakened Germany’s position 
due to the ‘erosion of the power to shape policies’ linked to deficiencies in conceptual 
originality and resources, and a lack of strategic orientation (Maull 2004b). Thus the 
country was slowly turning its back on world politics, and revealing a lack of 
engagement as a consequence of a deficit in the substance of foreign policy. Maull saw 
a negative evolution of German foreign policy from an active civilian power to a 
country gradually positioning foreign policy on a qualitatively weaker stance and 
withdrawing from its responsibility. This is what Maull identified as ‘the paradox of 
German foreign policy -  of policy continuity in a different world’ where German 
foreign policy ‘has insisted on continuity, and has (...) determinedly stuck to its old 
course’ (Maull 2006b: 1). This has produced ‘signs of a loss of coherence, consistency, 
and above all effectiveness from about 1995 onward’ (Maull 2006b:2).
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But continuity did not mean that Germany managed to engage with all these 
areas and increase its interests and power projection. The effectiveness of German 
foreign policy, most authors of all three groups agreed, depended on having the 
necessary resources to pursue the ambitioned goals, and the skill to promote effective 
international coalitions and institutions. Many policy analysts identified a growing 
asymmetry between Germany’s will to engage more assertively in international politics 
and the means to effectively pursue such a policy given Germany’s complex internal 
economic situation and the willingness to project a successful image abroad. Many 
identified shrinking resources (Bertram 2004, Hellmann 2004b and 2007, Maull 2004b), 
a lack of structural power to engage in an ambitious foreign policy and face new 
international problems (Jeffery and Paterson 2003) and stark disagreements with the 
United States over the future of world order (Maull 2006b) as the new problems for 
German foreign policy. Others observed that under the Red-Green government 
Germany’s international influence had continuously declined. Schroder und Fischer got 
entangled in a reality of their own creation, not realizing that it was illusionary to claim 
a place in the concert of world powers while their country’s political weight was 
diminishing, with defence and development aid spending steadily declining (Gutschker 
2005a).
What the different arguments have shown is that there is an end to the overall 
foreign policy consensus which had prevailed in previous years, if  we take the debates 
over security policy and military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
Iraq out of the equation. What is remarkable is the degree of political cross-positioning 
these debates produced, where a conservative historian (Schollgen) sided with a left- 
nationalist (Bahr) in their support for Germany’s more assertive and natural path.
1.5. Conclusion
The Kohl, Schroder and Merkel governments have responded differently to the 
international and domestic challenges of the post-Cold War world, and eighteen years 
after unification, have positioned Germany in a new position of power.
Under Helmut Kohl’s leadership Germany combined the strategies of European 
unification with a close transatlantic relation. He promoted the deepening of the ‘hard 
core’ of the EU, through a close German-French relationship, together with the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Austria linked with institutional enlargement to 
the East. At the same time he strengthened the German-American relationship. Thus
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Kohl followed a truly Euro-Atlantic strategy, attaching European integration to the 
transatlantic alliance. He concentrated almost fully on the Europeanist lane of policy for 
he believed that European unification was the best response to Germany’s new position. 
Thus he did not pursue the second, more individual policy lane in the pursuit of German 
interests, at least not more so than had happened during the cold war. But the Kohl 
government was also too constrained in its own policy strategy to admit that some 
change was inevitable.
In contrast, under Gerhard Schroder’s leadership Germany reached normality, a 
claim made by the Chancellor which automatically implied modification in that it 
presupposed a more equal treatment by Berlin’s partners and the parity of power. This 
new dimension of a second policy lane, while not denying Germany’s commitment to 
normative power and embedded multilateralism on the first lane, meant to enlarge 
Germany’s international policy context and strengthen its margin of manoeuvrability. 
To ensure these interests, Berlin accelerated on the second policy lane, at times 
overtaking Germany’s partners on the other lane, possibly being the first to reach the 
end of the policy lane, but risking isolation and uncertainty about the direction it had 
taken.
Thus a policy which unilaterally engaged in a recognition of ‘sameness of 
power’ and equality of power status in the international community risked transforming 
the nature of the transatlantic alliance and even the inner coherence of the enlarged EU. 
Schroder’s foreign policy represented a change in that he allowed for a weakening of 
the transatlantic link, wished to extend German influence unilaterally and instead 
pursued a pan-European strategy where Russia would become a privileged partner. In 
addition, it was an illusion for Germany to pretend that from actively claming a 
permanent UNSC seat automatically derived greater legitimacy and a ‘licence’ to 
engage more assertively in international politics.
The new Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far reinforced the old Euro-Atlantic 
strategy strengthening Germany’s embeddedness in the European Union and NATO, 
with a selective enlargement eastwards and a cautious partnership with Russia. This has 
widened Germany’s room for manoeuvring. First it allowed Merkel to prevent that the 
Kohlean vision of Germany’s European strategy was interpreted as a product of the 
Cold War conditionalities only, recovering the legitimacy of a policy of Euro-Atlantic 
embeddedness which had previously paid off. Secondly, it has shown in Merkel’s two 
years in office that Schroder’s new direction of assertiveness with a disentangled 
transatlanticism and a unilateral flirtation with Russia was not the inevitable course for
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Germany. Finally, the generalised unease with which most capitals in Europe reacted 
towards Berlin’s position in 2002 and 2003 only strengthened Merkel’s resolve to 
reinforce a more Euro-Atlantic policy of embedded interests realizing that for Germany 
to play an increasing role in international politics this could only be done in accordance 
with both EU and US partners. Thus the present coalition government has tried to 
combine both policy lanes through a more pragmatic policy approach.
Still, we no longer live in the immediate post-Cold War world, but in a post- 
September 11, 2001 world, where the old predominance of the Western world has 
begun to crumble, and where the emergence of new world powers and forces are 
challenging the Westernized identity of many international institutions. Faced with 
these challenges no German government can evade international responsibilities, any 
less than the European Union. As the EU’s strongest member, Germany has the power 
and a Europeanized identity to play a role in Europe’s more global presence in 
international politics. This has led the present government to reinforce combining its 
role on the European policy lane of policy making with the more individual policy lane 
on specific policy issues in cooperation with other European partners. Ultimately this 
increased external projection also represents a challenge to the reliability of normative 
power as the preferred form of foreign policy-making.
As the ensuing chapters will show German foreign policy has been on a 
transformative path since the late 1990s. Berlin’s participation in the wars in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan has changed the nature of Germany’s international identity. And even 
if every military operations Germany participates in has a ‘civilian power’ component in 
terms of conflict resolution mechanisms and post-conflict reconstruction this no longer 
necessarily makes Germany stand out in comparison to its partners. Every European 
country involved in military operations abroad includes civilian power instruments as 
part of its strategy and wants to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction, not only 
Germany.14
14 This thesis distinguishes between ‘normative power’ and ‘civilian power’, preferring the use o f  
‘normative power’. First, in the civilian power approach, the emphasis is on ‘the specific way in which 
military force will be applied - never alone and autonomously, but only collectively, only with 
international legitimacy, and only in the pursuit o f ‘civilizing’ international relations.’ Hanns Maull 
(2005). ‘Europe and the new balance o f global order’, International Affairs, 81(4) 781. (My emphasis). 
Through juxtaposition, Maull puts too much emphasis on the military dimension o f  the concept thereby 
setting too narrow a framework for a wider normative analysis. In other words, while the civilian power 
approach aims to downplay the role o f  military power, it becomes hostage to the same element it is most 
critical of. Secondly, while the civilian power approach focuses mostly on the external actions o f the 
state, with the aim to ‘civilianise’ international politics, the case o f Germany shows that its normative 
power served to consolidate Germany’s own position in the Western community o f  states. Thus while 
normative power later became an important element o f German diplomacy, it emerged foremost as a 
domestic yardstick towards measuring appropriate behaviour.
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To understand how normative power has become such an effective form of 
power for German foreign policy within the Euro-Atlantic constitutional order and how 
the remaking of Germany’s Europeanized foreign policy has transformed the contours 
of that foreign policy, a framework is needed which articulates the question of 
normative power with foreign policy identity and the sources of political action. This is 
what the next chapter will do.
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CHAPTER 2: Germany’s international identity and normative power
2.1. Introduction: The problematique
German foreign policy is shaped by Germany’s identity and Germany’s complex 
relationship with the concept of power. It is about what country Germany wants to be seen 
as internationally, and what sort of power it projects when it exteriorizes its identity. Foreign 
policy identity is understood as one element of Germany’s identity which develops through 
international policy actions of the political elite.15 This brings the question of power and the 
role of German power in international politics into the analysis and begs the question of how 
to establish a conceptual link between the traits understood to form a country’s identity and 
the content of that state’s foreign policy, and between the process of identity formation and 
identity projection into foreign policy practice.
With a limited margin of political manoeuvrability, the foreign policy of the Federal 
Republic after 1949 was conditioned by political and normative constraints. These were 
alliance commitments towards NATO and its partners, particularly France and the United 
States linked to compliance with norms of multilateralism. Building on these constraints, 
Germany developed a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998), understood as 
political action conducive to respecting normative policy elements previously agreed upon 
by German policy-makers and its allies. As a founding member of the European 
Community participating in the definition of institutional norms and rules the Federal 
Republic developed the practice of norm conforming behaviour, the assumed predictability 
of which translated gradually into a particular form of power, namely normative power. At 
the time of German unification, normative power was already a substantive element of 
foreign policy; since normative power has implications on the policies of states, it is an 
effective form of power. Considering how multifaceted power is, it was, apart from 
economic and institutional power perhaps the only other form of power predominant in 
German diplomacy.
Normative power can be defined as the capacity of the power holder to exert, 
through a norm conforming behaviour, influence over others which confer respect and
15 Because this thesis rests on the argument that foreign policy is about the projection o f a state identity 
into the international arena, the concept o f national identity as an inherently domestic element is 
deliberately left out o f  the analysis. For the purposes o f understanding the overall argument, it is 
sufficient to state that national identity is only one component o f a country’s identity, which will be 
highlighted in the ensuing empirical chapters only when the national identity element decisively shaped 
Germany’s international identity.
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recognise legitimacy to the one projecting power. In the case of Germany’s highly 
institutionalised form of foreign policy-making, normative power developed well in the 
wider international constitutional order.16 The Euro-Atlantic area is the most achieved form 
of a constitutional order which aims to be durable, legitimate, consensual and non-coercive. 
Germany’s normative power contributes to the construction of this constitutional order.
Critics argue that if  Germany acts through normative power this is due to structural 
weakness, for purely utilitarian purposes or simply an ‘unintentional by-product of German 
behaviour and practice’ (Hyde-Price 2000:117). Others suggest that an analysis focusing 
exclusively on a normative dimension of politics to the detriment of power politics neglects 
‘the strategic specificities to identity-representation dynamics’ (Youngs 2004:415).
But the case of Germany suggests that normative power developed regardless of 
increasing material capabilities during the Cold War. As Europe’s strongest economy with 
material and structural resources Germany could have weakened its normative power and 
strengthened other forms of power, such as military power or its international status as a 
potential great power. Rather, it continued to enhance normative power until the end of the 
1990s. Paradoxically when structural and material power resources became weaker, the 
German government initiated changes in its normative power. In this case, structural 
weakness of the economy and dwindling resources were accompanied by the attempt to 
recover more traditional attributes of power, when it seemed logical to reinforce the 
normative power elements. The question then was, to the extent that power became more 
‘normalised’ and joined by more traditional power attributes of a sovereign nation, what 
would happen to Germany’s normative power?
Normative power was transformed through the remaking of Germany’s international 
identity. Like in the cinematographic industry, the notion of a remake is the attempt to do 
anew something old built on its foundations without rejecting them, while attempting to 
improve it. A ‘remake’ allows for the inclusion of elements of continuity, but also makes 
the theorising of change possible. Chancellor Kohl was intent on ensuring continuity in 
foreign policy, particularly in European and transatlantic politics. Chancellor Schroder, by 
contrast, tried to reposition foreign policy sources and locate Germany on a higher 
international standing, adding a new source of identity -  that of international parity with 
other powers as entitlement to a self-confident nation. Changes in the sources of foreign
16 G. John Ikenberry defines constitutional orders as ‘political orders organized around agreed-upon legal 
and political institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise o f power. ( ...)  The stakes in 
political struggles are reduced by the creation o f institutionalized processes o f  participation and decision 
making that specify rules, rights, and limits on power holders. A constitutional order is neither identified 
nor ensured by the existence o f a constitutional document or charter (...) but by the way in which agreed- 
upon and institutionalized rules, rights, protections, and commitments combine to shape and circumscribe 
the wielding o f  power within the order’ (Ikenberry 2001:29).
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policy therefore occurred within existing institutional frameworks and were domestically 
induced. This highlights the difficulty o f discerning change where and when it has occurred, 
and of showing where and why continuity has prevailed in other instances. Thus a 
framework is necessary which allows us to define the parameters of change.
Such a framework rests on locating the analysis o f Germany’s normative power 
within the foreign policy-identity dynamic. This results from the interaction between the 
making of foreign policy and the exteriorisation of identity into the international arena. Two 
elements need to be taken into account. First, it is necessary to identify the material, 
institutional and ideational structures in which foreign policy functions. Secondly, the 
normative framework which establishes the parameters for political actions o f individual 
actors has to be assessed. The years until 1998 reveal that material, institutional and 
ideational structures maintained much continuity in most foreign policy areas. In contrast, 
the period between 1998 and 2005 shows that ideational structures were loosened, and 
actomess and new normative convictions prevailed over the structural context, leading to 
changes in Germany’s foreign policy identity and the remaking of Germany’s normative 
power.
Hence the aim of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework which articulates 
the question of normative power with changes in Germany’s international identity. Was 
Germany’s normative power merely circumstantial, emerging from a lack of political 
manoeuvrability, and structural weakness, or did it constitute a goal in itself and a logic of 
its own for policy-makers? Are multilateralism and the renunciation of force still the 
prevailing norms or did new norms enter into competition? Was Germany willing to engage 
in a more unilateral position at the expense of previously multilateral stances? Establishing 
such a framework will allow us, in the ensuing chapters, to trace the practice o f normative 
power in German foreign policy, and establish how the remaking of German identity has 
transformed this power.
To outline the argument the chapter is organised as follows. The first section makes 
the case for constructivism to study foreign policy change and power. The second section 
presents a framework for articulating foreign policy and identity. Because normative power 
is such a major component of Germany’s international identity, the following section then 
expands on the notion of normative power. The fourth section combines normative power 
with the foreign policy-identity dynamic by introducing a logic of appropriateness and a 
logic of consequentiality, two logics of political action suggested by James March and 
Johan Olsen. Finally, the conclusion looks at the implications this framework has for 
understanding German foreign policy practice and sets the ground for the ensuing chapters.
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2.2. Theoretical framework
This thesis is informed by elements of constructivism and liberal institutionalism. It uses 
insights, first, from conventional constructivism in that the socially constructed reality
17originates in international social interaction and produces implications on state action. 
Constructivists study the interaction between the international and the domestic processes
1 ftand the overlapping norm creation that occurs within a given social order. The 
constructivist approach starts from two premises. Firstly, neorealism and liberal 
institutionalism see identities and interests as given and fixed. Constructivism problematizes 
this by suggesting that neither is ontologically prior to the other and both are mutually 
constitutive (Katzenstein 1996). In contrast to neorealism and liberal institutionalism, both 
incapable of explaining the origins of social phenomena (Ruggie 1998a:871), 
constructivism believes that understanding the socially constructed nature of international 
politics is the precondition for understanding politics, and the starting point for explaining 
political action.
Secondly, constructivism holds that state behaviour is motivated by more than 
merely material interests. Ideational, non-material elements such as identities and norms are 
also constitutive of state action.19 As John Ruggie put it, ‘constructivists hold the view that
17 The constructivist approach includes Emmanuel Adler, Martha Finnemore, Ernst and Peter Haas, Peter 
Katzenstein, Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf, John Ruggie and Alexander Wendt. See E. Adler 
(1997). ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal o f  
International Relations, 3(3), 319-363; P. Katzenstein, ed. (1996). The Culture o f  National Security. 
Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press; J. Ruggie (1998). ‘What 
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’, 
International Organization, 52/4, 855-885; J. Ruggie (1998). Constructing the World Polity. Essays on 
International Institutionalization, London: Routledge; A. Wendt (1995). ‘Constructing International 
Politics’, International Security, 20(1), 73-81; A. Wendt (1992). ‘Anarchy is What States Make o f  It: The 
Social Construction o f  Power Politics’, International Organization, 46 (2) 391-425. A. Wendt (1994). 
‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political Science Review, 88(2). 
See also T. Christiansen, K. Jorgensen and A. Wiener (1999). ‘The social construction o f  Europe’, 
Journal o f  European Public Policy, 6/ 4, 528-44.
18 This is different from systemic constructivism or what could be termed ‘Wendtian constructivism’ 
which, according to the theorising o f Alexander Wendt is more concerned with the impact o f  social 
reality on the systemic structures o f international politics, partially neglecting agency and the domestic 
dimension o f the state. See A. Wendt, 1992, 1994 and 1995, op. cit.
19 Studying the ideational dimension o f foreign policy is not new. Margaret and Harold Sprout analysed 
the contextual milieu in which foreign policy decisions occur. Michael Brecher studied the foreign policy 
o f a country as dependent on the psychosocial milieu. From a different perspective, the belief system 
literature dealt with political elite conceptions. Robert Jervis looked at perceptions and their effects on 
foreign policy. Kal Holsti’s ‘national role conception’ was motivated by the attempt to combine both the 
social and psychological contexts with foreign policy analysis. However, neither conceptualised the 
question o f identity, nor developed its link to foreign policy. Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout (1957). 
‘Environment Factors in the Study o f International Politics’, Journal o f  Conflict Resolution, 1, 309-328; 
Michael Brecher (1972). The Foreign Policy System o f  Israel: Setting, Images, Process, London: Oxford 
University Press; Robert Jervis (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Relations,
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Kal J. Holsti (1970). ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study o f  
Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly, 14/3, 233-309.
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the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material; that ideational 
factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only 
individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of 
ideational factors are not independent of time and place’ (Ruggie 1998b:33). Because 
reality is socially constructed, structures are a reflection of and created through discursive 
practices and habituation processes. Thus ‘ [t]he international and domestic societies in 
which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways. The state is a social 
actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the 
reasons for the interests that motivate actors’ (Katzenstein 1996:23). What matters is the 
social fabric of world politics and the problematizing of interests and identities of actors and 
how this shapes policy actions.
The constructed world combines ideational factors with instrumental rationality.
Against anarchy, constructivism advocates a more ordered structure of international
00society. For both neorealists and liberal institutionalists anarchy is inherent to the 
international system, where states act as rational and unified actors with given state 
identities which are prior to a state’s action. Constructivists, in contrast, see the world and 
the state as self-reproducing systems and believe that states exist in a social dimension. 
Against rationalism, constructivism broadens the scope to include social conditionalism. 
This means that ‘a core constructivist research concern is what happens before the neo­
utilitarian model kicks in’ (Ruggie 1998a:867). Thus constructivism does not reject all neo- 
utilitarian findings but it reaches different conclusions once it starts asking questions about 
social practices that neo-utilitarians take for granted.
Finally, against neorealism constructivism acknowledges the importance of 
domestic politics. Neorealism’s refusal to include domestic politics into the analysis, 
‘perhaps the most serious flaw of neorealism’ (Hoffmann 1995:283) makes it unsuitable as 
a theoretical approach to study questions of identity.
Apart from social constructivism, this thesis accepts insights from liberal 
institutionalism which investigates how institutional structures influence the behaviour of 
state action and shape foreign policy interests by taking domestic preferences into account. 
Johan Olsen has characterised institutions as ‘rules and practices embedded in structures of
20 In this, many constructivists fall back on the premise o f the English School, according to which the 
international system is characterised by what Hedley Bull termed the ‘international society’, where a 
group o f states interact through the acceptance o f common rules and institutions thus mitigating the 
effects o f international anarchy. Hedley Bull (1977). The Anarchical Society. A Study o f  Order in World 
Politics, London: Macmillan. See also Tim Dunne (1998). Inventing International Society. A History o f  
the English School, London: Macmillan Press, and Christian Reus-Smit (2002). ‘Imagining society: 
constructivism and the English School’, British Journal o f  Politics and International Relations, 4/3, 487- 
509.
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meaning and resources’, arguing that change in a political order causes not only 
‘reorganization and reallocation of resources, but also reconceptualization and change in 
expectations, preferences, aspirations, mentalities and identities’ (Olsen 2000). John 
Ikenberry has suggested that international institutions have acted as ‘binding institutions’, 
institutionalising limits on state behaviour which ‘can make the exercise of power more 
restrained and routinized, but they can also make that power more durable, systematic, and 
legitimate’ (Ikenberry 2001:273).
It is a central proposition of this thesis that international institutions have acted as an 
important source of Germany’s normative power. Germany’s normative power is closely 
associated with Germany’s institutional setting which allowed for the conditions for 
normative power to develop in the first place. Authors working in the liberal institutionalist 
realm have emphasised Germany’s Europeanised state identity and Germany’s embedded 
multilateralism (Bulmer et al. 2000).
Finally, and to a minor degree, this thesis is sympathetic to what can be termed 
‘normative realism’.21 If we concede that classical realism was not averse to the notion of 
values in politics, a study on identity and foreign policy has to take this into account. Stanley 
Hoffmann early in his writings underlined the centrality of ‘men’s values, beliefs, and 
emotions, (...) their purposes and ideas’ (Hoffmann 1959:366). He argued that ‘state 
interests are not simply reducible to power and place [but] are constructs in which ideas and 
ideals, precedents and past experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all play a role’ 
(Hoffmann 1995:5). The difference between constructivism and normative realism, is that 
whereas the latter only acknowledges identity, norms and values to play a minor role in 
states’ foreign policy, constructivism puts identity, norms and values at the centre of its 
analysis.22
21 I would include Stanley Hoffmann, Raymond Aron and E.H.Carr in this group o f classic realists who 
accepted that politics in not averse to normative considerations, where questions o f identity, legitimacy 
and justice also played a role. Still, for them identity had no independent explanatory power.
22 More recently attempts have been made to find some commonalities between constructivism and 
realism. Richard Youngs has suggested that ‘constructivist and rationalist explanations might be 
combined to account for the way in which instrumental choices are made within a range o f  common 
normative understandings; (...)normative and instrumentalist dynamics can be seen to set parameters for 
each other’. R. Youngs (2004). 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External 
Identity', Journal o f  Common Market Studies, 42(2) p. 431. Janice Bially Mattem has argued for a 
‘realist-constructivist’ approach which could take ‘international politics as a whole to be socially 
constructed, (. . .) to study (...) everything in international relations as social constructs - from morality, 
ideals, and such liberal topics as security communities to self-interest, fear, and such realist topics as the 
balance o f power’. J. Mattem (2004). ‘Power in Realist-Constructivist Research’, International Studies 
Review (6) p. 345. See also L. Barkin (2003). ‘Realist Constructivism’, International Studies Review  (5) 
325-342. M. Williams (2004). ‘Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical 
Realism, and the Moral Construction o f Power Politics’, International Organization (58) 633-665.
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2.2.1. Constructivism, foreign policy change and power
There are two problems with constructivist analyses of German foreign policy. First, most 
authors tend to explain foreign policy continuity (Boekle et al. 2001; Marcussen et al. 1999; 
Maull 2004a; Banchoff 1999). By introducing the concept of identity, they suggest that 
norms and identity change only slowly, and so does, by implication, foreign policy. Since 
the foreign policy of the Federal Republic revealed continuity in its alliance commitments 
and multilateralist approach, continuity rather than change seemed to best characterise 
foreign policy after unification. Therefore if identities were slow to change and foreign 
policy was about identity, constructivism was well suited to explain continuity. In their 
attempt to establish constructivism as a new theoretical approach in the 1990s, 
constructivists often conditioned their studies to the element of continuity, potentially 
hindering the emphasis on studying change in identity and foreign policy, lacking in effect a 
neutral approach. Part of constructivisms’ credibility derived from explaining enduring state 
identities rather than unstable ones. At certain times in history, though, even enduring state 
identities can be subjected to moments of redefinition and change. Change is possible ‘when 
identity elements are discursively re-framed in a way that can legitimize new policy options’ 
(Stahl et al. 2004:439). In those situations, what has to be explained is how change occurred, 
and what effect that change has had on identity itself.
The history of the German state identity in the twentieth century suggests that 
identities are not resistant to change, and can undergo a major transformation in a relatively 
short period of time. In fact, in less than five decades Germany’s state identity underwent 
four changes. It entered the twentieth century as an ascendant European power, with a strong 
will to exert its new strength. After the First World War it tried to establish itself as a 
nascent democratic state during the Weimar Republic, in opposition to its imperial past. 
Shortly afterwards, National Socialism was a third attempt in less than fifty years to create a 
new German identity through war, against the previous two.
The German sociologist Helmut Plessner explained these identity changes through 
Germany’s constitution as a Tate nation’ (Plessner 1935). The lateness of the German 
nation was sociological and cultural in origin and this had been a major cause for National 
Socialism in Germany. Not only was Germany a late nation, it also was comparatively late 
in arriving in the Western democratic community of states, given that its national identity
23 Helmuth Plessner (1974). Die verspatete Nation. Uber die politische Verfiihrbarkeit burgerlichen 
Geistes, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. In the book originally published in 1935, Plessner traces the 
intellectual roots o f  nation building failure in Germany back to the seventeenth century.
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hitherto had been intrinsically anti-Western (Winkler 2000). Although (or because) 
Germany was a ‘late nation’, and a late Western nation, it had more difficulty than others to 
establish a stable identity making it more prone to change.
The policy followed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer after 1949 represented a 
double departure from this past. First, the FRG was now ready to embed its policies in 
institutional structures together with its new partners in NATO and the European 
Community (policy of Einbindung). Secondly Adenauer located Germany firmly in the West 
(Westpolitik), until then not a traditional area of German policy-making. The combination of 
these two elements ensured that the Federal Republic was to become more like Western 
Europe by acquiring a democratic and Western identity.
Thus if German state identity has been propitious to change it is problematic that 
many constructivist accounts of German foreign policy assume continuity as appropriate to 
explain German foreign policy after the end o f the Cold War. Even if the two foundational 
pillars, a democratic and Western state identity remain solid, the foreign policy identity is 
still prone to change. More generally, if reality is socially constructed, this assumes a 
dynamic which, theoretically, suggests greater potential for change than for continuity. The 
fact that identities are ‘historically contingent and must be understood contextually’, as 
Peter Katzenstein suggests, should have made the potential argument for change in the 
German case even stronger (Katzenstein 1996:534). Since Germany’s international identity 
did not rest on firm historical foundations before 1949, one question after unification was 
whether the anchoring of its post-1949 identity had been conditioned by the international 
bipolar structure as neo-realist theory suggested, or whether Germany had developed an 
enduring state identity. After the end of the cold war the potential for structural changes in 
the European order could have led to an increase of Germany’s power position (Hyde-Price 
2006). Empirically, the fear of many Western leaders to accept a unified Germany in the 
middle of Europe in 1990 had to do precisely with anxieties regarding this potential for 
change.
But Germany resisted the structural challenges and the changes in foreign policy 
identity that occurred were mostly domestic in origin. Apart from the changes in Germany’s 
security policy, which resulted from continuing alliance commitments, they were induced 
by policy-makers themselves. But ‘[s]ince foreign policy is an external projection of 
domestic affairs, it follows that real change in foreign policy comes from domestic change’ 
(Cooper 2003:107-108). Agency was a willing activator for change and this was induced by 
the political leadership, particularly after 1998, when German diplomacy underwent 
significant changes which the notion of continuity within the constructivist approach does
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not explain.
The second problem with constructivism is that it tends to neglect the study of 
power. Because power figures prominently in realist and neorealist analyses as a core 
concept, it has often been shunned by other approaches. As a consequence ‘neoliberal 
institutionalists, liberals, and constructivists have attempted to demonstrate their theoretical 
salience by demonstrating how "power" variables are not causally consequential in their 
explanation of empirical outcomes’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005:40). There are only few 
exceptions. Within the liberal institutionalist approach, Joseph Nye introduced the concept 
o f ‘soft power’ to account for empirical analyses o f power in its non-realist dimension. Nye 
defined soft power as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments. (...) Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country’s 
military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of 
others, our soft power is enhanced’ (Nye 2004:854). Nye opposes soft power to hard power, 
achieved by payments and coercion, but argues that in practice the most effective use is a 
combination of both sources of power. Whereas Nye’s term of soft power can be linked to 
normative power, it leaves out two elements specific of the latter. First, Nye does not 
account for the significance of norms as such. Soft power rests on culture, values and 
legitimacy, not on norms. Secondly, soft power does not presuppose institutions to thrive; 
by contrast, normative power only genuinely exists within an incremental institutional 
context.
With regard to Germany, some authors have addressed the issue of power. William 
Paterson has suggested that ‘(...) the notion that power can only be viewed in the neo-realist 
national interest mode involves a rather narrow view of power, for the exercise of which 
German institutions are intentionally rather ill designed’ (Paterson 1996:182). Simon 
Bulmer addressed the issue of power establishing a typology of the ‘four faces of power’ to 
explain Germany’s European policy (Bulmer 1997). Bulmer identified, first, deliberate 
power, which is power as ‘forceful articulation of interests’ in the ‘neorealist perception of 
utilizing power in multilateral negotiations’, a form of power Germany rarely made use of. 
Secondly, indirect institutional power is the power to ‘influence the structure, norms and 
policy principles of the EU indirectly’. Because of domestic elite consensus, Germany made 
much use of this institutional form of power which it projected ‘indirectly and in a diffuse 
manner’, suggesting that it is ‘soft power’. Because norms and ideas, not only interests, are 
important, the European Union reflects ‘social power’ or ‘institutional power’. 
Unintentional power is a third form which is ‘dispositional rather than the product of
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deliberate action’ and ‘arises from unintended consequences of domestic political and 
economic power’. Finally, Bulmer suggested empowerment as a fourth face of power which 
has a ‘passive, dispositional power dimension’ because o f the ‘close congruence between 
the EU’s character and Germany’s institutions and identity’ (Bulmer 1997:73-76 and 
Bulmer at al. 2000:13-18). What Bulmer has suggested for Germany’s European policy can 
be applied to other areas of policy-making, such as Germany’s bilateral relationships with 
France and the United States, and its security policy.
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall point out that ‘ [a] 1 though constructivists have 
emphasized how underlying normative structures constitute actors' identities and interests, 
they have rarely treated these normative structures themselves as defined and infused by 
power, or emphasized how constitutive effects also are expressions of power’ (Bamett and 
Duvall 2005:40). Stefano Guzzini has tried to tackle this problem by arguing that ‘the 
concept of power has emerged as one of the most prominent ways to link the (...) 
interaction between the social construction of meaning (including knowledge) with the 
construction of social reality’ (Guzzini 2000:170; 2005). The concept of power provided ‘a 
central, because sociologically pertinent, link between the construction of knowledge and 
social order (Guzzini 2000:172).
Germany has made an unconventional use of its power potentials, and it has been in 
the realm of normative and constitutional power that these potentials have produced the 
most effective results in perpetuating precisely that sort of power. In view of an 
overemphasis on continuity and a lack of emphasis on the notion of power, with regard to 
German foreign policy, this thesis suggests a framework which considers change in 
Germany’s international identity, through the analysis of normative power in policy­
making, which will be dealt with in the next sections.
2.3. The articulation of foreign policy and identity
Foreign policy functions as the arena where international state identities are defined, 
exchanged, transformed and consolidated. There is a mutual constitutionality between 
identity and foreign policy, in that an ongoing interacting process exists between identity 
that shapes and is also shaped by foreign policy. Hence the articulation of foreign policy 
and identity needs to be conceptualised as a two-way process where foreign policy can be a 
direct result of identity indicators such as a democratic or a multilateralist identity, and 
where a remaking of identity can also derive from foreign policy, through international 
interactions between states or institutions.
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How can state identity be defined? Identity is not a given element but has 
independent explanatory power and is understood in a socially constructed dimension. For 
Peter Katzenstein ‘state identities are primarily external’ (Katzenstein 1997b:20). ‘State 
identity, Banchoff notes, refers to the self-placement of the polity within specific 
international contexts’ (1999:268). Thus the formation of state identity is an on-going 
process involving dimensions of inclusion and exclusion in that a double process takes place 
within a state’s own environment and towards other states. Katzenstein distinguishes 
between an intrinsic identity, such as being democratic, and a relational identity, such as 
being sovereign. A state is only sovereign as long as there is another entity in the 
international system to be sovereign against (Katzenstein 1996:59). Identity formation 
develops in opposition to an other, who constitutes the opponent for one’s own identity. 
This helps explain why borders are (still) relevant for many sovereign states.
But exceptions can occur when identification takes place more with external than 
internal indicators. This is what Anne Norton called the ambiguity of identification. 
‘Individual and collective identities are created not simply in the difference between self and 
other but in those moments of ambiguity where one is other to oneself, and in the 
recognition of the other as like’ (Norton 1988:7). The sources of Germany’s post-unified 
international identity still are the combination of a former malign internal self from its 
National Socialist past, and a benign external other, the West, the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union.24 National Socialism served as the constitutive imperative of what post­
war Germany had to avoid at all costs, whereas the congruence which developed between 
Germany and politics in the Euro-Atlantic area served as a mechanism to overcome that 
shameful past since ‘to bury Germany in the bosom of its Western allies, such as NATO and 
the EC, was to bury the distrust of Germans’ (Buruma 1995:30).
In other words, the formation of state identity took place not only on a domestic 
level but also through international interaction resulting from the interaction with the 
international realm of politics, other states and international institutions (Wendt 1994). Thus 
choices in foreign policy are shaped by conceptions of identity resting on a set of normative 
principles which make the state identifiable to other states.
There are only a few studies which establish the direct connection between identity 
and foreign policy. While the study of identity became fashionable in the 1990s the number
24 What makes the question o f  German identity even more complex is the existence o f  a semi-self in the 
figure o f a second German state, the Democratic Republic o f Germany during the Cold War. In both 
Germanys, identity building was done against the other. The enemy image became not foremost the 
opposed superpower but the ‘opposing Germany’ that provided part o f the rationale for identity building. 
See Stefan Berger (2004). Inventing the Nation: Germany, London: Hodder Arnold.
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of works published on foreign policy and identity has remained low. William Wallace 
identified a relationship between foreign policy and identity when he suggested that ‘there is 
the 'grand strategy' definition [of foreign policy], that foreign policy is about national 
identity itself: about the sources of national pride, the characteristics which distinguish a 
country from its neighbours, the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values 
it stands for and seeks to promote’ (Wallace 1991). Though not referring explicitly to 
international identity, Wallace established a link between domestic elements of identity and 
the promotion of values onto the international arena.
In 1998, Ilya Prizel published National Identity and Foreign Policy: nationalism and 
leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, a ‘study of nationalism and its impact on foreign 
policy’ (Prizel 1998). He argued that nationalism and national identity are the glue that 
gives coherence to all polities. Identities help define values and rank priorities; these shape 
foreign as well as domestic politics. Prizel’s analysis has the merit of laying the grounds for 
the study of a state’s identity and foreign policy. In the particular case of Germany after 
1945 the national element of identity itself was decisively shaped by external factors, so 
that its foreign policy identity was as much influenced by external as by domestic factors.
Since identities are not fixed their content is not a priori given. Identity spills over 
into the foreign policy domain, but the interaction can have a ‘boomerang effect’ on a 
state’s identity: although foreign policy generally functions as an instrument of a given 
identity, it also serves as an identity shaper or a vehicle to transport a changing identity. 
Such change happens either when there is a significant historic juncture or when a political 
leader is prone to initiate such a change and enjoys a favourable supportive domestic 
setting. At this historic juncture states redefine their identities and national interests, where 
‘under situations of persistent stress even well-established identities can change at a 
remarkable rate’ (Prizel 1998:8). This process of change need not, however, mean that the 
identity was previously unstable or volatile. Rather, this occurs in what can be termed 
‘potential path redefining moments’, when due to externally or domestically induced 
circumstances a state reshapes its foreign policy identity.
New conceptions of identity are bound to affect foreign policy interests where 
polities ‘adapt to new circumstances, develop new mythologies, and recast themselves’ 
producing new identities and normative frames that ‘can result in different concepts of the 
national interest and therefore new foreign policies (Prizel 1998:427). In moments of state 
formation, or potential path redefining moments, states often take other states’ identities as a
25 A post-structuralist analysis combining identity and foreign policy is found in David Campbell (1992). 
Writing Security: U.S. foreign policy and the politics o f  identity. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.
45
model to emulate. The quest o f the Federal Republic after 1949 was to form a state whose 
identity was closely identifiable with the Western democratic community of states, for that 
would consolidate German identity and the newly created state (Winkler 2000).
In this identity-foreign policy dynamic, identity exteriorizing is not disinterested. It 
can be co-operative, obstructive, or neutral. Whether states are influenced by their friends’ 
or by their foes’ identities can have an effect upon their own identity. Hence the ideational 
component does not exclusively mean possibilities of cooperation. A state can react in a 
benign, hostile or neutral way. Therefore, in exercising foreign policy a state not only 
exteriorises identity but can also be an identity shaper of other states, producing 
consequences for the receiving state, which reacts and projects its own identity as a 
response. Consequently, through foreign policy practice the state simultaneously exteriorizes 
its own identity, reacts towards inputs given by the receiver of the political action and 
potentially changes identity indicators of the receiving state. Foreign policy serves as a 
vehicle which transports identity on a relational basis and is thus not only an externally but 
also an internally orientated action.
2.3.1. Germany’s international identity and foreign policy change
Normative power became central to Germany’s post-war identity formation. Because 
identity indicators were externally driven, foreign policy interaction helped shape the FRG’s 
identity. If having power is the ability ‘to make or to receive any change, or to resist it’ 
(Lukes 2005: 478), then Chancellor Kohl resisted change arising from the structural and 
normative changes of the end of the Cold War and refrained from becoming a change 
activator. Kohl’s emphasis on European integration as a matter of war and peace, and his 
continued commitment to both the German-French partnership and the German-American 
alliance served to deliberately avoid changing the parameters of his country’s foreign 
policy. ‘The axis of our foreign policy orientation has not shifted’, Kohl stated. ‘For unified 
Germany the Atlantic and European partnerships continue to be of existential significance. 
After unification the whole of Germany is now - like the old Bundesrepublik before it - 
spiritually and politically part of the West’ (Kohl 1997b). This stemmed from Kohl’s 
conviction that testing the robustness of alliances in a new structural context would damage 
European integration, the Atlantic Alliance and Germany itself. Maintaining course in the
26 Steven Lukes draws on John Locke, who defined power as being ‘able to make, or able to receive, any 
change’. John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government and A Letter concerning Toleration, ed. 
J.W.Gough (Oxford:Blackwell, 1946), p. I l l ,  as quoted by S. Lukes (2005). ‘Power and the Battle for 
Hearts and Minds’, Millennium, 33 (3).
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face o f change was therefore in itself a manifestation of Germany’s normative power.
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, by contrast, engaged with the momentum for change, 
by remaking the contours of German identity and challenging the robustness of Germany’s 
international allegiances. In his first years as Chancellor, Schroder made assertions of 
German self-confidence and emancipation towards remaking German identity and 
transforming Germany’s status as a power with international parity similar to that of other 
powers. In his first speech before the Bundestag as the new Chancellor, Schroder spoke of 
Germany’s self-confidence as an ‘adult nation, which does not have to feel inferior to 
absolutely no one’ (Schroder 1998) revealing his confidence in Germany’s ability to change, 
and in steering the country towards bringing about that change.
This different approach suggests two things. First, the main impulse for initiating 
change came from domestic politics when the Chancellor himself became a decisive change 
activator. Secondly, Schroder revealed less concern with embedding decisions in a 
European and international context. Redefining relations with allies were not sporadic 
episodes but part of a larger pattern of change, suggesting that they resulted from deliberate 
policy options rather than from momentary circumstances. This stood in stark contrast to 
Kohl’s position that any decision made by Germany would have to be firmly located within 
European and international structures.
Moments of significant international or domestic change are thus propitious to study 
how identities are changed and remade. These moments, as I have suggested earlier, can be 
described as ‘potential path redefining moments’, or ‘historical junctures’ (Ikenberry 
2001:21) when established identities are challenged and redefined. Normally, ‘barring 
severe crises, processes of identity formation and reinterpretation are likely to be slow’ 
(March and Olsen 2004:14). However, a ‘combination o f critical juncture and effective 
entrepreneurship can (...) lead, in a shorter timeframe than is usual, to a recalibration of the 
normative frames’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001:693). The period between 1998 and 2005 
suggests that this combination materialised, with specific incidence on the role of policy­
makers as change activators. The normative contextualisation of German foreign policy is 
thus studied in the next section.
2.4. Normative power in German foreign policy
2.4.1. Normative power and constructivism
The question of normative power as a power dimension equally valid to political, economic
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and military power has in the last decade entered the study of European politics through the 
realm of constructivism. Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford raised the question of 
whether institutionalized practice of normative power had not already become more 
important than material power in today’s world (Adler and Crawford 2004). It was Ian 
Manners who put the term ‘normative power’ on the constructivist agenda. He defined 
normative power as ‘the ability to shape or change what passes for normal in international 
relations, and which will (...) have utilitarian, social, moral, and narrative dimensions to it’ 
(Manners 2000:32). Manners applied the term to European foreign policy, and argued that 
because the EU is constructed on a normative basis, where norm diffusion occurs in the 
absence of physical force, ‘this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. 
(...) [T]he most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does 
or what is says, but what it is’. Consequently, ‘the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ 
in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all’ (Manners 2002:252-53). The EU’s 
normative dimension is thus a producer of political actions since it has the ‘ability to shape 
the ideational constitution of international relations’ (Manners 2000:44). In other words, the 
EU is predisposed to pursue changes in existing conventions which rule international 
politics.
As Helene Sjursen has noted, ‘in so far as the EU’s ‘normative’ dimension is linked 
to the idea of the EU as a ‘particular’, ‘novel’ or ‘different’ actor, this would suggest that it 
breaks with the established normative order’ (Sjursen 2006:174). As a different sort of 
international actor, it does not use military force as a first resort instrument in international 
politics, preferring the use of non-military means through institutional practice and the 
projection of its norms outside of its borders. As Thomas Diez has argued, ‘it is not a power 
that relies on military force, but one in which norms in themselves achieve what otherwise is 
done by military arsenals or economic incentives’ (Diez 2006:616).
What Manners argued for the EU holds in part for Germany’s role in European 
politics. His analysis is useful with regard to defining the EU as a ‘normative space’ where 
Germany exerts its own normative power. Outside of the EU normative space, Germany’s 
strongest form of power as a European player in international politics has also been its
27 Ian Manners (2000). ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? ’, Copenhagen Peace 
Research Institute, Working Paper 38.
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/COPRI publications/COPRI publications/pubIications/38-2000.doc 
Ian Manners (2002). ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal o f  Common 
Market Studies, 40/2, 235-58; Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the 
Crossroads ’, in Helene Sjursen, ed. (2006). Special Issue: ‘What Kind o f Power? European Foreign 
Policy in Perspective’, Journal o f  European Public P o licy , 13/2, 182-199. Thomas Diez (2005).
‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe ” , Millennium:
Journal o f  International Studies, 33/3, 613-636; Helene Sjursen, ed. (2006). Special Issue: ‘What Kind o f  
Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective’, Journal o f  European Public Policy , 13/2, 286-303.
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normative power. After 1990, Germany has gradually acquired international significance 
through the projection o f normative power, and in its predisposition to pursue a normative 
foreign policy.
There are, however, two caveats regarding the use of Manners’ approach. First, this 
thesis does not suggest that Germany is a Normative Power in the sense of Manners’ 
definition of Normative Power Europe. Were this the case it would imply that Germany's 
international identity is characterised solely by normative power and Germany would exist 
as a Normative Power only. This thesis problematises the degree of normative power in 
German foreign policy; it does not argue for the idea of Germany as a Normative Power. It 
thus sees power as a multifaceted concept and accepts that Germany has normative power 
along with other forms of power such as economic and military power. What is at the centre 
o f the thesis is the changing nature of normative power in German foreign policy.
Secondly, in 2006 Manners elaborated on the distinction between the EU as a post­
national normative power and a more traditional power politics entity (Manners 2006). This 
thesis does not see the two forms of power as mutually exclusive, nor does it find the 
distinction analytically useful. Rather, it assumes that German foreign policy increasingly 
combines elements of normative power with other forms of power, and is interested in 
tracking the normative sources of Germany’s international identity.
Normative power is here understood as one form of power which emanates out of 
two interconnected instances. First, normative power emanates from the magnetism others 
feel towards the one exerting it to the extent of wanting to emulate it or develop a strategy to 
obtain gains from being close to the power holder. Because of the magnetic effect is has 
upon others, normative power is inherently relational power. Secondly, it emanates from the 
will of the state with normative power to perpetuate that instance and decide future policies 
in accordance with proven normative attractiveness. For a state to acquire and maintain 
normative power, it has to assure the projection of norms and benefit from compliance with 
them. This normative power has to be institutionalised for only institutions embody and 
project norms which empower the state. In times of international or domestic change that 
attractiveness of power runs the risk of faltering, especially when the power holder has 
acquired other forms of power, and the receiving states no longer acknowledge the same 
legitimacy and trust towards the normative power.
28 Ian Manners has recently problematised the articulation o f  both sorts o f  power, suggesting that in the 
long term Europe as a Normative Power would suffer through an increasing militarization o f the EU’s 
international actions (Manners 2006).
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2.4.2. Norm creation, norm interaction and norm change
Liberal institutionalists recognize the importance of norms and attribute to them a coercive 
effect on state action (Cortell and Davis 1996). Constructivists, by contrast, argue that 
norms are constitutive of a state’s identity and its interests (Jepperson et al. 1996). Peter 
Katzenstein defined norms as ‘collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given 
identity’ (Katzenstein 1996:54). Norms themselves acquire motivational force for a certain 
action and shape identities and interests, thereby contributing to the creation of social 
reality. This suggests that norms have a powerful effect on international interaction. 
Spruyt has noted that ‘three factors determine the relative impact of norms: the internal 
consistency of a particular normative framework, the incentives for political entrepreneurs 
to champion certain norms over others, and the feedback from the broader environment’ 
(Spruyt 2000:66-67). Because this thesis is informed by both constructivism and liberal 
institutionalism it accepts the effects of norms as producing at times coercive effects on 
state action, at other times they are constitutive of a state’s identity.
To address how norms lead states to acquire specific identities and interests it is 
necessary to distinguish between utilitarian and constitutive norms. First, utilitarian or 
regulative norms are norms which ‘order and constrain behaviour’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998:891). Utilitarian norms are those which ‘help states coordinate and collaborate so as to 
maximise utilities’ (...) serving ‘functional purposes: they regulate behaviour, reduce 
uncertainty by institutionalising conventions, signal expectations, and reveal information’ 
(Spruyt 2000:69). If the effect of a norm is regulative, norms ‘operate as standards for the 
proper enactment or deployment of a defined identity’ (Katzenstein 1996:54).
Secondly, there are constitutive norms or social norms which create something new, 
be it interests or identities. Constitutive norms ‘create new actors, interests, or categories of 
action’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891). They are ‘constitutive of actor identity and 
interests’ and can be ‘understood as a matrix of constitutive principles that govern the 
behaviours of members of a given social group’ based on socialization (Spruyt 2000:68). 
Constitutive rules ‘prestructure the domains of action within which regulative rules take 
effect’ (Ruggie 1998b:33). Neo-utilitarianism’s profound gap, according to Ruggie, is that it 
Tacks any concept of constitutive rules’ (Ruggie 1998a:871). In terms of effects,
29 On motives, see Audie Klotz (1995). Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against 
Apartheid, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. More generally, see Nicholas G. Onuf (1989).
World o f  Our Making. Rules, and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia:
University o f South Carolina Press and Martha Finnemore (1996). National Interests in International 
Society, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
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constitutive norms ‘specify the actions that will cause relevant others to recognize and 
validate a particular identity and to respond to it appropriately’ (Katzenstein 1996:54).
The distinction between utilitarian and constitutive norms depends on the state’s 
action. As a social process norm creation tends to develop slowly. Norms and ideas are part 
of the constitutive process of identity formation, creating effects which in turn shape 
interests. Normative frameworks shape and account for change in interests and state 
behaviour. This begs the question of how the norm diffusion process takes place (Checkel 
1997). Norm diffusion occurs either in an implicit and unintentional manner, through the 
attractiveness of the norm content, or through a conscious, pro-active manner. Here, the 
means range from simple persuasion to economic benefits, and ultimately coercive means to 
enforce rules and norms.
This is a process of socialisation which consolidates identities but also subjects them 
to oscillations in time of major domestic or external change. At the same time as norms are 
contingent on social reality, they function as stable particles of the mental road map which 
guides political actions. Thus while norms are not immune to change, established norms are 
expected to produce precisely that sort of context which aims at creating sameness and 
normality, stability and order. ‘To the degree that institutions generate beliefs in a legitimate 
order, they simplify politics by ensuring that many things are taken as given. Rules and 
practices specify what is normal, must be expected, can be relied upon, and what makes 
sense in a community’ (Olsen 2007:5).
That is why the emergence of a new norm generally tends to create initial 
resistance. Surprisingly, Chancellor Schroder’s pursuit o f a new norm of international parity 
did not create much domestic resistance, which might suggest that the domestic audience
<5 A
was ready for a change in the nature of Germany’s foreign policy identity.
2.4.3. From normative practice to normative power
If we take Ian Manners’ definition of normative power as the ability to shape conceptions of 
‘normal’, then at its beginning, in 1949, the Federal Republic lacked normative power. 
Instead of exerting power, Germany’s new code of conduct was to act according to 
acceptable normative practice and strive towards being considered ‘normal’. The FRG’s 
actions required normative foundations, and this predisposed it to act in a normative way, 
respecting alliance commitments through multilateralist policies. Germany’s normative 
power was characterised by ‘the ability to shape and influence the structures within which
30 The degree o f  domestic receptivity regarding identity change will be dealt with in chapter three.
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other political actors have to operate’ (Hyde-Price 2000:112). The continued practice of 
institutional multilateralism, reliability on norm compliance and alliance allegiance 
transformed Germany into a shaper of European norms, leading to a foreign policy in 
conformity with international norms and willingness to contribute to its more generalized
i
adherence and strengthening.
The exercise of normative power has two dimensions. First, for norm-compliant 
behaviour to lead to normative power there has to be intentionality of power. The actor is 
aware of the normative power potential, and is willing to use it. Consciousness of this power 
and willingness to use it will potentially reinforce a state’s normative power. Secondly, 
there is normative power which is pursued unintentionally, and which arises out of policy 
decisions and actions augmenting normative power. Echoing Bulmer, this form of power is 
projected ‘indirectly and in a diffuse manner’ (Bulmer 1997:51).
Norms functioning in the domestic space of a state can result from domestic norm 
creation. But often ideas do not originate domestically, as the case of Germany shows. 
Germany’s two most important foreign policy norms were alliance loyalty and Westbindung 
to NATO and the EC, and institutional multilateralism. First, the Westernised identity and 
alliance allegiances within the Western community of democratic and liberal states became 
a constitutive norm which every policy-maker ffom 1949 to the present has followed. 
Secondly, multilateralism, introduced into German politics as a regulative norm by its 
partners, was transformed into a constitutive norm of state behaviour.
Together these norms became the cornerstone of Germany’s international identity, 
developing into normative power through policy practice and positive receptivity by others 
who recognised this practice as legitimate. They reached the domestic arena through a 
process that Jeffrey Checkel identified as empowerment through the domestic political elite, 
which makes norms acceptable through discursive and social practice. Empowerment 
occurs ‘when the prescriptions embodied in a norm first become, through changes in 
discourse or behaviour, a focus of domestic political attention or debate’ (Checkel 
1997:476). Distinguishing between norm compliance and norm empowerment is a first step 
towards establishing when normative power is at play.
2.4.3.I. The sources of Germany’s normative power
The sources of Germany’s normative power are mostly non-material sources of power.
31 Germany’s norm-compliant behaviour was ensured not only through policy-making, but also 
through a legal framework with effect on some foreign policy decisions, such as legal procedural rules 
for military operations o f the Bundeswehr, stipulated by the German Constitutional Court.
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During the Cold War the core principles of Germany’s foreign policy identity rested on six 
normative elements, and two normative constraints. The first two normative elements 
developed in tandem: institutionalised multilateralism. Germany accepted the ‘binding 
institutions’ which made up the international constitutional order Germany was part of and 
its foreign policy developed through ‘reflexive multilateralism’ (Bulmer 1997). After 1949 
Germany’s return to the community of nations was done by an externally induced 
socialisation process of democratic norms, which predisposed it towards multilateralist and 
anti-militarist policies, making the FRG more open to the acceptance of norms produced 
externally. Belonging to a Western security community (Deutsch 1957) was a normative 
element of Germany’s post-war identity.
A second source of normative power was Germany’s institutionalised Europeanness. 
Normative power rested on the Europeanness in Germany’s foreign policy. This 
commitment to community (Smyser 2003) became deeply ingrained in the German identity, 
to the extent that the high degree of Europeanization of its policies was idiosyncratic of 
Germany’s European policy. Furthering European integration, enlarging the EU to promote 
security and stability, and ensuring the transatlantic partnership remained the priorities of 
the Kohl government, pursued through a multilateralist institutional framework (Bulmer et 
al. 1998). The purpose of this norm complying behaviour was to prevent any recurrence of 
conflict between European peoples and the desire to ensure a European peace order in 
which Germany could best maintain its normative power and succeed economically. After 
1998 Chancellor Schroder transformed this Europeanness, making it more instrumental and 
less normative: preserving Europeanness as a common denominator for foreign policy was 
no longer an absolute priority.
A third source of normative power was the trust of Germany’s allies. The capacity to 
create political trust towards its neighbors and allies as a resource of foreign policy became a 
constitutive element of Germany’s normative power. Without the recognition by others that 
Germany could be trusted, policy-makers would have lacked the conditions to consolidate 
normative power effectively. Trust and reliability regarding norm compliance, not only 
(mutual) interest, ensured that long established alliances and the stability deriving from them 
prevailed.
Good results in foreign policy and ‘the conviction that this can be turned into success 
for someone else’ served, in the long term, as a fourth source of normative power, for ‘if 
another country is felt to have the recipe [for success] and to be willing to share it’ (Cooper 
2004), it will be left, potentially, with a considerable amount of normative power. As March 
and Olsen have noted, ‘rules of appropriateness are seen as carriers of lessons from
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experience as those lessons are encoded either by individuals and collectivities drawing 
inferences from their own and others’ experiences, or by differential survival and 
reproduction of institutions, roles and identities based on particular rules. Rule-driven 
behaviour associated with successes or survival is likely to be repeated. Rules associated 
with failures are not’ (March and Olsen 2004:12).
In the case of Germany, economic success linked to a successful membership of the 
European Community and NATO early on set the parameters for a successful foreign policy. 
Because the diplomatic margin of manoeuvrability was limited, Bonn accepted a policy of 
low profile rather than assertiveness, complying with rules and norms considered 
appropriate. But because norm compliance developed into successful practice, German 
policy-makers managed to capitalize on these norms, gaining normative power as a result.
Fifthly, the projection of normative power is linked to the question of duties and 
responsibilities in foreign policy. At the centre of Germany’s normative power was the 
concept of responsibility: recognizing their country’s ‘special responsibility’ in foreign 
policy conditioned German policy-makers to act in a responsible manner internationally. 
Hans Dietrich Genscher, during his seventeen years as the Federal Republic’s foreign 
minister, pursued a Verantwortungspolitik (politics of responsibility), which he opposed to 
Machtpolitik (power politics) (Genscher 1997:1014-16). By implication, Germany shunned 
power politics, for a responsible, normative foreign policy seemed irreconcilable, until 1998 
at least, with traditional power politics.
Finally, in the specific case of Germany, identity itself developed into a source of 
power, where normative practice evolved into normative power. If there is coherence 
between a country’s core normative values and beliefs and its foreign policy actions, i.e., if 
the policy-maker does not betray its country’s core values, then identity is a non-material 
source with the potential to become normative power. Hans Peter Schwarz critically noted, 
in the mid-1980s, that Germany’s relationship with power oscillated between obsession 
with power in the first half of the twentieth century and power oblivion in the years of the 
Federal Republic (Schwarz 1985). Because of its ambivalent relationship with the concept 
of power, particularly in its military dimension, Germany became predisposed towards more 
nuanced uses of power. Thus acquiring normative power was a useful form to circumvent 
the recurrence of German power in the traditional sense, and still retain some of the 
elements of power itself.
There were also normative constraints. The first normative constraint was that 
Germany should be a self-restrained actor (Selbsteinbindung), and act internationally with a 
limited margin of manoeuvrability. Klaus Kinkel, the successor to foreign minister
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Genscher, often spoke of Germany’s foreign policy as imbued with a ‘culture o f restraint’. 
The second normative constraint was to never again begin a war of aggression from German 
territory. From German soil should never again emanate a war of aggression. Thus, without 
becoming a pacifist state Germany’s actions were constrained by the norm ‘never again 
war’. Germany’s armed forces were ‘citizens in uniform’ whose military action was 
confined to the NATO area and only for defensive purposes, and the Bundeswehr was a 
parliamentary army. Initially these six core principles all functioned as normative 
constraints. But the more Germany complied with them, and showed its neighbours and 
allies that it was now a trustworthy state, the more these constraints transformed into 
normative power. Thus practice of norm compliance allowed the conditions for Germany to 
acquire normative power.
2.4.4. Potential path redefining moments
Potential path redefining moments are historical junctures when due to externally or 
domestically induced circumstances a state reshapes its foreign policy identity. During such 
a moment states can choose to alter their approach to political action, opting for more 
utilitarian or more normative instruments to achieve policy goals. The German case suggests 
that between 1998 and 2005 such a path redefining moment occurred in German foreign 
policy leading it evolve towards a more calculated rationale for action.
2.4.4.I. Germany’s normative power from 1997 to 2007
After unification, policy-makers continued to project normative power. While the 
persistence of normative power legitimized Germany’s standing as a valid member of the 
international community of states and helped Berlin to enhance its own power status within 
the Euro-Atlantic space, the purpose of normative power increased. It exercised a 
transformative function in that it persuaded others of the appropriateness of its own model. 
Through the spread of particular norms Germany engaged in the transformation of other 
actors. Its widespread support for Eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO produced a 
normative effect upon the action of others while creating stability by enlarging its own 
normative space (Arora 2006). What during the period of the Cold War started as a 
domestic code of conduct, evolved as if stencilling its inner self, through continuous 
legitimisation by others, into an external norm projection. Finally, normative power had a 
transformative function in that it enabled Germany to set standards for appropriate
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international behaviour and participate in creating a normative constitutional order.
Thus the repetitious projection of norms through foreign policy, its effectiveness and 
legitimacy, and acceptance and emulation by others consolidated normative power. In 
addition, the ability to replicate the normativeness of its foreign policy, and be able to 
project this onto areas where such a degree of normativeness did not exist and which were 
receptive towards it shows how strong normative power already was. In other words, the 
readiness to replicate one’s own model and reproduce the setting where normative power is 
empowered also constituted normative power.
Still, the purpose of normative power has had different meanings for German 
governments. At times the normativeness was considered the appropriate end in itself. At 
other times Germany used its normative power as a means to obtain specific results. This 
raises the question whether identities and norms are used genuinely or instrumentally, and 
what are their underlying logics for action.
2.5. Logics of political action: the logic of appropriateness and the logic of 
consequentialism
James March and Johan Olsen, authors working in the realm of institutionalism, have made 
the case for two different logics of political action to interpret human behaviour (March and 
Olsen 1998). First, there is ‘action as driven by a logic of appropriateness and senses of 
identity.’ Social norms tend to develop within a logic of appropriateness, setting aside 
instrumental purposes of political action. ‘The pursuit of purpose is associated with 
identities more than with interests, and with the selection of rules more than with individual 
rational expectations’. To act appropriately is to proceed according to ‘the institutionalized 
practices of a collectivity and mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, 
right, and good. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations and duties encapsulated in a role, an 
identity, and a membership in a political community. Rules are followed because they are 
perceived to be adequate for the task at hand and to have normative validity’ (Olsen 2007:3). 
That an individual or a collectivity considers a rule of action as appropriate ‘may reflect 
learning of some sort from history, but it does not guarantee technical efficiency or moral 
acceptability’ (March and Olsen 2004:4).
Secondly, there is action as driven by a logic of anticipated consequences and prior 
preferences. A logic of consequentiality ‘sees political order as arising from negotiation 
among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which 
there may be gains to coordinated action.’ Policy-makers pursue anticipatory action on the
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basis of strategic calculus intent on producing expected advantageous results. State actions 
are determined by the expectation of specified consequences, responding to (national) 
interests. To act consequentially is to work towards an expected outcome and to anticipate 
future consequences, in conformity with contemporary conceptions of rationality. In 
practice, as Olsen has recently argued ‘political actors may subsume one logic as a special 
case of the other. They may establish a hierarchy among logics, or be governed by the 
relative prescriptive clarity of different logics. The resources available for acting in 
accordance with different logics may be decisive. Actors may use different logics for 
different purposes. There may be a sequential ordering of logics of action, and change 
between logics of action may result from specific experiences’ (Olsen 2007:13).
Proponents of constructivism argue that a logic of appropriateness underpins 
normative actions, suggesting that ‘constructivism starts from the assumption that actors 
follow a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of consequentiality’ (Rittberger 
2001:105). This is problematic, for if  constructivism sees identity and interests as mutually 
constitutive in a socially constructed world, they are initially equally relevant. Identity can 
initially have a higher significance than interests, but at some point interests, which are 
considered a product of socialization, will have a boomerang effect on identity, and vice 
versa. Put differently, using constructivism as a theoretical approach can lead to socially 
appropriate results, but also to socially inappropriate results. A state can change its 
international behaviour from a generally cooperative stance to one of incremental non- 
cooperative behaviour. Therefore it is no contradiction for constructivism to focus on a logic 
of consequentiality as much as on a logic of appropriateness since there is no compelling 
reason for it to be only about the normative component of political action. Rather, a study of 
the role of identity in foreign policy needs to combine the normative dimension of foreign 
policy with the utilitarian one. In other words, by engaging with the ‘interest’ component as 
being mutually constitutive of identity and vice versa, constructivism is already engaging 
with the utilitarian logic of consequentiality.
In fact in March and Olsen’s typology there is no dominant behavioural logic since 
both logics are complimentary and most political actions tend to combine elements of each 
(March and Olsen 2004:19). This is so because political actors are formed ‘both by their 
interests, by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules embedded in 
their identities and political institutions. They calculate consequences and follow rules, and 
the relationship between the two is often subtle’ (March and Olsen 1998:952).
If we relate this to Bulmer’s typology of the four faces of German power addressed 
at the beginning of the chapter, only deliberate power, ‘a forceful articulation of interests’ is
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close to the logic of expected consequences. All other three forms of power, indirect 
institutional power, unintentional power and empowerment suggest more closeness to the 
logic of appropriateness. But variation in the choice of the political logic can occur as a 
result of path redefining moments. Initially states can become members of institutions or 
engage in relationships for instrumental reasons. Over time, the motivational force can 
change into a logic of appropriateness through habitual practice and communication. By the 
same token, a state which initially pursued a logic o f appropriateness can, over time, be 
attracted towards pursuing a more consequentialist approach in its behaviour.
2.5.1. German policy-makers, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of 
consequentiality
What made the normative context of the Federal Republic durable and predictable after 
1949? According to March and Olsen, ‘rules and standard operating procedures are most 
likely to dominate when actors have long tenure, frequent interaction and shared experiences 
and information; when they share accounts and institutionalized memories; and when 
environments are fairly stable’. But sometimes the contents of the logic of appropriateness 
for foreign policy change, through a leadership induced discourse for change, or through 
generalised new legitimating practices. How, then, are changes in the motivations of 
political actors explained?32
Accumulated experiences with a specific situation over extended time-periods, 
shared experience and institutionalized memories of actors who have a long tenure of power, 
March and Olsen suggest, tend to produce the practice of rules of appropriateness. ‘This can 
be replaced by the logic of consequentiality, when rule-following is defined as 
unsatisfactory in terms of established targets and aspiration levels.’ Defection from the logic 
of appropriateness tends to occur ‘in periods of radical environmental change, where past 
arrangements and rules are defined as irrelevant or unacceptable’ (March and Olsen 
2004:22-23). The German case suggests that a state’s foreign policy can evolve towards a 
more calculated rationale for action. This usually occurs when there is a potential path 
redefining moment, or ‘critical juncture for change’ which transforms the underlying logics 
for action.
32 March and Olsen do not tackle this question explicitly. Because institutions are seen as the preferred 
context for pursuing logics o f action in international politics, the authors merely consider changes in the 
institutional context, when ‘institutions and their constitutive rules are discredited as unworkable and 
intolerable and change initiatives are presented as emancipation from an order that is a dysfunctional, 
unfair or tyrannical relic o f an unacceptable past.’ James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (2004). ‘The logic 
o f appropriateness’, ARENA Working Papers, WP 04/09, p 16.
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After 1990, the notion of appropriateness, predominant in three of the four faces of 
German power regarding foreign policy changed. Shortly after coming to power in 1998, the 
Schroder government embarked on changing the sources of Germany’s international 
identity. Whereas normative power before 1998 was exercised mostly in an indirect 
institutional or unintentional manner, the Chancellor now intended to use normative power 
differently. For Schroder, the old normative context with its identity indicators was no 
longer sufficient and normative power was now to serve an instrumental purpose of 
enhancing Germany’s international standing and make it similar to that of other powers. He 
therefore disagreed with the content of the established rules of appropriateness and worked 
towards a logic of consequentiality. He did so first, by trying to apply it to the bilateral 
German-French alliance. After failing to achieve such a change, Schroder embarked on 
pursuing the new logic with regards to the bilateral German-American partnership, European 
politics, and the pursuit of a permanent UN Security Council seat for Germany.
Thus German identity embraced two new norms. First, the formula ‘never again war’ 
was transformed by the formula ‘never again Auschwitz’. Berlin now accepted the principle 
of military intervention for the defence of human rights; because military interventions were 
now being fought for humanitarian purposes, Germany should assume a more interventionist 
stance regarding questions of regional war and peace by participating militarily. By March 
1999 it was considered appropriate for Germany to participate in an offensive military 
operation against Serbia in Kosovo, for the defence of human rights in Kosovo.
Secondly, Berlin developed the norm of international parity by which it felt 
legitimated, not least by its recognised normative power, to strive for status and power parity 
with its peers. The aim was to raise Germany’s standing internationally as a different sort of 
power, by pursuing new interests in European politics, enhancing Germany’s international 
status and participating more assertively -  and at times more unilaterally- in international 
politics. In the case of Germany’s UN policy towards reform of the UN Security Council the 
Schroder government weakened its normative multilateralism in favour of a more utilitarian 
multilateralism. The run-up to the Iraq war in 2003, during the decisive year of 2002, 
revealed Schroder’s more instrumental use of normative power. This episode revealed the 
extent to which the Chancellor himself was willing to change a traditional norm of Euro- 
Atlantic multilateralism into one of European bilateralism.
By redefining the coordinates of Germany’s international identity, Schroder hoped 
to enhance Germany’s status and locate it on a more equal level with fellow powers, while 
recovering more traditional power attributes. In his quest to transform Germany into a
33 These policy domains constitute the empirical part o f  the ensuing chapters.
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European power more like other powers and elevate his country to a new status, Schroder 
transformed normative power by introducing a new norm into German foreign policy, that 
of international parity. This was to become a constitutive norm for Germany’s strive 
towards equal standing in the international community. Contrary to most of Germany’s 
norms, international parity was domestic and not international in origin. The price that the 
Schrdder government was willing to pay for such a change was a lessening of Germany’s 
normative power. This can be seen in European and transatlantic politics, be it in Berlin’s 
attempt to decrease Germany’s financial contributions to Brussels, or pursuing a unilateral 
position on the Iraq war. Overall, the Schroder government played an active role in pursuing 
a more national, and also more unilateralist agenda than had traditionally been the case. 
This led to a diminishing of coherence between the core normative values and foreign 
policy-making. As a consequence, Germany’s normative power internationally decreased.
The Schroder government did not reveal disagreement over Germany’s normative 
power and its institutional multilateralism in principle. Rather the aim was to transform 
Germany’s international identity while hoping to maintain its normative power. From the 
decision-makers perspective, there was no ambiguity or conflict between different identity 
indicators. Rather, introducing a new norm of international power parity was legitimate and 
a logical step following the end of Cold War constraints, and the emancipation of German 
foreign policy.34 Schroder’s aim was not so much to lessen Germany’s normative power but 
to author that power more by Germany and ensure that it played a greater international role 
on the basis of an equal consultation among partners. To do that Schroder believed that more 
parity implied that the sources of normative power would become less Europeanised and 
less transatlantic, more in conformity with a German national interest.
Such a change of sequencing political logics, however, has its costs. To pursue a 
logic of political action with clarity depends on the available resources necessary to the 
policy-maker. Therefore choosing one logic of political action to the detriment of another 
will depend on the ‘variation and change in the resources available for acting in accordance 
with rules of appropriateness and calculated (self) interest’ (March and Olsen 2004:21). 
While Schroder decided to follow such a redefinition of actions, the necessary resources 
which would have made such a change viable, were scarce. Albeit rhetoric of a more 
assertive and grown-up Germany, structural and economic means were decreasing.
34 On publishing his memoirs, Schroder has conceded that his seven years as Chancellor served to 
emancipate German foreign policy. Gerhard Schroder (2006). Entscheidungen, Hamburg: Hoffmann und 
Campe.
35 The years between 1998 and 2004 saw a decrease in the budgets o f  the Auswartige Amt and the 
Defence Ministry. Hanns W. Maull (2004). ‘Die schleichende Krise der deutschen AuBenpolitik:
Pladoyer fur eine Remedur’, 1 August, www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/resources/dossiers/maull.pdf.
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Furthermore, a more instrumental exercise of Germany’s normative power could lead to 
accusations of ‘German normative hegemony’ over its partners or institutions, increasing 
the costs for change in logics of political action. The political cost would be the mistrust of 
others as to why Germany has been willing to disregard traditional norms, such as a break 
away from multilateralism, and why it has done so when it did.
The coalition government led by Angela Merkel has attempted to recover 
Germany’s normative power. While it no longer eschews leadership as during the Kohl 
years it makes sure there is a legitimate basis for it and the acceptance by its partners. It has 
also recovered the political foundation for normative power, through the centrality of the 
EU and NATO and the partnerships with France and the U.S. in an ever integrating Euro- 
Atlantic space. For that the norm of multilateralism has also been rehabilitated.
2.6. Conclusion: The weakening of Germany’s normative power?
Germany’s relationship with power remains problematic. For Kohl the foreign policy 
discourse was confined to post-1945 power notions, or ‘apower’ notions, which stood in 
contrast to a more traditional reading of power politics. By contrast, Schroder willingly 
engaged in a process of redefinition not only of Germany’s state identity in its foreign policy 
dimension, but also of its relationship with the question of German power. In her two years 
in office, Chancellor Merkel has put forward a pragmatic synthesis of both her predecessors’ 
way of articulating normative with other forms of power and new international norms.
This chapter has developed a theoretical framework from which the empirical part of 
the thesis will proceed. It has conceptualised German foreign policy through the 
combination of three theoretical concepts: the dynamic interaction between foreign policy 
and identity; the significance of ‘normative power’, and the differentiated use of logics of 
political action. The logics of political action activate the elements of power through which 
identity and foreign policy interact.
It seems plausible that Germany will pursue a trajectory combining elements of its 
normative power with more traditional power attributes, with the result being a Germany 
which makes policy in a way increasingly similar to that of other powers. The foreign policy 
of the present Grand coalition government, led by Chancellor Merkel, indicates this striving 
for the sum of the two logics of political action, and the persistence of normative power 
linked to other power attributes. A reflection of Germany’s transformed power is that in the 
wake of its own changes it is helping to shape the transformation of the European Union in 
its security dimension and strategic policy-making.
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For that Germany needs to have effective material resources to support a credible 
normative policy. On the one hand, enlarging the context, as happened with NATO and EU 
enlargements, implies a wider foreign policy projection area which in turn requires larger 
material and ideational capabilities. On the other hand, the more the Bundeswehr participates 
in different areas around the world the more it needs to ensure that normative power can be 
supported by other means when necessary.
Finally, Germany must reveal strategic ambition to follow its policy visions. 
Thinking through questions of international order, and incorporating them into a political 
strategy is not the sole prerogative of a ‘realpolitik’ power. Any power -  be it realpolitical or 
normative -  needs to consider the wider picture of strategic order, and position itself with 
regard to that order. This raises the question of how to judge the behaviour of a normative 
power in action? Is it to be evaluated by the end results? Or by initial motivations that 
empower the political actor, regardless of the outcome? Can the formula ‘normative when 
possible, power political when necessary’ hold for Germany’s foreign policy? How well 
Germany has fared in dealing with these challenges will constitute the empirical part of the 
next five chapters. The following chapter will therefore deal with how the question of 
normative power was viewed domestically by the political elite.
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CHAPTER 3: The domestic sources of German foreign policy identity: The 
government, political parties and foreign policy
3.1. Introduction: The domestic sources of German foreign policy identity
Foreign policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, traditionally, has not enjoyed a high 
standing in German politics. Due to constraints on its sovereignty for forty years, it was 
a domain which raised only occasional interest with the German people and even with 
its political elite. With unification, Germany’s new position in the centre of Europe 
and rising expectations from neighbours and allies, this foreign policy self- 
consciousness came under strain. The inherent ambiguities and underlying tensions in 
Germany’s international policies had never been squarely faced and were often 
deliberately avoided, forcing the political elite now to make tough choices.
This led to controversial parliamentary debates on Germany’s role in the world. 
The debates on foreign policy of the 1990s were as much debates between the political 
parties, as they were inner party debates on adjustments about the parties’ programmatic 
stances. The changes that occurred in German foreign policy have been accompanied by 
heated debates in the Bundestag which have touched upon the post-war principle of 
political consensus. In the present decade, debates are no longer fought excessively 
within the parties, centring more on the issues than before. To what extent German 
foreign policy is about German identity is reflected in the number of debates that were 
not about foreign policy per se, but which cannot be left out of discussions about the 
future of foreign policy. The notion of historical memory, the German Sonderweg, the 
concept of a German identity touched upon the question of foreign policy. The thread 
that runs through all of them is the question of German identity and how Germans 
perceive of their identity along the spectrum from a German great power on the one end 
to a normative power on the other.
This raised a number of questions. How did the foreign policy ideas articulated 
by leading politicians structure the foreign policy debate? Who or what were the sources 
of change and who or what were the forces of continuity? How could Germany best 
adapt to the post-Cold War world in a responsible manner? What did ‘responsibility’ 
mean in foreign policy and what sort of discontinuity in foreign policy would amount to 
irresponsible behaviour? How could German policy-makers convince others of the 
reliability of German democracy and avoid Germany’s transformation into an
36 This was confirmed by many o f the interviewees. Berlin, September 2000.
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‘unpredictable power’ (Haftendom 2001:388)?
This chapter discusses the role of key decision-makers and bureaucratic cultures 
in both perpetuating the old sense of identity and promoting a new one. In this sense, 
‘domestic contests over foreign policy are driven not only by the balance of contending 
forces, but also by the interplay of competing foreign policy ideas’ (Banchoff 
1999b:l 1). This chapter argues that the sources of German conduct derived neither, first 
and foremost, from a structural international change, nor from the influence of 
international institutions on German behavior; rather, changes were domestically 
induced and negotiated by domestic actors.
To assess the degree to which a domestic consensus existed in unified Germany 
to project foreign policy goals in search of international compatibility, the chapter 
analyses sources of change and forces of continuity in German foreign policy between 
1997 and 2007. To do so it examines the most controversial parliamentary debates and 
programmatic changes of Germany’s four main parties, the Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) together with the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens (Biindnis 90/Die Griinen).37 
Three issue areas are examined throughout the debates: Germany’s international 
military operations, its European policy, and transatlantic relations.
3.1.1. The past and the various German questions
Domestic debates on foreign policy are never disconnected from the past and the 
perceptions others have about Germany. It is impossible to discern the mood among the 
political elite without grasping the historical context. Particularly in foreign policy the 
past continued to be a burden that influenced German policy-makers (M. and S. 
Greiffenhagen 1995). The wider debates which had begun among historians from the 
1970s onwards started to have political meaning and fed back into the domestic political 
debates on foreign policy.
The complexities of German identity are in part at the root of what became 
known as the German question. This German question was not one but several questions 
composed of political and identity elements. First, in its external dimension it reflected 
the neighbouring countries’ difficulty in coping with Germany’s geographical position 
in the middle of Europe. This goes back at least to the seventeenth century, when
37 The PDS has been left out o f  the analysis since, in the timeframe under analysis, it was neither a 
member o f a governing coalition nor did it play a decisive role in foreign policy-making.
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Germany was made up of various small power entities, lacking a unifying political core. 
The end of the religious Thirty Years War, in 1648, represented a paradoxical outcome. 
While it marked the birth of the modem European state system and the sovereign state, 
for Germans it represented the postponement, sine die, of the creation of their own state 
according to the same rules that had just been created. From there on Germany stood in 
opposition not only to other European states but also to the historic evolution of the 
continental state system. The great power assertion that Germany underwent after 
unification in 1871, under the Weltpolitik of the Prussian Emperor Wilhelm II, led to 
political instability in Europe. Germany’s rise to great power status after 1890 was one 
cause for the outbreak of the First World War. The geopolitical positioning of Germany 
in the centre of Europe and how its neighbours dealt with it was the traditional German 
question (Geiss 1997). Germany was either too weak, thus susceptible to outside 
intervention from the great European powers, or it was too strong, and thus a threat to 
its neighbours; either way this caused political instability in Europe (Joffe 1999).
Secondly, the German question is linked to the idea of the German ‘special path’ 
(Sonderweg). The Sonderweg thesis has not traversed a linear path. During the 19th 
century the German ‘Sonderweg’ thesis had a positive connotation in the German 
national conscience in that it represented Germany’s existence as a cultural nation. 
Indirectly this was already one form of compensating for the inexistence of a unified 
state.38 After 1945 the German Sonderweg came to mean the negative side of German 
exceptionalism (Sontheimer 1999:58). The conservative handling of the German 
question was challenged by the historian Fritz Fischer in 1961 when he presented a 
revisionist interpretation of Germany’s participation in the First World War by arguing 
that instead of being dragged into the war, the German Reich had initiated the war 
deliberately to obtain world power status (Fischer 1961). If Fischer’s thesis was right, 
the National Socialist years between 1933 and 1945 no longer stood as an individual 
German catastrophe but represented the culmination of Germany’s incompatibility with 
liberalism and democracy. This turned the Sonderweg thesis on its head: ‘from proud
38 After 1957, the European Community in a very different manner became, also a form o f  substitute for 
the lack o f national unity.
39 Fischer’s thesis led to the first German historians’ debate (Historikerstreit) on the reassessment o f the 
role o f  imperial Germany in the First World War. This led to the first revision o f German twentieth 
century history. The conservative monopoly on the reading o f  history then became complemented by a 
more centre-left interpretation o f history. See, for example, S. Berger (1997). The Search fo r  Normality 
National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800, Providence, Oxford: Berghahn 
Books; J. Knowlton and T. Cates (1993). Forever in the Shadow o f  Hitler? The Dispute about the 
Germans’ Understanding o f  History, original documents o f  the Historikerstreit, New Jersey: Humanities 
Press; M. Travers (1990). ‘History Writing and the Politics o f  Historiography: the German 
Historikerstreit’, The Australian Journal o f Politics and History, 37 (2), 246-261.
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assertion of Germany’s differences to the West it became a sad reflection of Germany’s 
aberrations from the West’ (Berger 2004: 191). The culmination of these aberrations 
was, of course, National Socialism, in which questions of German identity, singularity, 
special paths were exploited to their extremes. In this sense, ‘the end of the Third Reich 
was also the end o f a German national special conscience’ (Sontheimer 1999:60).
Thirdly, the German question reflected contradictions between ideas highlighted 
by Alexander Humboldt and Immanuel Kant, who represented the German 
Enlightenment, and those of Johann Gottlieb Fichte or Georg Friedrich Hegel, who 
embodied the German national idea and Romanticism. German romantic nationalism 
‘was directed against the spirit of the Enlightenment, which was despised as a Western, 
superficial and rationalist ‘Ungeist”  (Kohn 1944:556). Thus the German question 
linked Germany’s geographical and political location to the nature of the political 
regime. This is why after 1945 it was vital for the Federal Republic to become a 
democratic and a Western state. And it helps explain why the German question, in 
whatever version it is debated, is always also a question about Germany’s international 
identity.
This created the terrain for an unstable identity putting Germans in a continual 
process of identity redefinition. Most debates on Germany’s role in the world in the 
twentieth century were linked to the problematique of how to deal with Germany’s past, 
and how this past influenced Germany’s present and its policy-makers. In 1947 Dolf 
Stemberger wrote, ‘We do not know who we are, this is the German question. Any form 
of German existence is overcome by a shadow’ (Stemberger in Bolaffi 1995:92). 
Almost sixty years later the national sentiment was still plagued by similar doubts about 
German normality. As then foreign minister Joschka Fischer stated in a debate in 2005, 
‘until today our country is a highly traumatised country. No one asks the question ‘Am I 
normal?’ if they are normal’ (Fischer 2005:36). This insecure identity also paved the 
way for repeated reassessments of history.
But German unification and the changed international context challenged the 
contours of Germany’s post-war identity, and provided the chance to deal with the 
seemingly ‘unfinished business’ of the German question, for it was only now that things 
could seriously go wrong with Germany again. As Timothy Garton Ash remarked 
shortly after 1990, ‘[a]lmost two hundred years after Napoleon’s comment, [that] 
Germany’s state of nature is becoming and not being, Germany was still in a state of 
becoming’ (Ash 1993:558). Now more than ever before, Germany had to prove to its 
neighbours and to itself that it was capable of undergoing an international political
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transition towards the inevitable increase of power without affecting negatively the 
stability of European and transatlantic institutions or reacting in an irresponsible 
manner.
This brings us to the question of German interests and the concept of 
responsibility in foreign policy. Whether Germany could wield power responsibly 
depended on how Germany dealt with its historical memory (Buruma 1995 and 
Banchoff 1997). Most political statements underline Germany’s special responsibility 
and duty, more than that of other states, to provide the world with the means to achieve 
those goals. The special relationship with Israel and the duty towards Israel’s right of 
existence which all German governments, without exception, have cultivated, relate to 
Germany’s past and to a present notion of responsible politics. In that sense, Germany’s 
responsibility in foreign policy has been about ‘the awareness of acting for others as 
well as for oneself; it begins with perceptions and values’ (Hill 2003:251-2).
3.1.2. Germany as part of the West
What distinguishes German history from that of classical democracies is first, that 
‘Germany became a nation-state much later than Britain or France’, and second, that ‘it 
only became a democracy much later’ (Winkler 2005:36). The difference between 
Germany, Britain and France is that ‘a national consensus for liberal political 
institutions developed much earlier in the Western countries than in Germany’ 
(Sontheimer 1999:59). After 1945 the transformation into both a Western and a 
democratic German state were thus the prerequisites for the FRG’s integration into the 
Western ‘pluralistic security community’ (Deutsch 1957). As a consequence Germany’s 
identity as a democratic Western state became constitutive of its foreign policy, for 
domestic reasons and as part of external influence. At the same time the constitution of 
German democracy and Germany’s post-war identity was intrinsically linked to the 
FRG’s position in the Euro-Atlantic system. As Fritz Stem suggests, ‘German 
democracy and German acceptance of Western traditions have been the preconditions 
for Germany's gradual reconciliation with neighbours and former enemies, with Poles 
and Slavs; for efforts at reconciliation with Jews; for a general acceptance of the burden 
of the past and a collective commitment to the future’ (Stem 2005). This was part of the 
socialisation process that West Germany underwent since 1945 and which led it to 
develop a diplomacy based on foreign policy continuity.
The domestic foundation of the nascent Federal Republic was the renunciation
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of power politics, and the acceptance of a culture of consensus and restraint through the 
Westbindung. This implied a deeper institutional focus on the inner workings of the 
young German democracy; the Atlantic Alliance, European integration and Germany’s 
‘arrival’ in the West were thus primarily understood as a domestic fortification of 
democracy. Together with constraints on sovereignty this led to a political culture in 
which foreign policy practice initially only played a secondary role. For the German 
elite Germany’s post-1945 foreign policy was characterised by engaged institutionalised 
multilateralism, commitment to European integration and alliance loyalty. But the 
debates on foreign policy never reverberated in the German domestic arena as they did 
in France or the United Kingdom. This had to do with the limited sovereignty which as 
a rule led foreign policy-makers to play the role of policy executors rather than policy 
shapers.
One of the questions put with renewed urgency in the aftermath of unification 
was whether or not Germany remained a part of the West. Ralf Dahrendorf considered 
that ‘Germany’s external position is decided by its internal strength. If the state of law 
(Rechtsstaat) and democracy are well anchored, there is no longer a question of a 
German mischief-maker in Europe or even of the ‘Reich as a European power of 
order’.40 Fritz Stem has argued repeatedly for the new Germany to make peace with 
itself, because ‘peace within a country constitutes the basis for a judicious foreign 
policy’ (Stem 2000). In this sense, the need to remember is linked to the need to use and 
exercise power responsibly. To reassure its neighbours, Chancellor Kohl asserted that 
‘for unified Germany the Atlantic and European partnerships continue to be of 
existential significance. After unification the whole of Germany is now - like the old 
Bundesrepublik before it - spiritually and politically part of the West’ (Kohl 1997).
Germany’s support for the EU’s policy of enlargement to the East was also an 
answer to that question. Through enlargement, Germany would finally be located firmly 
in the middle of the West. Joschka Fischer has termed this the great achievement of 
German democracy. Speaking before the DGAP in June 1998 shortly before becoming 
foreign minister, he stated that the Westbindung of the F.R.G. had been ‘Germany’s late 
democratic revolution’ (Fischer 1998a:80). The birth of post-1945 democracy in 
Germany was contingent upon the linkage to the U.S. For Fischer, ’Germany’s 
Westernization was the positive dissolution of all the contradictions of our history since
40 R. Dahrendorf, ‘Die Zukunft des Nationalstaates’, in K. H. Bohrer and K. Scheel, eds. ‘Deutschland in 
der Welt. Uber Aussenpolitik und Nationalstaat’, Merkur, 9/10, 1994, p. 758, quoted in C. Hacke, 
‘Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime’, in K. Kaiser and J. Krause, eds. (1996). Deutschlands neue 
Aussenpolitik. Band 3. lnteressen und Strategien. Munchen: R. Oldenboutg Verlag, p. 4.
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the creation of the first national state in 1871 ’.'41
3.2. German foreign policy debates during the Kohl government (1997-1998)
3.2.1. Germany’s role in international politics: the past and German normality
In the foreign policy debates of the 1990s there were two German elements which 
played a role in shaping foreign policy, representing the limits of responsible foreign 
policy. They can be termed the ‘power politics factor’ and the ‘Auschwitz factor’, both 
reminiscent of the various faces of the German question. First, there was the ‘power 
politics factor’ which came from the tradition of German Machtpolitik and which raised 
the question of the limits of German power and Germany as a power in the centre of 
Europe. The second element was the ‘Auschwitz factor’ which raised the question of the 
limits of German inaction in the face of international aggression. The political 
reluctance of German policy-makers to exert a more assertive role in security policy 
derived directly from Germany’s self-understanding of its own national-socialist past. 
How could ‘Auschwitz’ allow for the more interventionist role that Germany’s 
neighbours and its institutional commitments expected? The persistent tension between 
Germany’s new strategic power, and the collective memory - the selective use of the 
past to legitimate present conditions of power - of the German past (Markovits and 
Reich 1998:13-15) accentuated the contours of the debates German politicians faced 
during the 1990s.
The contrast between a new position of power through stronger international 
engagement, a new discourse of national interest and a policy of alliances, on the one 
hand, and a persistent reluctance, for historical reasons to engage in international 
politics more assertively was the dividing line which ran through the German political 
spectrum. Politicians were split between those who intended to keep the memory alive 
and use history as a reminder, as did the SPD and the Greens, and those who wanted to 
normalise Germany’s relationship with its own history and go beyond the burdens of the 
past, as did the CDU/CSU and the FDP. The CDU/CSU and the FDP leaned towards a 
more assertive international role, accepting changes in its security policy while 
maintaining institutional and alliance commitments. The SPD and the Greens, until the 
late 1990s, were more constrained, internally, to accept a new foreign policy
41 Interview with foreign minister Fischer, Der Spiegel, 18 May 2002, http://www.auswaertiges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=3173
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assertiveness.
For Chancellor Kohl, foreign policy was more ‘a reflex of personal chemistry 
than an institutional process.42 His understanding of foreign policy and European policy 
in particular was shaped by a strategic normative vision. For Kohl post-unification 
normality meant foreign policy continuity, accepting that Germany was to become more 
like other states, achieving this likeness of power through the typical means of the old 
Federal Republic: defence of national interests but through a consensual style, and an 
all-inclusive multilateralism, that did not disregard smaller member states. This implied 
accepting more international responsibility while maintaining the main foreign policy 
coordinates of the old Federal Republic: compatibility between German unity and 
European unification; the unconditional double priority of the European and the 
transatlantic pillars, linked to the bilateral relationships with France and the United 
States; and increasing Germany’s margin of manoeuvrability within these coordinates of 
continuity and alliance trust. Changes in security policy were conducted within given 
institutional structures.
Political normality thus implied the end of any kind of Sonderwege. But this was 
not the same as suggesting an end of Germany’s normative power, since normality did 
not mean ‘Germany’s belated adoption of rational decision-making, unfettered by 
normative considerations’ (Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001). Thus Germany was not 
casting off its normative power in order to become a rational power-maximizing actor; 
rather normality implied rethinking the normative foundations of German foreign 
policy, and reformulating norms hitherto valid but increasingly considered insufficient 
to position Germany before the new challenges of the post-Cold War and the post- 
September 11 world.
In practice this meant that ‘the era of jumping on the bandwagon [was] over’, as 
then president Roman Herzog alerted. ‘Germany is part of the concert of big 
democracies, whether it wants to be or not, and when one of these democracies decides 
to step aside, inevitably it damages not only the others, but ultimately also itself. (...) 
We should not take ourselves to be more important than we are, but neither should we 
pretend to be smaller than we are. (...) Increasingly we see that inaction too timid to take 
risks can in the long run be more risky than action ready to take risks’ (Herzog 
1995:162).
The domestic post-war consensus among the ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition 
and the SPD regarding Germany’s embedded multilateralism in European and
42 Conversation with Matthias Fischer, Lisbon, June 2003.
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transatlantic institutions persisted. But Germany’s security policy was challenged by the 
wars in the Balkans, which fuelled parliamentary debates. Significantly, the debates 
were as lively between the political parties as they were inside them.
Parliamentary debates were conducted in specifically German terms, such as, for 
example, debates on the rights of intervention versus non-intervention. Expressions such 
as ‘we Germans, in particular’ were ubiquitous in the German political discourse and 
functioned as a reference to the special responsibility in defining Germany’s 
international role. This says a lot about German identity and the way Germans have 
dealt with their own power: it was never dissociated from their own sense of Germaness 
and their past. Thus while wanting to become normal again, Germans continued to 
underline their own particular role to behave responsibly and normatively in foreign 
policy.
3.2.2. Debates on German security policy: Bundeswehr out-of-area interventions
After unification, the political elite had difficulty in facing tough questions over 
Germany’s new security policy and reaching a consensual position. Inhibitions about 
the projection of military force for other than humanitarian purposes initially traversed 
all political parties. Debates on Germany’s security policy and Germany’s participation 
in international military operations centred around two positions. First, the government 
position, held by the CDU/CSU and FDP, favoured a gradual participation of the 
Bundeswehr in allied military operations which could include combat operations. 
Secondly, the opposition’s stance was led by the traditional left within the SPD and one 
faction in the Green party which cautioned against any international military 
participation to resist what they saw as the temptations of a renewed German militarism. 
For centre-right parties participation in international military operations meant the 
potential recovery of responsible German power; for centre-left parties it meant the 
inclusion of Germany in a multilateral peacekeeping structure. The middle ground was 
paved by liberal arguments, in favour of intervention for moral purposes and 
humanitarian actions only.
The coalition government favoured a gradual Bundeswehr participation in 
international military missions. Both foreign minister Klaus Kinkel and defence 
minister Volker Ruhe advocated the normalisation of Germany’s military participation 
outside of the NATO area, particularly in humanitarian missions. The novelty and 
difficulty in addressing the issue of military interventionism in Somalia and Bosnia in
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the years 1992-94 led political leaders to resort to the highest judicial institution of the 
country to resolve the controversial issue. On 12 July 1994 the German Constitutional 
Court stipulated that the Bundeswehr could join UN international coercive actions in 
NATO’s out-of-area provided the Bundestag had approved the operation by single 
majority before each deployment.43 This was a way of legitimising a political position 
and putting an end to the political debate over whether or not the Bundeswehr should 
intervene at all in such situations and under which sort of mandate.
The SPD had considerable difficulty in adjusting to the new international reality 
and was reluctant to change its security policy and conceptualise a new role for 
Germany. Rather, for historical reasons the party meant ‘to show others that it did not 
want to take advantage of the new situation of regained strength, and that the country 
would stick to the modesty it displayed since the Second World War.’44 The Social 
Democrats favoured maintaining Germany’s low international political profile and 
opposed German military involvement abroad, agreeing only to German participation in 
UN peacekeeping missions against more muscular UN-mandated interventions.’45
As one SPD party member put it, ‘thinking in historical categories and [being] 
aware of historical burdens, the SPD was reluctant to accept a new role and its new 
position of power. Its priority was to make unified Germany predictable and safe for our 
neighbours (...) thus European integration was necessary to dispel our neighbours’ 
fears. However, we had to find out that our voluntary acceptance of the policy of 
modesty was not recognised to the degree we had expected. There were strong 
international expectations towards Germany playing a stronger role, and bigger 
responsibility, for example in the question of international interventions. While the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP were quick to change their positions, the SPD blocked its own 
internal change for years’.46
There were only few exceptions. Rudolf Scharping, chairman of the SPD, 
argued for a more engaged position of the Bundeswehr, and SPD foreign policy experts
43 Decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court: Bundesverfassungs Gerichts Entscheidung, vol. 90, 286, 
II, pp. 286-394.
44 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000. The Social Democrats favoured 
maintaining Germany’s low international political profile and opposed German military involvement 
abroad, agreeing only to German participation in certain UN peacekeeping missions, which the party had 
decided on at its party conference in Bremen in 1991.
45 At the SPD party conference in Wiesbaden in September 1993 the delegates adopted a resolution which 
stated that ‘Social Democratic peace policy is based on a comprehensive security definition (...) . We 
want that the military dimension o f security continues to lose significance.’ Quoted in Uwe Nerlich, 
‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Konzeptionelle Grundlagen fur multilaterale Rahmenbedingungen’, in K. 
Kaiser and H. Maull, eds. (1997). Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik. Band I. Grundlagen, Munchen: 
Oldenbourg, p. 156.
46 Interview with Gemot Erler, Berlin, September 2000.
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Karsten Voigt and Hans-Ulrich Klose suggested that their party should accept German 
military participation in both peace-keeping and peace-making UN sponsored 
operations, including combat missions. But these positions were premature within the 
SPD. This meant that until the mid-1990s the SPD was ‘confined to the sidelines of the 
debate’ (Janning 1996:38) since most SPD members opposed ‘a more prominent 
German role in the world, opposed thinking in terms of “national interests,” disputed the 
need to revise Germany’s military constraints, and believed Germany’s past prohibits 
any notion of normalization’ (Gordon 1994:238).
The turning point came in December 1997 when the SPD changed its foreign 
policy position at the party conference in Hannover. In light of the coming legislative 
elections in the fall of 1998 the decisions adopted on foreign and security policy at this 
conference changed the SPD’s traditional position towards a gradual Bundeswehr 
participation in Alliance led military missions. The party voted in favour of 
international military interventions, under the following conditions: ‘NATO operations, 
which are not collective defence operations conducted under article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, need a UN Security Council mandate when coercive measures are 
used’. In addition, ‘each military intervention to end a combat situation needs to be 
integrated into a civilian strategy’.47 With these programmatic changes, the Social 
Democrats made peace with mainstream Atlantic Alliance positions and prepared their 
party for winning the upcoming federal election.
The Greens (Biindnis 90/Die Griinen) also had a hard time in adopting its 
security policy to Germany’s new post-unification realities. They opposed the idea of a 
European military superpower and what they saw as the government’s increasing 
militarization of foreign policy, and argued for a civilian and ecological conception of 
politics. Germany’s interests should be embedded in wider European interests and rest 
on pacifism. But the Green’s party leader, Joschka Fischer, warned that ‘if  it is correct 
that the Westbindung is the central raison d’etre of the second German democracy, 
domestically as well as in foreign policy, then there is the need for a very self-critical 
discussion with national-pacifist and neutralist “special paths” in the German Left’ 
(Fischer 1994:208).
This discussion began in 1995 with the war in Bosnia with its highly divisive 
impact on the internal debates of the Green Party. The Srebrenica massacre of Bosnian 
Muslims by Serbian forces in July 1995 highlighted the inner party division between the
47 SPD party conference in Hannover, 2-4 December 1997. Beschluss zur Aussen-, Sicherheits-und 
Entwicklungspolitik, p. 32 and p.32, respectively.
48 Karl-Ludwig Giinsche, ‘Fischer-Thesen: Grune fordem Sonder-Parteitag’, Die Well, 3 August 1995.
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Realos, supporters o f a pragmatic, less ideological approach to foreign policy, such as 
Joschka Fischer, Krista Sager and Helmut Lippelt, and the Fundis, the ideological core 
of the party, in favour of maintaining a pacifist position, such as Ludger Volmer and 
Jurgen Trittin. The discussion crystallized over whether the Bundeswehr should 
intervene in Bosnia and for what reasons. For the Fundis, in the pacifist vein, ‘never 
again war’ was a sufficient moral reason against intervention; for the Realos ‘never 
again Auschwitz’ was a necessary moral reason for intervention.
At the Greens’ party conference in Bremen in December 1995 the majority of 
delegates decided against the use of force and military intervention in Bosnia. At the 
Greens party conference in Magdeburg in March 1998, the party delegates voiced their 
opposition to military combat missions and to the extension of the Bosnia mandate 
SFOR, making compromise impossible.49 The results of the vote showed a deeply 
divided party. Joschka Fischer, who favoured the SFOR mandate extension, saw his 
position within the party weakened. Six months before the general election, when the 
Greens stood a real chance of entering a federal governing coalition as the junior 
partner, the majority of members voted against the deployment of German forces 
abroad, and still favoured the substitution of NATO by a new security organisation in 
Europe. At the beginning of the election campaign, the Greens were a divided party on 
some crucial foreign policy issues.
While in international relations a wider debate was underway during the 1990s 
about humanitarian military intervention generally, the German domestic debates 
continued to highlight the problematique from a purely German point of view, and the 
responsibilities that this entailed for Germany’s new security policy in particular. 
Security policy remained a highly controversial domestic issue, with debates about 
military intervention conducted mostly in terms of Germany’s specific history and 
characteristics.
3.2.3. Debates on German European policy
In Germany’s European policy a cross-party consensus existed during the 1990s 
regarding the European Union as the preferred institution in which Germany could best 
pursue its foreign policy interests. At the same time, Germany’s European policy was 
ripe for normative change, and change was ‘purposefully sought’ (Hyde-Price and
49 The vote, which set the party line for a Bundestag vote in June 1998, scored 275 to 274 against 
adopting the SFOR mandate as a peaceenforcing measure. Die Welt, 9 March 1998.
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Jeffery 2001:692) by domestic actors to debate the role of normative power in German 
foreign policy. The debates reflected a competition among parliamentary members with 
each one trying to be more European than the other. ‘Europe’ was the sacrosanct word, 
and part of the parliamentary consensus in the German Bundestag was based on the fear 
of providing any misunderstanding or being branded as anti-European.
The CDU’s position on European policy was the continuation of the European 
integration process, strong support for EMU and EU enlargement. The party also 
supported the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, and the increase of majority 
decisions in the EU Council to make the EU capable of action in international politics.50 
The CDU argued for more assertiveness in the pursuit o f German interests as long as 
they were embedded in multilateral European structures. In the Christian Social Union 
(CSU), the CDU’s sister party in Bavaria, two positions emerged regarding European 
policy. One was represented by economics minister, Theo Waigel, the other by Edmund 
Stoiber, state minister of Bavaria. Waigel was one of the main promoters of EMU, and 
the institutionalisation of a High Representative for CFSP, arguing that Europe was a 
historical mission, in which Germany had to be anchored.51 This revealed Waigel’s 
Kohlean credentials. Under the leadership of Edmund Stoiber the CSU followed a more 
nationally orientated position, which was critical of the overall goals of European 
unification and the creation of a European federal state. During the pre-campaign year 
of 1997 Stoiber tried to assert his position more fiercely, by criticising EMU.53 Stoiber 
displayed a less emotional attachment to the European Union, arguing that the Monnet 
method and the principle of an ever closer union as set out in the Maastricht Treaty were 
no longer valid. The finality of the European Union had to be newly defined, to avoid an 
exclusively top-down integration no longer understood by German voters.54 T he 
European Monetary Union (EMU) was a classical example, at least in Germany, that the 
political elites had decided for the German people.’55 This position found wide support 
within the CSU. As Christian Schmidt put it, ‘the German method, to solve problems 
through money inside Germany does not work at the European level, unless the 
Germans are willing to pay for it. But the Germans are no longer capable of doing so,
50 ‘Europa ist Deutschlands Chance’, Decision taken at the CDU party conference in Leipzig, on 13-15 
October 1997. Protokoll, pp. 445-450.
51 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
52 See an interview with Edmund Stoiber in the Suddeutsche Zeitung on 2 November 1993, p. 14, quoted 
in Joschka Fischer, Risiko Deutschland: Krise und Zukunft der deutschen Politik, Munchen: Knaur, 1994, 
p. 336-337.
53 See ‘The princes are revolting’, The Economist, 28 June 1997, p. 45 and ‘Stoiber verscharft Konflikt 
um den Euro’, Die Welt, 30 June 1997.
54 Interview with Edmund Stoiber, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 27 September 2000.
55 Interview with Christian Schmidt, Berlin, September 2000.
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and neither is there a political will. That is why the European policy of the CSU is more 
realistic and down-to-earth; it is not anti-European, but it raises more questions’.56
The FDP had a more pro-European position. Foreign minister Klaus Kinkel 
argued that ‘Our interest is Europe. Europe must not regress into a community of 
convenience in pursuit of free trade and prosperity. ‘Europe’ has always been based on 
political ideas while economic integration has always been seen as a starting point for 
political union. We intend to retain this ‘finalite politique’.’57 For the FDP, Germany’s 
willingness to loose sovereignty, end the voting principle of unanimity and to appoint a 
general secretary for an operative CFSP was closely linked to the idea that in exchange
c o
the EU should become a more assertive actor.
In a resolution adopted at the SPD party conference in December 1997 the 
delegates stated that ‘European unification remains the highest aim of German 
politics’.59 They argued for the development of the EU towards a political union, CFSP 
and majority decisions, strengthening of the European Parliament, EU reform and 
enlargement.60
Despite strong internal party disagreements over international military 
interventions, until 1998 foreign policy remained on a path of continuity. At the end of 
the Kohl government, Germany continued to ‘exhibit strong elements of 
exceptionalism. It [was] essential that its allies recognise[d] the coexistence of these two 
dimensions in German foreign policy and work to accommodate the tensions that will 
inevitably grow out of them’ (Dorff 1997:11). Thus at the end of the Kohl government 
the political elite in Germany continued to be essentially multilateralist and to eschew 
the adoption of a national interest discourse (Paterson 1996).
56 Interview with Christian Schmidt, Berlin, September 2000.
57 Klaus Kinkel speech in Oxford, in 1996, cited in Thomas Kielinger, Crossroads and Roundabouts: 
Junctions in German-British Relations, Bonn: Press and Information Office o f  the German Federal 
Government, 1997, pp. 224 and 227.
58 Interview with Helmut Haussmann, Berlin, September 2000.
59 http//: www.spd.de Antrag A 1 (in der Fassung der Antragskommission)
ParteivorstandAuCen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik
60 SPD party conference, Hannover, 2-4 December 1997. Antrag A 1 AuBen-, Sicherheits- und 
Entwicklungspolitik, p.30.
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3.3. Political debates during the Schroder government (1998-2002)
3.3.1. Germany’s role in international politics: the Zeitgeist of the new Berlin 
Republic
That a new Zeitgeist traversed the Berlin Republic was seen in the so-called Walser 
controversy which emerged in October 1998 over the acceptance speech by the winner 
of the literary Peace Prize of the German Book Trade, Martin Walser.61 The writer had 
always been outspoken about the need to recover the national element in German 
identity. In the speech Walser delivered at the Paulskirche on 11 October he criticized 
what he saw as the ‘’’instrum entalisation” of the Holocaust argument for present
(\* kpurposes’, which produced a suffocating effect on Germany’s national identity. He 
advocated the recovery of a national normality and a different use of historical 
memory.64 The political elite should endorse the history of the new Berlin Republic as 
no longer singularised only by Germany’s guilt for the Holocaust. Instead, Germans 
(and the outside world) should accept that Germany had taken its place in the Western 
community o f ‘civilized states and democratic nation states’ (Berger 2004:247).
While the speech sparked a wide public debate, Walser had hit the tone of the 
new Republic. His position was welcomed by the new Chancellor who saw in the 
literary dispute an opportunity to push forward the discursive changes for a new 
German normality.65 In his opening speech as Chancellor before the Bundestag on 10 
November 1998 Schroder first stated that the change of government was ‘a generational 
change in the life of our nation. Increasingly, our country is shaped by a generation 
which has not experienced the Second World War directly’. This suggested that history 
continued to function as a reminder of Germany’s past, but no longer as a constraint on 
its present actions. As a consequence, Germany should act on the world stage with the 
‘self-confidence of a grown-up nation which does not have to feel inferior to absolutely
61 Roger Cohen, ’Germany searches for ‘Normality” , The New York Times, 29 November 1998. 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9405EFDA 1339F93 AA15752C1 A96E958260&sec=&sp 
on=&pagewanted=all
62 See Martin Walser, ’Uber ffeie und unfreie Reden’, Der Spiegel, 7 November 1994, pp. 130-138.
63 Speech by Martin Walser in the Frankfurter Paulskirche on 11 October 1998. Quelle: Borsenverein des 
Deutschen Buchhandels.
http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumenteAVegeInDieGegenwart_redeWalserZumFriedenspreis/
64 Walser’s speech was criticized by Ignatz Bubis, chairman o f  the Central Council o f Jews in Germany, 
who charged Walser with wanting to erase the Holocaust from the German historical memory in order to 
build a new German nationalism. See S. Berger (2004). Inventing the Nation: Germany, London: Hodder 
Arnold.
65 Egon Bahr also rose to Walser’s defense. See E. Bahr (1999). ‘Die „Normalisierung“ der deutschen 
AuCenpolitik’, Internationale Politik, 1 /1999, 41 -52.
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no one and which looks ahead prepared to face its history and its responsibility’.66
Secondly, the Chancellor emphasised a new rationale for EU membership. This 
had changed from obligation to choice: ‘we are Europeans not because we have to be 
but because we want to be’ (Schroder 1998). By implication, Germany was multilateral 
not because it had to be but because it wanted to be. This suggested that multilateralism 
was no longer automatic because it rested on fewer constraints. In remaking the 
contours of German identity and recasting the sources of identity towards a domestic 
legitimacy, this new premise could produce substantial foreign policy changes, since it 
opened the possibility for a redefinition of Germany’s European and transatlantic 
policies. This meant that Germany could soften Germany’s post-1945 alliances and 
partnerships, which no longer rested on Germany’s automatic allegiance. All this made 
Schroder, in the words of German philosopher, Peter Sloterdijk, the first chancellor of 
normality (Veit 2006:47).
The remaking of German identity was challenged each time politicians discussed 
Germany’s possible participation in a new international military operation. It was at the 
intersection of domestic political debates with foreign policy practice, particularly 
security policy, that the new identity was forged. The debates broke the taboo of 
military participation in international offensive operations, and this made possible 
Germany’s military participation in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. ‘It is not a question of 
giving the military [dimension] an undeserved space, but rather not to taboo this aspect 
of foreign policy, which has been done for too long.’67 After September 11, 2001, 
Germany’s security policy paradigm was rearranged and its security perimeter extended 
to ensure Germany’s security ‘up to the Hindu Kush’ as defence minister Peter Struck 
put i t 68
Still, considering the controversy the Walser speech caused in German society, it 
is surprising how Schroder managed to lead Germany to participate in the country’s first 
combat mission in the Kosovo war only half a year later and how he managed to 
strengthen national self-confidence through the generalised anti-war feeling in 2002-03; 
through a pacifist, traditionally left-wing and in principle anti-national argument he 
reinforced the national element in German foreign policy identity.
66 Plenarprotokoll 13/3, 10 November 1998.
67 Interview with Chancellor Schroder, Die Zeit, 18 October 2001.
68 Speech given by Struck in Hamburg on 15 October 2003, Internationale Politik, 6/2004.
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3.3.2. Debates on German security policy: German participation in multilateral 
military interventions: the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan
3.3.2.I. The Bundestag debate on Kosovo
On 16 October 1998 the Bundestag held a debate on a government proposal for 
Germany’s participation in a possible NATO led military mission in Kosovo for 
humanitarian purposes. To achieve a consensual position, the timing of the debate was 
fortunate. Shortly after the parliamentary elections and before the constitution of the 
new Red-Green coalition, the CDU/CSU and the FDP, as parties of the outgoing 
government, would hardly have criticized their previous policy on Kosovo; on the other 
hand, the incoming SPD/Greens coalition had to present a policy fit for governing, and 
ensure the foreign policy continuity both parties preached during the election campaign. 
The proposal of the outgoing government was adopted by 500 Bundestag members, 
with 62 votes against and 18 abstentions, enabling the incoming new government to 
instruct the Bundeswehr to participate in Germany’s first combat operation in a NATO
• • 69mission.
In the debate, defence minister Volker Ruhe considered that if  NATO proceeded 
with the operation in Kosovo it would be Germany’s most dangerous mission so far, 
with the employment of 500 Bundeswehr soldiers, a contribution he considered both 
necessary and significant. Wolfgang Schauble, chairman of the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary group, argued that the military mission rested on a sound basis of 
international law and was indispensable to preserve peace and human rights. Foreign 
minister Kinkel considered the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, 
responsible for the tragedy in Kosovo, for having ignored ongoing diplomatic efforts by 
the international community to find a political solution. NATO’s humanitarian 
intervention would not create a new instrument of law, and did not open a precedent 
which gave NATO general authority for interventions.
Germany’s participation in the war in Kosovo marked a break in the positions of 
the Social Democrats and the Greens with regard to their traditional pacifist stance in 
international politics. Rudolf Scharping, chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, 
argued that continued military pressure was the only way to achieve the political goal of
69 Drucksache 13/11469. Plenarprotokoll 13/248, 16 October 1998. The ‘no votes’ included one 
CDU/CSU and one FDP, 21 SPD, 9 Greens, one independent and all 29 PDS members.
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granting the Kosovo Albanians autonomy in the Yugoslav federation of states. For 
Joschka Fischer, Milosevic’s policies represented a lasting danger of war in Europe. 
Fischer believed a peaceful solution was still possible, but could only be achieved 
through the threat of the use of force.
At the Greens’ party conference in Magdeburg in March 1998 the party had still 
considered that Germany’s participation in NATO missions without a UN mandate was 
unacceptable. A year later, at the party conference in Bielefeld, in May 1999, the Greens 
engaged in a fundamental debate, ‘which almost tore us apart, because of this massive 
contradiction between our principles -  and this was for real and not the thin air of 
ideology’ (Fischer 2007: 213). Fischer made the ‘most important political speech’ of his 
life (Fischer 2007:227) in the inhospitable party conference mood. The foreign minister 
stated that his position rested on two principles: ‘never again war, never again 
Auschwitz, never again genocide, never again fascism. Both are for me inseparable’. He 
thus pleaded with party members to support his government’s Kosovo military
•  70mission. In a heated debate Fischer’s policy was approved by 444 against 318 votes, 
and the Greens had finally changed their position over the use of military force.71
Thus with the Kosovo war the utility of the past was amplified: whereas until 
1999 Germany’s history led it to shy away from international military engagements, the 
Kosovo war turned this logic on its head: because of Serbia’s human rights atrocities in 
the province of Kosovo Germany had the moral obligation to intervene and could no 
longer be a passive if paying bystander. Thus the logic of appropriateness prevailed, but 
the reasons for it changed. Now the past was distinguishable between aversion to the 
use of force and engagement with the use of force for specific (appropriate) reasons.
There was agreement among the four major parties that Germany should not 
send ground troops to Kosovo. This had to do with historical memory, but also with the 
generalised worry about Russia’s position. ‘NATO combat troops on the ground would 
send Russia into war’ claimed Edmund Stoiber, chairman of the CSU, who in mid April 
1999 visited Moscow to ensure that Russia stayed involved diplomatically in the
77Kosovo issue and refrained from using force to support Serbia. Overall, German 
political parties managed to achieve a considerable consensus on Germany’s first 
effective combat operation in a NATO led mission.
70 Speech by Joschka Fischer at the extraordinary party conference in Bielefeld, on 13 May 1999.
71 It is likely that without Fischer’s influence in the Green Party, the governing coalition would not have 
survived the Green’s internal debates on Bundeswehr interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. That is 
why he considered resigning from the party had his policy not been approved.
72 ’Bodentruppen wiirden RuBland in den Krieg hineinziehen. Edmund Stoiber wirbt nach Moskau-Reise 
um Verstandnis fur die Haltung des Kreml zur westlichen Militarstrategie im Kosovo’, D ie Welt, 12 April 
1999.
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3.3.2.2. The Bundestag debate on Afghanistan
Another decisive Bundestag debate took place over Germany’s military participation in 
the U.S. led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As a consequence of the 
terror attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the Schroder government had 
proclaimed Germany’s ‘unlimited solidarity’.73 Speaking before the Bundestag on 11 
October 2001 the Chancellor stated that ‘taking over international responsibility and 
avoid any direct risk cannot be the guideline of German foreign and security policy’. At 
the same time a new military operation in a more risk-prone environment enhanced a 
‘new self-understanding of German foreign policy’.74 This shows how foreign policy 
decisions and identity sources were closely intertwined. In his pledge for a more 
politically and emotionally sovereign country Schroder linked a more dangerous 
German external commitment to a more confident identity.
On 16 November 2001 the Bundestag members debated Germany’s military 
participation in Afghanistan. It was a debate which turned out to be as much on foreign 
policy as on the government’s position in domestic politics. Schroder combined the 
Bundestag vote on Germany’s participation in the UN military mission in Afghanistan 
with a vote of confidence for his government.75 The vote of confidence was necessary 
because of disagreements on the Afghanistan mission within the SPD and the Greens, 
rather than the opposition parties. Although all parties, except for the PDS, agreed on 
the Afghanistan mission of post-conflict reconstruction they disagreed on the voting 
procedure. A single vote on the Afghanistan mission would have produced the majority 
of votes of the opposition parties, enabling dissenters within the governing parties to 
vote against the mission, thus raising the issue of the viability of the governing 
coalition.
Although the CDU/CSU and FDP agreed on the mandate, they were not willing 
to give the government their vote of confidence, criticising the combination of both 
votes for preventing the Afghanistan mission from enjoying a wider parliamentary 
support than the voting results reflected.76 Some members of the SPD and the Greens 
were not ready to merely vote for the availability of a Bundeswehr mission and wanted
73 Speech by Gerhard Schroder before the Bundestag regarding the attacks on the United States, 12 
September 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/186.
74 Speech by Gerhard Schroder before the Bundestag, 11 October 2001, Plenarprotokoll 14/192, p. 18683.
75 See Gerhard Schroder’s speech before the Bundestag on 16 November 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/202.
76 See the speeches by Friedrich Merz, CDU, and Wolfgang Gerhardt, FDP, before the Bundestag on 16 
November 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/202, p. 19860 and p. 19866, respectively.
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to stipulate the concrete mandate mission, or they disagreed with what they saw a 
limitation of the freedom of action by the parliamentarians to decide exclusively on the 
international mandate.77
The government’s policy for a German military participation for twelve months 
in the war against international terrorism in Afghanistan was approved by a small 
margin of 336 of the 662 Bundestag members. Of the 326 votes against, four were given 
by the Greens, one by the SPD, together with all the CDU and FDP votes. Whereas in 
the case in Kosovo the main motivation for intervention had been the humanitarian 
concern to prevent a possible genocide, in Afghanistan alliance solidarity was the main 
justification that produced a parliamentary majority.
3.3.3. Debates on Germany’s European policy
In line with the government’s new assertive tone, the old foreign policy consensus on 
European policy, with a strongly Europeanised identity among Germany’s major 
parties, began to crumble. As Hyde-Price and Jeffery suggest, ‘key elites in the policy­
making process have been recalibrating their approach to Europapolitik in the light of 
their normative and ideational understandings of Germany’s foreign policy role’ (Hyde- 
Price and Jeffery 2001:697). While Kohl’s strategy had been to formulate German 
identity in line with incremental European unification - where a German identity would 
at some point become superfluous in foreign policy terms, now the locus of German 
identity should derive from the domestic setting. This was a significant change from the 
previous policy approach. Implicitly it also suggested that Schroder saw the EU less in 
integrative terms.
A more national perspective was the result of the SPD’s party congress in 
Nuremberg in November 2001 where the party delegates adopted a resolution 
(Leitantrag) on European policy.78 Part of it endorsed the traditional line towards 
European integration. More significantly, the resolution set limits on the competences of 
European institutions: competences which could be better fulfilled at the national level 
should be returned to the member states in policy areas such as agriculture and 
structural policy to widen the scope for an autonomous regional and structural policy of 
the member states. A clear assignment of competences according to the subsidiarity 
principle should be pursued at the Nice IGC in 2004 to delimit the political
77 See S. Lemke, Biindnis 90/Die Griinen, Plenarprotokoll 14/202, 16 November 2001, p. 19887.
78 Leitantrag E l, pp. 42-68. ‘Proposal: Responsibility for Europe’, National Conference o f the Social 
Democratic Party, 19-22 November 2001, http://www.spd.de/english/politics/partycongress/europe.html
82
responsibility of member states and EU. This reflected a renationalisation of the SPD’s 
European policy, and played into the hands of the Chancellor who, as former minister 
president of Lower Saxony, had voiced his scepticism towards attributing excessive 
competences to EU institutions, showing his reluctance, for example, towards EMU.
In the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the SPD supported stronger integration. In 2003 
the SPD favoured the creation o f a European Security and Defence Union with a few 
core European countries. The ‘European Security and Defence Union should be open to 
all member states who wish to join and improve the military capabilities through
79increased military cooperation to strengthen NATO’s European pillar/
The Green party supported Joschka Fischer’s vision for the future o f the 
European Union. In a speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 12 May 2000, 
Joschka Fischer advocated a European federation with a German-French core, opening 
the debate on European institutional reform. His model supported ‘the expansion of 
reinforced co-operation between those states which want to co-operate more closely 
than others’. This rested on the creation of a centre of gravity, an avant-garde group, 
‘the driving force for the completion of political integration and should, from the start,
520comprise all the elements of the future federation’.
This was not that distinguishable from the CDU’s pro-integrationist position on 
European policy. In an interview the chairman of the CDU, Angela Merkel stated that 
Germany should play a more important role in Europe and in the world. She rejected the 
idea of a ‘German way’ in foreign policy, and stated that ‘Europeans must define their 
interests more clearly in the future. This will mean a big responsibility for Germany. For 
European interests to achieve again more importance, it is necessary that Germany’s 
role also increases in European politics.’81 The CDU thus advocated an increase of 
Germany’s European responsibility to act internationally.
3.3.4. Debates on German transatlantic policy
In a Bundestag debate on transatlantic relations on 15 March 2001, party disagreements 
emerged over how to deal with the foreign policy of the new Bush administration, its 
inclination towards unilateralism and its proposed plan to create a National Missile
79 Leitantrag A 416 Internationale Politik. SPD party conference in Bochum, 17-19 November 2003, p.
14.
80 Joschka Fischer, ‘From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality o f Europe’, Humboldt 
University, 12 May 2000. www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/joschka_fischer_en.rtf
81 ’Merkel lehnt einen ’deutsche Weg’ ab’, Die Welt, 11 August 2002.
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Defence (NMD) programme.82
Foreign minister Fischer characterised the United States as having a ‘global 
order role’. Arguing for the continued presence of the U.S. in Europe, Fischer stated that 
‘if the US withdrew or diminished its presence in Europe this would push Germany into
O')
a role which it neither wants nor should strive for.’ But ‘because of the importance of 
the European unification process we will have to continuously adjust the relationship 
with Europe and transatlanticism.’ Fischer stated that ESDP was not directed against 
NATO which retained its central importance for the strategic security and defence 
capacity for Europe and for Germany. Rather than rivalling NATO’s strategic defence, 
ESDP was focused on the Petersberg missions of crisis management and conflict 
prevention. But Fischer avoided a clear position of the government regarding NMD, 
because of its ‘preliminary stage’.84
Volker Ruhe, CDU, argued that for the US to stay engaged in Europe, ‘Germany 
must become a more relevant and equal partner’ and prevent that ‘the Atlantic Alliance 
declines into a mere security net’. The CDU proposed that Germany join the NMD 
program so that it could ‘be a real partner to the U.S.’. ‘If we want to have influence on 
the Americans, then we have to state a clear German position’, in this ‘debate about a
o  c
new security strategy for the twenty-first century’, Ruhe concluded. Wolfgang
Gerhardt, FDP, suggested that ‘the real task is to coordinate positions with the 
Europeans, define a European interest and to judge critically when the Americans do not 
take European positions into consideration.’86
Michael Glos, CDU/CSU, stated in the debate that he was ‘thankful and proud to
0 7
be able to live as a German in Germany’. This, he stated, ‘we owe to the Americans’. 
Thus although both the SPD and the CDU/CSU used a similar narrative of new pride of 
the German national identity, the CDU/CSU retained the external identity sources, i.e. 
transatlanticism, whereas the SPD located them preferentially at the domestic level.
The government’s position regarding Washington’s plans to begin a war in Iraq 
produced two intense debates during the election summer of 2002. On 27 June 2002 
Karl Lamers, CDU, argued for more German assertiveness in Europe. ‘For Europe’s
82 Plenarprotokoll 14/158.
83 Speech by Joschka Fischer before the Bundestag, on transatlantic relations, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 
March 2001, p. 15376.
84 ‘Fischer wamt vor neuem Wettriisten. Aufienminister will deutsche Position zu NMD offen halten’, 
Berliner Zeitung, 16 March 2001.
85 Speech by Volker Ruhe before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March 2001, pp. 15365,
15368 and 15367.
86 Speech by Wolfgang Gerhardt before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March 2001, p. 15371.
87 Speech by Michael Glos, CSU/CSU, before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/158, 15 March 2001, p. 
15376.
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self-assertion and its identity nothing is more important than for it to have a clear idea 
about its relation with the rest of the world. Europe cannot become like America to be an 
independent and equal partner. Europe has to develop its own specific strengths. It must 
not be the same as but equal to the US. In the eyes o f the non-Western world Europe has 
to become an independent actor within the West and not only a appendage or at best a 
junior partner of the U.S., or else it cannot play the role, which is rightly expected of it,
OQ
and which would strengthen the West as a whole.’
But members of the government parties also criticized the government for not 
seriously attempting to pursue a common European position on the U.S. war plans for 
Iraq. Shortly before the election, Hans-Ulrich Klose, SPD member and part of the 
Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, gave a speech in which he criticised the 
government for weakening the West’s diplomatic position by stating beforehand
O Q
Germany’s non-involvement, and argued for a tough stance against Iraq. Christian 
Sterzing, Green Party member of the Bundestag argued that instead of going it alone, 
Germany should help find a ‘European way’ which would enable Europeans to have an 
‘effect on the American discussion’.90
The opposition parties accused the Chancellor of exploiting anti-American 
feelings for electoral purposes. The CDU’s position on the government’s Iraq policy 
was vague, falling between a cautious distancing from Washington and a soft criticism 
of the government’s rejection of military action. Wolfgang Schauble, CDU, voiced 
indirect criticism of the U.S., arguing that it would be more productive for the 
diplomatic work of the international community if  considerations other than the return 
of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq were set aside. Friedbert Pfluger, CDU foreign policy 
expert, criticised the Iraq policy of the Red-Green government for sacrificing/giving a 
considerable blow to the German-American friendship for the sake of electoral tactics.
Up until mid-August the Chancellor warned Washington not to use military 
force against Iraq. At the end of August Schroder began to state that German soldiers 
would not participate in a military strike against Iraq.91 The foreign ministry, on the 
other hand, tried to downplay the disagreements with Washington, stating that a critical
88 Speech by Karl Lamers before the Bundestag on 27 June 2002, Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 
14/245, 27 June 2002, p. 24709.
89 ’Hans-Ulrich Klose kritisiert deutsche Debatte liber Irak’, Kieler Nachrichten, 12 September 2002. 
http://www.historikertag2002.uni-halle.de/artikel/p38.shtml
90 Quotation taken from BBC Newsnight on 24 September 2002.
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/programmes/newsnight/archive/2279050.stm (accessed 26 July 2005).
91 At the beginning o f  August Schroder spoke o f the ‘German way’ in election speeches, referring to 
domestic politics. But in the heat o f the discussions over Iraq this expression became instrumental to the 
opposition who accused the Chancellor o f proposing a new German path in foreign policy.
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position regarding an attack on Iraq had been the position of the government for months 
all along.
On 13 September 2002, another emotional debate took place in the Bundestag
09over the Iraq issue. In his speech Schroder declared that the German position rested on 
‘alliance solidarity on the one hand, and [Germany’s] own responsibility, on the other.’ 
Germany’s alliance duties had been well accomplished. In the four years of Red-Green 
leadership the government had ‘proven this: in Kosovo, in Macedonia, but also with 
‘Enduring Freedom’. (...) We have made [difficult] decisions, and this has increased 
Germany’s status in the world.’ Against his critics Schroder stated, ‘this is an 
‘international policy with self-confidence and without arrogance. (...) The existential 
questions of the German nation are decided in Berlin, and nowhere else’. Regarding 
Iraq the Chancellor stated that it was not acceptable ‘that instead of the goal to 
reintroduce weapons inspectors to [Iraq], the goal should now be regime change by 
force’. This reinforced his view that ‘Germany will not participate in a military
• O '!intervention’ under his leadership.
What stands out from Schroder’s speech is that he made no reference to Berlin’s 
cooperation with partners and institutions, such as France, the EU or the UN. Thus at 
the beginning of a serious transatlantic crisis over Iraq, the Chancellor justified 
Germany’s position on the basis of a self-confident foreign policy capable of making 
decisions on its own. This was not the foreign policy continuity Germany’s partners 
were used to, and the opposition parties let their criticism be known.
In contrast, foreign minister Fischer explained the government’s policy by 
placing Germany’s role into a wider international context. ‘The decisive strategic 
question is the creation of a new world order as President George Bush and his foreign 
secretary James Baker formulated at the end of the Cold War.(...). This new order has 
to be based on a global cooperative security system. (...) The crucial question is 
whether this new world order is created through a cooperative or confrontational 
approach.’ Fischer justified his unease over Bush’s war aims by fearing that the U.S. 
might not be willing to stay in the Middle East once the intervention was over and build 
the new regional order. This would have a negative strategic implication for Europe 
because ‘as a direct neighbouring region we cannot change our geopolitical situation.’ 
For the foreign minister, the government pursued ‘peace politics on the basis o f realism. 
This means that we will present our decisions in the alliance, even if they are
92 Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 2002.
93 Speech by Chancellor Schroder before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 2002, pp. 
25582-83.
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uncomfortable, in a justified manner.’94 This was a different and more diplomatic way 
o f  handling the Iraq issue. For Fischer, it was a question of rational explanation and 
justification; for Schroder it was a question of German self-confidence and an increase 
in status.
The opposition parties criticized the Chancellor’s position as conducive to 
Germany’s international isolation. Angela Merkel, CDU, spoke of the Chancellor’s 
irresponsible u-tum from the government’s ‘unlimited solidarity’ on September 11, 
2001 to ‘unlimited unilateralism’ on September 11, 2002’, and argued for the continued 
alliance with the U.S., with democracy and freedom.95 Guido Westerwelle, leader of the 
FDP, criticised the Chancellor for the ‘state of speechlessness’ among partners, for not 
handling the issue in personal conversations with President Bush, and for not attempting 
to coordinate a position together with Germany’s EU partners. For Westerwelle, this 
amounted to a ‘break in one of the guidelines of German foreign policy.’96 Whereas the 
SPD and the Greens were against Germany’s participation in a war against Iraq, neither 
the CDU/CSU nor the FDP took a clear stance on whether Germany should participate 
in a military strike against Iraq.
The government’s position over the Iraq issue marked a caesura in German
07politics, when the old foreign policy consensus crumbled. Until 2002 the four major 
parties would probably have agreed that the basic continuity parameters of German 
diplomacy were ‘never alone, no German special path, no unilateralism, but instead a 
close binding in an ever integrating Europe, a stronger role with Europe in the Atlantic 
Alliance, and together with the Alliance and Europe assuring that the United Nations
QO
can play a stronger role for international order.’ By the summer of 2002 relations with 
America became the key, controversial, issue between the SPD-Green governing 
coalition and the CDU-FDP opposition, marking the end of the traditional consensus.
33.5. Competing approaches: Schroder and Fischer
During the Schroder government, the most significant change occurred at the level of
94 Speech by foreign minister Fischer before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 2002, 
pp. 25594-99.
95 Speech by Angela Merkel, CDU, before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 2002, p. 
25608.
96 Speech by Guido Westerwelle, FDP, before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 
2002, p. 25588.
97 ‘Das Mass aller Aussenpolitik’, Frankfurter Rundschau,7 September 2005, http://www.fr- 
aktuell.de/ressort s/nachrichten_und_politik/thema_des_tages/?cnt=722432
98 Speech by Wolfgang Schauble, CDU, before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 
2002, p. 25622.
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the sources of identity formation and change. While until then the sources of German 
identity had been mostly external, Chancellor Schroder redefined this equation by trying 
to domesticate the sources of a modified German foreign policy identity. Starting from a 
new understanding of the ideational and normative components o f foreign policy, the 
Schroder government domestically articulated policy towards change, enlarging the 
domain of policy action and elevating Germany onto a higher international standing. 
Schroder developed a new foreign policy narrative of shared meaning and helped to 
forge a collective intentionality and a legitimating framework for action to emerge in 
domestic German politics.
But the Chancellor and the foreign minister did not pursue the same foreign 
policy approaches. While they agreed on the big issues such as Kosovo and Iraq, a 
closer look revealed contending convictions regarding basic strategic foreign policy 
questions. This can be seen in their handling of questions of identity, history, interests, 
institutions, alliances and strategy.
First, for Schroder the sources of identity were national, whereas for Fischer 
Germany’s international identity was intertwined with European and American sources. 
Secondly, while a new generation of politicians no longer needed to be constrained by 
history, according to the Chancellor, the foreign minister often referred to Germany’s 
WWII history as a constraint which German foreign policy should continue to accept 
with responsibility. Thirdly, Schroder coined the term ‘enlightened self-interest’, 
according to which the country should ‘define its interests and convey them to others 
through rational arguments. The art lies in adjusting national interests with those of our 
friends so as to advocate common requests.’99 Schroder pleaded for ‘more independence 
and self-responsibility in foreign policy’.100 For Fischer, Germany’s interests should be 
pursued through a multilateral approach to German diplomacy. Fischer argued that ‘who 
reclaims a leadership role for Germany, immediately has more anger than leadership. 
Europeans react instinctively [in an] antihegemonic [way].’101
Fourthly, institutions remained important for Germany. But whereas for the 
Chancellor they should serve primarily German interests, for the foreign minister 
institutions should embed these interests in a multilateral framework. For the former, 
NATO remained important to enhance Germany’s status as a more equal partner at the 
same level as other powers. For the latter, NATO maintained the vital transatlantic unity
99 Schroder speech on 2 September 1999, in Berlin.
100 Interview with Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, Der Spiegel, 2, 5 January 2004, p. 22.
101 Interview with Joschka Fischer, by Roger de Week, ‘Ein Realo sieht die Welt’, Die Zeit, 47, 12 
November 1998.
of the Western world. Fischer argued that German foreign policy was not about 
normality but about ‘creating a new historical reality, political Europe, which began 
after 1945 and which is founded essentially on the decision by the United States to stay
1 (YJin Europe. Thus Germany should avoid the renationalisation of its European policy, a 
position not shared by Schroder who often pursued a less Europeanist policy.
Fifthly, for Fischer Germany’s predictability towards its allies and a politics of 
self-restraint were the two pillars of Germany’s external actions and alliance policy 
(Fischer 1998a). A return to ‘power politics’ in German foreign policy ‘would be 
catastrophic for our country’ (Fischer 2001a). This ran counter to Schroder’s repeated 
proclamations of a new German self-confidence. Alliances were no longer as binding as 
during the Cold War and this allowed Germany to diversify its alliance policy towards 
other actors, such as Russia.
Finally, while the Chancellor’s strategic approach accepted changes in German 
foreign policy the foreign minister’s strategic approach preached institutional continuity 
in the face of new challenges. After September 11, 2001 Fischer began to change his 
concept of a core federal Europe towards the concept of a strategic Europe. Europe’s 
new strategic outlook meant that to maintain the unity of the West a strategic dimension 
for the EU in the Middle East was necessary, including EU enlargement towards Turkey 
(Fischer 2004a). For Schroder, the cohesiveness of the West as it had existed until 1998 
was no longer the essential pillar of German foreign policy.
Parallel to these competing approaches, Chancellor Schroder’s role in foreign 
policy grew steadily, often at the expense of Fischer’s foreign ministry. With the 
creation of a European division in the Chancellorship after the 2002 elections, Schroder 
increasingly played a role in European policy, especially after he gave up his position as 
SPD party leader in 2004. Thus Fischer’s overall influence on German foreign policy 
diminished during the coalition’s second term (Grant 2005).
With regard to Schroder’s and Fischer’s approaches, the CDU stood closer to the 
foreign minister’s views, whereas in certain policies like European integration the CSU 
was supportive of the Chancellor’s positions. At the end of the Red-Green government, 
all major parties agreed that Germany’s international responsibility had grown and that 
it had to pursue a more assertive foreign policy. The difference lay in the sources of that 
new assertiveness. For the SPD, in particular Gerhard Schroder, the sources were 
essentially domestic, left-national: Germany’s new ‘enlightened self-interest’ derived
102 Interview with J. Fischer on the future o f the relationship between the U.S. and Europe, Der Spiegel,
18 May 2002, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv id=3173.
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foremost from the German national sentiment. For the CDU/CSU and FDP, the new 
assertiveness remained closely tied to Germany’s Europeanist and transatlantic 
allegiances. For the Greens, in particular Joschka Fischer, Germany’s new role 
emanated from moral responsibility and strategic vision.
3.4. Political debates and policy-making during the Merkel government (2005- 
2007)
Even though the immediate policy results of the Schroder years weakened Berlin’s 
position internationally the successor government had an increased margin of 
manoeuvrability if it knew how to play its cards well. The first two years of the Merkel 
government have revealed a willingness towards greater pragmatism in combining both 
elements of Kohlean continuity and of Schroder engagement for change. Chancellor 
Merkel has returned to a more balanced style, trying to balance divergent European and 
transatlantic interests, but has done so with a greater acceptance of Germany’s 
international role and power.
While the CDU/CSU remained the most pro-European party, the contours of its 
Europeanism have changed. Whereas it no longer uses expressions such as ‘United 
States of Europe’, it still aims for a political European Union with a common security 
and defence policy. But it has become more pragmatic in stating the need for the 
definition of external boundaries and the rejection of full membership of Turkey, 
preferring instead a ‘privileged partnership’. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) is not 
a traditional pro-European party. In addition, the SPD, unlike the CDU, has always had 
to struggle against ‘dissenters’, particularly on the regional level, like Oskar Lafontaine 
or Gerhard Schroder.
3.4.1. The role of Bundeswehr interventions: the case of Lebanon
On the issue of Germany’s international military engagement, Merkel, in contrast to 
Schroder, re-emphasised the importance of German and European history for 
Germany’s motivations. The Bundestag debate on Germany’s engagement in Lebanon 
was conducted in that light. In July 2006 a war began between Israel and the Hezbollah 
group on Lebanese soil. In a debate in the Bundestag on 6 September 2006 on 
Germany’s international operations Chancellor Merkel considered that because Israel’s 
right to existence was part of Germany’s raison d'Etat, Germany could no longer
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abstain from intervening, in political and humanitarian terms, and also militarily. But 
for historical reasons, German troops would not be stationed along the Lebanon-Israel 
border, to avoid the possibility of German soldiers (even mistakenly) shooting Israelis. 
For Germany to assert its interests in the Congo and in Lebanon, it was necessary to 
renew the emphasis on European cooperation and joint interests and an EU capable of
i maction after the transatlantic crisis. For foreign minister Steinmeier, who advocates a 
‘self-confident modesty’ (Steinmeier 2006) ‘Germany has an obligation to engage in 
stability, peace and democracy towards the people and the regions which lack the means 
for conflict resolution. This is why we will engage in Lebanon and the Middle East, at 
the side of our European partners.’ For the foreign minister the aim of Germany’s 
international deployments was never to increase its power, but to monitor peace 
processes, ensure stability and end genocide. This is the responsibility of German 
foreign policy.’ 104
Former defence minister Peter Struck agreed on the extension of the 
Afghanistan mandate, but not on a change of the mandate towards southern 
Afghanistan.105 As the Chancellor, Struck argued that Germany could not deny its 
participation in the international fight against terrorism at the risk of being isolated in 
the international community and of no longer playing the responsible role in Europe 
expected of Germany. For that reason, and because the United Nations, Israel and 
Lebanon had asked Germany for help, the SPD supported the military operation and a 
robust mandate for the Bundeswehr.
The FDP, on the other hand, had begun to change its position regarding outside 
interventions. It opposed the Bundeswehr’s mission in the Congo, rejected the extension 
of the Afghanistan mandate and indicated that it would vote against a mandate for 
Lebanon. The FDP disagreed with what it saw as a change in Germany’s security policy 
since it was Germany’s tradition not to allow for a deployment of armed soldiers in the 
Middle East.106 The FDP leader, Guido Westerwelle argued that for historical reasons 
and the vagueness of the UN mandate Germany ran the risk that its mission in Lebanon, 
even if  only at sea, degenerates into a combat mission. While the FDP did not stipulate a 
principled party position against international deployments, it increasingly questioned 
the validity of those actions. The FDP’s position reflected partly the changing 
international climate, with public opinions in many countries getting increasingly
103 Merkel speech before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/46, 6 September 2006, p. 4480-81.
104 Steinmeier speech before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/46, 6 September 2006, p.4522.
105 Struck speech before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/46, 6 September 2006, p. 4490-91.
106 Westerwelle speech before the Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 16/46, 6 September 2006, p.4506.
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frustrated over the direction of U.S. and Western policy in the Middle East, and not just 
in Germany.
The debate over Germany’s military participation in Lebanon divided the 
political spectrum down the middle. The government coalition argued that Germany had 
a growing international responsibility and faced expectations by others which led it to 
choose a responsible involvement in many parts of the world, including Israel. The FDP 
argued that because of Germany’s historical responsibility it should not get involved 
everywhere, particularly not in the Middle East. Thus the FDP’s growing scepticism 
against outside military interventions was not a programmatic line, but taken on the 
basis of each individual mission. The PDS/Linke in principle rejected Germany’s 
military engagements abroad and considered they contributed to a militarization of 
German foreign policy. On 20 September 2006 the Bundestag approved by large 
majority Germany’s participation.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the dimension of normative power in German domestic 
politics and the extent to which the contours of a changing German international 
identity have transformed the parameters of that normative power. It has studied how, 
particularly between 1998 and 2005, policy-makers reformulated Germany’s 
international identity and shaped a more utilitarian approach for foreign policy-making 
which they make acceptable domestically, with public opinion susceptible towards 
change. This remaking of identity reinforced a logic of consequentialism in Germany’s 
motivations for political action and diminished the country's predominantly normative 
orientation.
The remaking of German international identity by recasting the external sources 
of identity, locating them at the level of domestic politics, may be the most significant 
legacy of the Schroder government and of the Chancellor himself. In the years under 
analysis an active process of collective redefinition and interpretation of reality has 
taken place, which became institutionalized producing practical effects’ (Adler and 
Crawford 2004). Changes in Germany’s foreign policy identity were domestically 
induced and began shortly after Schroder became Chancellor. Berlin’s new assertion on 
the international stage was merely reinforced by President Bush’s foreign policy after 
January 2001, and after September 11, the most critical post-Cold War juncture. 
Recasting identity indicators resulted in German interests being shaped differently. The
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revived activism over a German permanent UNSC seat is a good example o f how the 
country’s new self-confidence was projected into the foreign policy domain as a 
interest.
It remains a paradox of German foreign policy that this remaking of identity 
should have come from a Social Democrat chancellor, instead of a conservative one, 
and that it encountered little real resistance. This reveals that German domestic politics 
was ready for a change in its international identity. While the parties often disagreed 
over the style of the Red-Green government, particularly its handling of the transatlantic 
crisis, all accept Germany’s more assertive role in international politics. While for 
Schroder this assertiveness followed mostly a logic of consequentialism, for Chancellor 
Merkel Germany’s assertiveness has returned to a logic of appropriateness. Thus the 
domestic debates have become more sober and less constrained by Germany’s history. 
More recent debates about the nature of Germany’s alliance commitment in Afghanistan 
were increasingly linked to the problem all NATO members face in international 
interventions, namely how to justify the cost of loss of soldiers’ lives in combat zones 
before their public opinions. It was no longer an exclusively German debate.
The following chapters will look at the practical implications of such identity 
and foreign policy transformation. The next four chapters deal with Germany's new 
security policy; Germany’s European policy; bilateral relations with France and the 
United States, and Germany's quest for permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council. These policy domains all involve fundamental choices about Germany's 
foreign policy identity, and the nature of Germany's normative power at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century.
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CHAPTER 4: Germany’s New Security Policy
4.1. Introduction: Normative power and Germany’s new security policy
In the face of international changes after 1990 and especially after September 11, 2001, 
Germany’s security policy came under increasing pressure from NATO partners to adapt 
to a more interventionist policy. At the same time, Germany has become an active player 
in the development of the EU’s ESDP. Despite the centrality of NATO for German 
security policy, Berlin supported ESDP as an additional transatlantic security institution. 
But ensuring compatibility between a new NATO and the nascent ESDP proved difficult 
for Germany, as it did for the rest of its partners.
Taking into account Germany’s bilateral relations with Washington and Paris and 
Germany’s anchor role inside NATO during the Cold War, even if as a passive actor, 
developing a European security institution would always affect Germany’s relationship 
with the U.S., particularly when it emerged amidst the worst transatlantic crisis ever. With 
the U.S. engaged in ‘coalitions of the willing’, preventive use of force and an increasing 
use of unilateralism, it seemed ever more pressing for Germany to help shape a new 
conception of European security order, be it for strengthening its own normative power, 
consolidating the new norm of international parity, or creating a more multilateral 
cooperative order.
During the Cold War, Germany’s security policy developed according to norms 
of ‘multilateralism’, ‘alliance loyalty’ and a ‘reluctance to use military force’ amidst a 
‘culture of restraint’ (Kultur der Zuruckhaltung). These normative foundations were 
consolidated in NATO. Successive governments after 1990 did not question maintaining a 
foreign policy based on normative principles whose goals continued to be the preservation 
of international peace and security, stability and peace in an integrating European and a 
multilateralist transatlantic relationship. The changes which took place occurred amidst a 
continued preference for non-military means and reluctance towards the use of force. 
Because participation or its refusal in international military operations was justified 
through the normative practice underpinning identity, as were the cases of Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, normative power has remained relevant in Germany’s security 
policy. Despite this continuity, Germany has increased its international troop deployment 
considerably, and has enlarged the conceptual scope of justification. At least since defence 
minister’s Struck famous formula of ‘Germany’s defence up to the Hindu Kush’, the 
geographical dimension of interventions has been enlarged, with operations including
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combat missions.
But relating normative power to military operations raises some questions. First, 
it questions the utility of force in enforcing norms. Before the 1990s the imposition of 
norms in Europe occurred through ‘the relative absence of physical force’ (Manners 
2002:252). During the 1990s the international community experimented with a possible 
new norm of humanitarian intervention (Dunne and Wheeler 1999) through the United 
Nations, to prevent cases of genocide. According to the new norm a state with 
normative power needed military force to stop a tyrant or a massacre. Secondly, the 
relationship between normative power and military force raises the question of whether 
a state with normative power should use military force to spread (liberal) norms when 
this is legitimized by the international community via the UN, or simply enforce peace 
and stability. In the latter case, the state would intervene towards creating local 
conditions for peace; in the former the state would intervene to impose its particular 
vision of order and governance.
This chapter addresses three sets of questions. First, how has Germany adapted its 
security policy to this new environment? Have changes occurred at the level of 
instruments only or did they challenge Germany’s foreign policy identity? Was a more 
active role for the Bundeswehr in international military missions compatible with 
Germany’s normative power? Secondly, why was Germany at the forefront of 
promoting a European security institution, given its traditional reluctance towards the 
use of force and the centrality of its security relationship with the U.S. within NATO? 
Did this indicate a more assertive Germany in security matters, more preoccupied with a 
European role than with transatlanticism? Finally, how has this reflected on Germany’s 
relationship with the U.S. and its role in NATO? Why did the Schroder and Merkel 
governments pursue an active course for NATO reform?
This chapter argues that changes in German foreign policy identity have led to 
an incremental change in Germany’s culture of anti-militarism and reluctance towards 
the use of force in peace-keeping, peace-enforcing and international combat operations. 
The participation of Bundeswehr troops in out of area humanitarian and combat 
missions has not turned invalid the notion of normative power. Participation in the war 
in Kosovo, in Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan and the refusal to 
join the war in Iraq all preceded lengthy parliamentary debates about how to combine a 
new interventionist policy with the continuation of normative power and a culture of 
restraint. Military force remains an instrument of last resort of an otherwise normative 
state identity.
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However, successive governments have now pursued a more utilitarian approach 
towards Bundeswehr operations abroad and have capitalized politically on Germany’s 
increasing participation. At the same time Germany has advanced ESDP with 
generalized domestic support, reflecting its will to proceed with an ever closer 
integration with other EU members in defence matters. This had to be accommodated 
with Germany’s relationship with Washington and its position in NATO where it has 
called for reforms and more consultations rights for itself and for Europe.
The challenge for German security policy has been to project its normative 
power, hitherto successfully used in most other foreign policy domains, onto the use of 
military force for the purpose of humanitarian interventions and post-conflict 
stabilization missions. Considering that these new international missions were being 
conducted in a normative understanding regarding the use of military force -  to protect 
innocent lives and create conditions for regional stability -  it was all the more 
remarkable how German policy-makers increasingly combined a logic of 
appropriateness with a logic of consequentialism in a highly normative set of questions.
4.2. The Kohl government 1997-1998
4.2.1. The end of the ‘culture of restraint’?
After 1990 Germany’s traditional ‘culture of restraint’ came under pressure despite the 
institutional continuity of NATO as the main security institutions for Germany’s 
Westbindung in a transatlantic security community. As then defence minister Volker 
Ruhe put it before the Bundestag in the early 1990s, ‘the culture of restraint which has 
developed in Germany in the last forty years, for which we don’t have to feel ashamed, 
cannot simply be ordered away. But it is also right that we can no longer make use of 
this restraint in a world that no longer exists. That is why we have to act together with 
others.’107
During the Cold War Germany’s security policy was constrained by a military 
taboo. First, Germany should not participate actively in military operations outside the 
NATO area, and never in combat missions. Secondly, it should not send troops to places 
where the German military had acted as an aggressor state during the Second World War. 
After 1990, the first premise was slowly surpassed by the Kohl government with
107 Speech by Volker Ruhe before the Bundestag, Bonn, 22 July 1992, Stenographischer Bericht, Presse- 
und Bundesamt der Bundesregierung, p. 8640.
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Bundeswehr participations in Somalia and Cambodia for humanitarian and peacekeeping 
reasons. In April 1993 the Bundeswehr participated in the NATO AW ACS mission 
under a UN Security Council mandate in the military enforcement of the no-fly zone over 
Bosnia. Because these interventions, particularly the one in Bosnia, were domestically 
controversial, the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on 12 July 1994 stipulated the 
legality of the Bundeswehr’s participation in out-of-area operations, thus facilitating the 
end of the German taboo.108
After 1994 the number of Bundeswehr soldiers deployed in peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcing missions around the globe rose steadily. At the time of change of 
government in October 1998, Germany had around 2800 soldiers participating in UN 
mandated peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Georgia. Over the next nine years the 
number of troops deployed reached almost 10.000 and the scope o f deployment was 
enlarged to places like Afghanistan, Congo, Djibouti, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Horn of Africa, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon and Macedonia.
4.2.2. Germany and NATO enlargement
Germany was an active participant in the transformation of the security landscape in 
Europe, becoming one of the staunchest supporters of the integration of Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary into NATO. Defence minister Ruhe had pushed for NATO 
extension to the Visegrad countries as early as the Spring of 1993 (Tewes 2002 and 
Arora 2006).109 Chancellor Kohl was at pains to balance the Central and Eastern European 
countries’ interest to join NATO with Russia’s unease over NATO enlargement. For then 
Russian foreign minister, Jewgenij Primakow, NATO enlargement ‘was possibly the 
biggest mistake since the end of the Cold War.’110 While trying to accommodate the 
interests of all parties through highly personalized relationships, Kohl gave a decisive 
impulse towards redefining the relationship between NATO and Russia, paving the way 
for the NATO-Russia Act on mutual relations, cooperation and security on 27 May 1997.
108 The decision stipulated that on the basis o f Article 24 of the Grundgesetz German soldiers could join 
UN peacekeeping contingents. It ruled that the deployment o f  troops could occur even when the UN 
mission involved a mandate to carry out acts o f military coercion. Furthermore, German troops could be 
assigned to NATO contingents deployed in UN missions. To ensure the democratic legitimacy o f  such 
military missions the federal government would have to seek approval by the German parliament by 
simple majority before deploying armed troops. Decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court: 
Bundesverfassungs Gerichts Entscheidung, vol. 90, 286, II, pp. 286-394.
109 V. Ruhe (1993). ‘Europe and the Alliance: key factors for peace and stability’, NATO Review, 41(3), 
12-15, and V. Riihe (1993). ‘Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era’, Survival, 
(35)2, 129-137. See also ‘Ewiger Frieden’, Der Spiegel, no. 40, 3 October 1994, 36-37.
110 Quoted in Karl-Ludwig Giinsche, ‘Wie sich Russland die Nato-Osterweiterung vorstellt’, Die Welt, 1 
April 1997.
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At the Madrid summit on 8-9 July 1997 joint NATO membership was offered to
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. For Ruhe, the Madrid summit had ‘finally
closed a chapter of the past’ and given NATO a new profile.111 Its new tasks were the
‘transfer of stability, practical cooperation with non-NATO states and international
crisis management in and for Europe’. ‘The new NATO will reflect the Europeans’ will
for its own capacity for action. When the U.S. is not directly involved, European
leadership will be possible in operations with NATO means and forces. This is because
NATO reflects also a new partnership between North America and Europe, which takes
11^
shape through a new division of burden and responsibility.’ However, the relationship 
between the EU and NATO was ‘one of the least well-defined aspects of contemporary 
European international politics: rarely discussed within Governments, let alone between 
the two international institutions’ (Wallace 1999:203). Redefining this relationship 
proved to be, only a few years later, one of the main challenges for the new German and 
European governments.
43. The Schroder government 1998-2005
4.3.1. Germany’s policy for Kosovo
The approval of a mandate by the Bundestag for the Bundeswehr to participate 
militarily in the likelihood of a NATO intervention in Kosovo was taken on 16 October 
1998, shortly before the new Red-Green government assumed office. Germany was the 
last NATO member country to decide its participation in the military intervention 
(Philippi 2001:63).
What were the reasons for Germany’s participating in NATO’s combat 
mission Allied Force in Kosovo? First, a general sense of shame over the human rights 
abuses and the mishandling of the Balkan crises in the early 1990s served as a catalyst 
for action in 1999, propelled by the failure of European states to deal adequately with the 
war in Bosnia and the dependency on the U.S. to broker a peace deal in Dayton in 
December 1995. The systematic human rights abuses of the Kosovo Albanians by the 
Serbian government’s forces led the outgoing Kohl government and the incoming 
Schroder government to apply the new norms, avoiding civilian casualties (Gentry 
2006), and justifying humanitarian intervention. War had ‘moved from being the
111 Ruhe speech in Garmisch Partenkirchen, 29 April 1997.
112 Ruhe speech in Garmisch Partenkirchen, 29 April 1997.
98
epitome of failure or domination to being a necessary instrument of humanitarianism’ 
(Hill 2003:238).
Secondly, international expectations on Germany to assume a responsible 
international new role pushed political action. As Chancellor Schroder stated, ‘we 
cannot evade our responsibility. This is the reason why for the first time since the
113Second World War German soldiers are in a combat mission’. The old 
Genscherian ‘policy of responsibility’ of non-intervention was no longer valid. 
Because Germany was a responsible member of the international community a 
reformed version of the concept of responsibility produced a more active foreign and 
security policy.
Thirdly, Germany followed the norms of multilateralism and alliance 
commitments. On 15 April 1999 Schroder declared before the Bundestag that ‘there can 
be no doubts as to our reliability, our determination and our steadfastness. Germany’s 
embeddedness in the Western community of states is part of the German raison d ’Etat. 
There can and there will be no Sonderweg with us’.114 Given Russia’s threat of the use 
of its veto, because of its traditional protective relationship towards Serbia, the issue 
was not voted in the UNSC, and the NATO operation occurred without a UN 
mandate.115 Here, the norms of alliance loyalty and human rights collided with the norm 
of respect for international law.116 This was so because ‘NATO is a community of values. 
Together with our allies we are fighting in Kosovo for our values: for human rights, 
freedom and democracy.’117
Finally, Germany’s engagement had also ‘to do with how Europe shall look like in 
the next century.’118 This suggests that, besides alliance motivations, a new logic of 
justification was Berlin’s concern with norms of (European) order, stability and alliance
113 Speech by Chancellor Schroder before the Bundestag on the situation in Kosovo, 15 April 1999, 
Plenarprotokoll 14/32.
1,4 Ibid.
115 Despite the lack o f a UN mandate, the intervention was seen as legitimate by the international 
community. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, did not explicitly reject the use o f force. Two months 
before the beginning of NATO’s operation, he stated: ‘The bloody wars o f  the last decade have left us 
with no illusions about the difficulty o f halting internal conflicts - by reason or by force - particularly 
against the wishes o f  the government o f a sovereign state. But nor have they left us with any illusions 
about the need to use force, when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, 
in the former Yugoslavia.’ Statement by Kofi Annan, Secretary General o f the United Nations to the 
North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, 28 January 1999, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990128a.htm.
116 International law itself was lagging behind the fastness o f international events. The UN Charter in its 
article 51 only allowed for individual and collective self-defence against aggression from another state. 
The need for international humanitarian intervention and military action against a state is not stipulated by 
the Charter.
1,7 Speech by Chancellor Schroder before the German Bundestag on the situation in Kosovo, 15 April 
1999, Plenarprotokoll 14/32.
118 Ibid.
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loyalty, revealing the government’s increasing manoeuvring in the utilitarian realm of 
political action. Creating the conditions for a more stable order in South-Eastern Europe 
was of interest to Germany. The ongoing human rights violations in Kosovo had already 
provoked an elevated number of refugees, and taking into account the Bosnia 
experience a few years earlier, Germany could well become the destination for many 
Kosovo Albanians. Thus creating stability in the Balkans was a preventive mechanism 
to anticipate possible domestic societal and financial implications due to the refugee 
question.
The limit for Germany’s participation was the use of ground troops. Chancellor 
Schroder stated that ‘the Federal Government, supported unanimously by the members 
of the German Parliament (...) opposes sending in ground forces and this is very much 
to do with the fact that NATO strategy, a strategy that we developed together, is slowly 
beginning to take effect, and it is supporting a political settlement.’119 But the main 
reason was that the use of ground troops would drag Russia into the war, on the side of 
Serbia leading the government to bind Russia to the diplomatic initiative of ending the 
war.
The demands of the international community remained clear: the immediate end 
of all acts of aggression, retreat of all military forces, stationing of international military
forces and the return of refugees. On 5 June 1999 the UNSC adopted resolution 1244 to
1 ->0end the war in Kosovo. As one German politician put it, ‘this resolution left all options
open with regard to the future status of Kosovo, including Kosovo’s independence, and it
1^1was signed by all Security Council members, including Russia’. On 6 June 1999 the 
Bundestag approved the Bundeswehr participation in KFOR, NATO’s force for the 
stabilization of Kosovo, in a multinational contingent made up of 8500 personnel, to begin 
peace-enforcement in the Serbian province of Kosovo.
The war in Kosovo produced significant consequences for Germany’s security 
policy. First, it represented a path breaking event in the gradual return to normality. It 
broke a double taboo. It helped Germans overcome the legacy of Auschwitz, not by its 
eradication from collective memory, but as a way for Germans to begin taking part in 
multilateral military operations for humanitarian reasons and which could involve 
combat missions. It was also path-breaking in that Germany’s military power was no 
longer taboo as an effective foreign policy instrument and could even be projected
119 Press conference by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, and Gerhard Schroder, Brussels, NATO 
Headquarters, 19 May 1999. http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990519a.html
120 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999.
121 Confidential interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
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outside Europe. Domestically, Kosovo put into practice what Chancellor Schroder defined
1 *7*7as ‘ending the military taboo’ in Germany’s security policy.
Secondly, two new norms were introduced into Germany’s security policy. On
the one hand, the norm of intervention for humanitarian purposes became part of
German diplomacy. This did not constitute a break with the norms and values
underpinning Germany’s normative power. Because the country participated through
institutional multilateral means, and for humanitarian purposes, this new position was
not contrary to a normative conception of foreign policy, thereby enlarging the realm of
normative power. But on the other hand, Germany’s military participation in Kosovo
was seen as an entitlement for a new narrative of increasing self-confidence and
maturity in foreign and security policy. The Chancellor introduced a new norm of
international parity, expecting, from Washington, more consultation rights over NATO
issues, and to be able to look its NATO partners in the eye. This was a new form of
alliance loyalty in that Germany tried to increase its margin of manoeuvrability and score
diplomatic points, signalling that it was ready to assume a new position within the alliance
framework. The Kosovo war coincided with Germany’s EU presidency and diplomatic
initiatives for post-war Balkan stability served to reinforce Schroder’s ambition to
attempt to locate Germany on a higher international standing. ‘On the Balkans -  I
believe this can be stated with certain pride’, the Chancellor said, ‘the Bundeswehr has
stood the test and has proven that regarding its efficiency and motivation it does not
1need to shy away from a comparison with our allies and partners in any way.’ As 
Wolfgang Ischinger, secretary of state in the foreign ministry stated after the war, 
‘Germany emerged from this crisis as a partner whose voice today has more weight than 
before.’124
Thirdly, the experience in Kosovo reinforced Germany’s conviction to promote 
the ESDP, to which Britain and France had given the decisive impulse through the St. 
Malo declaration on defence in December 1998. Finally, the Kosovo war also 
highlighted the need for the Bundeswehr to transform itself from a territorial defence 
army to a more flexible and interventionist army. Both these points will be discussed 
further below. For Germany, which held the EU presidency, the priority now was to 
devise a post-conflict reconstruction plan.
122 Interview with Chancellor Schroder, Die Zeit, 18 October 2001.
123 Schroder, ‘Bundeswehr und Wirtschaft -  eine strategische Partnerschaft auf dem Weg in den 
modemen Staat’, CD Rom Bulletin, Nr. 24, 5 May 2000.
124 Wolfgang Ischinger, ‘Keine Sommerpause der deutschen AuBenpolitik. Zwischenbilanz nach dem 
Kosovo-Krieg’, Internationale Politik, 10/1999, 59-63.
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4.3.1.1. The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe
Proposals regarding the conceptual framework for a stability plan for the Balkans were 
developed within the foreign ministry as early as January 1999. For Joschka Fischer, 
the success of the Stability Pact was ‘a question of the political reliability of Germany
10f\and Europe’s foreign policy’. The German EU presidency developed a post-conflict 
reconstruction plan for Kosovo, through a combination of measures of security 
stabilisation, economic development and respect for human rights. Part of the Stability 
Pact for the Balkans was the inclusion of the long term prospect of future EU and
1 97NATO membership for the countries in South-Eastern Europe. In the preparatory 
conference between representatives of over thirty countries and organisations on the 
Petersberg, in Bonn, on 27 May 1999, Fischer stated: ‘We have to do today for 
Southeast Europe, what was done for the West after 1945 and for the East of our 
continent in 1989, namely to open a way to pacify the region, through the creation of 
stable requisites for democracy, market economy and regional cooperation as well as 
lasting embeddedness of these states in the Euro-Atlantic structures’. This implies that 
‘all successor states to Yugoslavia and Albania need to be given the offer of a clear EU
t jo
membership perspective, even if  this is achievable only in the very long term’. On 10 
June 1999 the European Council in Cologne adopted the Stability Pact for South- 
Eastern Europe, a long term multilateral conflict prevention strategy and an institution
19 0to promote security, democracy and social and economic growth in the region. The 
Stability Pact for the Balkans thus ‘opened the way to Brussels and led the region 
towards the Europe of integration’ (Fischer 2004a).
The Stability Pact had two dimensions: one created a system of interwoven 
institutions relating to Brussels; a second one created a web of relationships among 
states in the region (Joetze 2001:175-76). Thus the stability pact inaugurated a new 
approach to post-conflict reconstruction and it opened up a new strategic dimension for 
EU foreign policy. Not only was Europe concerned with contributing to the inner 
stabilisation and nation-building of the Kosovo area: the aim was to ensure stability in
125 Interview with Christian Sterzing, Berlin, September 2000.
126 Speech by foreign minister Joschka Fischer before the Bundestag on the Balkan Stability Pact on 
Southeastern Europe, 27 January 2000, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6%5Farchiv/2/r/r000127a.htm
127 Not every EU member supported the perspective o f EU membership for Albania or Macedonia.
France, Holland and Spain showed their disagreement. ‘Europa will dem Balkan helfen’, D ie Welt, 25 
May 1999.
128 Speech by foreign minister Fischer at the preparatory conference, Petersberg, Bonn, 27 May 1999. 
Bulletin, No. 34, Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 31 May 1999.
129 Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Presidency Conclusions, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/koll_en.htm
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the Balkan region, with potential future EU membership. Europe was paving the way 
for the region’s future institutional order and allegiance, and by implication, shaping the 
region’s future foreign policy.130
The Kosovo crisis was an example of Germany’s normative power projection 
and active engagement in institutional multilateralism. Two instances of normative 
power were subsequently at play. First, Germany, along with other countries, imposed a 
set of norms by military force, to end genocide and create a safe environment for the 
projection of norms. In the second instance, and as part of the initial decision to strike 
military action against Serbia, the German presidency took the initiative for post-conflict 
civilian measures for Kosovo. In forging a diplomatic initiative, Germany displayed 
normative leadership inside the EU by making the case for the linkage between military 
and civilian instruments.
Germany had become an active player but during the crisis its preferred approach 
from Berlin’s perspective was to concert with only a few powers outside the CFSP 
framework through the so called Contact Group, created in 1994 between United States, 
Germany, France, Britain and Russia to deal with the crisis in Bosnia. This was seen as 
more effective since it allowed for the inclusion of Russia, and for a more active 
German position which it could not have enjoyed in the UN Security Council. Another 
mechanism was the Quint, the gathering of the foreign ministers of the United States, 
Germany, Britain, France and Italy, who through daily telephone conferences 
accompanied the development of the Kosovo war. As former foreign minister Fischer 
says, ‘the Quint quickly evolved into ‘a highly efficient, direct and also informal 
instrument of coordination and leadership for Western and transatlantic policy’ (Fischer 
2007:168). Thus at the same time as Germany was promoting CFSP through its EU 
presidency it was effectively concerting its actions with a few big players in what some 
have described as a i directoire, in the sense that it appears to be a leadership group in 
the EU decision-making process that takes decisions affecting the interests of other EU 
Member States and this without their participation’ (Gegout 2002:332).
Consequently, the Kosovo war and its outcome represented a successful path 
defining moment and critical juncture for German security policy. Kosovo had revealed 
Germany’s effective crisis management capabilities, widening Germany’s margin of 
military manoeuvrability and catapulting Germany onto a more equal standing among the
130 For articles on the stability pact see Emil G. Mintchev (2000). ‘Europa und die Probleme des Balkans. 
Ein Jahr Stabilitatspakt fur Sudosteuropa’, Internationale Politik, 55 (8), 53-58. Andreas Wittkowsky,
‘Der Stabilitatspakt fur Sudosteuropa und die "fiihrende Rolle" der Europaischen Union’, A us Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, B 29-30/2000, S. 3-13. Marie-Janine Calic (2001). ’Der Stabilitatspakt fur Sudosteuropa’, 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 13-14, 9-16.
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greater European powers and the U.S. The traditional military culture of restraint had been
enlarged to combat missions for humanitarian purposes, with implications for foreign
policy. Germany now felt legitimized to pursue its interests more assertively. In this sense,
Kosovo was Schroder’s ‘very good war’ and became a catalyst for a more assertive and
1 % 1self-confident Germany.
4.3.2. The development of the ESDP and Germany’s role
While negotiations for NATO’s potential intervention in Kosovo were underway, France 
and Britain gave the decisive impulse for the development of the ESDP in December 1998 
(Howorth 2000). The St. Malo declaration on European defence stipulated that on the basis 
of the Amsterdam Treaty the EU should proceed towards a common European Security 
and Defence Policy within the realm of CFSP.132
Some argue that the St. Malo declaration was a British-French reaction against 
the increase of German power (Jones 2003). This would suggest that NATO’s historical 
function, ‘to keep the Germans down’, had been transferred to the new ESDP since 
NATO could no longer perform that function. It seems more plausible however, that the 
initiative stemmed from the wars in Bosnia in the 1990s which had a galvanizing effect 
towards progress in European security and defence issues (Howorth 2001). First, the war 
in Kosovo laid bare what Bosnia a few years earlier had revealed already: the weakness 
of Europe’s military capabilities had produced a situation where operations were 
effectively conducted mostly by the Americans. The Europeans flew only 30 per cent, 
according to American sources, only 20 per cent of the operations (Joetze 2001:193). St. 
Malo was a response to EU members’ weaknesses in acting alone and the need for 
greater integration of EU countries’ defence policies. Secondly, British and French 
policy-makers realized that increased capacity for autonomous military operation was 
necessary to strengthen Europe’s defence pillar within NATO against American military 
and political predominance.
The St. Malo initiative was well received by the German government which 
used its EU Council presidency to embed it in the wider EU framework. The Cologne 
European Council summit in June 1999 paved the way for the ESDP and a European 
Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) as the core of independent EU armed forces to be
131 John Vinocur, ‘Schroder under heavy fire on domestic front’, International Herald Tribune, 22 May 
1999.
132 Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence, 4 December 1998. 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/edu/adl/standalone_obj/22224/scos/l/documents/0.pdf
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1 'X'Xestablished at the Helsinki European Council summit in December 1999. Under the 
‘Helsinki Target Goals’ EU members were to provide a collective force of 60.000 
troops, deployable outside the EU area within sixty days, self-sustainable for up to 12 
months, and operational by May 2003. The ERRF would operate in and outside NATO 
areas when NATO could not intervene, or decided against it. Berlin assured 
Washington that ERRF was neither a decoupling from the Atlantic Alliance nor an 
unnecessary duplication of NATO structures and that it should be created in close 
agreement with the United States and its forces deployed only as a subsidiary to 
NATO.134
Why did Germany actively promote a European security institution, given its
traditional reluctance towards the use of force and the centrality of its security
relationship with the U.S. within NATO? First, the wars in the Balkans were the catalyst
in strengthening the German and other European governments’ resolve to push ESDP 
1forward. The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo had shown that Washington did not treat 
Europeans equally in political terms. The lack of effective co-decision strengthened 
Berlin’s resolve to side closer with Paris, even more so that France had signed the St. 
Malo treaty alone with Britain, accentuating Germany’s handicaps in the military 
domain.136 Britain’s active participation was important since Germany and France had 
not developed a defence relationship, despite their close cooperation in many other 
integration domains. Second, Berlin’s attempt to coordinate its moves closely with 
France signalled receptiveness towards Paris’s ambition of a European defence more 
autonomous from Washington. The irritating Brussels summit on 29 April 2003 where 
Germany and France, together with Belgium and Luxembourg discussed EU military 
capacities and the creation of independent European headquarters showed that the 
transatlantic crisis was not only unfolding in the UNSC over Iraq but that Berlin and 
Paris were serious about European defence. Schroder envisaged European autonomy in 
crisis management tasks, while NATO should be limited to collective alliance defence. 
For the German government ‘ESDP was conceived as the basis for a new Atlanticism’, 
where ‘only a stronger Europe would get a hearing in Washington’ (Rudolf 2005:136). 
Finally, Germany wanted to embed its new military role in a Europeanised framework 
(Jeffery and Paterson 2003:67). Germany conceived of ESDP on the basis of its position
133 European Council Declaration ‘On Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence’, Annex III to the Presidency Conclusions, (Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999), sec. 1- 
5, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe en.htm#a3.
134 Interview with Friedbert Pfluger, CDU, Berlin, September 2000.
135 See Karsten Voigt, ‘The Discussion o f a European Security and Defense Policy: Labor Pains o f a new 
Atlanticism’, speech in Washington, 8 March 2000. www.auswaertieesamt.de
136 Interview with Andreas Schockenhoff, CDU, Berlin, September 2000.
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as a ‘Friedensmacht a peace power, a model Germany tried to project onto European 
structures and to engage in long-term commitments towards post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts.
But Berlin’s support for the creation of a European rapid reaction force had to be 
backed by increasing defence expenditures. Furthermore, Germany was incapable of 
conducting an autonomous international military operation comparable to the operations 
undertaken by France in the Cote d’Ivoire or Britain in Sierra Leone (Veit 2005). 
Discrepancies in military structures were ‘bound to lead to disagreeable differences 
within the Alliance as well as between Europeans. Germany is likely to be identified as 
the main culprit for slow progress in this field’ (Joetze 2002:15). Others understood the 
ESDP ‘as a possibility for transatlantic synergy, and not as a vehicle for European 
emancipation. Any independent security policy or military action of the EU will only be 
able to deal with conflicts on the lowest end of the intensity scale. For any greater 
military crisis, the support of the USA remains indispensable’ (Kamp and Masala 2006). 
The U.S., of course, was reluctant to accept a change of its own status within NATO, 
from hegemonic leadership to increasingly cooperative parity, which is what Germany’s 
position implied.
The new defence minister, Peter Struck, who assumed office on 25 July 2002, 
brought a more assertive tone than that of his predecessor Rudolf Scharping into the 
security discourse. ‘Germany’s role and responsibility for security in Europe and peace 
in the world have grown still further. Our interests, our responsibility as a major and 
strong European state and our international commitments have resulted in a constant 
increase in the number, intensity, size and duration o f the operations in which the 
Bundeswehr participates. Today, we are one of the largest troop-contributing nations
1T7with respect to international peace support operations’. ‘Germany has become a 
grown-up, also in the military dimension’.138 Therefore Germany could reclaim a right
1 “5 Q
to have a say in NATO’s international operations.
Struck argued for a redefinition of the NATO-EU relationship. ‘At least since 
the war in Kosovo Europeans have come to realise that conflicts in Europe will remain 
possible. That is why a bigger capacity for action for the EU and for the Europeans in 
NATO reflects the new security situation and the logic of European integration. 
Reducing the EU to the status of a ‘civilian power’ would not be in the interest of an
137 Opening speech by Peter Struck, at the conference ‘Impulse 21 - Berlin Forum on Security Policy’, 
Berlin, 23 June 2003.
138 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 August 2005.
139 Struck Interview on 14 September 2005 http://www.dradio.de/dkultur/sendungen/interview/418032/
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effective policy for peace/140 The relationship between NATO and the EU was ‘not a 
question of European "counterweights” to a dominating superpower.’ It was a question 
o f an efficient partnership on equal terms between democratic states which are and will 
remain dependent on one another to guarantee their security (Struck 2004). As Karsten 
Voigt, the coordinator for German-American relations in the Foreign Ministry made 
clear, ‘It is not in our interest to accept a global division of labour as occasionally 
envisaged by Washington -  “the US fights, the UN feeds, the EU funds”.141
At the height of the transatlantic crisis in 2003 defence minister Struck 
highlighted two questions affecting the basic concepts of security within the Euro- 
Atlantic community. Before a national audience he enquired, first, ‘Are we still making 
political and military plans for the same operational scenarios on each side of the 
Atlantic?’ Secondly, ‘Do we still have the same perception of the threats to our security 
and how far do we agree on the importance of military power to avert dangers?’142
By 2003, the EU had developed a joint European policy for the Balkans. 
Considering that ten years earlier, such a policy would have been unthinkable it was an 
achievement for the young ESDP to have European forces taking over political and 
military responsibility from NATO in Macedonia and Bosnia. This produced two 
consequences. First, it showed that however limited, the EU had the civilian and 
military capabilities to engage in post-conflict peace-enforcing and reconstruction 
missions. Second, the transference of power and responsibility from NATO to the EU 
showed that the Balkans had gradually become the EU’s main responsibility.143
4.3.2.I. The European Security Strategy
2003, the year best remembered for the transatlantic crisis, was an important year for the 
development o f ESDP. The ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement between the EU and NATO in 
March 2003 set the framework for a strategic partnership between the two institutions 
with the aim o f stipulating the realms of action, the use of NATO facilities for EU
140 Speech given by Struck in Hamburg on 15 October 2003. http://www.bmvg.de/archiv/reden/ 
minister/031015_struck_festvortrag_hamburg.php>.
141 K. Voigt (2002). ‘EU-USA: Transatlantische Beziehungen in der Bewahrungsprobe’, speech at the 
Institut fur Europaische Politik, 4 June, http://www.auswaerti ges- 
amt.de/www/de/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=3247
I42Opening speech by Peter Struck, at the conference ‘Impulse 21 - Berlin Forum on Security Policy’, 
Berlin, 23 June 2003.
143 This did not mean that Washington was no longer influential in the area. Its support for the 
independence o f  Kosovo and the pressure it exerted on some European capitals could be seen earlier this 
year before the proclamation o f independence on 17 February 2008.
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operations, and avoid duplication.144 In operation Concordia as in future EU operations, 
the agreement granted the EU access to NATO’s military assets and military planning 
facilities and structures. At the end of November 2003 France, Germany and Britain 
presented a joint paper entitled ‘European Defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning 
and operations’, later adopted by the Brussels European Council on 12 December 
2003.145 The transatlantic crisis itself had proved a catalyst for a strong ESDP.
At the Brussels European Council, the EU also adopted Europe’s first Security 
Strategy (ESS). The ESS affirms Europe’s determination in ‘guaranteeing a secure 
Europe in a better world’, through effective multilateralism. It envisaged a preventive 
engagement strategy, aimed to empower the EU ‘to act before countries around us 
deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian 
emergencies arise.’ In the fight against terrorism the EU adopted the strategy against the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.146
For the German government the ESS was ‘a milestone for the strategic definition 
of the role and the tasks of the EU in a dramatically changed security context and under 
the conditions of globalisation. After the Iraq conflict the ESS sends a central internal 
and external message: the EU has the claim to speak with one voice when it comes to 
face the challenges and risks of our time.’147 Some German academics and policy­
makers considered the ESS so important for Germany that they questioned whether 
Germany, which lacked a national security strategy, needed one at all. Christoph 
Heusgen, security and foreign policy adviser of Chancellor Merkel, and Christoph 
Bertram argued that the ESS covered Germany’s national security concerns, while 
Wolfgang Ischinger, German Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and Klaus Reinhardt, 
former general of the Bundeswehr, wondered that Germans even discussed the issue of 
whether every country needed to have their own security strategy.148 For Ischinger, the 
European Security Strategy was compatible with Germany’s interests not least ‘because 
we introduced these interests into the conception of the ESS’. But the domestic political 
debate and the democratic legitimization of German foreign policy would only benefit if
144 Statement by NATO’s Secretary General on the Berlin Plus Agreement, 17 March 2003. ‘From 
Copenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers, 67, December 2003, 48- 
49.
145 Joint Paper by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Naples, 29 November 2003. ‘From 
Copenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers, 67, December 2003.
146 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, European Security Strategy, Brussels European Council, 12 
December 2003. ‘From Copenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers, 
67, December 2003.
147 Reply o f  the government (Drucksache 15/3181,21 May 2004) to a set o f  questions put forward by the 
CDU/CSU on the importance o f the ESS for Germany (Drucksache 15/2888, 30 April 2004).
148 1 35th Bergedorfer Round Table, ‘Interests and Partners o f German Foreign Policy’, September 29 -  
October 1 2006, Berlin, p. 43-45.
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the ESS was complemented by a German foreign and security strategy, Ischinger 
concluded.149
At the same time as Germany promoted ESDP it showed a preference for 
concerted action with Paris and London with regard to the nuclear problem in Iran. The 
three actors followed a strategy of containment through their joint EU-3+1 initiative (with 
the belated inclusion of the EU’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana) pursued to 
dissuade Teheran to proceed with its nuclear programme and engage with the IAEA. 
Although this was not surprising given the urgency of the question, it is nevertheless 
remarkable that this new positioning with Europe’s two big military powers was done 
outside any EU treaty framework and without domestic controversy at the level of the 
political elite. All major German parties accepted the new diplomatic approach of 
combining ESDP with a more selective multilateral policy more in line with a political 
conception of a European power.
4.3.3. Germany in Afghanistan and the implications for its security policy
September 11, 2001 had challenged Germany’s culture of restraint and forced 
politicians to make difficult decisions arising from the tensions between conflicting 
policy norms. It ‘changed our vision of the world. (...) For the first time Europeans 
have to focus more on questions of stability outside of Europe than inside of it.’150 
Germany’s continuing reluctance regarding the use of military force for offensive 
purposes stood in contrast to increasing demands from Washington to make an effective 
military contribution in the new fight against international terrorism.
Following Berlin’s proclaimed ‘unlimited solidarity’, and Washington’s request 
for a German military contribution on 7 November the government requested the 
Bundestag to approve Germany’s participation in the US-led military operation 
‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan.151 The aim of the international operation was to 
combat the sources of international terrorism and depose the Taliban regime in Kabul,
T S'?in a UNSC sanctioned military mission. The Bundeswehr participated militarily in
149 Wolfgang Ischinger, 135th Bergedorfer Round Table, ‘Interests and Partners o f German Foreign 
Policy’, September 29 -October 1 2006, Berlin, p. 45.
150 K. Voigt (2002). ‘Die amerikanische AuBenpolitik nach dem 11. September’, Rhein-Main-Runde, 13 
May, http://www.auswaertises-amt.de/www/de/aus2abe_archiv7archiv id=3J32
151 Plenarprotokoll 14/202, 16 October 2001.
I52UN Security Council Resolution 1348 expressed ‘its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to 
the terrorist attacks o f 11 September 2001’ thereby legitimating international action against terrorism in 
Afghanistan and paving the way for the US-led multinational intervention with a UN mandate. United 
Nations Security Council: Resolution 1368 (2001), September 12th 2001, 
http://ods-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf/OpenElement
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Afghanistan since November 2001 and since January 2002 the German navy was 
engaged in the Horn of Africa for surveillance of the sea lines of communication, as part 
o f Operation Enduring Freedom. ISAF supports the Afghan authorities in establishing 
stability, while OEF serves to combat international terrorism. As part of the ensuing 
post-conflict policy, Germany joined the ‘International Security Assistance Force’ 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan in April 2003 and participated when NATO took over ISAF’s
1 S3command in August 2003, its first ground operation outside Europe.
A possible merging of the two operations, ISAF and Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), has been under discussion since 2005, driven by Washington’s aim to 
transfer soldiers from Afghanistan to Iraq. But Germany and other NATO members 
have always opposed this, arguing that the ISAF and OEF missions serve different 
purposes and should remain separate and mutually complementary operations. Germany 
has been particularly engaged in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) around 
Kunduz and Feyzabad and has taken over the Regional Command North.
The Afghanistan operation enlarged Germany’s security parameter, until then 
confined to the ‘NATO plus Balkans’ area with the exception of short term operations in 
Africa. Germany’s mission was presented as an extension of its security commitments 
worldwide in the face of a global new security threat posed by asymmetrical threats and 
international terrorism. Germany’s defence, as Struck emphasized, started at the Hindu 
Kush. Although the mission was to maintain security and assist in the reconstruction of 
the country, the use of large-scale troops was avoided to ensure public support 
(Schwarz 2004:557). The Bundeswehr participation in Afghanistan is still dealt with 
domestically as only a reconstruction effort. No German politician risks speaking of a 
German Kampfeinsatz (combat mission) in Afghanistan for fear of underlining the 
already increasingly sceptical German electorate towards defence along the Hindu 
Kush. The justification behind Germany’s participation was foremost alliance solidarity 
(more than alliance loyalty) rather than humanitarian intervention as had happened in 
Kosovo. But similar to the government’s strategy during the Kosovo war, German 
diplomacy paved the way for post-war reconstruction measures and promoted the 
Petersberg conference in Bonn on 5 December 2001 for the political stabilisation of 
Afghanistan.
Defence minister Struck was quick to state that ‘this broadened concept of 
defence does not mean that Germany and the Bundeswehr must participate in every
153 The still ongoing ISAF mission began on 1 January 2002. NATO took over the command o f the 
mission on 11 August 2003. As o f April 2008, approximately 47.000 troops from 40 countries were 
stationed in Afghanistan. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdFisaf_placemat.pdf
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international operation. Every operation must still be subject to close scrutiny. It 
remains an undisputed fact that our responsibility for keeping peace is limited by our 
ability to do so. This will compel us even more to avoid sending our forces on too many 
missions at one time.’154 Each new mission would continue to be scrutinised by 
parliamentary control in a sovereign manner every time the UN, NATO or the EU asked 
Germany for a new intervention. This was a clear rejection of the principle of 
‘everywhere and anytime’, as Struck put it, and was meant to justify Germany’s non­
involvement in Iraq. However, the mechanism to send troops abroad was substantially 
facilitated at the end of 2004 when the Bundestag adopted a law for sending German 
troops abroad (Entsendegesetz). While military operations still had to be sanctioned by 
the Bundestag, the parliamentary vote could now take place after the mission had 
already begun and after the government had sent troops.155 While this made the process 
more expedient, Germany’s net of legal impediments to the possible deployment of 
the Bundeswehr in combat was still upheld.
4.3.4. Germany’s participation in international military operations
In June 2003 Germany had stationed around 8000 Bundeswehr soldiers in international 
operations abroad participating in several post-conflict stabilisation operations, in 
Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Afghanistan. German troops participated 
in operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ESDP’s first 
international military operation begun and conducted by the EU. But the EU operations 
‘Artemis’ in the Congo and Concordia in Macedonia were limited in time and less 
complex than the EUFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina which the EU (EUFOR) took 
over from NATO in December 2004. While both operations served as a test case for the 
EU’s military capabilities, for big military operations Europe still lacked the military 
resources, like adequate transport vehicles, high precision weapons and intelligence 
instruments.
Since 2003 Germany has participated in the following ongoing civilian, police 
and military ESDP operations: in the Western Balkans in EU Military Operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), to establish and maintain security in 
accordance with Dayton/Paris Agreement, EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
154 Opening speech by Peter Struck, at the conference ‘Impulse 21 - Berlin Forum on Security Policy’, 
Berlin, 23 June 2003.
155 ‘Bundestag beschlieCt Entsendegesetz’, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 3 December 2004. 
http://www. sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/ artikel/123/44079/
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(EUPM); and in the EU Planning team in Kosovo. In the Middle East, Germany 
participates in EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS); EU 
Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU 
BAM Rafah) and the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex). In Asia, 
it is present in the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN); in 
Africa in EUFOR TCHAD/RCA; EUPOL RD CONGO; EU security sector reform 
mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo). The two biggest 
Bundeswehr operations are NATO led missions. Germany has up to 3500 troops in 
Afghanistan in operation ISAF to assist the Afghan government in providing security, 
and 2300 troops in Kosovo in operation KFOR to establish and maintain security in 
Kosovo.156
156 The Military Balance 2008, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 428, and the Bundeswehr’s 
website: Bundeswehr Einsatze
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C1256FlD0022A5C2/Docname/Aktuelle Einsaetze Home: 
and the ESDP website:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=pt&mode=g’
Jahresbericht 2003, Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, Drucksache 15/2600, 9 March 2004, pp. 
8-9.
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Table 1. Bundeswehr Deployment around the world 2002-2007
Troop Deployment
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
NATO Operations
Afghanistan, ISAF 1,120 2,300 1,909 1,860 2,900 3,155
Kosovo, KFOR, Joint
Enterprise 4,600 3,100 3,900 2,280 3,000 2,279
Mediterranean Sea, ■
Active Endeavour 240 250
Djibouti, (OEF,
Operation Enduring 200
Freedom)
Kuwait (OEF) 
(10.2.2002-4.7.2003)
250
EU Operations
Bosnia -Herzegovina,
EUFOR, Operation 1,000 810 900 235
Althea
Democratic Republic
of Congo, EUFOR 740 -
(30.7.2006-30.11.2006)
Macedonia, Operation
Concordia (31.3.2003- - 40
15.12.2003)
Democratic Republic 
of Congo/Uganda, 
Operation Artemis 
(12.6.2003-1.9.2003)
- 97 - - - -
UN Operations - ' • x * -
Lebanon, UNIFIL, 
Maritime Task Force 
(begun in Sep. 2006)
993 905
■ : ..■ ■ -77.7 ....  .
m m  •* m  ■1
Sources: The data was compiled from three sources: IISS, The Military Balance 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2008. Jahresbericht 2003, Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, Drucksache 
15/2600, 9 March 2004, pp. 8-9.
Bundeswehr-Einsatze
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C1256FlD0022A5C2/Docname/Aktuelle Einsaetze Home
It is not always possible to find definite data about number o f troops as changes occurred during the same
year.
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4.3.5. The changed role of the Bundeswehr
The changed international context and Germany’s new position made a reform of the 
Bundeswehr necessary towards new operational requirements and a more operations- 
orientated force. Mostly due to budgetary constraints between 1998 and 2004 reform 
was slow in coming and only events in Kosovo, September 11, 2001 and Afghanistan 
forced the Defence Ministry to initiate the structural reform. A growing discrepancy 
between the new German rhetoric of engagement for peace missions abroad, and a 
continuous decrease in defence expenditures was evident between 2001 and 2003. More 
significantly, there was a gap between the effective increase of German military 
deployments abroad and the difficulty in providing the adequate resources which such 
operations entailed. The will to translate normative power and a new assertiveness into 
Bundeswehr participation in international peace missions clashed with the lack of 
resources, often linked to a lack of strategic ambition. International operations were 
occurring in far-away places, with longer and more dangerous missions, while at the 
same time there was a reduction in personnel. The conceptual process of reform lagged 
behind the Bundeswehr’s participation in UN or NATO sanctioned crisis management 
missions already underway.
In 2003 a deal was reached between the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of 
Finance, according to which the defence budget would not be cut until 2006 and would 
be raised by 800 million Euro a year from 2007 onwards.157 This finally opened the way 
to transform the Bundeswehr into a smaller, more operational and flexible, more 
combatant and operations-orientated armed forces (Stelzenmuller 2004), transforming 
the Bundeswehr from a territorial defence army to an intervention army of global reach.
The defence ministry published a major defence review, the Defence Policy 
Guidelines (DPG or Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) in May 2003. The DPG 
adapted the new capability profile to Germany’s new international commitments, 
changing operational requirements by setting up response forces, stabilisation forces 
and support forces. By 2010 the Bundeswehr should have 252.500 armed forces, made 
up of 147.500 conscription forces (support forces) as well as a 35,000-strong combat 
intervention force and a 70,000-strong peacekeeping and stabilisation force for rapid 
deployments in international missions. These new guidelines stipulated that there was
157 Opening speech by Peter Struck, at the conference ‘Impulse 21 - Berlin Forum on Security Policy’, 
Berlin, 23 June 2003.
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1 SRno longer a geographical limitation to the Bundeswehr’s international role. As the 
defence minister stated, ‘conventional national defence can no longer be the primary 
factor determining the structures and capabilities of the Bundeswehr. The task of 
international conflict prevention and crisis management, including the war on 
international terrorism, now comes first in the task spectrum. This task has key bearing 
on the capabilities, the command and control system, the availability and the equipment 
of the Bundeswehr. In other words: It is the task that should determine the structure of 
the Bundeswehr.’159 Against the idea of professional armed forces, conscription was 
maintained.
4.4. The Merkel government and Germany’s security policy (2005-2007)
4.4.1. Compatibility between EU and NATO
The Merkel government has revealed a different approach to the question of 
compatibility between NATO and ESDP. For the Chancellor in particular they are not 
two incompatible alternatives but two fundamental pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security. 
Thus in opposition to the predecessor government, Merkel did not see the ESDP as an 
emancipatory mechanism against NATO or the U.S. Speaking at the Munich security 
conference in February 2006 Merkel stated Germany’s regained preference for NATO, 
and recourse to the ESDP only as a second option. For the new Chancellor it was 
important to ‘give NATO a kind of primacy in transatlantic cooperation, meaning an 
attempt first being made by NATO to carry out the necessary political consultations and 
decide on the required measures - which does not mean everyone participating in 
everything all the time....other courses should not be explored until the Alliance fails to 
arrive at an agreement’ (Merkel Munich 2006). For the Chancellor, ‘the European 
Security Strategy, NATO’s Strategic Concept and the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America provide the suitable foundation on which to conduct a more 
intensive dialogue on the form our common security agenda should take (Merkel 
Munich 2006). Revitalising transatlanticism was thus the priority of Merkel’s foreign 
policy. ‘Strengthening Europe's security identity, separate from the Atlantic security 
partnership, is not a route I want to take. Both pillars [Atlantic partnership and European
158 Ministry o f Defence, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien fur den Geschafibereich des Bundesministers 
der Verteidigung, Berlin, May 2003, 6-31.
159 Opening speech by Peter Struck, at the conference ‘Impulse 21 - Berlin Forum on Security Policy’, 
Berlin, 23 June 2003.
115
integration] are, so to speak, two sides of the same coin. For me NATO will continue to 
be the strongest expression of a security policy for which we are jointly responsible’.160
But Berlin’s aim to play a more assertive role has produced diverging positions 
with Washington regarding NATO enlargement and Alliance missions. While the U.S. 
has been pushing for enlargement, Berlin has been hesitant regarding Croatia’s, 
Macedonia’s and Albania’s membership, arguing vaguely that they ‘can be justly 
hopeful about becoming Alliance members’ sometime in the future. With Ukraine and 
Georgia, Merkel was even less forthcoming stating that ‘there can be no automatic 
accession’ (Merkel Munich 2006).161 Germany is also sceptical about the idea, 
promoted by the Bush Administration, of a ‘Global Partnership’. ‘The covertly 
expressed U.S. wish to incorporate countries such as Pakistan in the circle of NATO 
partners has been particularly controversial’ (Kamp and Masala 2006). For Berlin it was 
preferable that ‘NATO establishes a dense network of partnerships with countries and 
international organizations with very varied priorities and objectives’ (Merkel Munich 
2006). Thus the government revealed its opposition towards Turkey’s EU membership, 
Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO membership, and the Bundeswehr deployment to combat 
missions in southern Afghanistan. Her conciliatory tone has not prevented Merkel from 
arguing for boundaries regarding the EU’s and NATO’s enlargement.
Germany’s political assertiveness in security policy has not necessarily 
translated into a more assertive stance regarding military operations on the ground that 
Germany was reluctant to lead the Congo mission for stabilisation and democratisation 
in 2006.162 While defence minister Jung did not rule out the possibility of combat 
situations in the EU’s Congo mandate he was vague on the possibility that Germany 
should lead the Congo operation, insisting instead that it should be an overall European
mission, since ‘this is a responsibility for all o f Europe and not only for Germany
1 6^alone’. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr extended its presence to the whole northern part 
of the country, beyond Kunduz and Feyzabad while maintaining its troop commitment of 
about 2500 soldiers and the continuation of the provincial reconstruction teams, which 
combined civilian and military instruments and which had proven successful and was
160 Merkel Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10 February 2007.
161 At the recent NATO Bucarest summit on 2-4 April 2008 the American perspective prevailed regarding 
NATO enlargement towards Croatia and Albania. But Ukraine and Georgia, also because o f Russia’s 
strong opposition, were given no long term prospect o f joining.
162 Speech by defence minister Franz Josef Jung at the annual meeting o f  the Arbeitskreises AuBen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik (ASP) on 20 April 2006 in Ingolstadt, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Presse-und 
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung,3/4, March-April 2006.
163 Interview with defence minister Jung, Deutschlandradio, 7 March 2006.
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being replicated by other teams in other parts of Afghanistan.164 But Berlin has been 
reluctant to engage the Bundeswehr in the more combative southern areas of 
Afghanistan, in ISAF, to assist British and American forces, setting out limits for 
Germany’s mission in Afghanistan. In Lebanon, Germany’s military presence in the 
United Nations peacekeeping mission is reduced to a Maritime Task Force off the coast 
of Lebanon for surveillance of weapons smuggling by sea, and can be considered a low 
risk operation. While the UNIFIL mission is important for being Germany’s first 
military operation in the Middle East, it is politically significant in that Germany takes 
an active stance in the region towards its traditional policy of defending Israel’s right to 
exist.
The new White Paper on German Security published in November 2006 does 
not set any specific limits of Germany’s participation in international operations 
regarding geographical location or political action.165 It will be interesting to observe 
the justification the present or future governments will give for refusing to intervene in a 
future operation.
The position of public opinion is contradictory. While 71% of Germans support the 
EU as an autonomous superpower equal to the U.S. only 22% are willing to accept an 
increase in defence expenditures to support that new status.166 This reflects public 
opinion’s continued aversion to military power. In a survey conducted by the 
Bertelsmann Foundation in December 2005 on the powers of the twenty-first century, 
the Germans revealed their continuing lack of enthusiasm for military power. Enquired 
as to what qualities a country must possess to be considered a world power, merely 7 
per cent of Germans identified military power. In contrast, 28 per cent o f French and 24 
per cent of British deemed it important.167 In another survey conducted in 2006, 73 per 
cent of Germans welcomed a higher German profile in maintaining peace and stability 
in the world, while 86 per cent of Germans considered the EU to be the international 
organization best placed to serve the same purpose. In contrast, only 19 per cent of
164 Speech by defence minister Franz Josef Jung at the annual meeting o f  the Arbeitskreises AuBen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik (ASP) on 20 April 2006 in Ingolstadt Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Presse-und 
Informationsamt derBundesregierung,3/4, March-April 2006.
165 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future o f the Bundeswehr. 
http://www.bmvg.de/portalP A_l_0_P3/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFODE/W+ 
2006+eng+DS.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb
166 Karl Heinz Kamp, ’Europaische Sicherheitspolitik in der Krise?’, Beitrage zur Intemationalen Politik 
und Sicherheit 01/2005.
167 Bertelsmann Foundation, ‘World Powers in the 21st Century. The Results o f a Representative Survey 
in Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States’, 
Berlin, 2 June 2006.
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Germans considered military power the most important quality of a world power. 
Thus for German public opinion Germany’s power is still seen foremost in normative, 
pacific, terms.
On the other hand, now that sucessive German governments have taken the path 
of international interventions they have to ensure that they opt for missions where they 
have the necessary number of troops available for it, and the willingness to stay engaged 
with the mission and its partners. Doing one or both things halfheartedly would run the 
risk of transforming Germany’s stance into a more irresponsible actor than one which 
had up front decided that it would not engage. The ongoing debate on Germany’s 
Afghanistan mission is a reflection of these doubts and hesitations.
4.5. Conclusion
Changes in security policy show that, between 1997 and 2007 Germany has been as 
much concerned with the limitations on the use of force, as with finding a European and 
transatlantic compromise to make the use of force acceptable domestically and in the 
Euro-Atlantic area. Germany’s normative power still plays a considerable role in the 
country’s security policy since Germany’s security policy has maintained elements of 
its traditional multilateralism and alliance commitments, allowing for incremental 
change in Germany’s military participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Conflict 
prevention and post-war reconstruction efforts became one of Germany’s security 
policy trademarks, as was the case of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. But 
the justification for the recourse to military power changed from its use only as a 
residual means to a pro-active use, first, for humanitarian reasons, and second, for 
stabilisation and security reasons.
At the same time, a transformation in Germany’s security policy has occurred 
whereby Berlin has increasingly followed a logic of consequential actions with a different 
logic of justification. This preference for a more utilitarian approach has been evident in 
the nature of Bundeswehr deployments abroad, and Berlin’s new security relationship, 
within ESDP, with Britain and France. First, the increasing number of NATO, UN or 
ESDP operations Germany is part of has served as an instrument to enhance Germany’s 
new position in global politics. With each new big deployment Chancellor Schroder 
reclaimed more consultation rights within NATO. Germany’s refusal to participate in the
168 Bertelsmann Foundation, ‘Who Rules the World?’ The Results o f  the Second Representative Survey in 
Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
Berlin, 22 October 2007.
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U.S. led war against Iraq was the apparent exception to the rule, but it was also used to 
demand more parity of power. Second, the utilitarian dimension is also prevalent in 
Germany’s selective new diplomatic approach, together with Britain and France in playing 
a constructive role towards the Iran nuclear problem. Berlin, London and Paris have 
coordinated their policies in the last few years, representing, in effect, an alternative 
mechanism towards handling the Iranian crisis, and have managed to exert some influence 
on Washington’s more robust moves towards Teheran. In both instances, the Schroder 
government pursued a revaluation of its status and an increase of its influence in given 
institutions.
This reflected the transformation of the relationship between the EU and NATO, 
and the EU’s role as an international actor with global pretensions. NATO is still regarded 
as the instrument for military operations, while the EU is perceived as using a softer 
approach to conflict management because of its combined use of civilian and military 
means. The problems of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran have challenged the notion 
that Europe and America share the same vision about world order and the instruments to 
best ensure it. Europe’s role in troop deployment outside Europe is often the result of 
U.S. pressure more than the consequence of a common European position. In addition, 
NATO operations tend to involve EU states on the basis of their bilateral relationship 
with Washington. Thus former foreign minister Joschka Fischer wondered: ‘Within the 
EU we discuss the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but within NATO we then act 
as though we are voicing individual national policies, which is definitely no longer the 
case. So I have often asked myself and others: why is the subject of the European pillar 
taboo?’169 Ambiguities will remain on both sides of the Atlantic. Depending on member 
states’ positions, ESDP will continue to swing between transatlantic synergy and the 
will towards greater defence and security autonomy from the U.S. Washington, on the 
other hand, will retain its long-held ambivalence over Europe’s pretension towards 
greater influence.
After the international community’s initial enthusiasm with international military 
humanitarian interventions during the 1990s, European states have come to realize that the 
consequences of such interventions are long-lasting and lead them to engage in complex 
post-conflict situations -  as well as raising big issues of principle in the international 
system. First, there is no guarantee that international stabilisation efforts can perpetuate 
peace locally. The instability caused by the proclamation of the independence of Kosovo
169 Interview with Foreign Minister Fischer, ‘The Reconstruction o f the West’, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 6 March 2004.
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on 17 February 2008 in Serbia and Kosovo revealed the difficulties of a ten-year peace 
enforcement mission.170 Second, EU and NATO members often do not agree on the scope 
of the mission and its post-conflict framework.171 Third, EU and NATO run the risk of 
institutional overstretch in that neither of the two institutions is likely to be able to uphold 
the military and civilian commitments agreed to during this decade. After the emergence 
o f humanitarian interventions, and the acceptance of the need to fight international 
terrorism through military operations in the first years of the new century, there has 
been a growing disenchantment of German public opinion, and more generally in 
Europe, has emerged towards continuing military operations abroad. This is likely to 
increase.
The present and future German governments face the dilemma of reconciling 
two contradictory positions. On the one hand, the overall willingness to continue being 
engaged in international military operations is likely to decrease, given public opinion’s 
disapproval over seeing increasing resources being spent for Bundeswehr international 
operations.172 Germany’s propensity to resort to the use of force remains unpopular, 
with the political elite finding it harder to justify combat operations with potential 
Bundeswehr soldier’s deaths to the German public. On the other hand, the Schroder but 
also the Merkel governments have embarked on a more utilitarian approach to foreign 
policy and are unlikely to relinquish the increase of power that Germany has gained in 
the last few years. But to remain an active player in selective power clusters such as the 
EU-3+1 and the P5+1, Germany will have to remain committed to projecting peace and 
stability abroad and to uphold its UN, NATO and EU operations for some time to come.
170 ‘Kosovo declares independence’, International Herald Tribune, 17 February 2008.
171 ‘Europe split on Kosovo independence’, EurActiv, 18 February 2008. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/europe-split-kosovo-independence/article-170353
172 As the previous chapter has shown, the FDP (Free Democratic Party) has opposed Germany’s more 
recent international operation in Lebanon in 2006 and 2007 for the reasons just indicated.
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CHAPTER 5: The European dimension of German foreign policy: Germany and 
European Union Foreign Policy173
5.1. Introduction: The Europeanization of foreign policies
Germany’s role as an increasingly self-confident and assertive actor in international 
politics was achieved mostly through its membership in the European Union. Because 
of a strong congruence between German and European institutions, interests and 
identities Germany has been portrayed as a ‘Europeanized state’.174 Recently 
Germany’s reputation as a Europeanized state has been challenged by some (Hellmann 
et al. 2005), raising the question whether it is possible for a state to de-Europeanize, or 
whether Germany has become more like other states, albeit still Europeanized in nature. 
Has Germany’s increasing self-confidence developed at the cost of Germany’s previous 
European enthusiasm? How has Germany used the normative power which it acquired 
through its EU membership? If Europeanization is understood as a process of ‘policy 
convergence’ is German foreign policy becoming immune to it? In contrast, which 
effects have EU policies produced on domestic positions? Have German governments 
attempted to coordinate policies domestically to produce a more effective policy? In the 
EU’s attempts to gradually emerge as a foreign policy actor, is there a nascent pan- 
European conception of interest and identity which has been adapted domestically by 
the German political elite?
This chapter examines Germany’s increasing self-confidence in foreign policy 
and begs the question if the conventional view of Germany as a “Europeanized state” 
needs to be revisited. It assesses patterns of convergence and divergence which can be 
traced back to the process of Europeanization by analysing both the “top-down” and
173 This chapter is to appear as ‘Germany in the European Union: Foreign Policies on the road to 
Convergence?’ in a shorter version in Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (eds), National and European 
Foreign Policies: towards Europeanization, forthcoming 2009.
174 On Germany as a Europeanized state see J. Anderson (2005). ‘Germany and Europe: Centrality in the 
EU’, in Bulmer and Lequesne (eds.) The Member States o f  the European Union. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 77-96; S. Bulmer (1997). ‘Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics o f the European 
Union and German Power’, in Peter Katzenstein, ed. Tamed Power. Germany in Europe Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press; S. Bulmer, C. Jeffery and W. Paterson (2000). Germany’s European 
Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu. Manchester: Manchester University Press; K. Dyson and 
K.H. Goetz, eds (2003). Germany, Europe and the politics o f  constraint, Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press; K. Goetz (1996). ‘Integration Policy in a Europeanized State: Germany and the IGC’. 
Journal o f  European Public Policy, 13(1); P. Katzenstein (1997). ‘United Germany in an Integrating 
Europe’, in P. Katzenstein ed. Tamed Power. Germany in Europe, Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press; 1-48.
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“bottom-up” dimensions of Europeanization in German foreign policy. It examines 
the impact of EU membership and European institutions such as the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on 
German foreign policy and explores how Germany has responded to changes arising 
from the EU’s effect on its domestic institutions and policies. Although an identity 
based explanation a priori suggests a tendency towards continuity, this chapter raises 
the question of change in Germany’s European policy pattern.
If initially Europeanization was conceived as the influence of European 
institutions to overcome cross-national asymmetries and produce change in domestic 
politics (top down process), its scope has widened into a process whereby domestic 
inputs feed back onto the European level of policy-making (bottom up process). Hix and 
Goetz defined Europeanization as ’a process of change in national institutional and 
policy practices that can be attributed to European integration’ (Hix and Goetz 
2000:27). Radaelli characterized Europeanization as ’processes of (a) construction, (b) 
diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies' (Radaelli 
2000:4). Featherstone and Radaelli see Europeanization as an inherently asymmetric 
process with a dynamic quality: ‘its structural effects are not necessarily permanent or 
irreversible. (...) The impact of Europeanization is typically incremental, irregular, and 
uneven over time and between locations, national and subnational’ where ‘profound 
disparities of impact remain’ (Featherstone & Radaelli 2003:4). More recently, Vink 
and Graziano broadened the conceptual scope suggesting that Europeanization should 
be theorized to answer ‘how European policies, rules and norms are affecting domestic 
political systems’ (Vink and Graziano 2006:12). Others consider foreign policy 
Europeanization not to be a vertical process at all, where uploading and downloading 
occur, but rather a horizontal process where supranational institutions are weak and 
member states remain the key actors, with Europeanization developing from a
175 On the growing literature on Europeanization see J. Anderson (2003). ‘Europeanization in Context: 
Concept and Theory’, in K. Dyson and K. Goetz (eds.) Germany, Europe, and the Politics o f  Constraint. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; T. B5rzel (2005). ‘Europeanization: How the European Union interacts 
with its member states’, in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds.) The member states and the European Union. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 45-76; S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (2005). ‘The European Union and its 
Member States: An Overview’, in S. Bulmer and C. Lequesne (eds.) The Member States o f  the European 
Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1- 20; K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli, eds. (2003). The Politics 
o f  Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press; J.P. Olsen (2002), ‘The Many Faces o f  
Europeanization’, Journal o f  Common Market Studies 40/5, 921-952; P. Graziano and M. Vink, eds. 
(2006). Europeanization: New Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan.
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‘coordination reflex’ between national governments (Bulmer and Lequesne 2005:345).
Thus Europeanization can be understood as a twofold process by which EU 
member states engage in uploading their policy preferences onto the EU polity and 
policies, and EU institutions download their policy inputs onto domestic member states’ 
polities. Because these two processes are in constant flux a two-way practice of 
adaptation occurs, where the outcome varies between a good and a bad fit of policy 
projection, with implications which change the national and European dimensions of 
policy-making. This can produce a tendency towards convergence between national 
identities and interests, and a European identity, in which both are increasingly 
constitutive of one another. Europeanization is ‘a bi-directional process that leads to a 
negotiated but limited convergence in terms of policy goals, preferences and even 
identity between the national and the supranational levels’ (Wong and Hill 2009). As 
Wong and Hill suggest, the Europeanization approach ‘attempts to strike a middle path 
as it accepts that member states adapt to CFSP decision-making structures and norms, 
while at the same time recognizing that these same Member States are themselves 
actively involved in shaping these structures and norms’ (Wong and Hill 2009).
5.1.1. Germany in the EU: the path towards Europeanization
The Europeanization of German politics started before the term itself became 
fashionable in the 1990s and conceptually operational in European studies. As a 
founding member of the European Communities (EC), the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) developed an almost symbiotic relationship with the EC, which served 
as a vehicle for the FRG to regain international credibility as a valid member of 
Europe’s political community. Europeanization occurred in three areas which 
characterised Germany as a Europeanized state.
First, Europeanization occurred in the identity dimension. In the 1950s the 
Federal Republic began to develop a Europeanised identity. While this was not 
exclusive of Germany, the country had no consolidated international identity to fall 
back on. The experience with National Socialism and Germany’s defeat in World War 
II created an identity vacuum after 1945 which membership in the EC proved suitable to 
fill. The European Community (EC) decisively shaped German identity, at the same 
time as Germany herself actively participated in European integration. The EC 
functioned as a kind of surrogate identity for Germans. Josef Joffe identified a 
‘transnational ersatz nationalism of Europeanism’ (Joffe 1992:80) in that ‘integration
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was a low-cost, high-payoff policy’ which ‘merely involved trading non-existing, 
potential rights for actual sovereignty. Since integration was predicated on the equal 
subjection to common rules self-abnegation became the condition of self-assertion’ 
(Joffe 1992:73).
Germany developed a multilateralist identity and adopted institutional 
commitments in line with the EC’s evolving normative framework for policy-making 
(Anderson and Goodman 1993). Gradually Germany’s international identity as a 
‘reflexive multilateralist’ was constructed through its European policy (Bulmer et al. 
2000:52). For decades, this identity synergy between Bonn and Brussels functioned 
well, considering that the interaction developed mainly within the EC itself, with only a 
limited foreign policy dimension. In the absence of a consolidated international identity, 
Europeanising one’s identity predisposed Germans to accept the Europeanization of 
foreign policy early on and in a different manner from other member states, in particular 
Britain and France. Germany’s state identity (Katzenstein 1997) was thus the first 
feature of the country to be Europeanized.
Secondly, Europeanization grew in the domain of institutional congruence. 
Germany’s recovery of a semi-sovereign foreign policy (Katzenstein 1987) and power 
was facilitated by the institutional congruence which developed between Bonn and the 
European institutions. ‘Germans preferred a European institutional context for 
implementing their national policies, shying away from purely national justifications 
and trying to avoid the perception that they were striving for national independence of 
action’ (Hanrieder 1989:305). Paradoxically, this was a strategy of ‘sovereignty gain’ 
through ‘sovereignty renouncing’ (Haftendom 2001). By delegating powers to EC 
institutions -  powers which the FRG effectively did not have in a way comparable to 
that of other members -  policy-makers were able to recover power, often 
unintentionally, ‘indirectly and in a diffuse manner’ (Bulmer 1997:51). Rather than 
functioning as limits on the country’s margin of maneuverability, European institutions 
thus provided a means for Germany to amplify its voice in European and transatlantic 
politics.
European institutions did not so much change Germany’s domestic institutions 
as they helped shape them domestically, thereby facilitating the interaction of up-and 
downloading practice. In other words, institutional congruence with the European 
Community paved the way for Germany to gradually acquire normative power and at 
the same time shape the contours of the European integration process in an active 
manner. Normative power served to project domestic institutional models onto the EU
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decision-making level, thereby shaping European institutions in a decisive manner. That 
the European Central Bank was moulded according to the institutional lines of the 
Bundesbank was no unintended consequence but also the result of Germany’s active use 
of its normative power. Bulmer and Katzenstein argued that this institutional 
congruence was so significant, that Germany managed to mould European institutions 
and policy-making decisively, thereby reducing adaptational pressures on domestic 
institutions (Borzel 2005:51).
In this distinctly German approach to European integration ‘policy-makers span 
the divide between European and domestic level forums and there is a cross-fertilisation 
of norms and policies in a two-way process’ (Miskimmon 2001:87). While initially 
Germany’s normative power was ‘an unconscious by-product of German behaviour and 
practice’ (Hyde-Price 2000:117) the power to shape European institutions was an 
intangible source of power which German policy-makers started making use of 
intentionally. Institutional uploading was thus at the core of Germany’s European 
policy.
Finally, Europeanization occurred in the realm of policy implementation, if  only 
because EPC was ‘not only the main framework for [Germany’s] diplomacy but almost 
the only one’ (Hill 1983:185). Conflicting interests between the EU’s projection of 
ideas onto Germany’s foreign policy making, and Germany’s exporting of identity 
factors onto the European level remained remarkably low. This led to a significant 
degree of Europeanization of German politics, leading one author to argue that ‘the 
Europeanization of the German state makes the search for the national, as opposed to 
the European interest a fruitless task. The national and the European interest have 
become fused to a degree which makes their separate consideration increasingly 
impossible’ (Goetz 1996:24). It was uncertain that this remained so after unification, 
since ‘the Federal Republic was not institutionally bound to remain an enthusiastic 
supporter o f deeper integration’ (Banchoff 1999a:266). It now had the potential to 
recover a sovereign national foreign policy, leading many to believe that the country 
would pursue a less Europeanised path or even disentangle itself from the EU altogether 
(Walts 1993).
Thus European institutions became a source of legitimacy for Germany’s 
political actions. As Anderson and Goodman have argued ‘in the eyes of German 
political elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments o f policy, but 
also normative frameworks for policy-making’ (Anderson and Goodman 1993:23). This 
normative framework has reinforced Germany’s post-45 multilateralist identity and
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institutional commitments. Until 1990, Germany influenced the integration process, 
often decisively, ‘in an unusual manner for a large member country. Germany projected 
its power softly, revealing a firm preference for normative and institutional over 
material interests, an ingrained support for multilateralism, and a greater inclination 
than its large European partners to delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions’ 
(Anderson 1997:80). No ‘Alleingange’ (unilateral action), only ‘Allgemeingange’ 
(multilateral action) was traditionally the golden rule followed by all German 
Chancellors. From this followed Germany’s enduring support for an effective Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.
5.1.2. Unification and changes in German European policy
The end of the Cold War represented a dual challenge for German policy-makers. It 
catapulted Germany into the potential position of becoming one of Europe’s key 
powers. At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1993) paved 
the way for the EU to gradually emerge as a foreign policy actor through a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The simultaneous emergence of these apparently 
contradictory reflexes have accompanied German policy-makers ever since. To assure 
foreign policy compatibility between both policy-makers followed a ‘two-lane policy 
approach’. In one ‘policy lane’, Germany sustained its multilateralist diplomacy of 
institutional continuity in the EU and NATO, promoting the institutional enlargement of 
both organizations. Thus in the Maastricht Treaty Germany ‘projected elements of its 
domestic model onto Europe’ (Anderson 1999:207). In CFSP terms, this meant that 
Germany supported a common European foreign policy, and favoured qualified 
majority voting (QMV).
In a second ‘policy lane’, policy-makers began to accept that the increase of 
Germany’s new position as a potential European power placed new expectations and 
responsibilities upon it as an individual policy actor. Therefore, amid institutional 
continuity, Germany’s role within these institutions changed, with implications for its 
foreign policy. The remaking of German identity has affected German interests in 
European policies and lead to a more ‘pragmatic’ reorientation of Germany’s European 
policy. It repositioned Germany in the EU, in its bilateral relationships with France and 
the U.S., and in the wider world. This, inevitably, led to contradictions and 
ambivalence, and the challenge was to balance both policies in such a way that 
Germany persisted as a Europeanized state. The key question now, as Christopher Hill
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suggested, was ‘whether or not national decision makers [were] significantly 
reconceptualising their notions of interest and identity in European terms’ (Hill 
1998:39).
While all governments pursued both policy lanes there were significant 
differences. Chancellor Kohl chose to reinforce the first lane maintaining a policy of 
continuity and the predictability of existing institutional frameworks, deepening and 
enlarging European integration, sometimes eschewing more international responsibility 
for his country. ‘The core of our foreign and European policy’, Kohl stated, ‘is the 
coherent continuation of the European process of unification. This is and will continue 
to be for Germany and for Europe a question of existential significance, and it is in 
reality also the question of war and peace in the twenty-first century’ (Kohl 
1995:06711). Before every major European summit, Kohl government members met 
with most of the smaller states’ leaders in order to sound out their positions and prepare
| nd'
them for the German position. By stating in advance what Germany’s position would 
be, these leaders felt respected and involved in the process of policy-making. Kohl was 
skilful in handling relations with his partners and the European Commission, and 
approached them diplomatically so as to ensure that he would not alienate them (Smyser 
2003:130).
Gerhard Schroder, in contrast, accelerated down the second policy lane, 
strengthening the coordinates of a changing German foreign policy, with a new sort of 
Europeanism. Before the Bundestag, on 10 November 1998, the new Chancellor stated 
what epitomized his new Europeanism: Germans ‘are Europeans not because [they] 
have to be but because [they] want to be.’177 This touched upon the nature of Germany 
as a Europeanized state, for it changed its European and transatlantic policies. By 
stating that Germany’s embeddedness in Europe was a question of choice rather than 
voluntary constraint, Schroder changed not only the Kohlean formula for European 
policy but also the tradition of almost four decades of Germany’s position in Europe. 
On the surface it seemed not much had changed; Germany remained on a path of 
continuity as a multilateralist European country. But Schroder’s statement opened an 
avenue for potential discord and signalled that his country’s place in the EU as a 
cooperative multilateralist member was no longer inevitable. Berlin’s partners could no
1 7Jtlonger count indiscriminately on Germany’s hitherto automatic congruent behavior. 
Thus the EU, although maintaining its validity as one of Germany’s normative
176 Conversation with Matthias Fischer, Lisbon, June 2003.
177 http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/regierungserklaerung/l6/69116/multi.htm
178 http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/regierungserklaerung/l 6/69116/multi.htm
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frameworks became more instrumental for German decision-makers with the source of 
Europeanness changing from voluntary constraint to explicit choice.
At first Schroder’s new policy of assertiveness attempted to diversify alliances to 
increase Berlin’s position vis-a-vis Paris, and move closer to Britain. This weakened the 
German-French motor without redefining relations with London. At the 
Intergovernmental Conference in Nice in December 2000 the Chancellor prompted an 
open disagreement with Paris over the allocation of number of votes in the European 
Council and a decrease of Germany’s net contribution to the EU’s budget. Schroder 
argued for a lessening of Berlin’s financial contribution to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and structural funds, a delimitation of the powers of EU institutions, and 
the recovery of some competencies by national institutions better equipped to deal with 
particular issues.179
Because of Frances’ stem opposition, Germany was unable to upload its 
preference for a change in the voting rights and for a new system of double majority 
voting. Germany ended up with 29 votes, the same number as France, Britain and Italy 
(Dubb and Deubner 2001). In addition Germany failed to reduce its financial 
contributions. Even though Berlin’s position seemed plausible, hinting at the democratic 
deficit and the need for a more balanced demography in voting rights among states, the 
proposal implied a quantitative advantage for Germany. Negotiations at Nice were so 
difficult that former foreign minister Fischer considered at the end that ‘Europe had lost, 
and national egoisms had won’ (Fischer 2007:347). Berlin had taken the initiative 
unilaterally instead of trying to rally behind it supporting voices, and had failed to 
upload its institutional preferences.
Thus a less enthusiastic strain of Europeanism, more nationally orientated, had 
entered the German political discourse (Schneider et al. 2001), slowing down 
Germany’s Europeanization path and suggesting a new ‘German-EU incongruence’ 
(Jeffery and Paterson 2003). Institutionally the aim was to reinforce the principle of 
subsidiarity of the Amsterdam Treaty by reallocating EU competencies towards the 
national level of policy-making with the EU acting only in instances when local and
179 Attempting to reduce financial contributions was not new. During the Kohl government both the 
finance minister Theo Waigel and foreign minister Klaus Kinkel had begun to argue, albeit 
unsuccessfully, for a lessening o f Germany’s financial contributions due to the high cost o f German 
unification and the prospect o f EU enlargement. In 1994 foreign minister Kinkel warned that Germany’s 
paying possibilities to the EU have reached its limits. ‘Countries with similar earnings will have to take 
on more financial responsibility in the future than they have done in the past.’ Klaus Kinkel (1994). 
‘Deutschland in Europa. Zu den Zielen der deutschen Ratsprasidentschaft in der Europaischen Union’, 
Europa-Archiv, 12, 25 June, p. 336.
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national institutions had proven incapable of doing do.180 Jeffery and Paterson identified 
this as the ‘shifting of tectonic plates’ indicating that the long-standing ‘virtuous circle’ 
between Germany and the EU was cracking down because Germany had arrived at a 
‘critical juncture for change’ (Jeffery and Paterson 2003).
The problem with this more instrumental approach was that Schroder’s new 
assertiveness did not result in a European leadership role (Bertram 2004). It produced 
too many divergences among EU member states, and indicated that the German 
government was more preoccupied in pursuing national interests rather than exercising 
the leadership role which many expected from Germany. In negotiation tactics, 
Schroder stated Germany’s position at the summit meetings, without much 
consideration for how smaller member countries would react and for presenting them 
with a credible case. Furthermore, Germany seemed also to have 
‘intergovemmentalised’ relations with Paris, discarding the Commission and the 
European Parliament.
With the Grand Coalition government led by Chancellor Merkel after November 
2005 Germany returned to the centre stage of European and transatlantic politics and its 
two central international institutions, the European Union and the Atlantic alliance. The 
tectonic plates inside Germany calmed down, while the European plates are still being 
rearranged. Merkel galvanised European policy to insure that the EU was capable of 
action, but not at the price of sidelining Germany’s own interests.
Germany kept to multilateral institutional commitments but gradually pursued its 
interests more assertively within those institutions.181 Its position in EU politics evolved 
from normative multilateralism to one of increasing pragmatic multilateralism balancing 
between its traditional normative approach and a new approach of more calculated 
interests. The rationale behind the same narrative was different. After 1998 the 
government distanced itself from the automatism of European institutional deepening 
towards a more assertive pursuit o f Germany’s own interests which, when they could be 
embedded in integration goals were presented in EU rhetoric, or which, when that was 
impossible, were presented as German interests in EU politics through a more utilitarian 
multilateralism. Thus the question of continuity and change in Germany’s European 
policy was a question of how far Berlin would go in pursuing its interests within the 
EU, when other EU members disagreed with the German position.
Because of its high degree of Europeanization, Germany’s European policy has
180 Schroder’s Leitantrag presented at the SPD party congress in 2001 on European policy reflected the 
Chancellor’s policy o f recapturing national competencies for German institutions.
181 Interview with Werner Hoyer, Berlin, September 2000.
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functioned like a mobile since the 1950s. A mobile has a fixed point to which several 
different parts are attached; but once one of them is put in motion all other parts begin to 
move. For over four decades Germany’s foreign policy rested on European integration and 
German-European synergy as the centrepiece of the mobile to which all other foreign policy 
domains were attached. The unspoken rule was to maintain the equilibrium between the 
pieces of the Europeanization mobile. After 1998 the fixed centre point of Germany’s 
Europeanized identity was shaken, touching upon all other individual mobile pieces and 
causing the construct to become unbalanced. The normative parameters were purposefully 
redefined by policy-makers acting as ‘entrepreneurs for change’, at times of ‘critical 
junctures’. These changes in Germany’s European policy have been domestically 
induced by key elites which have recalibrated ‘their approach to Europapolitik in the 
light of their normative and ideational understandings of Germany’s foreign policy role’ 
(Hyde-Price and Jeffery 2001:697). The ambivalence of Schroder’s European policy 
was that he simultaneously pursued a more assertive self-confident foreign policy 
without realising that Germany played a pivotal role in holding together the European 
Union, upon which Berlin’s new ambition to become a more pragmatic international 
actor itself depended.
In comparison to other member states Germany remains a Europeanized state, 
and elements of convergence between Berlin and the EU persist. But congruence 
between Germany and the EU is not an indicator of policy convergence between EU 
member states across the board, and divergences among them can cause a lessening of 
Europeanization. German policy-makers probably come closest to the “European- 
idealist” conception of a normative-civilian power model for European foreign policy in 
that both Germany and the EU support the promotion of democracy, human rights and 
security cooperation as common values in international politics. But as with the EU, 
Germany still lacks sufficient structural power, underlining the discrepancy between the 
stated ambition and the absence of material and financial resources allocated to foreign 
and defence policy (Maull 2006b).
5.2. Germany and EU foreign policy downloading
This section of the chapter analyses the impact of EU “downloading” on Germany’s 
foreign policy-making. It looks at how Europeanization feeds back into Germany’s 
domestic institutions and policies, and whether this has led to changes in them. It thus 
studies the transformational effects the EU has on Germany’s policy preferences, and
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the pressure Germany feels to adapt to and to accommodate EU policies.
The EU’s aim in downloading is to promote growing cross-national convergence 
between the foreign policies of member states towards the adoption of an increasing 
number of common positions. Since the ability for EU institutions to download in the 
realm of foreign policy depends on common positions previously adopted by the 
member states, the record for the EU’s downloading capacities, as opposed to other 
policy domains remains rather poor. There is a significant lack of policy coordination at 
the European level of member states’ foreign policy preferences (Huttmann 2007). It is 
difficult to identify policy areas where the actual substance of national foreign policies 
has been changed because of downloading. Furthermore conflicting interests abound in 
relations between member states. Ultimately, European institutions have only a limited 
capacity to change domestic structures and policy-making processes because they lack 
robust institutional structures themselves; thus rather than effectively changing domestic 
actors they are themselves subject to volatile environmental change (March and Olsen 
1998). Still, for the EU to become a credible international actor, it has to promote the 
convergence of European interests (ESS 2003:1). But to turn the European Union into a 
truly effective institution ‘capable for action’, with an autonomous foreign policy and 
defence capability, Germany itself had to show it had the capability in its own foreign 
and security policy, to make the necessary changes. This was a form of indirect 
downloading by EU institutions onto German foreign and security policy, and 
constitutes a significant paradox in German foreign policy. The chapter will now 
examine some of the policy domains where this convergence has been attempted.
5.2.1. Downloading and the policy of enlargement
EU enlargement after 1995 produced two important foreign policy consequences. First, 
it was the EU’s first external projection of its normative power through the projection of 
norms and the expectation of compliance by EU candidate countries (Grabbe 2005). 
Second, as Hill pointed out in 2001, enlargement (re-)introduced a geopolitical 
dimension into European politics (Hill 2001). It enlarged the EU’s Eastern border 
enormously, and made Russia a real neighbour, towards whom the member states had to 
define a policy and develop a foreign policy strategy.
Both the Kohl and Schroder governments were strong advocates of the EU’s 
Eastern enlargement. First, enlargement was propitious to Germany’s identity as a 
country committed to embedded multilateralism, and provided the institutional
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framework for multilateral cooperation. Second, it functioned as a conflict prevention 
mechanism in that enlargement represented the institutional answer to ensuring stability 
on the European Union’s borders, and project stability beyond these borders. As former 
German president Roman Herzog alerted, ‘the West must stabilise the East so that the 
East cannot destabilise the West’ (Herzog 1995:163). The Kosovo crisis in 1999 had a 
direct impact on the degree of commitment of Western leaders towards Eastern 
enlargement of the EU and NATO, leading them to speed up the enlargement processes 
for political and strategic reasons (Wallace 2002:90). Thirdly, economic reasons led 
Germany to prefer an institutional integration of the former communist countries to a 
mere bilateral economic relationship. Fourthly, enlargement to Central and Eastern 
Europe empowered Germany to replicate its own success and project its normative power. 
The EU’s enlargement policy revealed an unintentional side of the projection of norms 
in that ‘the European Union exercised soft power in its own neighbourhood to great 
effect, but without really trying. This is because the power derived from the fact of its 
very existence rather than from an active foreign policy’ (Freedman 2005:29). Fifthly, 
Germany also felt indebted to these countries since ‘it was (...) the aspiration to freedom 
of these countries that gave us unification’ (Kinkel 1995:06727). Finally, Germany’s 
pro-active position towards enlargement served as yet another example that post-unified 
it remained committed to its institutions and interests as a multilateral actor and to its 
identity as a multilateral actor with normative power.
Despite supporting enlargement policy-makers knew that it would change 
Europe’s international identity and challenge the EU to pursue more actively the policy 
of becoming an international actor. The Kohl government felt uneasy about ‘the 
geopolitical implications of enlargement’ in that enlargement was a process with a 
geopolitical knock-on effect with foreign policy consequences (Hill 2001). To the extent 
that, as Hill suggests, ‘each aggrandisement of the Union is inherently both territorial and 
communitarian [and] brings the external border into new zones of international relations’ 
(Hill 2000:5) Germany’s foreign policy dimension grew and forced policy-makers to deal 
with a bigger foreign policy arena, repositioning Germany towards a more Eastern state 
of mind. This hit the foundational core of its role within the EU and of its position in the 
world and inevitably affected Germany’s own international identity and role in the 
future structure of European order.
Thus, aside from the expectations which had fallen on Germany’s own foreign 
policy (the second policy lane), the same was now happening at the EU level, removing 
Germany’s possibility to cushion its arguments with EU rhetoric. Both Germany and the
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EU were heading full speed towards the challenges of new and more assertive foreign 
policies. If for forty years the German question had been at the heart of the European 
construction, it was now Europe’s future configuration which was at the centre of 
Germany’s own identity. European integration had originated, in part, to help solve the 
German question; for that reason alone it was condemned to succeed, for failure was not 
an option, since it would have, once again, located the German question at centre stage 
in European politics. The stagnation of the integration process would have left Germany 
devoid of a political rationale for action which over forty years had shaped its foreign 
policy. On the question of what Germany’s foreign policy alternatives were should the 
EU fail, the majority of the German political elite unanimously resisted the thought, and
1R9did not even consider worthwhile alternatives.
In addition, opposing Eastern enlargement would have been seen as morally wrong 
and would have undermined the logic of appropriateness shaping German foreign policy. 
This was what Frank Schimmelfennig called the ‘rhetorical entrapment’ of the member 
states’ own making, when on the basis of common values they followed the norm-based 
rather the interest-based arguments for enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2001). Opponents 
of enlargement were shamed into agreement by highlighting the problem of the wider use 
of normative power in foreign policy.
With the Merkel government Germany has become more pragmatic about 
further EU enlargements. The new coalition government faced the limits of the 
projection of European normative power towards the exterior. The incapacity to say 
‘no’ to new potential candidates would in the long term weaken the normative power 
which was one of the reasons for attracting new potential candidates in the first place. 
Angela Merkel was the first European leader to address this question openly stating that 
‘Europe has borders.’ By identifying the need for Europe to define its borders the 
Chancellor has overturned the self-inflicted moral entrapment of enlargement 
(Schimmelfennig 2001). Albeit in the tradition of Helmut Kohl’s European policy, 
Merkel rejects grand visions which could hinder the effective functioning of the EU. In 
this sense, the Chancellor stated before the 2005 elections that her party preferred a 
‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey rather than full membership and has steered 
Berlin’s negotiating position within the EU in that direction as an open-ended process, 
excluding the automaticity of previous rounds of enlargement. This new attitude 
towards enlargement policy was without precedence after a decade of continuous 
enlargement promises towards various candidates, and is paving the way for a more
182 This was confirmed by the majority of interviewees.
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flexible EU with an increased margin of manoeuvrability.
The policy of enlargement was the EU’s first successful foreign policy. 
However, enlargement ‘was never presented as an act of foreign policy and the thinking 
through of strategic consequences never went further than a generalised belief in the 
stabilising effects of inclusion’ (Hill 2002:79). The characteristic style was ‘one of 
disjointed incrementalism, shuffling from one half-commitment to another without 
spelling out to a wider audience the direction in which such commitments are leading’ 
(Wallace 1996:3-4). From the perspective of Europeanization, however, Eastern 
enlargement was a successful example of the Europeanization o f German foreign 
policy.
5.2.2. Downloading and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
Ten years after the institutionalization of a European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) was initiated by France and Britain in December 1998 in St. Malo, and five 
years after the beginning of its missions, ESDP is one of the EU’s foreign policy areas 
where some modest success has been achieved. The 1999 EU Helsinki summit laid out 
the EU’s military capabilities for Petersberg tasks and stipulated headline goals for 
2003.183 The year 2003 was also decisive because the EU adopted its first European 
Security Strategy.184 Since 2003, the EU has held civilian-military missions in Aceh,
i o r
Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, Macedonia, and Rafah.
In December 2006 Germany took over the military command of the EUFOR Bosnia 
Herzegovina mission Althea, underway since the EU took over the command from 
NATO forces in December 2004. In 2006 Germany also led the ESDP mission in 
Congo (Miskimmon 2007). The ESDP’s most recent mission was decided in January 
2008, with the EUFOR military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, as
1 RApart of a regional approach in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
183 The headline goal was to create a rapidly deployable force o f 60.000 soldiers by 2003 to enable a more 
flexible force with military and civilian crisis management capabilities capable o f the full range o f  
Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty. Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 
10-11 December 1999.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm
184 European Security Strategy: ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ 
http://wAvw.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage. ASP?id=266&lang=:EN&mode=g
185 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2008: 428, and Bundeswehr website: 
Bundeswehr Einsatze
http://AVAVW.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C1256FlD0022A5C2/Docname/Aktuelle Einsaetze Home: and 
ESDP website: http://Avww.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&Iang=pt&mode=g
186 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
http://AVAVw.consilium.europa.eu/cms3 fo/shoAvpage.asp?id=1366&lang=en&mode=g. For an overview of  
Germany’s international military operations see chapter 4 o f  the thesis, table 1 on p. 113.
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There has occurred some Europeanization regarding ESDP missions. Member 
states find it comparatively easier to agree on sporadic missions with a limited 
timeframe decided through intergovernmental cooperation in the Council, than on CFSP 
positions regarding such strategic issues as Europe’s policy on transatlantic relations, or 
on Iraq. They agreed on the ESS, but did so for different reasons. Germany wanted to 
enhance the EU’s civilian conflict and crisis management instruments; Britain 
understood the ESS as a bridging device in transatlantic security issues; and France 
aimed to strengthen the EU’s security and defence autonomy vis-a-vis Washington.
Germany accepted downloading of ESDP inputs because its own security policy 
was undergoing a process of reform and normalisation, while ESDP served as an 
instrument to continue embedding its security policy in a multilateral process, and to act 
in out-of-area missions under a European heading. But this agreement on joint ESDP 
missions does not mean that EU institutions are downloading to the extent of changing 
the domestic structures of Germany’s security policy. Overall strategic positions and the 
shape of institutions such as the Bundeswehr continue to be resistant to 
Europeanization.
5.2.3. Downloading and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was created in 2004 in part as a response to 
the limits of the EU’s big bang enlargement towards the Eastern part of Europe, and in 
anticipation of the potential conflicts arising in the new areas which would now border 
with the EU.187 As the European Security Strategy stated in 2003 ‘stability on Europe’s 
borders is essential for the EU to pursue an effective foreign policy’ (ESS 2003). The 
European Neighborhood Policy is considered a geopolitical imperative for the EU’s 
external action to ‘consolidate a ring of friends around its rims’. ENP ‘challenges the
EU’s ability to develop an external policy complementary to enlargement that is
1 80effective in promoting transformation and reform’.
Still in its early stages it is difficult to assess the domestic impact of EU 
downloading in the policy domain of ENP. The strength of the neighbourhood policy, as
187 The ENP includes sixteen non-EU states: ten from the Mediterranean basin (grouped in the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian 
Authority, Syria and Tunisia, and six to the East o f the EU, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/partners/index_en.htm
188 Presidency Progress Report, Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Council o f the EU,
15 June 2007, 10874/07, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdEen/07/stl0/stl0874.en07.pdf
189 ‘A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy’, European Commission COM(2007) 774 final, 5 
December 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf7com07 774 en.pdf
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Charles Grant has argued, ‘is its flexibility. Some action plans are ambitious, offering 
the chance of participation in a wide range of EU programmes; others, designed for 
neighbours at a much lower level of economic development, offer much less. Thus the 
ENP allows the EU to treat countries that might one day join differently from others’ 
(Grant 2006:59).
During the German EU presidency in 2007 the German government put forward 
a proposal for a new EU policy on Central Asia, which the Council adopted.190 This 
indicates that Germany is pursuing a more proactive stance in ENP, than merely 
downloading the strategy papers on ENP put forward by the Commission. But Germany 
was only in part a key player, since it clearly favoured a neighbourhood policy for the 
post-Soviet area rather than conceptualising an ENP for both Eastern Europe and the 
Caucasus, and also the Mediterranean countries. This more selective approach to ENP 
helps explain why the ENP Plus proposal, put forward by Steinmeier during the German 
EU presidency in 2007, was turned down by EU members, in particular by France, 
Spain and Italy.
5.2.4. Downloading European policy for the Middle East
The European Union has become increasingly active in the Middle East developing 
different mechanisms for dealing with several ongoing conflicts. EU states have over 
the years forged a congruent position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
providing financial assistance towards both sides, and supporting the creation of a 
Palestinian state while respecting the sovereignty of Israel. Recognizing that only a 
cooperative effort by the EU, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the 
countries of the region will lead to a resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the EU 
is a full participant in the Middle East Peace Process Quartet. European leaders accept 
that Europe ‘must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it 
is solved’ (ESS 2003:8).
In March 2003, the Brussels European Council approved the "EU Strategic 
Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East" to promote peace, prosperity 
and progress in the region and build on existing institutions such as the multilateral 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), or the European Neighbourhood 
Policy which includes some Middle Eastern states. European action has materialized
190 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21-22 June 2007. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf
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through a concerted effort among the EU’s key members, Britain, France and Germany 
in an attempt to present a European position against Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Whereas 
the policy outcome of such policies has not often proven successful, the 
Europeanization among member states and the EU itself has made some acceptable 
progress.
Berlin has only recently developed a policy for the Middle East. While it had 
relations with all countries in the region, and a special one with Israel, it was part of a 
moral and historic tradition of German diplomacy not to play an active or independent 
role in the area (Fischer 2007:409). Thus without a clear definition of German interests 
for the Middle East, Germany was more likely to rely on European initiatives in this 
policy area. Germany’s infant Middle East policy became embedded in a European 
framework leading it to adopt an impartial position vis-a-vis all states in the region, 
while maintaining its special relationship with Israel (Perthes 2004). This was a 
consequence of Europeanization, where Germany often adapted its foreign policy to that 
of the EU and other member states’ foreign policies. In September 2006 the 
government, with the approval of the Bundestag, decided the first armed Bundeswehr 
mission in the Middle East as part of the UNIFIL mission, for the stabilization of the 
south of Lebanon.191
While consensus among the German elite exists that stability in the region is a 
priority for Germany and Europe, defining how Germany should position itself 
regarding the conflicting parties often leads to domestic divergences in the coalition 
governments. For example, whereas foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier believed 
Syria needed to be included in peace negotiations, Chancellor Merkel was more
1Q9cautious on how to handle Damascus.
5.2.5. Downloading relations with the U.S., Russia and China
Relations with the United States, Russia and China reflect the EU’s difficulties in 
downloading CFSP preferences onto member states. Convergence remains a problem 
for several reasons. Firstly, member states endorse a CFSP rhetorically but when it 
comes to pursuing their national interests towards great powers, they often prefer to act
191 In UNIFIL mission in Lebanon Germany leads the UN’s first maritime stabilization operation off the 
coast o f Lebanon. In September 2007 the Bundestag extended its participation for another year, albeit 
reducing the number o f its troops from 2400 to 1400.
http://www.einsatz.bundeswehr.de/C1256FlD0022A5C2/CurrentBaseLinkAV26SVK7M066INFODE
192 German Foreign Minister Criticized for Courting Syria, Deutsche Welle, 18.01.2008 http://www.dw- 
world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3073033,00.html
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unilaterally, in the name of national sovereignty. Strategy papers by the Commission 
hardly serve as more than guiding lines for member states to follow in their many
■I
individualist approaches. Secondly, to enhance their own international status, ‘each of 
the leading member-states runs after the chimera of a special bilateral relationship, at 
the expense of supporting common policies’ (Grant 2007:27). Thirdly, member states’ 
interests are often simply too divergent among them or in relation to the third party to 
allow for a long term common strategy towards Russia and China. German-Polish 
tensions in 2005 over how to approach Russia, or the Polish veto regarding the renewal 
o f the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 2007 illustrate this 
point. Finally, relating to other great powers presupposes a convergent world view. 
Whereas France and Germany shared a multipolar world view with anti-American 
undertones during the 2003 transatlantic crisis, Britain’s position was more protective of 
its close relationship with Washington, not to mention the position of the remaining 
twenty-four member states. As such ‘European policy so far originates from a 
congruence of interests, rather than from a convergence of the foreign policies of the 
individual EU member states’ (Stumbaum 2007:58). As a consequence, policy 
dissonances are often the result.
Germany’s relationship with great powers is thus not so much a question of 
adapting its national foreign policy to the EU and other member states’ foreign policies, 
since the CFSP’s ‘strategic partnerships’ can only be considered a ‘soft’ form of 
downloading. Neither is it a matter of ‘de-Europeanization’ of German foreign policy, 
because no Europeanization of foreign policy preceded it. Berlin predominantly defines 
Germany’s policies regarding relations with Russia, China, and the US bilaterally, 
making the ‘big issues’ fall outside the area of European foreign policy making.
The increasing number of recent conflicting issues between Russia and the EU, 
such as over the status of Kosovo, Russia’s energy supply to Europe, bilateral problems 
between Poland and Russia and the Baltic states and Russia, make the adoption of a 
common position towards Moscow all the more difficult and have weakened the PCA 
and its four ‘common spaces’ created in 2003 as a framework for EU-Russia relations 
on the basis of common values and shared interests.
Regarding China, the EU’s second biggest trading partner after the US, the EU
193 European Commission, ‘The European Union and Russia: Close Neighbours, Global Players, Strategic 
Partners’, October 2007. European Commission, ‘The European Union and the United States Global 
partners, global responsibilities’, June 2006.
Both available at: http://ec.europa.eu/extemal relations/library/publication.htm
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has unsuccessfully pledged for years for China to open its markets and engage in 
reciprocal trading rules and fair market competition. In a 2006 paper the European 
Commission recognized that the litmus test for the bilateral relationship will be 
adjusting EU trade policy ‘to the competitive challenge and driving a fair bargain with 
China’.194 In addition, it remains difficult to envisage the substance of such 
partnerships if the values upon which the EU is built -  democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights -  are not part o f Russia’s and China’s values in foreign policy (Hughes 
2007).
Thus it is in the realm of Great Power relationships that Europeanization is 
weakest and the least effective since the substance of relations still falls outside the 
realm of the CFSP and ESDP framework. And occasional concerted efforts towards 
adopting common policies towards Moscow, Beijing, and also New Delhi are 
insufficient to forge a true European foreign policy.195 Part of the reason is that the 
European Union ‘has not learned to behave like a traditional great power’ (Wallace 
2007:7) but so far there is no consensus among the twenty-seven member states on 
whether that is the role the EU should play. Rather most states seem to accept for now a 
tentative common vision to act internationally -  as a normative-civilian power with 
military instruments that serve normative and civilian purposes empowering a rule- 
based international order through effective multilateralism (ESS 2003:9). But although 
power politics is no longer the rule among EU member states it does not follow that in 
the realm of its nascent foreign policy the EU can turn a deaf ear to it when dealing with 
states which define their own interests according to a power politics understanding of 
foreign policy (Cooper 2003). The ESS also addresses preventive engagement against 
threats.
Despite the growing number of ESDP missions, and the creation of the ENP the 
degree of policy convergence will ultimately depend on how willing member states are 
to converge their interests towards Europeanization at the expense of national 
sovereignties and their own profiling on the international stage. In addition, an 
increasing pressure to download foreign policy inputs domestically can lead the bigger
194 ‘EU -  China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities’, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 24.10.2006
COM(2006) 631 final, http://ec.europa.eu/extemal_relations/china/intro/index.htm
195 At the European Council summit in Brussels on 14 December 2007 no reference was made regarding a 
EU policy on Russia or China. Whereas the section on external relations deals with issues such as 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Kosovo, Iran and Lebanon, climate change, regional crises in Congo or 
Myanmar, no common strategy is mentioned with regard to Moscow or Beijing. Brussels European 
Council, Presidency Conclusions, 14 December 2007,
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3 fo/showPage.asp?id=432&lang=en&mode=g
139
states to augment their own uploading preferences on EU foreign policy outputs. This 
brings us to the theme of the next section, the uploading dimension of Europeanization.
5.3. Uploading Germany’s preferences on EU foreign policy outputs
This section of the chapter assesses Germany’s impact on EU foreign policy outputs. It 
examines how Berlin has promoted its preferences in the formulation of EU positions in 
the four policy areas dealt with in the previous section by looking at the extent to which 
German domestic positions boomerang back onto the European stage.
In the realm of foreign policy, the lack of policy practice and the EU’s infant 
role as an international actor means that the member states’ room for manoeuvre is 
comparatively stronger than in other EU policies. Germany’s eagerness to upload onto 
the CFSP level blends well with its interests and traditional multilateralist approach. 
Traditionally, ‘Bonn’s European policies sought to create supranational and governance 
frameworks that would support the FR’s successful economic formula’ (Anderson 
2005:79). The practice of uploading German preferences onto European policy domains 
existed already during the Cold War: ‘(...) in the EC, what Germany wants, it gets, 
especially since the German government remains determined not to want anything that 
would cost it the external support it deems indispensable. Basically, however, Germany 
does get much of what it wants, and what it doesn’t want doesn’t get done’ (Hoffmann 
1995:309).
This notwithstanding Germany’s European policy rests on a highly decentralised 
policy-making system where ministries such as the foreign ministry, the economics and 
finance ministry, and the agricultural ministry participate, producing ‘the most 
deconcentrated’ domestic institutional structure for EU policy-making (Bulmer et al. 
2000:22). The plurality of competing EU policy-coordinating ministerial departments 
where each ministry has its European head of department accountable to the ministry’s 
secretary of state can weaken Berlin’s negotiating position in Brussels, making a 
coordinated position difficult (Hiittmann 2007). German representatives in Brussels often 
fail to agree on a common position, opting to abstain in a European Parliament vote.196 
German European policy thus continues to be decided mostly in Berlin at the 
intergovernmental level.
Germany has been an active player in seizing the initiative, and has acted as an 
‘entrepreneur for change’ (Jeffery and Hyde-Price 2001). It has helped shape EU
196 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
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foreign policy in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, and in other EU’s international 
engagements. Its will to shape CFSP and ESDP also stem from the domestic consensus 
o f the political elite regarding the EU’s role as a nascent global player. Thus Germany’s 
position on several European foreign policy issues is likely to prove highly influential in 
the coming years. This helps explain why the role of the Kanzleramt was strengthened 
when the Red-Green government created the European department within it thereby 
increasing the inputs of the Chancellor towards CFSP and ESDP (Miskimmon 2007:14).
Berlin has pursued two sorts of uploading, a normative and a policy uploading. 
First, there is an uploading of normative content. The most significant input Germany 
produced is the influence of its normative power in pursuing multilateral cooperation 
mechanisms and the use of civilian crisis resolution instruments in European diplomacy. 
When German foreign minister Steinmeier argues that one of the ‘trademarks’ of 
European foreign policy is regional crisis management through civilian instruments in 
Afghanistan, the Middle East and Kosovo this is a typically German emphasis on 
conflict resolution which the EU has adopted through the process o f uploading o f what 
has been Germany’s traditional post-war stance in foreign policy (Steinmeier 2007). In 
this sense, Germany’s normative power has contributed to the EU’s present 
international identity as a normative (Manners 2002, 2006) or civilian power (Telo 
2006).
Secondly, there is an uploading of policy content. Germany’s capabilities to 
upload its interests and institutional models onto the EU have been effective in other 
domains, like the European Monetary Union (EMU), the configuration of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) or EU reform. Germany has also pursued foreign policy uploading 
with some effectiveness. During the 1990s it decisively shaped the contours of the EU’s 
Eastern enlargement, uploading its preferences for an enlargement o f twelve states, and 
leading other member states to adopt its enlargement policy. More recently, Chancellor 
Merkel has acted as the quiet uploader in helping to make the EU more capable as an 
international actor. Her role in unblocking the financial deadlock at the Brussels summit 
in December 2005, and in pushing forward the EU reform treaty in 2007 has 
strengthened the EU’s capacity for action.
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53.1. Uploading German preferences onto the EU and member states regarding 
ESDP
Germany’s record in uploading its preferences in ESDP is mixed. It shaped the civilian 
dimension of the ESDP which the British-French St. Malo initiative for a common 
defence in December 1998 had not envisaged. The German government successfully 
argued that an ESDP combining both military and civilian dimensions would best 
prepare the EU for its international operations and give it a profile abroad congruent 
with the normative framework applied within the EU space itself. Berlin also gave a 
decisive input to Europe’s foreign and security policy during the German EU presidency 
in the first half of 1999, claiming that ‘the European Security and Defence Policy was
1Q7“bom” in June 1999’, during the German Council Presidency in Cologne. In truth, in 
the defence area Germany lagged behind France and Britain, and it is clear that not 
having been a part of the St. Malo process, Berlin was eager to make its contribution to 
join and thus used the presidency to prepare the EU for the ‘Headline Goals’ adopted 
half a year later at the Helsinki European Council. The presidency also highlighted 
Germany’s role, with the Bundeswehr’s first time participation in a non-UN sanctioned 
military combat mission in Kosovo. The uploading of Germany’s preferences for 
negotiating the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe as a civilian instrument for post­
conflict reconstruction shaped the ESDP in a decisive manner for the EU’s nascent 
security policy. Operationally, the Bundeswehr participation in NATO and ESDP 
missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Macedonia confirmed Germany’s reputation as a 
responsible alliance partner at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 had a strong German imprint in 
Berlin’s preference for effective multilateralism, civilian crisis management instruments 
and the use of military force as a mechanism of last resort. Germany’s exerted pressure 
for the wording ‘pre-emptive engagement’ to be substituted for ‘preventive 
engagement’ (Irlenkauser 2004) thus differentiating the European from the American 
approach to threat response. In the absence of a security strategy of its own it is rather 
surprising that Germany managed to have an influence at all. Still, in including the case
197 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future o f  the Bundeswehr, p.34. 
http://www.bmvg.de/portalPA_l _0_P3/PortalFiles/C 1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFODE/W+ 
2006+eng+DS.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb
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for preventive engagement, the EU is one step ahead of Germany in becoming a more 
‘militarised’ actor.
Despite the ESDP’s modest success in its first eight years, Germany’s capability 
to shape European and other member states’ foreign policies towards ESDP, as opposed 
to normative uploading, is not linear. Political constraints in increasing defence 
expenditures to provide the resources necessary and the scrutiny each mandate or 
change in existing mandates undergoes in lengthy Bundestag disagreements about the 
scope of the mission continue to limit Berlin’s capacity for action as do the 
discrepancies between the potential for engagement and existing capabilities to deliver
10Rtroops and material to act in dangerous military zone like southern Afghanistan. In 
addition Germany’s security engagement in Afghanistan has been built more on an 
accumulation of reactions towards US pressure for stronger engagement than on a 
German strategy itself. Germany’s refusal in early 2008 to send German soldiers to 
combat missions in the South of Afghanistan in support of NATO’s mission only 
reinforces the dilemma German security policy is facing.199 All this diminishes Berlin’s 
capacity to upload practical policy preferences for ESDP missions.
5.3.2. Uploading German preferences onto the EU and member states regarding 
ENP
One of the primary goals of German security policy is ‘the strengthening of the 
European area of stability through the consolidation and development of European 
integration and the European Union’s active neighbourhood policy with the states of the 
southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean region.200 Germany’s interest 
in shaping CFSP towards the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood can be seen as a successor 
policy to the enlargement policy, even though the ENP does not envision EU accession 
for ENP members. During the German EU presidency in the first half of 2007 the 
Brussels European Council in June 2007 adopted the new strategy for a partnership with
iCentral Asia. This was an initiative put forward by foreign minister Steinmeier,
198 In 2004-2005 Germany spent 1.4% of its GDP on defense expenditures, less than France (2.5%), 
Britain (2.7%), Denmark (1.8%). Fischer Weltalmanach 2008, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, p. 534.
199 ’USA fordem Kampfeinsatz der Bundeswehr’, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 31 January 2008, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/deutschland/artikel/7/l 55600/
200 White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future o f  the Bundeswehr, p.7. 
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/PA_l_0_P3/PortalFiles/Cl 256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFODE/W  
+2006+eng+DS.pdf?yw_repository=youatweb
201 Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21-22 June 2007, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf
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through a new Ostpolitik for Central Asia as a way to export stability and ensure energy 
security after the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 had revealed Europe’s energy 
vulnerability. However, Steinmeier’s additional proposal for an ENP Plus was rejected 
(Kempe 2007). ENP Plus would have opened up a distant perspective of future 
membership negotiations for Europe’s Eastern neighborhood. Other EU members saw 
this as an attempt by Germany to increase its influence in the region and upload again 
its policy preferences onto the ENP.
Because the ENP is a new area for member states to profile their interests, it is 
yet another area where member states’ motivations diverge. Germany’s attempt to 
upload its vision of a ENP refocusing on the South Caucasus and Central Asia would 
have increased Germany’s position in European foreign policy. French president 
Sarkozy’s proposal for a EU Mediterranean Union, presented in June 2007, can thus be 
seen as a response meant to emphasize France’s leading role in the geographical area of 
the Mediterranean. Unsurprisingly, Chancellor Merkel initially opposed the idea 
arguing it would fragment the Union, while implicitly it was seen as a challenge to 
Berlin’s own position in the Union.202 In March 2008 Merkel and Sarkozy have put 
forward a joint proposal for a Mediterranean Union, with Merkel having received 
assurances that all twenty-seven member states would be part of the initiative, and no 
additional funds would flow into the new institution.
5.3.3. Uploading German preferences onto the EU and member states regarding 
the Middle East
The Middle East is the region where both Germany and the EU are building up a 
political presence, and it has become a vital testing ground for the seriousness and 
efficiency of an evolving CFSP and ESDP, and for the EU’s assertion as a global 
security actor. Germany has only recently developed policies for the region and towards 
individual states. While it fosters its relationship with Israel and attempts to influence 
EU positions towards Tel Aviv, it has become more outspoken about the Palestinians’ 
right to establish their own state. Former foreign minister Fischer tried to play an active 
role in mediating the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2001-2002, and after 11 September 
2001 put forward proposals for a global strategic perspective for the Middle East.
202 ‘German Chancellor Doubts French Leader’s Mediterranean Plan’, Deutsche Welle,5 December 2007. 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2989117,00.html
203 Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Fischer to the Bundestag on Middle East policy, Berlin, 13
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Together with Britain and France, Germany is part of the EU-3+1 initiative, with the EU 
High Representative, in cooperation with the United States, Russia and China, in 
diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. In the 
summer of 2006 Germany participated for the first time in the region in a maritime 
operation in the realm of UNIFIL mission off the coast of Lebanon.204 German 
diplomatic efforts towards the region have led to its participation in the Middle East 
Quartet which Berlin tried to revive during the German EU presidency in 2007.
While Germany’s role as an active player in the region has grown, Berlin’s 
capability to shape European and other member states’ foreign policies towards the 
Middle East remains limited. Because it lacks a tradition of active political engagement 
in the region, Germany has thus far preferred to adapt to inputs from Brussels and other 
member states.
5.3.4. Uploading German preferences towards great powers
Relations with great powers are too important for EU members not to pursue their own 
specific interests and national foreign policies. Towards Russia, German Chancellors 
have pursued divergent approaches. Helmut Kohl recognized Russia’s importance as a 
strategic partner for the EU and the West and played a decisive role in promoting the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia which the European Union 
signed with Moscow in 1997 for a ten year period 205 Gerhard Schroder, in contrast, 
pursued more uploading than downloading reflexes in his attempt to forge a bilateral 
strategic relationship with Moscow. But his repeated overtures towards Russian 
president Vladimir Putin were mostly unilateral German initiatives which occasionally 
included France, but which did not rest on a wider European initiative towards 
fomenting a stable relationship with Moscow.206 On the contrary, they were pursued 
amidst strong intra-European divisions regarding relations with the United States and its 
policies for Iraq.
Schroder’s pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy produced unwelcome 
consequences for Germany’s stance in transatlantic relations and European policy. The 
loosening of established alliances and lack of linkage between relations with Paris,
February 2004, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe archiv?archiv id=5370
204 http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/mandate.html
205 Partnership & Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Russia, 1 December 1997 
http ://ec. europa. eu/extemal_relat ions/ceeca/pca/index. htm
206 The Kaliningrad meeting between Putin, Schroder and Chirac in July 2005 to celebrate the city’s 750th 
anniversary revealed that Schroder perceived policy towards Moscow more on a bilateral, and great 
power level than on a European one.
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Washington and Moscow cost Berlin influence on the international stage, leaving 
Germany isolated and weakened in its traditional equidistance between Europe and 
America (Szabo 2004). Berlin’s opposition to the US-led operation against Iraq was 
also the catalyst for intra-European divisions thus preventing a possible common 
European position on U.S. policy. Simultaneously, Schroder distanced Germany from 
the U.S. and did little to prevent the ensuing intra-European divisions which made a 
joint European position impossible. All this raised doubts as to whether Berlin’s 
unilateral move was circumstantial or a break from its traditional reflexive 
multilateralism towards a less Europeanist Germany (Schwarz 2005). Without clear 
priorities, Germany’s influence within the EU as well as the EU’s more general attempt 
at playing an international role diminished, with German capabilities to upload policy 
preferences severely limited between 2002 and 2005.
With the aim to repair German-American relations and Berlin’s influence in 
Europe, Chancellor Merkel has given a major impetus to reestablishing close European- 
American relations. The creation of a transatlantic free trade area in the spring of 2007 
between the European Union and the United States falls back on an initiative originated 
in Berlin, and exemplifies the regaining of Germany’s uploading capabilities in 
European politics.207 The harshening of Russia’s position towards the West has led to a 
cooling down of EU-Russia relations. Chancellor Merkel has taken a tougher stance 
than her predecessor towards Russia’s disregard for human rights reflecting a policy 
more in tune with European human rights and democracy values. The EU-Russia 
meeting in Samara in May 2007 during the German presidency raised the stakes but 
only highlighted the tense relations between both sides and the difficulty in renovating 
the EU-Russia PCA which expired in November 2007, and which the presidency was 
unable to unblock.208
Germany thus returned to a leading European role in the EU’s relations with 
both the United States and Russia. It has also tried to play an active role in the EU’s 
foreign policy towards China. Schroder had pursued mostly economic interests in the 
bilateral relations, and, together with French president Chirac unsuccessfully claimed 
the lifting of the European arms embargo against Beijing. Merkel, in contrast, has made 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law a priority of her governments’ policy 
towards China, which is in accordance with the Commissions’ strategy paper, but which
207 ‘US and EU agree 'single market”, 30 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/6607757.stm
208 ‘Germany launches last-ditch move to save Russia-EU summit’, Financial Times, 15 May 2007, 
http://www.ft.com/home/europe
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does not constitute a sufficiently common basis for all member states to agree on.209 
While the Merkel government has pursued policy initiatives to embed Germany’s 
approach in a European policy towards great powers, it still remains an area where 
Germany as much as other states pursue an active national foreign policy at the same 
time.
5.4. The EU as an international actor and Germany’s role
Robert Cooper defined the European Union as representing what he calls the post­
modern world bound by international norms and institutionalised relationships where
910military power does not play a major role in international politics (Cooper 2003). 
This definition is in essence not very different from Manners’ definition of Europe as a 
normative power, in that both recognize its singularity as a foreign policy actor 
(Manners 2002; cfr. Youngs 2004). Normative power best develops in Cooper’s post­
modern world of European states because it becomes a constitutive part of a different 
kind of international actor where military means are not the primary source of power. 
Because of the absence of physical force and the importance of cultural diffusion ‘the 
most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or 
what it says, but what it is’ (Manners 2002:252). But both Cooper and Manners are 
aware that the EU does not live isolated in a post-modern, normative bubble. In a recent 
re-evaluation of his argument, Manners has conceded that it is likely that the EU will 
increasingly undergo a militarization the more it engages with the outside world - 
although this ‘need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power’ 
(Manners 2006:183). Cooper, by contrast, does not see the EU as a military power but 
he is clear that as an international political actor it needs a security dimension. Yet he 
suggests that the EU, in its dealings with the non-post-modem world accepts that ‘in the 
international arena, even with its supposed anarchy and power politics, lasting change 
requires legitimacy, soft power that is, as well as hard power (Cooper 2004:180).
In European politics we are witnessing the development from a normatively 
orientated foreign policy towards a more pragmatic engagement with Europe’s more
209 ‘EU -  China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities’, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 24.10.2006
COM(2006) 631 final, http://ec.europa.eu/extemal_relations/china/intro/index.htm
210 In contrast, the pre-modem world is characterized by a state with a fragile structure, with little real 
sovereign authority, living in a post-imperial chaos. In the modem world, on the other hand, the nation 
state is strong and the state system is still intact. Sovereignty is inviolable and order is assured by a 
hegemonic state or a balance o f power, and security is ultimately guaranteed by force. Robert Cooper 
(2003). The Breaking o f  Nations, London: Atlantic Books, pp. 16-17 and p. 22.
147
immediate neighbourhood. In this sense, Germany’s own path partially away from a 
foreign policy shaped by considerations of normative power towards a more robust 
foreign policy parallels the European Union’s own CFSP and ESDP evolution, with 
hard choices required regarding the Middle East, Northern Africa, Central Asia and 
China.
5.5. Conclusion
Member states are likely to agree when their interests coincide -  which is not the same 
as saying that there is an overall policy convergence. It is conceivable that European 
foreign and security policy will simultaneously progress down both on a 
Europeanization lane, as this chapter has depicted, and through a more clustered 
approach, of multilateral groupings which unite for a specific policy purpose, such as 
the EU-3+1 cluster on Iran. Still at an early stage, it is uncertain that these multilateral 
frameworks will produce workable results or that they can work in other domains; there 
is too much disagreement between the EU-3 countries regarding the scope and aim of 
future missions, there is a wider leadership reluctance, and there is some resentment by 
states like Spain, Italy and Poland as to why they were not included. Concerted action 
towards Iran suggests that we might see in the future a combination of CFSP together 
with a more power political approach which locates Germany, Britain and France at the 
level of the US, Russia and China. As Christopher Hill argued, ‘the paradox which now 
obtains is that the CFSP and some form of directoire have become interdependent’ (Hill 
2006). This need not be detrimental to the EU and CFSP as such. But it presupposes that 
the EU’s other member states accept this new great power legitimacy, and that the EU-3 
group is willing to turn efficient policy-making into a benefit for the EU as a whole.
The changes which occurred in Germany domestically in recent years do not 
suggest the end o f Germany as a ‘Europeanized state’. But Germany has become a 
different sort of Europeanized state. First, while it remains more ‘Euro-enthusiastic’ 
than France and Britain, its Europeanism is now pursued foremost for Germany’s own 
political and economic interests. Secondly, the Europeanization dynamic reveals a 
stronger tendency for Germany to upload than the other way round. Germany has 
decisively shaped the contours of European Monetary Union and Eastern enlargement. 
In CFSP and ESDP Germany has managed to successfully upload its normative and 
some institutional preferences. With the Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007, 
awaiting member states’ ratification in 2009, the EU will have adopted Berlin’s
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preference for a double majority voting system (after the French political rejection in
Nice in 2000) thus strengthening Germany’s position, since population is now an
important factor in EU decision-making. German policy-makers have increasingly
moved towards a logic of consequential ism in their European policy more in tune with
211the new German foreign policy of international assertiveness.
EU foreign policy remains intergovernmental. If ratified by all member states, 
the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the intergovemmentalist dimension, reinforcing the 
role of the member states and stipulating a partial transfer of competencies back to 
national governments, while keeping the rule of unanimity for key decisions. It states 
that CFSP and ESDP provisions “do not affect the responsibilities of the member states, 
as they currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of 
their national representation in third countries and international organisations”; neither 
do they “prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the 
member states” or “the primary responsibility of the Security Council and of its 
members for the maintenance of international peace and security”. Although 
functional borders between the competencies of the national governments and the 
European Commission and the Council are likely to become increasingly blurred, 
member states tend to hold on to what they perceive as their sovereign domains. Power, 
institutions and ideas are thus not only subject to Europeanization, they are also 
‘permeated by strong residual claims of freedom of action particularly by the larger 
member states’ (Smith 2007:440).
This notwithstanding, there are some encouraging signs for the continuation of 
Europeanization of foreign policy. First, of the big three EU member states Germany is 
still the one where a nascent pan-European conception of interest and identity stands the 
best chance of playing a role in the pursuit of national foreign policies of member states, 
and the strengthening of the EU’s CFSP and ESDP. The desirability of shared norms 
and notions of European interests is consensual among the German elite and embedded 
in its foreign policy discourse. The future of German foreign policy is still dependent on 
the success of EU foreign policy. Secondly, when the EU-3+1, Germany, Britain and 
France act together towards countries like Iran, they are helping to forge what is 
perceived from the outside as a European approach. This in turn feeds back into the 
intra-European space, promoting the commonality of interests vis-a-vis other
211 On the distinction between a logic o f appropriateness and a logic o f  consequential ism for political 
action, see Johan P. Olsen, ‘Understanding Institutions and Logics o f Appropriateness: Introductory 
Essay’, ARENA Working Paper, 13, August 2007, p. 9. http://www.arena.uio.no
212 The Treaty o f Lisbon
http://bookshop.europa.eu/eubookshop/FileCache/PUBPDF/FXAC07306ENC/FXAC07306ENC 002.pdf
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international issues.
Thus Europeanization of foreign policy will lead to an increase of the areas 
where EU outputs will enter the member state space. At the same time, however, the 
more the EU moves closer to CFSP and ESDP integration, and the EU acquires an 
international role, the more the EU’s big three and others will strive to retain elements 
o f state sovereignty and make their own national inputs and upload their preferences 
onto the EU level. The stronger the institutional mechanisms for the EU to become an 
effective foreign policy actor, the more complexities of convergence and divergence 
will emerge in member states’ attitudes regarding international politics. Paradoxically, 
success in ESDP missions can also increase the uploading reflexes of the EU’s leading 
states. Thus there is a tendency towards increasing Europeanization, particularly in the 
fields of ESDP and joint military operation; at the same time, there is no automaticity in 
the degree of Europeanizing convergence since an effective European foreign policy is 
still much dependent on the strength most member states are willing to empower it with.
Ultimately, both Germany and the EU are facing the pressure to act as 
international actors and may face the challenge of doing so in a less ‘European’ way and 
act, in some circumstances, more like other great powers. To summarise the 
interconnectedness between Germany and Europe with regard to questions of power, 
both Germany and the EU are on a path from a Europe-idealist conception of their role 
in the world to the gradual realization that for both to play a significant role they have to 
undergo a gradual transformation of the nature of that power. As we have seen, a 
European foreign policy identity has not only promoted but created European common 
interests in ESDP and ENP. Thus combining elements of normative with more 
traditional attributes of power shows that the two are not mutually exclusive, and may 
both be necessary in determining what constitutes an effective international power.
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CHAPTER 6: The Euro-Atlantic dimension of German foreign policy 
Redefining bilateral relations: Germany’s partnerships with France and the 
United States
6.1. Introduction
Germany between Paris and Washington: sources of compatibility and dissent
Changes in Germany’s normative power have come to the surface in the realm of 
Germany’s bilateral relationships with France and the United States. For over forty years 
both were vital for the Federal Republic. After unification, it was no longer given that 
these bilateral relationships were essential for Germany or that they could remain on the 
path of continuity advocated by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Because of changes in the 
structural context in the Euro-Atlantic area, and Germany’s enhanced power position 
within it, these two bilateralisms became increasingly difficult to reconcile. In light of 
this, Germany tried to renegotiate relations with both partners. This took many forms. 
For Chancellor Kohl it meant that Germany assumed a more active international role in 
its security policy within the Atlantic Alliance. For Chancellor Schroder it meant 
transforming Germany’s normative power into a more utilitarian form of power to assert 
a new foreign policy. For Chancellor Merkel it means reconciling differences after the 
transatlantic rift over the war in Iraq and recovering political and institutional cohesion 
in the Euro-Atlantic area.
During the Cold War, maintaining close relations with both Paris and 
Washington was the cornerstone of Germany’s post-war multilateralist strategy and its 
normative commitment to Westbindung. In Europe, France was the necessary partner in 
a ‘privileged partnership’ (Simonian 1985) for a stable post-war reconciliation in 
Western Europe, and Germany’s European policy. In the Euro-Atlantic area the United 
States was the indispensable partner to guarantee democracy consolidation in Germany, 
provide a security umbrella against the Soviet Union and ease suspicion against Western 
Germany by guaranteeing that its security policy was embedded in the wider 
transatlantic community. Germany’s strategy meant to balance these two poles trying to 
accommodate French anxieties and American expectations. Trapped between these two, 
it was one of its successes to avoid antagonizing France or the United States. For
151
German policy-makers, both were ‘essential partnerships’, not least because the Federal 
Republic had no other options.
Despite the centrality of both relationships for Germany ‘a post-war record of 
recurrent mutual unfriendliness’ (Wood 1998:16) existed between France and the U.S. 
and mediating the dilemmas this produced was part of the FRG’s post-war diplomacy. In 
times of transatlantic crises, it was frustrating for Bonn to take sides because ‘neither the 
American nor the French design for Europe fully accommodated German interests. 
Opting for Washington meant supporting a strategic posture that the German 
government no longer viewed as fully serving German security interests; opting for Paris 
meant supporting a European order that fell far short of Bonn’s preferences’ (Hanrieder 
1989:12-13).
After the end of the Cold War, Germany’s position became increasingly difficult 
to maintain, first, because its own potential power had risen, and secondly because the 
Maastricht treaty laid the foundations for a European common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP). Germany could neither renounce further integration with France, which 
touched on a common foreign and security policy, nor could it alienate the United States 
from Europe whose role was still essential for a stable European peace order. In 
addition, Bonn needed to sooth fears of smaller European countries of a German 
hegemonic position over Europe.
Paris and Washington envisaged almost opposite projects regarding German 
unification. France was the EC member state with the biggest difficulties over coming to 
terms with German unification. It reinforced its policy of benign containment hardly 
disguising the fact that it had no interest in seeing Germany play a more powerful role. 
The U.S. took the opposite view in that president George Bush perceived Germany as 
capable of a leadership role in Europe, alleviating what would become a diminished 
American involvement in Europe. Paris expected restraint, paying too much attention to 
history, fearing that an unrestrained unified Germany would act more unilaterally 
because of its increased power. Washington suggested international engagement, paying 
too little attention to the constitutive elements of European integration which had shaped 
Germany’s political identity and which located Germany firmly in the EU. Still, their 
common objective was to retain some sort of control over Germany’s actions. While 
France deepened European integration, the United States strengthened the NATO 
transatlantic alliance.
France’s fear of Germany’s accession to a predominant power in Europe was 
linked to its own declining role in world affairs and its predicament as a medium sized
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power with pretensions to being a great power in world affairs and a leading power in 
Europe (Hoffmann 1999). While on the international arena France acted through the 
channel of sovereignty, it accepted some sovereignty pooling in EU politics, if  only to 
allow for a greater control of Germany’s actions (Sauder 1995a:36). In contrast, the 
United States’ support for German unification and a stronger Germany was linked to 
America’s position as the victorious power in the post-Cold War order. Washington 
believed that the emergence of Germany as a stabilising power in Europe depended on 
Germany’s definition of national interests and which relationships and institutions it 
found most conducive to pursuing those interests (Asmus 1991:546).
Between 1997 and 2007 Germany’s normative behaviour in foreign policy 
underwent changes in the realm of bilateral relations towards increasing pragmatism and 
a changing German identity. The context for change was created by a combination of a 
critical juncture for change, entrepreneurs willing to forge change and a discursive 
refraining and renegotiation of status in bilateral relations. This change did not reflect a 
‘return to traditional power politics’, but the adaptation of a pattern of foreign policy 
which increasingly combined the logic of appropriateness with a logic of expected 
consequences.
Change also occurred in the realm of European and transatlantic relations. If 
after the end of the cold war, ‘the most striking characteristic of the relationship [was] 
continuity rather than change (Wallace 2001:16), after 11 September 2001 a strategic 
competition between the US and Europe set in. In a wider sense, the dual enlargements 
of NATO and the EU were meant to replicate and enlarge the post-1945 liberal 
constitutional order. At the same time, they revealed an underlying strategic competition 
between Europe and the US, underway since the mid-1990s. For Washington, NATO 
enlargement to the East extended its security web closer to the regions of the Caucasus 
and the Middle East. For Germany, and to a lesser degree France, EU enlargement 
meant projecting Europe’s stability order into a wider European neighbourhood. In 
addition, changes in transatlantic relations were also a consequence of transformations 
occurring in European politics, such as EMU and an embryonic European defence.
The chapter addresses a series of questions. Has there been a significant 
departure from the norms which have guided German foreign policy identity and 
interests towards its two essential bilateral relations? How much is Germany’s changing 
identity shaping new interests and have new norms been created to redefine Germany’s 
relations with France and with the U.S.? Has Germany’s traditional approach towards 
Paris and Washington been transformed into a more instrumental logic of expected
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consequences? How have France’s expectations been articulated by its policy-makers? 
How has the US reacted towards Berlin’s unilateral rejection of its Iraq policy in 2002- 
2003? Which role did Germany play in the connection between the transatlantic crisis in 
2003 and the European crisis in 2005?
This chapter argues that the dissonances which occurred in Germany’s two 
bilateral relations and which undermined the cohesion of NATO and the EU resulted to 
a great extent from the normative shift which occurred in Germany and which clashed 
with the power conceptions of other institutional members. It examines Germany’s 
changing alliance behaviour towards Paris and Washington to show when and where the 
logics of appropriateness and consequentiality were at work, and how Kohl, Schroder 
and Merkel have remade German international identity sources to reframe bilateral 
relations. It analyses how Germany has coped with the EU and the wider transatlantic 
area as two overlapping structures acting as ‘constraints and temptations’ (Hoffmann 
1995:282) vis-a-vis Kohl’s goal to ensure continuity, Schroder’s aim of asserting change 
and Merkel’s policy of refurbishing both special relationships. The chapter examines 
cases of both convergence and dissonance of interests to show how Germany positioned 
itself between France and the United States, and how, from 1997 to 2007 it navigated, 
mediated or chose between them. Section one analyzes German-French and German- 
American relations in the last two years of the Kohl government. Section two examines 
how the two relationships were renegotiated during the Schroder governments. Section 
three reflects on two years of the present Merkel government and assesses how it has 
succeeded thus far in its aim to recover both relationships after the transatlantic and the 
European crises.
6.2. The Kohl government and bilateral relations
6.2.1. Germany and France: the persistence of the resilient partnership
The German-French relationship of the post war years is to be distinguished from the 
project of European economic integration and the need for German-French 
reconciliation. For Germany the attractiveness of the bilateral relation lay ‘more in its 
ability to heal historical wounds, build a peaceful partnership and form a strong basis for 
the European negotiation process, than in the possibility that it might elevate the German 
nation-state - along with France - above the rest of the EU members’ (Deubner 1997:17). 
After unification this institutionalised bilateralism continued to be Germany’s preferred
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strategic partnership (Bulmer et al. 2000). Its strength came from the legitimacy 
recognised by other EC members, which accepted that European integration progressed 
through German-French initiatives.
Germany’s capacity to develop its normative power was closely linked to the 
stability of the German-French partnership during the Cold War years. The German- 
French relationship turned into a normative framework which conditioned and 
empowered Germany’s European policy. Because the relationship ‘had a strong 
symbolic content as emblematic of a new type of relationship between European states’ 
(Bulmer et al. 2000:52) it often functioned as a barometer for convergence and 
divergence on policy issues among EU members. This led some to suggest a German- 
French ‘co-operative hegemony’ (Pedersen 1998) as the motor for integration initiatives 
or the brake on initiatives one of the partners did not agree with.
French motivations for European integration were closely linked to France’s 
strategic visions regarding its neighbour, in an attempt to forestall a more powerful 
Germany. European integration was thus ‘an imaginative and profoundly innovative leap 
beyond the traditional methods of interstate relations’ as ‘a construction of friendly 
containment’ of Germany’ (Hoffmann 1999:78) and of enhancing France’s position, 
both within the European Community and outside of it. The French were inherently 
realist in that they found it ‘difficult to believe that once a state becomes measurably 
more powerful - as Germany has since unification - it will not throw its weight around’ 
(Friend 2001:57). France linked its approval of German unification to deepening 
European integration for it feared that Germany might be tempted to go it alone if both 
failed to progress on integration. For Paris, ‘the one thing worse than domination by the 
Germans within the EC would be domination by them outside of the EC’ (Pond 
1999:42).
6.2.1.1. The EU dimension
Despite the traditional German-French core in the EU, both countries pursued 
contrasting projects for European integration. France sought three goals. First, it sought 
to preserve French sovereignty. A strong, intergovernmental Europe of sovereign 
nations is not incompatible with French sovereignty. Secondly, it aimed for a leadership 
role in Europe. The German-French tandem served this purpose, in that it helped France 
to quietly contain German ambitions and promote French leadership in a more 
Europeanized framework. Finally, France envisaged the EU as a ‘Europe-puissance’,
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with autonomous defence capabilities in a multipolar world and a CFSP moulded by 
French design.
In contrast, for the Kohl government the integration logic affected the 
sovereignty of the member states themselves. ‘The notion of the inviolable sovereignty 
of the [nation state] still carries weight, although this sovereignty has long since become 
an empty shell’ (Schauble and Lamers 1998). Germany’s voluntarism to surrender 
sovereignty to supranational institutions was typical of the Cold War years (Sauder 
1995a). Germany conceived of a German-French leadership in coordination with other 
member states’ positions. It supported EU majority voting in CFSP, initially, as ‘the best 
guarantee against a new German question’. At the same time, however, Germany 
projected its own normative conception onto the EU. Finally, Kohl did not share the idea 
of an international role for Europe independent of the United States, preferring to think 
only in terms of alliance with Washington.
Most steps taken on integration preceded a negotiation between Germany and 
Paris and were then presented to other EU members. On some occasions this functioned 
as a face-saving exercise for the French, as was the case with European Monetary 
Union. EMU resulted out of a common strategy between Chancellor Kohl and President 
Mitterrand, but the location and structure of the European Central Bank were decisively 
influenced by Germany. French decision-makers knew that EMU enhanced Germany’s 
power and laid bare France’s decreasing influence and status because of the strength of 
the German economy.
The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 set the ground for the EU to prepare itself for 
eastern enlargement. It institutionalised a flexibility clause, but in practice, this 
amounted to a slowing pace of integration. Deepening integration through flexible 
cooperation would allow some member states to proceed with closer integration at a 
quicker pace than others. The result was that flexibility was a way to avoid more 
institutional binding commitments from the member states thus the integration speed 
decreased. But Germany and France did not give the treaty the necessary impulse for 
further integration (Guerot 2007).
Enlargement, the EU’s big foreign policy project, did not rest on a joint German- 
French enlargement strategy. Because of German-French differences it advanced only 
slowly and on an ad hoc basis rather than through a common strategy. Whereas 
Germany was pro-active, France pursued the EU’s policy towards institutional 
enlargement to ten new member states in 2004 reluctantly. Paris was not a keen
213 Interview with a German politician, Berlin, September 2000.
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supporter of Eastern enlargement for it faced the inevitable shift of the EU’s centre of 
gravity towards the East and an enhanced German position within Europe.214 Finally, 
enlargement weakened the centrality of the German-French partnership. Part of Kohl’s 
imperative to make enlargement the other side of the coin of institutional deepening was 
to accommodate and soften shifts in the German-French relationship. But enlargement 
brought a new foreign policy dimension into EU politics where Germany rather than 
France was bound to become the leading player and where the centre of gravitation 
would be ‘Eastemised’.
This was France’s new predicament in the face of the inevitability of 
enlargement: while it had to continue on the path of European integration as the best 
guarantee for preventing potential German unilateral action, either way German 
influence on the continent would rise, much to the chagrin of France’s own position.
Thus the commonality of German and French interests produced effects mostly 
within the internal dynamics of the institution and did not lead to joint German-French 
foreign policy actions outside the EU.
6.2.I.2. The security dimension
Germany and France had different views, of long-standing, on America’s role in the 
future security structure in Europe. Germany wanted a European defence embedded in 
transatlantic structures, to fortify the European capacity for action and strengthen 
NATO. France, on the other hand, wanted Europe to develop its own independent 
defence capability, and the WEU to become NATO’s European pillar.
While the Kohl government appealed to continuing U.S. engagement with 
Europe, including the Balkan region, President Chirac favoured a European security 
policy increasingly independent from Washington which would ultimately have an anti- 
Atlanticist dimension (Haftendom 2001:395-396).
There were also different approaches regarding NATO enlargement. While 
Germany strongly advocated NATO enlargement, France’s position was contradictory 
(Kamp 1998). Faced with the inevitability of enlargement, France changed its position in 
1997, at a time when it was considering re-joining NATO’s military structure. At the 
Madrid summit on NATO enlargement in July 1997, US-European divisions came once
214 Differences over policies regarding Eastern Europe were not new. During the Cold War, ‘neither 
Washington nor Paris pursued Eastern policies that satisfied Bonn and that could have allayed Bonn’s 
suspicions that the German viewpoint was insufficiently represented by its major allies’ (Hanrieder 
1989:12-13).
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again to the surface. Americans rejected the French claim that NATO enlargement 
should include Bulgaria and Romania, besides Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
*y i ft  . _ .whose entry NATO members had already agreed on (Kamp 1998). The Germans 
positioned themselves in a mediating position, accepting both the American proposal for 
only three members, and the French one for five new members. Ruhe preferred the US 
position, Kohl and Kinkel accepted also the French one (Kamp 1998: 177). In the end, 
the American position prevailed. This short-lived episode revealed the complexities of 
French-American relations and the difficulty for Germany to play a mediating role.
Part of the European legitimacy of the special German-French relationship 
during the Kohl years was that the bilateralism was integrative, attracting other 
European states into respecting this core European relation and not feeling threatened by 
it. Germany acted traditionally as a mediator between the interests of smaller and larger 
member states (Jopp 2002). But it avoided establishing ad hoc coalitions which might 
stimulate an anti-France core, which would gravitate around Germany. Thus the bilateral 
relationship in the EU has ‘acted as a decompression chamber’ for the French elite to 
deal with Germany’s increased power after unification (Bulmer et al. 2000:127) and 
served to ‘contain the tensions potentially occasioned by the changing power balance’ 
(Bulmer et al. 2000:71).
When the bilateral relationship was under strain, joint initiatives failed to 
materialise. Until the end of the 1990s Germany was more willing to subordinate to 
French design for European unification than to try to put forward a unilateral German 
stance (Haftendom 2001). But at the turn of the century a growing unease emerged 
between Berlin and Paris over Germany’s role in EU institutions.
6.2.2. Germany and the United States: the continuity of an enduring alliance
6.2.2.I. From protected ally to partner: ‘Partners in leadership’?
In the immediate post-cold war world, the United States put high expectations on unified 
Germany expecting it to assume a leadership role in Europe (Wallace 1995) and to 
become the preferred anchor for America’s strategy in Europe through a ‘new special
215 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, NATO Press Release M -l(97)81, 8 
July 1997. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm
2,6 The Madrid Declaration included the compromise statement that ‘the Alliance expects to extend 
further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and 
obligations o f  membership ( ...)  No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the 
objectives o f  the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.’
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relationship’ (Tamoff 1990). In May 1989, shortly before the fall of the Berlin wall, 
President George Bush proposed a joint US-German leadership role in NATO during his 
visit to Mainz, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary o f the Federal Republic. The 
U.S. attempted to lure Germans into a privileged position through the rhetorically 
attractive formula o f ‘partners in leadership’ (Zelikow and Rice 1995:31). This was new 
for during the Cold War the German-American relationship functioned in a multilateral 
institutional setting where ‘neither the United States nor the Federal Republic was ever 
able or willing to give primacy to bilateral relations in its foreign policy’ (Schwarz 
2004:539).
The U.S. proposal, o f course, was not innocent. First, it signalled that for 
Washington transatlantic relations were changing and Europe was no longer 
fundamental to U.S. security; Germany had lost the geopolitical significance it had 
during the Cold War (Koopman and Stark 2004). Secondly, Germany would share its 
part of the transatlantic security and exercise leadership, through a more assertive 
projection of power and pave the way for the U.S. to begin its gradual retreat from 
Europe. Thirdly, it could suggest that Germany would become increasingly disentangled 
from the integration process, thereby weakening the German-French relationship, and 
ultimately the integration process itself. Finally, the scenario of a German hegemony in 
Europe led Washington to anticipate this by proposing a joint leadership initiative which 
would forestall unilateral actions and position Germany as America’s junior partner. 
Ultimately, then, for Washington, ‘the quality of German-American partnership largely 
depended on whether Germany would take on more global responsibilities, or would 
remain predominantly a European power’ (Mayer 2001:74).
The German government deliberately did not engage with the American 
proposal. First, it meant that Germany would have to redefine its alliance with America 
repositioning the bilateral relationship on a qualitatively higher level than the German- 
French one. Such a change would have implied, first, German-American leadership 
within the Atlantic Alliance, and secondly a German leadership role within the EU, 
congruent with American interests in Europe. This could have pressured Germany to 
perform unpleasant tasks in Europe, probably weakening European integration, and 
would have represented a break in the traditional German policy of equidistance, not to 
mention the less positive reactions it would have produced in some European capitals.
Secondly, and as a consequence, an increased international German assertiveness 
would unbalance the European integration process, which relied on joint German-French 
leadership. Germany did not want to jeopardize relations with Paris which would have
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found such a change unacceptable. Thirdly, the proposal suggested a misperception from 
the American side in the belief that by luring one of its members outside of the EC, 
stability on the continent would increase allowing the US to withdraw. Fourthly, 
Germany’s security policy was still too constrained domestically and internationally to 
facilitate a joint leadership. Even if Germany was then at The height of its international 
influence’, according to former foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (Genscher 
1997:626), it lacked the means and the political will to guarantee the assertive act that 
Washington expected from it. Finally, it is likely that any German government in the 
1990s would have encountered fierce domestic resistance towards the American idea.
6.2.2.2. The security dimension
Instead Kohl strengthened the German-French relationship. European integration was 
accelerated, through the Maastricht Treaty, whereas with Washington relations remained 
much the same. Kohl manoeuvred diplomatically not to offend the Americans, but 
preferred to deepen European integration instead of taking on a leadership role for which 
Germany was ill prepared and which would have weakened its integrative stance in 
Europe. Still, Germany attempted to continue to play the role of mediator between 
France and the U.S. and keep its twin bilateralism intact. While this revealed diplomatic 
skill by the Kohl government in attempting to perpetuate the fragile equilibrium without 
alienating allies who had different visions of world order the constraints of such policy 
became evident because they conditioned Bonn to keep precisely that balance.
Germany and the U.S. had a similar position regarding NATO enlargement to the 
East. The Americans took the lead in paving the way for the first group of countries to 
join NATO through the Partnership for Peace in early 1994 and Europeans were relieved 
to follow (Pond 1999:68-69). Germany supported the U.S. and took an active stance in 
acting as one of the main driving forces of NATO expansion towards Eastern Europe. 
Initially, German defence minister Volker Riihe pressed harder for enlargement than his 
American counterpart (Tewes 2002 and Arora 2006).217
Germany and the United States worked closely together towards 
institutionalising a new strategic partnership between Russia and NATO, signed with the 
NATO-Russia Declaration, in May 1997 (Hyde-Price 2000). Germany wanted to assure
217 In the German government Riihe was the strongest advocate o f NATO enlargement, with Chancellor 
Kohl careful o f  NATO’s relations with Russia, and foreign minister Kinkel concerned with security 
worries o f those countries which were left out. But Riihe opposed the idea o f a Russian membership in 
either NATO or the EU.
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Russia that it would not be excluded from the European security architecture, and the 
U.S. knew it had to create an institutionalised relationship with Russia, not least for that 
very reason.
For Chancellor Kohl ‘reliability and alliance capability are the basis of German 
foreign policy. German special paths in Europe and in the world inevitably lead into 
isolation’ (Kohl 1997b). Renegotiated relationships thus took many forms and were 
conducted following a logic o f appropriateness of action. During the 1990s it became 
increasingly difficult for Germany to maintain the defiant balancing act of pursuing the 
Europeanisation of its diplomacy and maintaining a close security relation with the 
United States, and, by implication, the primacy of NATO. American ambivalence 
regarding an independent European defence pillar also contributed to the uncertainty of 
transatlantic relations. If Washington was not truly interested in a EU with its own 
defence capabilities to become a potential future competitor, a Europe incapable of 
becoming an international actor would become increasingly irrelevant for the United 
States.
6.3. The Schroder government and bilateral relations
6.3.1. The German-French relation, 1998-2002
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder started his Chancellorship on the basis of a different self- 
understanding of his country’s international role. Schroder wanted to free Germany’s 
foreign policy from the constraints of the previous sixteen years of political leadership 
under Helmut Kohl and its excessive reliance on continuity. Schroder made assertions of 
German self-confidence and emancipation towards transforming Germany’s new status 
as a power with international parity similar to that of other powers. In his first speech 
before the Bundestag as the new Chancellor, Schroder spoke of Germany’s self- 
confidence as an ‘adult nation, which feels inferior to absolutely no-one.’ This 
suggests that after 1998 the established logic of appropriateness was gradually substituted 
by a new legitimacy for appropriateness and by a reinforced logic of consequentiality.
Paradoxically, it was the decision over the use of military power which pushed 
Schroder’s agenda. The Kosovo war in the spring of 1999, shortly after the Red-Green 
coalition came to power, marked a watershed in German foreign policy, not only in 
terms of the military operation but because this was the transition to adulthood in
218 Gerhard Schroder, speech before the Bundestag (Regierungserk.la.rung), 10 November 1998.
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German security policy, with obvious political implications. For the first time since the 
Second World War, Germany fought offensively in a NATO operation, alongside its 
allies, in an operation not sanctioned by the United Nations.
For the Chancellor Germany’s successful participation in the operation and the 
subsequent diplomatic handling of the aftermath handled by the German EU presidency 
in the first half of 1999 empowered him to begin redefining Germany’s relationships with 
Paris and Washington. Schroder made no effort to conceal that the Kohlean premise “ to 
be everybody’s darling” by being as Europeanist as France and as Atlanticist as Britain 
so as not to have to choose between the United States and its European partners’ 
(Haftendom, quoted in Peters 2004: 395), was not in Germany’s best interest. Schroder 
sought to emancipate Berlin from ‘decisions made elsewhere’, accepting the costs of 
relinquishing its traditional multilateralism. This transformed Germany’s normative 
power because it loosened the constraints on the instrumentality and consequentiality of 
its political actions. His striving for a new norm of international power parity meant that 
Germany’s new self-confidence required equality within the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union, and to a raising of international status.
6.3.1.1. Germany and France: Two equal partners?
The Chancellor pursued two steps in dismantling Germany’s logic of appropriateness 
and its alliance constraints. Recognising the importance of both the German-French and 
the German-American relationships, he envisaged repositioning Berlin’s position within 
the existing frameworks. During Schroder’s first emancipation moment, between 1999 
and 2001 the Chancellor contested France’s EU co-leadership and tried to free Germany 
from the institutionalised bilateralism. During Schroder’s second emancipation moment 
in 2002-2003 he turned to Washington and liberated himself from the American alliance. 
These emancipatory moves in European and transatlantic relations were accompanied by 
a more global ambition, the assertive claim for a German permanent UNSC seat, and by 
repeated overtures towards Russia, conducted on a bilateral basis between the Chancellor 
and president Vladimir Putin.
Schroder’s first emancipation moment also led him to attempt a closer 
relationship with Britain. That the Chancellor’s first visit took him to London instead of 
Paris was not well received in France, as was his initiative for a joint publication on
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“7  IQEuropean social democracy with British prime-minister Tony Blair in June 1999. 
Although the much publicized initiative did not mark the beginning of a new German- 
British leadership in Europe, it would have hit the German-French relationship at its core 
had it done so. Naturally, it displeased the Socialist French prime-minister Lionel Jospin, 
at a time when German-French relations were not the warmest, as the Berlin summit in 
March 1999 had shown with German-French disagreement over renegotiation of the EU 
budget and the future of the CAP (Gloannec 2004:37).
6.3.1.2. The Nice Intergovernmental Conference in 2000
A year later, in 2000, German-French bilateralism became a hindrance to progress on 
integration. At the Nice European Council in December 2000, Berlin and Paris were 
unwilling to coordinate their positions and make a coherent proposal on EU policies. 
They failed to present a joint strategy on the creation of the financial and institutional 
structures, engaging in open disagreement over the reweighing of national votes in the 
Council of Ministers. Schroder argued for an increase of Germany’s number of votes 
because of its higher population number, which Chirac opposed on the grounds that such 
an increase would cause an imbalance between the EU’s strongest member countries. In 
the end institutional reform was postponed to another intergovernmental conference in 
2004.
Whereas Chirac meant to re-establish the traditional German-French motor as a 
means of improving France’s position, Schroder aimed to locate Germany on a higher 
standing within that same relationship, to obtain power parity with France. The inbuilt 
mutual containment mechanism against tensions in the German-French relationship had 
begun to crumble. This was a consequence of the logic of expected consequences which 
increasingly prevailed in the bilateral relationship from the German side.
At the end of negotiations, Schroder’s plan to create a precedent and 
quantitatively increase Germany’s voting rights failed because of vehement French 
resistance.220 The compromise did not reflect a joint concern to advance European 
integration but rather the defence of purely German and French interests. Significantly, it 
was no longer guaranteed that in the future the German-French duo would automatically 
be willing to make an effort to unblock negotiations and proceed with integration. Thus
219 On the Blair-Schroder paper Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte, see Greg Chambers, European 
social democracy in the 21 st century, FES, London, 2000.
220 Germany had to accept the same 29 votes attributed to France, Britain and Italy. Schroder managed to 
negotiate a higher number o f German members to the European Parliament, and guaranteed, against 
Chirac’s initial position, that Poland got the same 27 votes as Spain.
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the Nice conference showed that ‘when France is grandstanding alone, to the 
disapproval of most other countries, Germany finds it easy to make ad hoc coalitions and 
shows its strength without offending others. But in the vast majority of cases, Germany 
does not wish to show its power to the Europeans at large, and while it may have 
difficulties with France, Germany prefers the partnership to a series of shifting 
coalitions’ (Friend 2001). In addition, Nice revealed politically that France’s European 
policy had turned defensive (Schild 2001).
The German-French relationship thus did not pursue a common strategy for 
furthering integration at this crucial point. This could also be seen in the lack of 
conceptual initiatives. A much debated speech foreign minister Joschka Fischer gave on 
the future of Europe in Berlin, in May 2000 produced little reaction in Paris (Fischer 
2000b). French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine reacted coolly. ‘I would no longer say 
that Europe is automatically an influence enhancing factor for [France]. This was the 
case of the early 1990s when it had fewer members (...). Today we have a more 
complex and unstable system where the balance between influence and institutions is 
defined less clearly, where relations are less harmonious, the roles less clearly defined, 
the results less predictable and less in tune with [France’s] own line. And this will only 
grow stronger’ (Vedrine, quoted in Schild 2001:9).
Germany and France traditionally shared a long-term commitment to a strategic 
project of internal European integration. But the more the European Union develops 
positions in its external domain the less capable the German-French tandem seems of 
being its driving force. CFSP, together with European security, has been the policy field 
where the Franco-German relationship ‘does not dominate to the same extent as in other 
policy fields’ (Miskimmon 2001:89).
6.3.1.3. The security and defence dimensions
This is partly because of Germany’s and France’s different security visions regarding 
America’s and NATO’s role in Europe’s security. Germany is not a traditional 
Atlanticist country like Britain, Portugal, Denmark, or the Netherlands, but the German- 
American security pillar gives its security policy a strong Atlanticist component. 
Germany is also not the traditional Gaullist country in favour of an autonomous ‘Europe 
puissance’ dear to the French, but German-French security cooperation gives its security 
policy a European dimension. This has strengthened Germany’s mediating role between 
the U.S. and France but made a German-French security policy more difficult.
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While Germany wanted to see Washington remain committed to European 
security and defence, and was willing to develop European defence structures as part of 
NATO, France was traditionally more ambiguous on America’s role, and has 
continuously argued for Europe’s strategic defence autonomy from Washington. For 
France to be critical of US security involvement is part of its raison d'Etat. The will to 
create an autonomous European defence is reinforced by the wish to diminish 
Washington’s role in Europe. For Berlin ESDP should have an additional function to 
NATO, but for Paris it should represent a credible alternative.
Another reason which explains the difficulties in advancing German-French 
security cooperation is that France enjoys more affinity with Britain, which has a similar 
defence capability and is also a nuclear power. Germany was not France’s preferred 
partner for defence cooperation, and Paris sided with London on security and defence 
matters. The French-British bilateralism on defence and security matters culminated in 
the Franco-British St. Malo declaration in December 1998 about the initiation of a 
European Security and Defence Policy. But with regard to the strategic outlook France 
remained in an isolated role. At Nice in December 2000, Paris aimed at convincing the 
EU to consider ESDP as an institution for European security autonomy. The Germans, 
together with the British held the view that the strengthening of a European pillar of 
defence could not be done against the Atlantic Alliance.
In its fear of German predominance over Europe, Paris faces the dilemma of 
wanting a stronger European autonomy from the US at the same time as it wishes to 
avoid a strong German role in a European defence structure. France’s pursuit of a 
‘Europe-puissance’, however, is only a viable alternative if Germany is willing to 
participate. This has increased Germany’s leverage vis-a-vis France.
However, a departure from Germany’s traditionally pro-Atlantic outlook was 
Schroder’s empathy towards the French concept of ‘Europe-puissance’, which he laid out 
as early as 1999. In a speech before the French National Assembly on 30 November 
1999 the Chancellor engaged with what had hitherto been a typically French 
interpretation of Europe’s role. ‘The French concept o f ‘Europe puissance’ aptly defines 
our common goal (...) and our common vision for Europe’s future. We want a Europe 
that represents its interests in a self-confident and successful manner’ (Schroder 1999b). 
He referred to the ‘Europe-puissance’ concept with respect to CFSP and ESDP 
(Meimeth 2003). This European independence, which was to be the basis for an equal 
cooperation with the United States, presupposed close German-French cooperation. 
Schroder lamented that the expression had not yet found resonance in the German debate
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221on Europe.
This acceptance of a German conception of ‘Europe-puissance’ fits Schroder’s 
wider claim for more German self-confidence and assertiveness in foreign policy. That 
seems to have been the main reason for the endorsement, rather than the end of 
Germany’s traditional transatlantic understanding of security. Nevertheless, four years 
later, during the transatlantic crisis, this position was no longer so clear-cut.
While the German-French relationship remained ‘institutionally robust’ (Hyde- 
Price and Jeffery 2001:702), with regular bilateral meetings between the prime ministers 
(and meetings between the foreign ministers institutionalised in 2001 as the Blaesheim 
process), the quality of the partnership had become less strategic to Germany, and now 
served primarily a tactical purpose. At the 2001 European Summit in Gothenburg, 
Germany, backed by France, imposed a seven year delay on the free circulation of 
persons coming from the new EU member states and, in exchange, Germany accepted 
France’s position against the liberalisation of electricity (Guerot 2006). German-French 
deals were now perceived as pursuing foremost national interests provoking a growing 
dissatisfaction with other members.
During the first term of the Red-Green government the German-French 
relationship came under strain because of Schroder’s attempt at redefining the 
partnership. This changed during the governments’ second mandate when Berlin and 
Paris stood together in their joint opposition to the U.S. led war in Iraq. Germany’s 
exposed and direct opposition to the US limited its freedom of action and put France 
again in a more significant position since Berlin now needed French support to sustain 
the credibility of its anti-war opposition.
6.3.2. The German-French relation, 2002-2005
6.3.2.I. The revitalisation of the German-French relation
In the summer of 2002, during the German election campaign Chancellor Schroder 
managed to capitalize on German anti-American sentiment to guarantee his governments’ 
re-election. Contrary to general expectation he did not change the government’s position 
after electoral victory. But Germany risked isolation in the EU and NATO. Recognising
221 For the French perspective see Jacques Chirac’s speech on European security and defence to the 
Presidential Committee o f the WEU Assembly, in Paris, on 30 May 2000: ‘The multipolar world that 
France is seeking will provide balance and harmony. But it will not be feasible unless Europe is organised 
and able to play its role on the international stage’.
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2000/1699.html
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the limits of defiance and realising that its unilateral stance isolated Germany
internationally Schroder conceded that internationally France still enjoyed a higher
000standing than Germany and acquiesced in French leadership in the Iraq question.
This ranking of positions ensured the revitalisation of the German-French tandem 
in EU politics. Thus it was no surprise that Schroder’s turn to Chirac for French support 
in the Iraq question in the summer of 2002 coincided with the revitalisation of the
0 0 “XGerman-French European motor. In both situations, transatlantic politics had given a
0 0  Adecisive impulse for a new dynamic in German-French relations.
Before the Copenhagen European summit in December 2002, Berlin and Paris 
reached an agreement to solve the differences on the EU’s common agricultural policy 
(CAP) and the amount of agricultural subsidies to the EU’s new members, opening the
00  5way for EU enlargement. In November 2002 Schroder and Chirac presented a joint 
initiative to the European Convention on economic policy, justice and home affairs, 
defense and institutional reform. The paper on institutional reform proposed a new 
formula on voting weights. On defence, foreign ministers Fischer and Villepin presented 
a joint initiative for the creation of a European Security and Defense Union (ESDU) and 
a European armaments agency.226 The development of ESDP towards a ESDU should be 
achieved through the mechanism of ‘reinforced cooperation’ and through the 
strengthening of the European pillar in the Atlantic alliance (Meimeth 2003).
In a display of policy coordination both capitals concerted their action towards a 
more flexible approach to the Stability and Growth Pact, which the EU adopted in 
November 2003. This, however, responded to German and French national worries since 
both countries had been unable to stick to the budget deficit criteria of maximum 3 per
222 On 8 September Chirac met Schroder in Hannover. While Germany and France agreed on a critical 
stance towards a unilateral American action against Iraq, Chirac did not rule out France’s military 
participation against Iraq. ‘Deutsch-ffanzosiches Treffen wegen Irak-Frage’, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 8 
September 2002.
223 President Chirac gave his impression o f the Iraq issue in an interview: ‘It isn't so much "Schroder and 
me" on one side and "Bush and Blair" on the other; what I'm seeing right now is "Bush and Blair" on one 
side and everyone else on the other. Which is a little bit different. To my knowledge, the EU has clearly 
come out against any unilateral action.’ Interview, New York Times, 8 September 2002. 
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais_archives/speeches_and_documents/2002- 
2001/interview_of_president_jacques_chirac_by_the_new_york_times-elysee_palace- 
sunday_september_8_2002.14617.html
224 French domestic politics also played a role in the revitalisation o f the bilateral relationship. 
Parliamentary elections in May 2002 had given Chirac’s party the majority, thus ending six years o f  
‘cohabitation’ o f two different political parties in government and the presidency. This had limited the 
President’s margin o f  manoeuvrability in foreign policy, or at least given him the opportunity to pretend 
so.
225 The EU agreed a transitional period for the integration o f  central and east European countries into the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) stipulating that the new European members would receive their 
farming subsidies progressively, with a phased reduction after 2007.
226 ’Berlin und Paris basteln an gemeinsamer Verteidigungspolitik’, Die Welt, 25 November 2002.
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cent of the GDP. In December 2002 Schroder and Chirac proposed that accession 
negotiations with Turkey should begin in 2005.
This new elan in the German-French motor for European integration showed 
that through common action Berlin and Paris could shape EU decision-making more 
effectively than any EU member on its own or any other alliance in the EU (Klau 2003). 
From the German perspective, it reflected Schroder’s calculus in not contradicting 
France and risk disagreement at a time when the German opposition to the Bush 
administration’s policy on Iraq lacked European support. The 40-year anniversary of the 
Elysee Treaty on 22 January 2003 coincided with tough negotiations underway in the 
UN Security Council about a second resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq, 
making it, from the German perspective, all the more pressing to show German-French 
unity on the international stage.
This bilateral revitalisation momentarily recovered the German-French motor for 
integration. However, EU members resented what they saw increasingly as a German- 
French directoire aimed at their own national interests such as their joint disregard for 
the rules of Stability and Growth Path. As one observer put it, ‘Europe’s motor was 
becoming a “locomotive without a train” as the smaller EU countries were consistently 
neglected’ (Guerot 2007:63). Especially candidate members, more Atlanticist, felt 
offended by Chirac’s dismissive language. This has affected the bilateral relationship for 
‘even if the Franco-German couple continues to re-emerge at critical junctures in EU 
affairs, its continuity, its gravity and its power have been weakened not least because it 
appears to be driven more by the pursuit of national interest or status than by a sincere 
commitment to Europe’ (Janning 2005:829). Furthermore, EU members were already 
deeply divided over the controversial prospect of a war in Iraq and its consequences for 
transatlantic relations.
At the height of the transatlantic row over American unipolarity, French 
multipolarity and a ‘Europe puissance’ concept, Germany, France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg gathered for a summit in Brussels on 29 April 2003 to discuss EU military 
capacities separate from NATO with independent European headquarters in Tervuren, 
under the banner ‘European Security and Defence Union’ (Rudolf 2005:138). That 
this meeting, derisively termed the ‘chocolate summit’ by American commentators, 
united the European anti-Iraq war group showed how American foreign policy in Iraq
227 ‘Vierergipfel berat uber EU-Verteidigungspolitik’, Financial Times, 29 April 2003.
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was closely connected to European plans towards a greater European defence identity. 
For most other EU and NATO member countries it was a demonstratable Franco- 
German act of defiance against Washington and NATO. First, it signalled German- 
French disregard for European multilateralism; this was seen as an attempt of German- 
French hegemony rather than a tentative CFSP position. Secondly, for the majority of 
EU members, transatlantic cohesion and the Atlantic Alliance were still the foundation 
for their own security. Thus any attempt to create an ESDP would have to be built in 
close coordination with the United States. Finally, the majority rejected turning the 
European Union into a counterweight of the United States and the idea of a ‘Europe 
puissance’. This unsuccessful German-French initiative marked a break from traditional 
German multilateralism and contributed to NATO and EU inner divisions, leading some 
to suggest that the meeting will ‘enter into the textbook of German diplomatic failures’ 
(Schmidt 2005).229
In practical terms the proposal made little sense without Britain, taking into 
account the Helsinki headline goals of December 1999. In September 2003 the 
Chancellor hosted a meeting in Berlin with president Chirac and British Prime Minister 
Blair. This signalled that Britain had been charmed into participating more actively in 
European defence, and that Berlin, Paris and London had agreed to proceed jointly on 
common European defence plans. ESDP was dependent on the inclusion of Britain, with 
its much stronger military capabilities than Germany. France - or at least its foreign 
minister - had come to the conclusion that ‘there will be no Europe without European 
defence and no European defence without Britain’ (Villepin 2003). This brought Britain 
on board and showed that NATO should not be sidelined.
Thus progress was made on ESDP at the Naples meeting of EU foreign ministers 
in November 2003, which settled the dispute over European defence headquarters and 
opened the way for ‘structured cooperation’ in ESDP. ESDP could not replace NATO 
but only be its complement. A German-French leadership role in ESDP seemed set aside 
for lack of military capabilities and recognition by other EU members. This showed that 
Berlin had to proceed with a reconciliatory move towards Washington, since the EU
228 Joint communique by Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium on European Security and Defence 
Policy, 29 April 2003, published in Internationale Politik.
229 Especially the timing and the way in which the four country initiative for a separate European defence 
headquarters in Tervuren was put forward were badly received, more than the content o f  the Brussels 
declaration, since it included a transatlantic declaration o f  solidarity and objectives which had previously 
been agreed on in the convent on the constitution, like the instrument o f ‘structured cooperation’ and the 
development o f Petersberg tasks (Koopman and Stark 2004).
230 ‘Joint Paper by France, Germany and the United Kingdom’, Naples, 29 November 2003. ‘From 
Copenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: Core Documents, Chaillot Papers, 67, December 2003.
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members’ message had been the need to maintain the transatlantic alliance and not 
weaken NATO.
Although these examples suggest a sequence which hints at a strategy, it is more 
likely that the Schroder government proceeded in an ad hoc manner without an 
underlying strategy, making up the policies as events went by rather than pursuing an 
elaborate foreign policy strategy. The way in which the German Chancellor conducted 
the opposition to US policy in Iraq also highlighted his lack of international strategic 
vision for German foreign policy and revealed that policy towards the US was based 
more on a succession of positions than on a coherent long term strategy. Germany took 
the initiative unilaterally to oppose Washington, and risked isolation if France had not 
jumped on board. Until early 2003 president Chirac had not ruled out a French 
participation in the American planned intervention in Iraq. Had France not opposed the 
American policy Germany would have been left isolated in both the EU and NATO. This 
would have severely damaged German-French relations, Germany’s normative power 
and quest for more assertiveness, not to mention the already fragile German-American 
relation. Despite Schroder’s claim for more assertiveness and a more calculated logic of 
action, Germany could not stand alone.
In the long term Germany did also not increase its freedom of action by pursuing 
unilateral overtures towards Russia’s president Putin. These were mostly German 
initiatives, which included France, for regular meetings among the three leaders, but 
which did not rest on a wider European initiative towards fomenting a stable 
relationship with Moscow.233 The Chancellor’s position on the prospect of Russian 
NATO membership was also clear. ‘The existing NATO-Russia Council cannot be the 
last word in relations between NATO and Russia. Those who think in longer historical 
dimensions cannot exclude a Russian NATO membership in the long-term.’234 More 
recently, the German-Russian plans for a joint oil pipeline project which would be built 
under the Baltic Sea and thus circumvent the passage through Ukraine was seen as 
another German display of power which showed little concern over neighbours’ worries 
or any desire to coordinate efforts towards a joint EU policy for Russia, least of all on
231 According to Der Spiegel France only officially opposed the U.S. after secretary of state, Colin Powell’s 
speech in the UNSC on 5 February 2003.
232 Schroder’s affinity with Russia was not new. Some German politicians had warned before September 
11, 2001 that the Chancellor was pursuing a pro-Russian course at the same time as he was distancing 
Germany from the US. ‘Bildet sich ein Riss zwischen Berlin und Washington?’ Die Welt, 29 April 2001.
233 German, French and Russian opposition brought the three leaders together in UNSC meetings on the 
war in Iraq. But Schroder, Chirac and Putin met regularly afterwards, as happened in August 2004 in 
Putin’s summer residence in the Back Sea resort o f Sochi, or in July 2005 for the 750th anniversary o f  
Kaliningrad, with Polish and Lithuanian leaders not being invited.
234 Schroder interview to Der Stern, 9 August 2001.
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the increasingly important issue of energy supplies. This partial disengagement from 
established alliance policies was unprecedented in the unified Germany and struck a 
sour note with many EU member states.
Contrary to what is argued the German-French motor had slowed down for 
longer than is usually suggested. Ever since German unification, integration has 
progressed slowly through the bilateral cooperation, if we exclude the Maastricht Treaty 
and EMU, both negotiated in the early 1990s by Chancellor Kohl and President 
Mitterrand. EU enlargement was also not the result of the German-French motor. This 
may suggest a ‘German shift to multiple bilateralism alongside a continuing though 
weakened Franco-German relationship’ (Paterson 2005:272). Thus despite assertions 
that Europe only progresses through German-French cooperation, an analysis of the last 
fifteen years suggests that while Europe does not move forward without Germany and 
France, the opposite is not true; while it only moves forward if Berlin and Paris are on 
board, this no longer necessarily presupposes a German-French leadership core. As we 
have seen the so often hailed German-French motor has not often produced expected 
results.
6.3.3. Germany and the United States: The political emancipation
6.3.3.I. The bilateral relationship between Germany and the United States
In his second act of emancipation, Chancellor Schroder tried to change Germany’s status 
and position within the transatlantic partnership. This was done in defiance of the US and 
of Germany’s traditional diplomacy of multilateralist transatlanticism. The Chancellor 
increasingly followed a logic of expected consequences, hoping to provide Berlin with 
new international status of power parity with other great powers.
To be fair on Schroder’s quest for assertiveness, successive U.S. administrations 
had empowered Germany to become more assertive and exert leadership, if  not ‘in 
America’s name’ than in close partnership with it. Washington had given Germany a 
‘license to lead’ Europe as long as Berlin’s leadership was exercised towards, and not 
against, the U.S. itself. Schroder, however, only followed the first part of the American 
equation, leaving the second part open to a case-by case analysis, as the wars in
235 That France felt uncomfortable with enlargement was shown in ‘October 2001, when then French 
Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine mounted a last-minute effort to block the German-inspired initiative to 
open the EU to ten new member states at once in 2004 the so-called “big-bang-scenario.”’ (Klau 2003).
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Afghanistan in 2001, and in Iraq in 2003, would demonstrate.
As a new government, the Schroder-Fischer team needed to establish its own 
power legitimacy in German foreign policy. The United States had pressed for enlarging 
NATO’s out-of-area domain for international interventions and had suggested that 
military operations could be established ‘with or without a UN mandate’ (Peters 
2004:392). This positioned Germany close to the US regarding a policy for the Balkans. 
Thus the Kosovo war provided the context in which that legitimacy became effective.
When George W. Bush became America’s new president in January 2001 Berlin 
revealed a growing unease with the foreign policy of the new administration, for its new 
tone, its disinclination towards multilateralism and its increasing unilateralism towards 
issues like the International Criminal Court, climate change and a new missile defence 
system. Various German politicians took a critical view of America’s ‘new paradigm of 
hegemonic unilateralism: the preservation of unipolarity’ (Rudolf 2005).
6.3.3.2. The impact of September 11,2001
The terror attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 produced ‘the end of the 
transatlantic routine’ (Voigt 2002) with implications for transatlantic relations and the 
German-American partnership. What had already started after the Cold War with the 
widening of the American security perimeter and the importance of outer European 
regions was intensified after September 11. The Bush Administration consolidated its 
preference for unilateralism, floating coalitions and a doctrine of preventive war. This 
amounted to a paradigm change in US foreign policy (Ikenberry 2002), and an implicit 
redefinition of America’s institutional commitments and alliances. By sidestepping the 
use of NATO Charter’s article 5 on collective defence to launch a joint response to the 
terrorist attacks, the Bush administration was quick in restating its initial propensity 
towards unilateralism. NATO now lost its vital role in U.S. security policy and European 
partners had to re-establish their own security priorities in the transatlantic alliance.
Reacting to the attacks on America, Chancellor Schroder stated in a speech 
before the Bundestag on 12 September 2001 that September 11 was not only a war 
against America, but against the whole civilized world. He pledged Germany’s
236 ‘While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support o f the international community, we 
will not hesitate to act alone, if  necessary, to exercise our right o f self-defense by acting pre-emptively.’ 
U.S. National Security Strategy, September 2002, p. 6. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html
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‘unlimited solidarity’ with its ally.237 But a week later he was quick to assert that this 
solidarity came at a price. ‘Our alliance obligation is consistent with a right, and this 
right is called information and consultation. As Germans and Europeans we want to 
assure unlimited solidarity with the United States regarding all necessary measures. I 
stress: Germany is ready to take risks -  also military ones -  but not to participate in 
adventures.’238
The terrorist attacks did not shake policy-makers’ convictions over Germany’s 
normative approach. But they changed the understanding of the international framework 
in which this normative power could work. The Chancellor saw this as an opportunity 
for Germany to play the more assertive role he advocated since 1998. September 11 
reinforced Schroder’s idea that German foreign policy had to become more utilitarian 
and consequential. In a speech before the Bundestag on 11 October 2001 on the 
situation in Afghanistan he stated, ‘I believe there are reasons for us to change the 
formulation and implementation of our foreign policy in one or the other part, (...), 
reasons which have to do with Germany’s position in the future’ (Schroder 2001). For 
Schroder, ‘September 11, 2001 changed the world. For Germany this meant the end of 
one phase of German post-war history. In an unprecedented way, Germans had to face 
their new responsibility and they have done so’ (Schroder 2002a:23113).
The German reaction to September 11 also highlighted the different approaches 
between the Chancellor and the foreign minister. While both agreed in their 
condemnation of the attacks, for Fischer September 11 was a ‘defining moment’, one 
which could ‘mark the beginning of a new era of cooperation and multilateralism’ 
(Fischer 2001b). Acknowledging it as one of America’s greatest achievements to have 
stayed in Europe in 1945, Fischer considered the transatlantic relations remained ‘the 
central pillar for peace and stability in the 21st century’. The problem was not ‘too much 
US’ but ‘too little Europe’ (Fischer 2002a). For Europeans to have a clear vision of their 
role in the world the main challenge was to create ‘more Europe’, not ‘less US’. In a 
Bundestag debate on transatlantic relations on 27 June 2002, Fischer stated that ‘without 
transatlantic relations in Europe (...) Germany would assume a role which we should 
not even strive for. This would put too much strain on us. The US provides not only a 
global balance; it also provides a balance in Europe up to this day’ (Fischer 
2002b:24716). For Germany this meant it should follow a ‘policy of wise self-restraint’
237 Speech by Gerhard Schroder before the Bundestag regarding the attacks on the United States, 12 
September 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/186.
238 Speech by Gerhard Schroder before the Bundestag regarding the attacks on the United States, 19 
September 2001. Plenarprotokoll 14/187.
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(Fischer 2001a), not the policy recommendation the Chancellor was to follow in the 
coming months.
6.33.3. The disagreement over Iraq
The disagreement over Iraq was not the beginning but the culmination of a series of 
attempts undertaken by Germany to redefine its relationship with the U.S. It was the 
most visible episode of disagreement and it revealed the limits of Germany’s alliance
'y ' iQ
loyalty and the will to emancipate from Washington. The dispute over America’s 
policy regarding Iraq and the possibility of war marked the beginning of Berlin’s open 
contestation of American foreign policy.240 It produced a ‘tectonic fissure in 
transatlantic relations’ reinforcing the already existing ‘polarization between Berlin-Paris 
and Washington-London’ (Schwarz 2004:558).
After January 2002, when Bush first made public America’s new preventive and 
pre-emptive strategy to combat international terrorism, and suggested that Iraq, as one of 
the ‘axis of evil’ states was a target for military action, reluctance emerged in Berlin 
towards continuing German support for Washington’s war on terror. Even so, Berlin 
signalled that it would not interfere in Washington’s moves on Iraq. This, the Americans 
argue, was the agreement that came out of the Schroder-Bush meeting in May 2002.241 
American military action against Iraq would not happen before the German election in 
September, thus Iraq need not become a campaign issue in Germany. But in late spring 
the German government adopted a pro-active stance against a potential military US 
engagement in Iraq.242 By stating that Germany would not participate in ‘military 
adventures’, Schroder presented an anti-war stance which paved the way for a growing 
anti-Americanism in Germany, exploiting a deep-seated public scepticism towards 
American military interventions. While this had obvious electoral appeal, it left little 
room for diplomatic manoeuvring.
239 Germany’s criticism o f America and its call for more equal treatment were not new. In a speech at 
Harvard University in June 1972 Chancellor Willy Brandt called upon the US to treat Europe as a ‘partner 
o f equal rank’. However, the international and the German domestic context were then very different, and 
such a claim after German unification and the end o f  bipolarity caused a different reaction in Washington. 
Brandt speech quoted in Bundestag debate 15 March 2001 on the future o f transatlantic relations, 
Plenarprotokoll 14/158, p. 15364.
240 However, a possible German opposition to attacking Iraq was discussed already in November 2001.
See Michael Naumann, ‘Ein Krieg wider Willen, Mit Amerika gegen den Terrorismus, aber nicht gegen 
den Irak: Die deutsche Biindnistreue hat ihre Grenzen’, Die Zeit, 8 November 2001.
241 For a detailed account o f the bilateral relation see Stephen Szabo (2004). Parting Ways: The Crisis in 
German-American Relations pp. 19-28.
242 This is why Bush took it personally when, at the height o f the electoral campaign during the summer, 
Schroder made his opposition to the war public, apparently violating the verbal agreement.
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In an interview on 9 August 2002 the Chancellor regretted that ‘consultations 
over when and how but also over i f  did not take place’, and therefore ‘one has to keep 
freedom of action to take decisions in one’s own interest, in the German interest, when
'yA'Xthese decisions are due.’ Shortly before elections, on 13 September Schroder stated 
before the Bundestag that ‘under my leadership Germany will not participate in a 
military intervention’ against Iraq.244 When most observers believed that his position 
was mere electoral tactic, Schroder pursued it after the second Red-Green coalition 
government took office. At a speech in Goslar, in Lower Saxony, on 21 January 2003, 
the Chancellor reiterated that ‘Germany will not support a [UN] resolution which 
legitimizes war.’245
It seems unlikely that in the row over Iraq Schroder made a miscalculation 
regarding the reactions of Germany’s European neighbours, hoping that most countries 
would side with Berlin’s approach. Rather research shows that the Chancellor aimed to 
follow his unilateralist stance regardless of potential European disagreement and made 
no prior consultations with EU members to ensure a concerted position. This confirms 
the German government’s disregard for the norm of normative multilateralism and the 
Chancellor’s aim of pursuing a more national course. In that, Berlin’s opposition to the 
US led war in Iraq in 2003 was a consequence rather than a catalyst for Germanys’ 
emancipation from Cold War constraints on German power.
Thus the most serious transatlantic crisis was principally a German-American 
crisis. The American administration pursued a strategy of ‘coalitions of the willing’, 
which amounted to a weakening of America’s own commitment towards traditional 
allies and alliances. Germany’s policies were more than merely reactive towards 
changes induced by President Bush. The Chancellor demanded more rights of 
consultation for Germany at the same time as he claimed that Germany would not 
participate in a war against Iraq even if the United Nations Security Council approved it 
in a resolution. The German-American crisis became a transatlantic crisis when French 
president Jacques Chirac joined Schroder in openly opposing Washington’s policy on 
Iraq in the fall o f2002.
243 Schroder insisted on consultation rights, and argued the President had promised them himself. On the 
occasion o f  his visit to Germany, Bush in fact stated before the Bundestag on 23 May 2002, ‘Our 
response will be reasoned, and focused, and deliberate. ( ...)  America will consult closely with our friends 
and allies at every stage.’ Remarks by the President to a Special Session o f the German Bundestag, 23 
May 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2002/05/print/20020523-2.html
244 Plenarprotokoll 14/253, 13 September 2002. Quoted in Gregor Schollgen (2003). Der Auftritt. 
Deutschlands Riickkehr auf die Weltbiihne, p. 119.
245 Der Spiegel, 13, 24 March 2003.
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Foreign minister Fischer’s logic of justification for Germany’s refusal to 
participate in the war against Iraq was not the logic of consequentiality but the logic of 
appropriateness of international actions. Opposing plans for a military attack on Iraq on 
the grounds that war would cause instability in the wider Middle East region, the foreign 
minister stated that only the UN had the international legitimacy and credibility to define 
and tackle new threats (Fischer 2002b). The foreign minister believed Germany should 
follow the norm of multilateral institutionalism and take the stability of the broader 
Middle East into account (Fischer 2002b). He justified Berlin’s position as that of an ally 
forced to warn a friend who is about to make a mistake, as was the case of the US in 
Berlin’s perspective (Fischer 2005c). It was the first time that Germany had been defiant 
of America’s arguments, openly stating that Berlin was ‘not convinced’ about 
Washington’s motives for military action against Iraq, as Fischer put it in early 2003 
(Fischer 2003). His argumentation logic, however, would not have prevailed had the 
UNSC adopted a second resolution legitimising the use of force against Iraq.
Why did Germany oppose the US on Iraq? First, Germany had participated in 
two wars between 1999 and 2002, making it very difficult to undertake any additional 
military commitments. In 2002 Germany had about 8500 Bundeswehr soldiers stationed 
around the world, representing the second biggest contingent of troops stationed in peace 
missions abroad after the US.246 Secondly, a strong German pacifist and anti-US feeling 
existed in German society. The government believed that the majority of Germans would 
hardly have supported a third war involving the Bundeswehr in yet another offensive 
mission shortly after the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars. The near miss outcome of the vote 
of confidence in the Bundestag on 16 November 2001 on Germany’s participation in the 
war in Afghanistan had shown how fragile Germany’s support was, and convinced 
Schroder not to risk such a narrow Bundestag vote again. Thirdly, the government was 
disenchanted with what it saw as insufficient recognition for Germany’s previous war 
and alliance efforts in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Germany’s position at the side of the US 
from Kosovo to Macedonia and Afghanistan had shown Germany as a trustworthy ally 
which had grown up in terms of participation in military operations. Whereas until then the 
multilateralist alliance norm had been sufficient, Schroder now wanted recognition for 
Germany's new status in the alliance, that is, a ‘right to information and consultation’
246 However, it seems plausible that if  a lack o f military capability was the main reason it would have 
been presented as such to the US. Also, the amount o f military participation expected from Germany was 
not clear.
247 The government’s policy for a German military participation in the war against international terrorism 
in Afghanistan was approved by 336 o f the 662 Bundestag members. The CDU and the FDP, four Green 
Party members and one SPD member voted against.
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derived from alliance obligations, as he stated on 19 September 2001.
Finally, Germany was motivated by new identity dynamics. The split over the 
Iraq war was also a discussion over Germany’s post-unification identity in that it 
represented a step further in remaking German identity. It meant to transform the nature 
of Germany’s normative power and to emancipate foreign policy from previous 
constraints. If Kosovo had been an emancipation act in German domestic politics Iraq was 
an emancipation act in German-American relations.
This produced consequences for Germany’s position. Berlin’s opposition in the 
run-up to the Iraq war represented a departure from Germany’s traditional normative 
multilateralist diplomacy and the European-transatlantic articulation aspect of Germany’s 
foreign policy identity.248
First, Schroder risked sidestepping a traditional norm of German diplomacy, that of 
alliance loyalty. Berlin adopted almost the opposite position to that adopted four years 
earlier. While in the Kosovo war in 1999 alliance solidarity prevailed over international 
law, in Iraq questions of international legality initially prevailed over alliance 
commitments.
Secondly, German-French bilateralism had triumphed over German 
multilateralism. This new ‘bilateral unilateralism’ (Frankenberger and Nonnenmacher 
2004) in early 2003 suggested that Schroder and Chirac saw themselves as the new 
‘leadership duo’ of Europe (Schwarz 2003:23). Bilateral relations with France 
predominated over Germany’s traditional European multilateralism and furthermore Iraq 
served to revitalise the German-French relationship. Ironically, this crisis highlighted the 
dwindling legitimacy of the German-French motor. The bilateral motor was only efficient 
as long as it did not raise suspicion of a joint hegemony and was seen as empowering the 
integration process.
Thirdly, European unity was another casualty of Germany’s position. Berlin did not 
consult with its European allies - at a time when it was claiming more consultation rights 
from Washington, in a unilateralist claim for multilateralism. The government also seemed 
not to try to get other Europeans on board until the end of 2002. When France finally sided 
with Berlin no joint effort was made to enlarge the anti-war coalition towards a common 
European stance. But by then a fierce division had already settled down between a group
248 Not everyone agrees that this represented a foreign policy change. See P. Rudolf, ‘German Foreign 
Policy and Transatlantic Relations’, SWP Working Paper, FG4, 2004. H. Maull claims Germany’s 
position on Iraq reflected its aversion to the use o f military force, one o f the civilian power concepts’ 
main characteristics. As I have stated elsewhere in the thesis, German foreign policy will not only lose its 
continuity when it loses its aversion to military force. The change in various other characteristics o f  
German foreign policy continuity such as multilateralism and alliance loyalty make the claim for 
continuity difficult to sustain.
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led by Germany and France, and a pro-American group made up of eighteen countries.249 
One would have expected Germany to make a strong effort to get general support within 
CFSP, but its position was anything but Europeanist, and challenged European unity. 
Instead of arguing for a European stance together with France and Britain, as was to be 
the case later in dealing with Iran over its nuclear ambitions Berlin was the main initiator 
in polarizing the EU into Europeanists and Atlanticists. Germany hindered the 
development of CFSP which it had always advocated. Without apparent quid pro quos 
Berlin loosened the institutional frameworks, the essential foundation of its foreign policy.
Fourthly, in the EU, Germany grew increasingly isolated in the run up to the war in 
March 2003. While not the only culprit, it did not manoeuvre diplomatically to prevent the 
falling out between EU members. At the time when many Eastern European countries were 
preparing to join the EU and NATO as full members, the transatlantic rift catapulted them 
into Washington’s arms. Berlin, once the main advocate of Eastern European integration, 
was now pro-active in attracting Russia into the anti-Bush coalition. Eastern European 
countries felt alienated and insecure by the conjectural alliance between Chirac, 
Schroder and Putin. This momentary triangular alliance did not produce benefits for 
Germany’s European policy. When the war against Iraq began on 20 March 2003, 
Germany’s traditionally multilateralist foreign policy had the backing only of France, 
Belgium and Luxembourg.
Fifthly, the transatlantic crisis became also a European Union crisis for it 
highlighted the lack of European consensus and the limits of the German-French EU 
leadership. The constitutional crisis in 2005, set out by the rejection of the French and 
Dutch referenda on the European Convention were a blow to the German-French 
attempt at EU leadership. Both crises signalled the limits of Germany’s and France’s 
attempts at transforming Europe into a counterweight to the US.
Finally, Berlin’s position weakened its possibility for a permanent UNSC seat, 
and not only because the US withdrew its support. The implicit lack o f interest in 
international law, i.e. SC resolutions, suggested that Germany considered the UNSC 
irrelevant -  at least as long as Germany itself was not a permanent member. Such a
249 A letter o f support for Washington’s position was published by eight European countries which sided with 
the U.S. in this emerging transatlantic rift, eight days after the German-French Elysee Treaty anniversary. 
This letter was signed by Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and 
Spain, and was published in Wall Street Journal on 30 January 2003. On 6 February 2003 another ten 
European countries, some o f them NATO candidates, signed a letter supporting Washington. The reason for 
the letters was twofold. First, they feared that antagonising the U.S. could weaken the US security 
engagement in Europe, which they deemed essential for Europe’s and their own security. Secondly, they 
wanted to send a signal that they opposed perceived attempts o f German-French hegemony on the continent, 
both in terms o f political leadership and what seemed to develop into German-French hubris.
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position was all the more paradoxical considering that at the same time Berlin was 
insisting on becoming a permanent SC member. By indicating that France, Russia and 
Germany, which was a non-permanent UNSC member in 2003-2004, would block a 
second UN resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq, Germany was 
contributing to the issue being withdrawn from the UN institutional framework 
altogether.
Taken together, these factors amount to a weakening of Germany’s normative 
power, brought about by a departure from alliance norms and the articulation of 
European and transatlantic affairs. The Chancellor seemed to miscalculate the key role 
Germany played in holding together the Euro-Atlantic area’s two vital international 
institutions, the Atlantic Alliance and the EU. By initiating a revisionist attempt of 
Germany’s position in each of them Berlin wasted valuable political and institutional 
capital, which handled differently could have raised German influence in both 
institutions at a much lower cost.
Schroder believed that enlarging Germany’s margin of manoeuvrability entailed 
loosening the traditional policy of linkage between allies and policy issues. In that sense, 
he revitalized relations with Russia, and did so outside the wider transatlantic strategic 
relation. At the height of the transatlantic crisis in 2003, Berlin seemed therefore closer 
to Moscow (and Paris) than Washington, joined by the aim of a counter-hegemonic 
coalition against the U.S. ‘Unable to balance American military power, France, 
Germany, Russia, and China created a coalition to balance American soft power by 
depriving the United States of the legitimacy that might have been bestowed by a second 
UN resolution’ (Nye 2003).
The transatlantic divide over the war in Iraq represented an unsuccessful critical 
juncture for German diplomacy which failed to widen Berlin’s margin of political 
manoeuvrability and negotiating power. Schroder’s aim to transform the nature of 
German power and Berlin’s need for recognition (Geltungsbedurfnis) was not 
acknowledged by its allies. In transatlantic relations, instead of enhancing its 
international status Germany lost influence (Gloannec 2004). Germany contributed to the 
worse NATO crisis since its creation, damaged the German-American relationship by 
opening a precedent of alliance disloyalty. The German government threw away 
valuable trust capital which the FRG had painstakingly accumulated after 1949. This 
raised doubts over Germany’s credibility as a reliable ally and weakened its source of 
normative power. In this transformed multilateralism, the price to pay for a unilateralist 
policy was the weakening of Germany’s normative power and ‘the political power re-
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socialisation of German foreign policy’ (Hellmann 2005).
6.4. The Merkel government and bilateral relations
When Angela Merkel became Chancellor in November 2005, the conceptual framework 
she envisaged for her country was significantly different from that of her predecessor. 
Rebuilding the transatlantic relationship and regaining the dynamic of European
9 snintegration were the main objectives of the grand coalition government. To achieve 
this Merkel had to restore Germany’s traditional linkage diplomacy between the 
German-French relationship, embedded in the European Union, and the transatlantic 
partnership, where Germany would once again become Washington’s main partner. 
Berlin would re-emphasise its reflexive multilateralism and work towards strengthening 
the Euro-Atlantic community within a liberal constitutional order. This coordination 
imperative was stated by Merkel in February 2005 before she became Chancellor, 
‘Germany has to align its foreign policy to four coordinates: ‘Germany’s efficiency4, 
‘European integration’, ‘transatlantic alliance’ and ‘workable international community’. 
Then we can represent German interests as a reliable partner. On the other hand, a 
policy which balances between multilateralism, bilateral initiatives and unilateral action 
(...) would not represent German interests’ (Merkel 2005).
Merkel’s conception of Germany’s place in international politics is an 
interesting combination of ideas of Konrad Adenauer, Helmut Kohl and Joschka 
Fischer. From Adenauer and Kohl, Merkel inherited the importance of European 
integration combined with the transatlantic relationship. Influenced by Fischer, Merkel 
conceptualises the Middle East in a similar fashion, the need for a strategic vision which 
emphasises the region as a fundamental challenge for Germany and the European 
Union. In this the search for stability in the Middle East will decisively influence the 
future of transatlantic relations, and the European Union’s international role. The 
Merkel government grasped the strategic importance of this region when Germany 
decided to participate in the UN military mission in Lebanon after the Israel-Hezbollah 
war in the summer of 2006, and when the German EU presidency in the first half of 
2007 made efforts to revive the international quartet for the Middle East.
250 Coalition agreement. ‘Deutschland als verantwortungsbewusster Partner in Europa und der Welt’, 
Koalitionsvertrag von CDU,CSU und SPD, Gemeinsam fu r Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit, 11 
November 2005, pp. 146-163.
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6.4.1. The German-French realignment
As Germany becomes a more vocal international actor and as CFSP progresses, it is 
possible that German and French interests will become less and not more convergent. 
The German-French opposition to the U.S. over the Iraq war should not be seen as the 
result of a joint German-French foreign policy vision. Rather we are likely to see cases 
where German and French interests coincide, and where this can initiate a common 
European position; at the same time, though, situations will occur where interests will 
diverge, making a European position more difficult. It is plausible that the Franco- 
German relationship will ‘persist as the alliance of first resort’, but the future shape of 
the EU, with a shrinking core and an enlarging periphery ‘will tend to reduce an 
exclusive reliance on ‘the privileged partnership’ (Paterson 2005:272).
At the EU Brussels summit in December 2005 Angela Merkel was praised for 
her mediating role in solving the financial deadlock over the EU budget, and for 
showing German willingness in recapturing the aim of institutional deepening and 
solving the constitutional crisis.251 In 2006 not much dynamism could be expected from 
the traditional duo, given that France was then at the end of an era, with parliamentary 
elections in the spring of 2007, whereas Germany was at the beginning of a new one 
(Picaper 2006:35). But on a deeper level the German-French relation had been stagnant 
for years in putting forward joint initiatives for integration. The failed European 
constitution project had never been a German-French passion. Enlargement proceeded 
because of German insistence in the face of French reluctance. But although France has 
traditionally stood critically vis-a-vis America’s security involvement in Europe, it 
gains more from contextualising its approach with Germany than from attempting to 
play a more unilateral transatlantic policy. Thus the new French president, Nicolas 
Sarkozy has shifted the French approach after May 2007 towards a less anti-American 
position, but has not done so in a coordinated approach with Berlin.
The recent French proposal for a Mediterranean Union was initially a French 
reply in 2007 to the German initiative for a new Ostpolitik towards Central Asia. The 
German Chancellor agreed to the constitution of a Mediterranean Union in March 2008, 
but there should be no illusion as to any joint German-French leadership, since the 
Mediterranean is traditionally seen as a French area of interest 252 The more the 
European Union asserts its influence internationally, the less the German-French duo
251 ‘Merkel vermittelt zwischen Chirac und Blair’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 2005.
252 ‘Mediterranean Union blueprint avoids key questions’, Financial Times, 12 March 2008.
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seems capable to act as the motor of integration.
6.4.2. The German-American rapprochement
Despite the transatlantic rift, Germany still remains America’s most important ally in 
continental Europe and plays a central role in shaping EU-U.S. relations. As a 
committed transatl anti cist Merkel accepted Washington’s role as that of an ordering 
power rather than display pretensions o f Germany as a new international power with 
order shaping capacities. The new Chancellor was aware of the key role Germany 
played in holding together the inner and intra-cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union. From this linkage between transatlantic and European issues she 
defined the foreign policy strategy of the new coalition government together with 
foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier. The recovery of transatlantic relations and of 
the momentum of European integration were closely interconnected and had to be 
recovered in an all-encompassing strategy to re-establish trust within the Euro-Atlantic 
area. This rested on the strategic conviction that Europe could not be created as a 
counterweight to the U.S.
Despite the seemingly Kohlean approach the Merkel government was freer in its 
dealings with Washington. Merkel stated during her first trip to the US in January 2006 
that she tolerated no human rights abuses, and opposed the American prison at 
Guantanamo Bay. The government has also not held back from criticizing U.S. policy 
on Iran or the U.S. nuclear treaty with India. But the Chancellor has not exploited this 
criticism to her advantage, nor did she display it excessively in the public domain but 
rather through private telephone conversations with the president or personal meetings 
between political leaders of both countries (Kamp and Masala 2006).
Almost two and a half years after the Grand Coalition came to power in November 
2005 the Merkel government has worked to recover the transatlantic alliance and re­
establish a German-French partnership that is not seen as an attempt at counter 
weighing American power. Considering the seriousness of both transatlantic and 
European crises the Grand Coalition has managed to recover a considerable margin of 
political manoeuvre both in its bilateral relations and within the Euro-Atlantic area. 
More decisively, Germany’s two special relationships have reached an unprecedented 
normalisation in that Germany feels increasingly less inhibited to use either ideational, 
normative or consequentialist justifications for its actions, not because it wants power 
parity but because the policy situation actively demands one particular option.
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6.4.3. Re-establishing the Euro-Atlantic area
The Merkel government grabbed the ‘window of opportunity’ presented by weakened 
European leaderships between November 2005 and spring 2007 to underline the 
changes which would set the new government apart. This gave the new government the 
chance to present initiatives which reversed some of its predecessor governments’ 
policies. Thus during her first foreign trip as Chancellor Merkel made the symbolic 
gesture of visiting Paris and NATO headquarters on the same day, signalling that 
German-French and German-transatlantic relations were again equally important.
Thus far Merkel has managed to recover the alliance relationship with 
Washington. This has been achieved in 2006 and 2007 through her leadership role in the 
EU in restablishing close ties with Washington and promoting a common Euro-Atlantic 
liberal constitutional order, which will appeal to both the US and the European 
transatlanticists, and set aside the German flirtation of the ‘Europe-puissance’ concept of 
her predecessor. After the German-American row and Berlin’s relative isolation in 
Europe, the new Chancellor has managed to turn the bilateral relations favourably for 
Berlin, upgrading Germany’s role in transatlantic relations.
In the EU the Merkel government has rebuilt Berlin’s relations with central and 
eastern European countries, taking their interests again more into consideration. This 
was well received by most, even if Poland tried to exploit this by an anti-Russian and 
anti-German diplomacy in 2006 and 2007. And it re-established a good working relation 
with the European Commission, and its president, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, whom 
Merkel had supported in his candidacy for the post in 2004.
In her pragmatic approach the chancellor has maintained a close economic and 
energy security cooperation with Moscow, but has distanced Berlin from the political 
unilateral overtures her predecessor had pursued. In 2006 foreign minister Steinmeier 
put forward plans for a new European Ostpolitik with regard to Russia and Central Asia 
which were partially negotiated during Germany’s EU presidency (Kempe 2007).
With the present government Germany has entered a more pragmatic phase of its 
emergence as a European power through a foreign policy of ‘self-confident modesty’ in 
the words of foreign minister Steinmeier (Steinmeier 2006). It softened the pressure of 
reconciling integration deepening with institutional enlargement and the automatism of 
the ever increasing Europeanization of the Kohl years. And it rejected the emancipation 
politics of the Schroder years, which had risked eroding the traditional pillars of a
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successful foreign policy, reaffirming Germany’s imperative towards Euro-Atlantic 
coordination. At the same time a more assertive German foreign policy is taking shape 
through a strengthening of the instruments of multilateralism; while Berlin maintains a 
highly multilateral policy approach with other countries and powers, it is gradually 
enlarging its typically Europeanised policy with a more power political understanding.
6.5. Conclusion: German foreign policy in Euro-Atlantic relations
The period from 1997 to 2007 has witnessed a strategic rebalancing in Germany’s 
position in Europe and the wider Euro-Atlantic area, affecting bilateral relations with 
France and the United States. Negotiating compatibility between the German-French 
and the German-American relationships was always more than mere bilateralism; it was 
also about the compatibility between European integration and the Atlantic Alliance. 
When Berlin and Paris revitalised their relation and jointly opposed America during the 
transatlantic crisis, this caused the first serious foreign policy crisis of the European 
Union. Thus the legitimacy of the German-French motor is decisive for the 
manoeuvring of Berlin’s and Paris’ diplomacies and for the EU’s attempt at forging a 
European foreign policy.
From the perspective of German foreign policy, the Iraq war was a critical 
juncture in transatlantic relations which, together with Schroder’s willingness towards 
emancipation created the context for change. This occurred through a discursive 
reframing of Germany’s ‘enlightened self-interest’ and a renegotiation of status in 
bilateral relations. This change did not represent a ‘return to traditional power politics’, 
but the enlargement of the uses of normative power and the adaptation of Germany’s 
foreign policy pattern which increasingly combines a logic of appropriateness with a 
logic of expected consequences. Germany has become a more independent player in the 
transatlantic relationship, and its position within the German-French relationship has 
suffered a significant qualitative change.
Germany’s actions have become increasingly pragmatic and consequentialist 
towards its two partners. Whereas previously the aim for more power parity was often 
done at the expense of Germany’s normative power, the Merkel government has 
recovered normative power and is pursuing German interests determinedly through 
additional power attributes. This has located Germany in a new position. That it has 
become the stronger player in the German-French relationship is in part an inevitable 
consequence of the end o f the Cold War, but also the result of a remaking of identity.
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Institutional reform went ahead according to Germany’s design of double majority 
voting as stipulated in the reformed Treaty of Lisbon signed in December 2007 and 
awaiting member states’ ratification.
If during the 1990s the Balkans was the testing ground for NATO alliance 
cohesion, it now is the Middle East and how to deal with conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The Israel-Palestinian problem and, more decisively, the problem of Iran, are also 
challenging the future of the Atlantic Alliance. While the Merkel government has 
contributed to the recovery of intra-alliance normality, alliance members do not share 
the same interests and strategic perceptions. This affects NATO but it also affects the 
European Union’s nascent foreign policy. In this sense, both German-American and 
German-French relations remain vital partnerships for German foreign policy and the 
Euro-Atlantic area the privileged context for Germany’s normative power to be 
complemented by a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy identity.
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CHAPTER 7: The international dimension of German foreign policy: the quest for 
a permanent UN Security Council seat
7.1. Introduction: Germany as an international player: From reluctance to 
assertiveness
The international dimension of German foreign policy can be illustrated in the unusual 
perseverance with which successive German governments have pursued the claim for a 
permanent seat in the Security Council (SC) of the United Nations. Support for a UNSC 
reform and a permanent seat has been the policy of Chancellor Kohl’s foreign minister 
Klaus Kinkel, Chancellors Gerhard Schroder and Angela Merkel. In September 1992 
Germany first stated its wish to become a permanent member of the Security Council. 
The new foreign minister Klaus Kinkel presented this goal before the annual meeting of 
the 47th UN General Assembly.253 The SC was considered by many states an 
anachronism for its outdated composition and need for a structural reform. Germany 
was willing to participate in this process, and if  the SC’s composition would be 
changed, Germany would ‘make known [its] intention to seek a permanent seat’ (Kinkel 
1992).
This announcement represented a departure from foreign policy objectives under 
foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who had never advocated a permanent SC seat 
for Germany (Genscher 1997). While it appeared, at first, a decision of mere 
institutional importance, aiming for permanent Security Council membership suggested 
a major shift in Germany’s wider foreign policy pattern, international strategy and 
identity. The goal in itself became representative of the change in German post­
unification foreign policy for it involved a fundamental choice about Germany’s 
international identity, with implications for the country’s future international standing.
Until the 1990s Germany was not perceived as a major global foreign policy 
actor either by its neighbours and allies or by itself. Non-military involvement in world 
politics was founded on a notion of responsibility for maintaining good diplomatic 
relations with countries in Asia, Africa and Central and South America and on 
promoting economic development. Thus German foreign policy outside of Europe and 
North America was founded mainly on development policy and diplomatic and
253 Klaus Kinkel’s speech before the annual meeting o f the 47th UN General Assembly (UNGA) in New  
York on 23 September 1992. See also 'Germany tells the U.N. it wants a permanent seat on the Council', New 
York Times, 24 September 1992.
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economic cooperation. In former foreign minister Genscher’s perception, Germany’s 
presence in the world was a question of responsibility, not of the projection of global 
power (Genscher 1990 and 1997:1016).
In contrast, Kinkel’s wish for Germany to aspire to permanent SC membership 
touched upon the category of world power. But Germany lacked a benign great power 
tradition and this raised the question of whether Germany had the necessary global 
foreign policy strategy which a permanent seat implied. Such a strategy would have to 
rest on solid principles and interests, with decision-makers aware of the policy 
consequences of such a global strategy. To be operational it would need the capacity to 
mobilise resources and produce results for long term policies. By simply announcing its 
wish for permanent membership and stating that it was ready to assume global 
responsibilities, Germany had not assured others that it had weighed the consequences 
of supporting a greater international role, and that it had the means to become a global 
player, let alone a global power. On the contrary, when the proposition was first put 
forward, Germany was still constitutionally prevented from participating in global peace 
operations and no experience of a military role in distant places. In other words, to 
become a global power Germany would have to make constitutional changes and learn 
to think of foreign policy in world category terms and act as a country with global 
interests, instead of merely employing a continuous rhetoric of global interests. This 
also presupposed that Germany knew what kind of player it wanted to be and what it 
wanted to be recognised as.
This chapter presents a norm-based analysis of Germany’s foreign policy 
identity in the international dimension of German diplomacy. The case study of 
Germany’s pursuit of a permanent SC seat emphasizes Germany’s new utilitarian 
multilateralism, and the new narrative of shared meaning which was introduced into the 
German foreign policy discourse. It examines to what extent Germany’s international 
behaviour has been conducted by principles of ‘normative multilateralism’, that is, a 
predisposition to act normatively (Manners 2002) and identifies when Germany has 
resorted to what can be termed ‘pragmatic or utilitarian multilateralism’, or 
unilateralism as a predisposition to act on the basis of a purely national interest 
approach. The chapter addresses three sets o f questions. The first one concerns 
empirical questions, and examines the actions undertaken by the Kohl, Schroder and 
Merkel governments. The second set is linked to strategic questions, such as the notion 
of global power and implications for Germany. The last set raises questions about 
constructivist assumptions and German behaviour.
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With regard to the empirical dimension, how successful was Germany’s UN policy 
between 1997 and 2007? Which means were at the disposal of German politicians to 
pursue these goals? What role did German representatives play in the UN Working 
Group on Security Council reform? Were German diplomats pro-active or passive, 
assertive or cautious, and strategic in their handling of the issue? Was there domestic 
consensus on the goal of permanent membership? What distinguishes the Merkel 
government from the Schroder and Kohl governments in its bid for a permanent seat? 
Why did Germany not pursue a common EU seat? Why did it pursue a campaign for a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council knowing that it never had much chance of 
succeeding (Grant 2005)?
The second set of questions relates to the wider foreign policy pattern and the 
strategic implications. Was the quest merely a question of prestige and international 
power recognition or did it echo a new will to play a greater role in world affairs? Did 
Germany’s existing diplomacy justify a permanent UNSC seat? Or did policy-makers 
pursue the seat for the purpose of legitimising the increasing number of military 
peacekeeping operations, and a strategy of projecting multilateralism more assertively 
towards an outer-European arena? How would a permanent membership be useful?
The last set of questions addresses the constructivist framework used along the 
thesis and relates it to the case study. Have new norms been created in the foreign 
policy discourse? Have conflicting norms emerged concerning Germany’s discursive 
and implementation practices? If identity functions as a key indicator of political change 
has this affected Germany’s position on Security Council reform? Does Germany aspire 
to become a global power in the traditional sense pursuing its own interest according to 
the utilitarian logic of expected consequences (March and Olsen 1998)? Or would it 
continue to follow a logic of appropriateness, even if it became a permanent member 
(March and Olsen 2004)? Finally, is this representative of a larger foreign policy change 
in Germany?
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first part presents the arguments 
behind Germany’s bid. First, it examines the normative reasons, following the logic of 
appropriateness. Secondly, it suggests utilitarian reasons, following the logic of 
expected consequences. The second part of the chapter then presents Germany’s 
position, and how the Kohl, Schroder and Merkel governments have dealt with the 
issue. The third part examines the incongruence between advocating a permanent 
German seat and a European foreign policy. The fourth part focuses on international 
reactions, such as the American and French positions, and Italy’s opposition, in the
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context of the wider Security Council reform proposals. In its last part, the chapter 
analyses conflicting norms between Germany’s prospective new international role and 
contextualises this with Germany’s position in Europe.
7.2. The quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat
7.2.1. Logics of appropriateness and consequentiality
There are two ways of understanding Germany’s logics for political action. The first is 
to see it as normative multilateralism which rests on assumptions of appropriateness for 
political actions. Germany participates in the international community in a responsible 
manner projecting its normative power through foreign policy decisions. For that it 
needs to become a permanent member of the Security Council to fulfil increasing 
international obligations and ensure respect for international law.
The second interpretation is to see Germany’s actions as a sign of a utilitarian 
multilateralism (or even unilateralism) on the basis of actions taken because of expected 
consequences. For Germany to achieve new international status as a global power, 
permanent SC membership would be the best power enhancing mechanism. In this case, 
Germany’s position revealed its ambition to exercise an assertive role as a global power 
to emulate other, ‘normal’ powers, and be treated by them as a peer state. The next 
section sums up the arguments by distinguishing between normative and utilitarian 
reasons for Germany’s quest.
7.2.2. Logic of appropriateness and normative argumentation
Among the normative reasons for Germany to become a permanent SC member, five 
seem plausible. First, Germany feels ready to assume duties and responsibilities on a 
global scale. Germany’s participation in a number of UN peace operations reflects its 
stance as a reliable multilateral partner willing to engage pro-actively to ensure 
international peace and security and oppose human rights violations. Permanent 
membership would ‘induce Germany to grow into a responsible global role’ (Kaiser 
1993/94:1016).
Secondly, in the eyes of its policy-makers, Germany would contribute to 
strengthening international norms of multilateralism. They see the United Nations as the
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international organisation that activates Germany’s normative foreign policy conceptions, 
through a multilateral framework for policy-making. As a permanent member the 
country could reinforce its tradition of ‘normative multilateralism’ in European politics, 
and translate this into effective policy-making on a global scale.
Thirdly, permanent membership would enhance the legitimacy of the Security 
Council. On the one hand, Germany enjoys a fairly unproblematic colonial past which 
would allow it to establish (or maintain) good relations with previously colonized states 
since it had ‘no positions of power or zones of influence to protect’ (Kinkel 1996a:20). 
On the other hand, it would become a non-nuclear permanent member, thus enlarging 
the Security Council’s legitimacy ‘by separating nuclear status from international 
influence’ (Kaiser 2004).
Fourthly, Germany would respond to what it sees as increasing expectations 
from a high number of member states, which, for the aforementioned reasons, see 
Germany as a country inclined to take other countries’ concerns more into consideration 
than the old SC permanent members.
Finally, a change of Germany’s position within the UN would represent a way to 
overcome Germany’s war past on an international scale, and to render the ‘enemy state 
clauses’ still contained in the UN Charter devoid of meaning. According to articles 53, 
77 and 107 of the Charter, countries which were aggressor states during the Second 
World War were enemies of the signatories of the Charter.254 Contrary to Japan, 
Germany has not campaigned actively for the removal of these clauses, for it feels that 
they became obsolete when the two German states joined the UN in 1973. German 
representatives have not abandoned the issue but sidelined it and expect the articles to 
be removed as a natural consequence of a Charter revision.
7.2.2.I. Normative reasons against a German permanent seat
The most significant argument to oppose Germany’s intention on normative grounds is 
that it would have to learn to think and act as a world power. It would not be sufficient 
to increase financial and material resources. The political cost would be a stronger 
leadership willing to shoulder greater international responsibilities and the definition of 
a global foreign policy strategy that such a new role implied.
Secondly, this would over-stretch Germany’s post-war identity and submit it to a
254 They are articles 53, 77 and 107 o f  the UN Charter. As a SC reform the removal o f these clauses 
requires a charter amendment. For the articles see Appendix on p. 234.
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sudden change from an Europeanised identity to the role of a global power, affecting 
Germany’s position within the European Union, Germany’s most important foreign 
policy arena and identity source.
Thirdly, a German seat by definition prevents a European seat. Contrary to the 
logic of the EU which strives towards converging member states’ with European 
interests, permanent SC membership reflects the willingness and capabilities of national 
positions only. How can Germany, simultaneously, encourage a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) to give the EU its voice in international politics and, in the 
United Nations, argue for a purely German seat? That both aims were contradictory 
showed the wider incoherence and lack of an overall German foreign policy strategy.
Fourthly, by wanting a seat like France and Great Britain, Germany helped 
perpetuate traditional great power politics. Striving for the permanent seat with a 
possible veto power showed that Berlin would use it in a similar manner as the other 
permanent five members, as a political tool for blocking decisions, or influencing non­
permanent members’ positions before a vote is taken (Nahory 2004). The veto power is 
also an invitation for permanent members to go against rather than ensuring compliance 
with international law if they believe it serves their interests. This reflects a hierarchical 
vision which goes against much of Germany’s foreign policy approach of normative 
multilateralism.
Fifthly, Germany’s ideational or normative attractiveness towards the outside 
world could be affected as a consequence of decreasing capabilities to materialize its 
promises to the international community. Its international credibility as a state which 
can deliver would be compromised, if it presented too ambitious an agenda with no 
follow-up deeds.
Finally, by joining the SC as a permanent member it does not follow that 
Germany could contribute to the strengthening and effectiveness of international norm 
application, and to the UN as a whole, any more than as an occasional SC member since 
a permanent seat was not a sine qua non for participating effectively in international 
lawmaking.255 The Schroder-Fischer government participated in codifying international 
law through advocating the constitution of the International Criminal Court, and made 
an important contribution to multilateralizing international relations by leading the 
initiative for the Petersberg conference in Bonn on the reconstruction of post-war 
Afghanistan in December 2001. Both cases happened without Germany being a
255 This was one o f former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s arguments against a German seat, as quoted in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitun,g ‘Zuruckhaltung aus Amerika’ 24 September 2004.
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permanent SC member.
7.2.3. The logic of consequentiality and utilitarian argumentation
There are also utilitarian reasons concerning Germany’s aspiration to a permanent seat. 
First, as the third largest world economy and third contributor to the UN budget, 
Germany sees itself as a rightful candidate to participate in the decision-making process 
of the world’s most global international institution. The former German ambassador 
to the UN, Gunter Pleuger, stated in 2002 that it was only ‘appropriate’ that Germany 
should join the SC since to shape policy it was necessary to co-decide. ‘If you are not in 
the SC, you cannot co-decide. But if  you are a member of the SC, you can introduce 
German policy, and if  you represent it well, you may even do so successfully’ (Pleuger 
2002).
Secondly, the increased number of UN operations involving the Bundeswehr 
showed that Germany was capable of participating in global politics. Germany 
increasingly made a linkage between its financial contributions, its participation in UN 
mandated peace operations and its demand for a permanent seat. The utilitarian aspect was 
obvious: because Germany has contributed, it had the legitimacy to ask for what it 
believed to be its rightful place in the international community.257 In 2004, Gemot Erler, 
deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group suggested that because Germany had 
accepted bigger responsibility in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, it could now reflect this 
in a reformed United Nations, implying that Germany had already shown why it deserved 
a new place in a new UN (Nass 2004).
The third argument is linked to the expected increase in power. A permanent 
membership would reinforce traditional state powers and perhaps give Germany the 
veto right, one o f the attributes of a great power.258 Permanent membership was thus the 
‘inevitable consequence’ of Germany’s increased power (Kaiser 1993/94) making it 
impossible for Germany to eschew its global responsibilities (Altenburg 1994). The 
recognition as a global power would give it a new status and rank in the international
256 ‘With a share o f 8,577% Germany is the third largest contributor followed by other EU partners - e.g. 
the United Kingdom (6.127%), France (6.030%) and Italy (4.885%). Together, the 27 member states o f  
the EU contribute over a third o f the overall UN budget.’ Permanent Mission o f Germany to the United 
Nations New York.
http://www.new-yorlam.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/01/GermanyUNMission.html
257 Together, the United States, Japan and Germany provide half o f the UN budget, with 22 percent, 19.5 
percent and 8.7 percent, respectively.
258 Although in the various reform proposals of the last years, the issue o f  granting the veto to new 
permanent members is not consensual and there is not yet a final proposal on how to handle the question 
o f the veto right.
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community, with additional prestige and lead other states to court Germany for support, 
and be consulted by others in relevant decisions.
Fourthly, it could be argued that during the transatlantic crisis in 2003 another 
motivation for the Schroder government to pursue a permanent seat was the possibility of 
using the Security Council in the future to check American power. It was a fortunate 
coincidence for Berlin that it was a non-permanent SC member at the time managing to 
create the quasi-alliance between Germany, France, Russia and China in early 2003 which 
functioned as a blocking force against the United States’ policy in Iraq and hegemonic 
pretensions. A permanent seat would make that possibility less dependent on the 
attribution of the occasional non-permanent seat.
Finally, more than pursuing an apparently unrealistic seat for the European 
Union, a German seat could ensure German and European interests. In contrast to 
France or Great Britain Germany would be more suitable to ensure the inclusion of EU 
interests, since it has followed the integrationist stance in the EU more than any other of 
the big states, and could translate this experience into a reformed Security Council. And 
since it is not a nuclear power it would change the apparent rule for qualification as a 
permanent member.
7.2.3.I. Utilitarian reasons against a German permanent seat
The first utilitarian argument against a new German role in the SC is that it would be 
too costly. At the time the claim was pursued most vigorously the necessary increase in 
German foreign policy and defence expenditures worldwide could hardly be matched at 
a time of dwindling capabilities and resources. Germany’s financial capabilities and 
post-unification economy were declining, making it difficult to empower a global role 
financially (Hellmann and Wolf 2004). Diminishing resources would over-stretch 
Germany’s capabilities and lead to inefficiency and lack of success as a global foreign 
policy actor.
Secondly, there were political costs such as involvement in controversial 
military interventions. The fact that Schroder combined the Bundestag vote on 
Germany’s participation in the UN military mission in Afghanistan in November 2001 
with a vote of confidence in his government shows the extent to which a greater
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9SQinternational role brought with it greater domestic political costs.
Thirdly, Germany’s international credibility was on the line. There was only a 
gain in Germany assuming more responsibility if, as Tono Eitel, former German 
ambassador to the UN said in 1999, The initiatives it makes in the SC are followed, if  
need be, by material deeds on the German part’ (Eitel 1999:130).
A fourth plausible reason was that a regional imbalance would emerge with 
permanent memberships of three European states. Geographically Europe was already 
well represented by Britain and France, and a logical consequence would be to give the 
European Union a seat. This has been Italy’s position not least because it would feel 
more empowered by a European seat and not as Teft out’ as it would were Germany to 
get one. Rome even orchestrated a high profile campaign to obstruct German entry and 
find a new way of reforming the UNSC.
Finally, the problem of effective decision-making in the Security Council 
prevailed making it difficult to see how augmenting the number of its members would 
make it more efficient.
7.3. The positions of the Kohl, Schroder and Merkel governments: From 
normative multilateralism to pragmatic multilateralism
If these are the lines of argumentation regarding a German permanent SC seat, what 
have been the policies of the German governments? Between 1997 and 2007 three 
approaches can be identified in Germany’s position regarding UN SC reform and the 
aim of gaining a seat. While the position of foreign minister Kinkel lacked a wider 
government strategy, the Schroder government pursued the goal through a more 
coherent approach in itself. The present CDU-SPD coalition government under 
Chancellor Merkel has upheld the claim, albeit with less stamina.
7.3.1. The position of the Kohl government
In the first years after unification, German policy-makers had difficulty in translating 
their countries’ interest into a strategy. Germany only became a full UN member 
through unification, suggesting that before 1990 the UN was not a privileged arena for 
policy-making (Schwarz 2003). Domestic foreign policy discussions centred on the
259 Gerhard Schroder’s speech before the Bundestag on 16 November 2001. Both votes were won for the 
Socialist-Green government by a small margin. Bulletin 1996-2003, Berlin: Presse-und Informationsamt 
der Bundesregierung, CD-Rom version, February 2004.
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scope of Germany’s international role, its inhibition to lead a more assertive foreign 
policy and its reluctance in participating in out-of-area military operations. When 
foreign minister Klaus Kinkel first spelled out Germany’s wish to become a permanent 
member of the Security Council before the General Assembly in September 1992, he 
stated that Germany would not take the initiative, but that in case the Security Council 
composition underwent reforms his country would put forward its desire for a 
permanent seat (Kinkel 1992). In 30 June 1993 Germany presented its position to the 
General Assembly. ‘The Federal government is prepared to assume the responsibilities
9 ahwhich permanent membership of the Security Council entails.’
Kinkel’s approach to the membership bid was normative. Germany’s increased 
international responsibility after unification meant that it could not just pay i ip  service’ 
to the international community but had to be willing to assume greater international 
responsibility and use its membership in a restrained way, institutionally bound and 
through a ‘culture of restraint’(Kinkel 1995). That the composition of the Security 
Council needed to be updated was, for Kinkel, ‘a question of legitimacy, credibility and 
effectiveness’ of the Council (Kinkel 1996b). His ministry supported the creation of one 
permanent and one non-permanent seat for each of the three large regions of the Third 
World, in addition to two new permanent seats for Germany and Japan, and a further
9 A1non-permanent seat for the eastern European countries. Kinkel was not explicit on 
whether Germany’s quest involved the right to a veto power but rather suggested 
elusively that Germany was ‘willing to embrace any adjustment of the voting 
regulations, including the veto privilege, which the present permanent members are 
prepared to accept for themselves’ (Kinkel 1996a:21).
While Kinkel’s initiative was not much noticed at home, the foreign minister felt 
vindicated through the large support Germany received from a majority of UN member 
states. He often framed the argument for a seat as a response to the wishes and tmst that 
the international community placed in Germany’s maturity and political responsibility 
(Kinkel 1997). ‘We want to become a permanent member of the Security Council’, 
Kinkel stated. ‘We do not stand in front of the door and try to run in, but we have - as I 
believe - the justified impression that this is more or less automatically approaching us. 
We have time. And we can afford to wait. We do not need to push. And I do not want to
260 Deutsche Stellungnahme zur Reform des Sicherheitrats vom 30. Juni 1993 (A/48/264, 20 July 1993), 
quoted in Lisette Andreae (2002). Reform in der Warteschleife: Ein deutscher Sitz im UN-Sicherheitsrat? 
Miinchen: Oldenbourg, p. 271.
261 For the purpose o f initiating work on UN reform resolution 48/26, 3 December 1993 created the Open- 
ended Working Group.
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either.’262
In the UN itself, Kinkel was supported by Tono Eitel, the German Ambassador 
to the UN who used multilateral diplomacy based on active engagement, and personal 
input to promote Germany’s readiness to ‘take on all responsibilities of a permanent 
member of the Security Council.’ Eitel was more outspoken than the foreign minister 
when he stated that this should include the veto right for new permanent members 
which had to be equipped ‘with the same armour the other permanent members have’ (Eitel 
1996).
Whereas the foreign minister was keen on campaigning for a German seat he did 
not pursue a seat for the European Union. While desirable, he had no illusions that 
neither France nor Great Britain would give up their membership, and furthermore, SC 
membership by an international organisation had not been envisaged by the UN Charter. 
It is also conceivable that the possibility of a European seat would have opened an 
avenue for the Chancellor to get involved, one of the few areas where Kinkel had 
managed to find a policy niche for himself.
In 1997 negotiations on the UN reform began in earnest both at the UN and in 
Germany. In January the Auswartige Amt laid out its position regarding the Security 
Council reform before the Bundestag.264 It stated that Germany and Japan should be 
considered as potential candidates for a permanent seat in a SC reform aimed at 
strengthening the UN’s legitimacy, effectiveness and credibility. A well-balanced SC 
composition would be achieved through the increase of up to twenty-six permanent and 
non-permanent members (these last should get have the possibility of getting re­
elected), thus avoiding the creation of a third category of SC members. Of the suggested 
five new permanent members, one each should come from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and one seat for Germany and Japan. The four non­
permanent members should come from the first three regions mentioned above, and one 
from Eastern Europe. The German government considered the abolition of the veto to 
be right, and the creation of a European seat as unrealistic, at the same time as it had no 
problem with the equity of the UNSC having three European members.
As a compromise solution the Kohl government was not opposed to the model of 
‘permanent rotating regional seats’ to solve regional disputes over which state would
262 Foreign minister Kinkel quoted in Andreas Zumach, ‘Reform or collapse: Is there a future for the UN 
in a unipolar world order?’, 29 June 1997, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/radiorep.htm
263 Permanent Mission o f Germany to the United Nations, Press Release, No. 62/97, 17 November 1997, 
http://www.germany-info.org/UN/un_press_97.htm (accessed 29.07.2002).
264 Drucksache 13/6773, 15 January 1997. Answer o f the German government concerning the Question 
put forward by the SPD parliamentary group on the Reform o f the United Nations (Drucksache 13/5055, 
19 June 1996).
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best represent a region. While the veto right was not a goal as such, Germany expected 
equal treatment for any new permanent members, including the veto right. This proposal 
was in line with other proposals under discussion in the UN reform process 
negotiations.265
In March 1997, UN General Assembly president Razali Ismail put forward a 
reform proposal to change the Council in accordance with the new balance of global 
power in the 1990s. The Razali proposal suggested an increase of nine members, 
elevating the number of SC members to twenty-four. Of the nine, five should become 
permanent members, two from the industrialized countries and three from the 
developing regions. Of the four new non-permanent members, one each should come
Of\f\ _ .from the three developing regions and one from Eastern Europe. The proposal 
rejected an expansion of the veto right to new permanent members. Germany’s 
Ambassador to the UN, Gerhard Henze, tried to downplay its significance. ‘We have 
always made clear that we are not interested in the veto power itself, Henze argued. 
‘What we want is non-discrimination. That is to say, Germany should not have a lesser 
status compared to other permanent members of the Security Council.’267 But the Razali 
proposal, the first realistic proposal in years was not submitted to a vote, mainly because 
the US opposed outright expanding the SC to more than twenty-one members.
While within the UN the proposal was thus stalled, there were also domestic 
reasons which hindered the bid. Traditionally Germany has advocated a European 
permanent UN Security Council seat in the event of the reform of that institution. The
? / o
Bundestag decision of 11 November 1992 indicated that position. Joining the UNSC 
had been Kinkel’s initiative, thus lacking overall assertiveness and wider government 
support.269 The foreign minister turned this into his ‘personal campaign’, which meant 
he was isolated within the government and unable to step up a lobbying campaign 
behind the scenes.270 This was his attempt to carve out for himself an area where he 
knew Kohl would not get actively involved making the Auswartige Amt the protagonist 
in a domain where the Kanzleramt had little interest, and it gave Kinkel the opportunity 
to transform his limited margin of manoeuvrability on the European stage into more 
visibility on the international stage.
265 James Paul, 'As Reform Negotiations Reach Fever Pitch, Germany & Japan Push for Permanent 
Security Council Seats', New York, 7 March 1997, http://www.globalpolicv.org/securitv/reform/secref97.htm
266 Andreas Zumach, ‘Reform or collapse: Is there a future for the UN in a unipolar world order?’, 29 
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267 Ibid.
268 Karl Lamers, ‘Uberlegungen zur europaischen Krise’, May 2006.
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Before 1998 the bid was hardly discussed by any other German politician, 
mainly because it was considered a non-issue for most.271 Some colleagues in other 
ministries did not conceal their uneasiness, considering Kinkel’s claim ‘rather 
embarrassing’.272 In early March 1997, Development Minister Carl-Dieter Spranger 
publicly criticized Kinkel's campaign, and accused the German Mission in New York of 
sending the ‘wrong signals’ about German policy and calling its approach ‘tasteless and
'yn'i
ultimately counter-productive.’
Chancellor Kohl was less outspoken about Germany’s quest for a permanent SC 
seat. In May 1992, the month when Klaus Kinkel became Foreign Minister, Kohl said: 
‘The question of a seat for Germany in the Security Council (...) is a question which 
does not worry me. For the moment, I feel very well represented by our partners, and 
particularly by the Europeans, of which France is a good example.’ In January 1993, 
Kohl reiterated that the pledge for a permanent seat was not an issue of the moment, and 
only when reform negotiations in the UN started, would Germany deal with the 
question.275 The Chancellor acknowledged the rising expectations of others towards 
Germany and recognized that the UN was the appropriate institution to fulfil them. But 
Kohl never dropped a hint over a German permanent SC seat and was ‘very restrained’ 
on the issue.276
Whereas Kohl accepted that Germany could play a larger role in the UN, he was 
not interested in a permanent seat because it did not fit his wider European vision of 
German foreign policy, and, considering Italy’s and Spain’s resistance, he felt uneasy 
about the consequences for European integration. In contrast to Kinkel the Chancellor 
was not searching for new identity indicators. The Euro-Atlantic area remained Kohl’s 
privileged domain for political action. Still, the rationale behind the same narrative was 
different: while formerly Germany sought refuge in a European rhetoric, after 
unification it turned into a more decisive protagonist in order to defend its interests 
more assertively, but always within the given parameters.277 The Chancellor accepted
271 Interviews with German politicians in Berlin, September 2000.
272 Interview with a German politician in Berlin, September 2000.
273 Generalanzeiger, 3 March 1997, quoted by James Paul, 'As Reform Negotiations Reach Fever Pitch, 
Germany & Japan Push for Permanent Security Council Seats', New York, 7 March 1997, 
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274 Joint press conference given by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand during the 59th German- 
French consultations at La Rochelle on 22 May 1992, Politique Etrangere de la France, May-June 1992, 
p. 72.
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that ‘Germany was too big and had too large a claim on its conscience to abstain in the 
world’, but involvement should be limited to participation in UN peacekeeping 
operations (Schoenbaum and Pond 1996:186). Kohl felt uncomfortable with the 
question of a permanent membership and instead of openly supporting his foreign
70
minister, Kohl distanced himself and let Kinkel pursue his goal.
Thus during the period of the Kohl government Germany was unsuccessful in 
its bid. Until 1998 the desire for a permanent UNSC seat was an exception to the given 
identity parameters of Europeanism and Atlanticism, and pursued only by the foreign 
minister. It failed, because of bad international timing, generalised international 
opposition -  which was not anti-German, per se - and because there was no underlying 
narrative to support it. The claim sat uneasily with Germany’s normative 
multilateralism. In light of this Kinkel’s repeated statements of a German ‘culture of 
restraint’, seemed more like a rhetorical device designed to allay fears of a new German 
predominance than a practical guideline by which he shaped the foreign policy of his 
ministry.
7.3.2. The position of the Schroder government
With the Schroder government, the aim of making Germany a permanent member took 
on a new dimension, and became the official government position with a more 
coordinated approach between the Chancellor’s office and the foreign ministry. The 
coalition programme of November 1998 stated that Germany would pursue a common 
European seat if  feasible but it would also ‘use the opportunity’ o f Germany’s 
admission as a permanent member of the UN Security Council ‘if a European seat [did] 
not appear feasible and if, at the same time, the Security Council [could] be reformed to 
achieve greater regional balance.’ The formula of the 2002 coalition programme of the 
second Schroder/Fischer was more assertive. In case the desired European seat did not 
materialize, Germany would ‘strive for’ its own seat.
Chancellor Schroder and foreign minister Fischer approached the issue 
differently. Whereas Schroder presented utilitarian justifications, Fischer sought 
normative ones. But the foreign minister had not always favoured a seat for Germany. 
In 1994 he had warned the Germans against a ‘return to a foreign policy with a militarist 
pillar’ where the ultimate goal of a “completely” sovereign Germany was to be among 
the world great powers, with a permanent seat in the UNSC, and with nuclear
278 Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 July 2004.
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sovereignty (Fischer 1994:229). Considering that only Europe, not Germany had global 
interests, Fischer advocated that his country strive for the Europeanization of the British 
and French permanent seats.
Four years later, shortly before the parliamentary elections in September 1998, 
Fischer changed his position and argued for a German permanent seat. Speaking about 
the foreign policy of the Berlin Republic in June, he stated that he preferred a European 
seat, but a German seat would be the second best option (Fischer 1998a:94). In an 
interview with the German weekly Die Zeit Fischer, already foreign minister, suggested 
that although it went against the logic of European unification, a permanent seat for 
Germany and Japan made sense since both were non-nuclear countries and major 
economic powers (Fischer 1998b).
The foreign minister used the normative argument underlining Germany’s 
willingness to accept more responsibility in a reformed Security Council. Fischer’s 
vision for German foreign policy rejected any sort of unilateralism and was instead 
based on what he termed the ‘multitaleral imperative’ (Fischer 2000). This multilateral 
imperative was founded on ‘a world belonging to the politics of responsibility based not 
on hegemonic claims but on cooperation, solidarity and multilateralism’ (Fischer 2001). 
To ensure greater legitimacy of action, Fischer attempted to make the permanent five 
more accountable, proposing that the use of the veto be linked to a statement of reasons 
before the UN GA (Fischer 1999).
After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Fischer reinforced 
what he saw as the need to accelerate the reform of the UN and particularly the Security 
Council. Speaking before the UN General Assembly on 12 November, Fischer 
suggested that one of the consequences of the terrorist attacks was the need for a clear 
definition of the UN’s reform priorities, and a more representative and efficient SC, to 
make the UN more capable to act.
Given Fischer’s credentials as a ‘committed European’, it was paradoxical that 
he should lobby for a national seat, without attempting to work towards a European one. 
Germany did not follow a parallel strategy of combining both and limited its actions to 
rhetorical commitments to a European seat.
Soon after becoming Chancellor in October 1998, Gerhard Schroder began to 
introduce new accents into the Republic’s foreign policy discourse. He was assertive 
about Germany’s interests, stating that if his country were to become normal, it should 
act like any other country, in a self-confident manner. In his first major speech before 
the Bundestag after taking office, Schroder stated that ‘Germany will realize the
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opportunity to become a permanent UNSC member, provided a European seat is not 
attainable’ (Schroder 1998). In a major foreign policy speech at the opening of the 
Berlin office of the German Society for Foreign Policy in September 1999, Schroder 
introduced a policy o f ‘enlightened self-interest’ as a guiding principle for conducting 
foreign policy. Part of this enlightened self-interest was the linkage between Germany’s 
contribution to the UN and its aspiration to status promotion. Schroder underlined that 
Germany was ready to accept ‘responsibility commensurate with its contribution and 
political capacities’ in an enlarged Security Council (Schroder 1999a). A year later, in 
September 2000 the Chancellor set out the guidelines for German policy at the 
beginning of the new century, where he reiterated the efficiency argument, and the 
inclusion of the member states with the greatest performance in the Security Council 
adding that Germany was ready to assume more responsibility in that institution 
(Schroder 2000a). A few days later, before the 55th UN General Assembly in New York, 
Schroder stated his country’s readiness to assume responsibility, equivalent to a 
permanent seat in the SC (Schroder 2000b). The fact that it was the Chancellor himself 
speaking before the GA was also indicative of the importance he attached to Germany’s
wd.279
To justify his more assertive stance, Chancellor Schroder introduced the concept 
of international parity as a new international norm into German political discourse. His 
desire to project onto the international stage a more self-confident Germany led him to 
seek parity with the other international powers, such as France and Britain, and aspire to 
the role they represented abroad, insisting on being treated by Washington ‘at eyelevel’ 
Cauf gleicher Augenhohe ’) in the biggest international institution. This new norm of 
becoming a peer power shaped political actions, the pursuit of a permanent SC seat 
being only the most visible one in the international dimension of German diplomacy.
The discursive practice of both Fischer and Schroder shows that their 
motivations for a German seat diverged considerably. Whereas Fischer represented 
Germany’s post-war commitment to normative multilateralism Schroder made no secret 
of his wish to introduce a more utilitarian multilateralism. Fischer’s role changed 
significantly between 1998 and 2005. While initially he approached the issue 
reluctantly, the foreign minister grew into the role of an active advocate for a German 
permanent seat. And whereas initially the motivations in the first term of office seemed 
to coincide with Fischer’s wider vision of normative multilateralism, as opposed to
279 Former Chancellor Kohl, by contrast, has never addressed the GA’s annual meetings, revealing the 
lesser significance he attributed the GA.
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Schroder’s more utilitarian understanding of it, in the second mandate Fischer’s stance 
evolved towards a more utilitarian reading of Germany’s role in the world. Their 
positions gradually converged, especially after the transatlantic crisis in 2003. The norm 
of international parity was embedded in a broader social discourse of ‘growing 
international responsibilities’ linked to more German self-confidence. It came to fruition 
since both the Chancellor and foreign minister managed to use arguments which were 
legitimated by this new political discourse (Checkel 2004).
At the height of the US-led war in Iraq (and Germany’s consistent opposition to 
it) Germany was a non-permanent member of the Security Council - i.e. from 2003 to 
2004. The German-American disagreement over the war on Iraq in 2002-03 thus further 
highlighted the contradictions of Germany’s bid. The new norm of international parity 
was developing at the cost of embedded multilateralism in European and transatlantic 
diplomacy. Berlin’s stance was ambivalent. Schroder demanded a permanent SC seat 
for Germany and simultaneously declared that Germany would not participate in any 
military operation in Iraq even i f  legitimated by a second UNSC resolution. This 
signalled the government’s lack of interest in a legitimating role for the SC and more 
importantly revealed a departure from Berlin’s traditional multilateralism and 
transatlanticism. Why insist on permanent membership if  Berlin stated a priori that 
some UNSC resolutions on such crucial issues as Iraq bore no relevance for its foreign 
policy with Germany?
On 24 September 2003, Schroder stated that ‘the Council must be reformed and 
enlarged. First and foremost, it must also include more representatives of the developing 
countries. Let me reiterate that in the context of such reform Germany is ready to 
assume greater responsibility’ (Schroder 2003:24). Pleuger stated a few days later 
before the GA that Germany believed that reform of the Security Council was 
‘indispensable in order to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of the Council’s 
decisions.’ But ‘the legitimacy of the Security Council is based on its 
representativeness.’ Pleuger’s sustained his argument also on an arithmetical logic: In 
1945 the UN had 51 members, eleven of which where SC members, adding up to ‘more 
than 20 per cent of the total membership’. ‘When the number of seats on the Security 
Council was increased from 11 to 15 in 1963, the United Nations had 112 Members’ 
(Pleuger 2003:24).
Germany’s bid for permanent membership gained momentum in 2004 as 
Berlin’s goal to become more assertive about obtaining a permanent seat coincided with 
the UN’s SC reform debate. After the Iraq debacle in 2003 Kofi Annan, the UN’s
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General Secretary, became more forceful in pushing forward a United Nations reform to 
solve what he termed ‘the crisis of multilateralism’. For the German government this
was viewed as a window of opportunity. Gemot Erler from the SPD considered it 
‘foolish’ if Germany would not seek to obtain a seat then at a time when Germany’s 
standing in the international community was high.281 The government’s confidence ran 
so high in 2004 that it even considered striving for a seat in the event that the United
909
States - whose support was now lukewarm, at most -did not explicitly support it. 
Foreign minister Fischer justified Germany’s claim as a response to Kofi Annan’s call 
for a UN reform after the Iraq war. ‘A multilaterally engaged country such as Germany 
could hardly have denied its participation’, argued Fischer. ‘Particularly after the Iraq 
war a [German] ‘no’ would have been wrong, because Iraq had shown that the UN is 
indispensable, and in need of reform’ (Fischer 2005b).
Schroder justified the claim in the following unconcealed terms of utilitarian 
multilateralism: ‘It would be irresponsible for us not to say now just exactly what we 
want’, which was understandable given that post-war reconstruction and cheque book 
diplomacy were Germany’s comparative advantages. Consequently, in the spring of 
2004 the Chancellor presented Germany as a candidate for permanent membership to a 
domestic audience (Schroder 2004).284 He reiterated Germany’s candidature in the 
Bundestag on 25 March 2004. ‘Germany is ready to take on responsibility as a 
permanent member of the Security Council’, he stated at the end of a lengthy speech on 
the state of Germany for 2010.285 For Gemot Erler, this was ‘a conscious signal’ that 
Germany saw itself as a natural candidate for an enlarged UNSC.286 It was also a signal 
for the SC itself, since Germany took over the monthly presidency of the SC in April 
2004. During the summer 2004 Germany stepped up its lobbying campaign to vow for 
international support. Lobbying for this seat became instrumental in Schroder’s 
meetings with leaders all over the world during that year. Fischer engaged in a 
‘shuttle diplomacy’ in Asia in July and the Middle East in August vowing for support
280 At the end o f 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan commissioned a committee o f  16 experts 
‘tasked with examining the major threats and challenges the world faces in the broad field o f  peace and 
security, including economic and social issues insofar as they relate to peace and security, and making 
recommendations for the elements o f a collective response’. ‘High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change’. Press Release SG/A/857,4 November 2003. 
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203
and reminding those countries of the high amount of development aid Germany had 
poured into those countries. Thus the logic of consequentiality was also being used 
outside the United Nations in Germany’s bilateral relations.
To strengthen its case, Germany enlarged the context of its strategy through a 
coordinated approach with other potential candidates for permanent membership. In 
September 2004, Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, the so-called G4 group, launched a 
joint campaign presenting themselves as ‘legitimate candidates’.288 At the 59th UN 
General Assembly the G4 put forward a joint declaration of their intentions ‘based on 
the firmly shared recognition that they are legitimate candidates for permanent 
membership in an expanded Security Council, support each other's candidature.’ 
During a visit to Japan in December the Chancellor and Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi called for both countries to be granted a permanent seat and receive the veto 
right to ensure equality among old and new permanent members.290 This stood in 
contrast to Secretary General Kofi Annan’s own two models of reform models neither
701of which envisaged a veto right for new members.
But the 2004 momentum had dissipated by the summer of 2005. On 16 May 
2005 the G4 submitted their draft resolution.292 The consistency of the G4 was already 
problematic for the sympathies and dislikes the group caused. Although China had no 
problems with Germany’s bid, indicating its support when Schroder visited China in 
December 2004, it opposed Japan’s claim and could therefore not support the G4 claim 
as a whole. In addition, China had indicated a month before that it supported India’s 
claim to permanent membership (Gutschker 2005b), signalling to New Delhi that it 
might gain more from pursuing the objective on an individual basis, a position shortly 
afterwards endorsed by Washington. The US no longer endorsed the German bid, but 
clearly stated its support for Tokyo’s quest. Berlin’s attempt to use the Iraq war had 
resulted in a weakening of the international support of its claim for a permanent seat.
On 6 July 2005 the G4 presented the draft resolution on SC expansion
288 Financial Times, 20 September 2004, p. 4. FAZ, 22 September 2004.
289 FAZ, 22 September 2004.
290 ‘Schroder fordert Veto-Recht fur Deutschland’, FAZ, 9 December 2004.
291 Kofi Annan’s two proposals for SC reform envisaged first the enlargement to six permanent and three 
rotating members. The second model proposed nine rotating members. FAZ, 16 May 2005.
292 The draft resolution suggested enlarging the SC by ten members, six permanent and four non­
permanent members. The new composition o f 25 members would be made o f eleven permanent and 
fourteen non-permanent members.
293 India has also been engaged in other regional groupings such as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) 
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(A/59/L.64) to the GA for debate.294 The G4 hoped that its draft resolution would be 
voted before the annual GA meeting on 14-16 September but the controversial debate 
dragged on and chances for the draft resolution even being discussed at the annual GA
JQC
meeting on 14-16 September looked increasingly slim.
During the German parliamentary election campaign in the summer of 2005 the 
government continued to argue that as the third largest financial contributor to the UN’s 
budget, and as the second largest country to send troops abroad after the U.S., with 
Bundeswehr deployments in Afghanistan and the Balkans Germany had the right to 
participate in the decisions of the Security Council and be treated equal to other powers.
7.3.3. The Merkel government and a permanent Security Council seat
After the September 2005 parliamentary elections, the new ruling coalition included the 
claim for a German permanent seat in the coalition agreement in November 2005. The 
agreement stated that Germany continued to endorse a permanent seat for the European 
Union, but would also be ready to assume greater responsibility through a German 
permanent seat (Coalition Treaty 2005:136). It is probable that the aim was put in the 
coalition treaty more at foreign minister Steinmeier’s insistence, than because of 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s own preferences. During the election campaign Merkel had 
endorsed a German seat but she did not count it as one of her priorities.
Thus the grand coalition was far from having a consensual position on what 
Berlin’s position should be. In mid-November Merkel’s foreign policy adviser 
Christoph Heusgen called a permanent seat for Germany ‘an illusion’, challenging 
foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, who as SPD member and former chief of 
staff of Gerhard Schroder was pursuing a permanent seat with the same commitment as 
the previous government.297
But it embarked on a new initiative. In January 2006 Thomas Steg, the 
government’s spokesman reiterated Germany’s willingness to assume greater 
responsibility worldwide. ‘This includes a permanent seat in the Security Council.’
On 6 January Germany, India and Brazil submitted a second proposal for the Security
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Council reform to the General Assembly.299 The SC should be composed of 25 
countries, eleven permanent and fourteen non-permanent rotating members, with the 
question of the veto for new members postponed for fifteen years. This was the same 
proposal the G4 had submitted to the UN in July 2005 and which had not been voted. 
Even though this was the most consensual proposal it again lacked the necessary two 
thirds majorities in the GA and the agreement of all five permanent members.300 Even if 
the group was successful in wooing smaller countries into casting their votes favourably 
and achieving the necessary majority for a UNSC reform, through the approval of 128 
of the 192 member countries, the reform process could still be vetoed by any one of the 
five present permanent members. Additionally, the crumbling of the G4 as a lobbying 
group had begun in mid 2005, which explains why Japan refrained from joining this 
second proposal together with the other G4 countries opting instead to pursue its claim 
on an individual basis. Tokyo knew that Washington still endorsed its bid, whereas
A^1
American support for a German seat was still unclear.
When foreign minister Steinmeier gave his first speech before the 61st UNGA 
session in New York in September 2006, it was all the more striking that he did not 
mention a permanent seat for Germany. He addressed the need for a wider UN reform 
but abstained from making the SC the centre of his speech (Hellmann and Roos 2007b). 
Rather he emphasized Germany’s duty to support the UN in contributing towards a 
more peaceful and just world (Steinmeier 2006b).
A German seat no longer seemed the pressing aim for the SPD. Kurt Beck, SPD 
chairman, refrained from pronouncing the policy at the first speech he gave on foreign 
policy as the new social democrat leader in November 2006 in Berlin. While he 
welcomed the enlargement of the SC, he made no reference to Germany’s own claim. 
This showed that while a German seat was not eliminated from the SPD’s policy 
agenda, it no longer ranked as high a priority as it had been during the Schroder years.
Merkel’s visit to Japan at the end of August 2007 signalled a renewed interest in 
Berlin and Tokyo pursuing a permanent seat jointly again. A few days later at the 62nd 
UNGA session in New York in September, Merkel stated that Germany still pursued a
299 General Assembly, A/60/L.46, 9 January 2006.
300 The General Assembly resolution 53/30, adopted in November 1998, stipulated that any resolution or 
decision on the question o f equitable representation on and increase in the membership o f  the Security 
Council and related matters would require the affirmative vote o f  at least two thirds o f the members o f  the 
Assembly, in conformity with Article 108 o f the Charter.
301 ‘Japan im Alleingang zum Sicherheitsrat’, Financial Times Deutschland, 6 January 2006, 
http ://www. ftd.de/pw/in/37681 .htm
302 Kurt Beck spoke at an SPD conference on Europe on the prospects the the German coming EU 
presidency in the first half o f 2007. Kurt Beck, ‘Europa gestalten: globale Friedensmacht - soziale 
Wirtschaftskraft’, speech by the SPD chairman in Berlin, 6 November 2006.
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permanent seat (Merkel 2007). Romano Prodi, Italian prime minister, reiterated Italy’s 
position opposing Berlin’s pretensions. Thus while the new grand coalition government 
continued to pursue a national policy more interest than promoting the CFSP dimension 
in UN politics, the intra-European divisions were also not mitigated, separating those 
member states which supported Germany, such as France and Britain, from those who 
argued for a European seat or simply opposed a German one, like Italy, Spain and 
Sweden.
At the end of 2007, the German position at the UN was one of revitalizing the 
initiative, on the basis of the G4 proposal. As Thomas Matussek, German Ambassador 
to the UN stated on 12 November 2007, Germany is open-minded towards an 
intermediary approach as long as it brings about ‘real change. We cannot simply settle 
for the lowest common denominator. We must create a formula for a Council that will 
reflect today's political realities and truly change the balance of power in the Council 
right from the start of the intermediary period.’ For that ‘a mandatory review within a 
clear timeframe and a clearly defined mandate’ had to be ‘an integral part of the 
solution’ (Matussek 2007).
7.3.4. Domestic elite support for Germany’s bid
Domestically, Schroder and Fischer were successful in constructing a powerful 
narrative of shared meaning accepted by the majority of the German political elite on 
the basis of a perceived legitimacy to be treated like other powers. As with the war in 
Kosovo in 1999 the Red-Green government had touched upon a nerve that was 
ideologically sympathetic to centre-right parties and which they therefore tended to 
support. In March 2001 the Foreign Affairs Committee (Auswartiger Ausschufi) 
presented a motion to the Bundestag for a solid German UN policy.303 Politicians of the 
four major parties considered that the UNSC should adapt to present day reality and 
make it more representative. It was implicit in the resolution that the coalition parties, 
the CDU/CSU and the FDP endorsed the view that Germany should become a new 
permanent member in a SC enlargement. Support cut across party lines. CDU member 
Volker Riihe, defence minister in the previous government supported the government’s 
position for a German seat. Friedbert Pfliiger, foreign policy spokesman for the CDU 
supported a German seat but was sceptical that this would be well received by
303 Joint motion presented by SPD, CDU/CSU, Biindnis 90/Die Griinen and FDP, Drucksache 14/5243, 
28 March 2001.
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Germany’s neighbours. Werner Hoyer, former state secretary of the Foreign Ministry 
under Klaus Kinkel advocated a European seat, without rejecting one for Germany.304 
Wolfgang Gerhardt, from the FDP advocated a seat for Germany but warned that it was 
not enough to claim a seat because o f ‘the country’s status as Europe’s biggest civilian 
power. The civilian power concept in itself is insufficient to promote peace in the world. 
Diplomacy needs to be complemented by military capacities’ (Gerhardt 2004). Hans 
Ulrich Klose, deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and SPD foreign 
policy expert was sceptical of the chances for success. Karsten Voigt, coordinator for 
German-American Cooperation in the Foreign Office argued for a German seat to 
counter its ‘moralising provincialism’.
Few openly argued against a German seat, with most criticism coming from the 
CDU. Wolfgang Schauble, CDU member and interior minister of the Merkel 
government favoured only a European seat, considering the Schroder government’s bid 
for a German seat ‘backwards looking’ and paving the way for a return of nationally
1AT
orientated foreign policies by European states. Germany lacked the material means 
that a global power role implied (Schauble 2003). Andreas Schockenhoff, of the CDU 
considered that the quest for a German seat divided Europe. Karl Lamers, CDU 
member, argued that ‘the quest for a national seat not only stood little chance from the 
start, it did little to promote Europe. This divided Europe. Germany should therefore 
accept France’s offer and send a German representative to the French UN delegation 
using its position there to work towards common European positions and a formal 
procedure within EU institutions for that purpose’ (Lamers 2006). But former 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, SPD, has also continuously criticized the Schroder and 
Merkel government’s argument that Germany is ready to accept more responsibility 
through a permanent UN Security Council seat (Schmidt 2004 and 2007).
7.4. The dilemma of a European seat: between CFSP and a permanent seat
Judged by financial contributions, the EU states together, make up almost 40% of the 
UN budget and peacekeeping operations, constituting its biggest financial contributor, 
ahead of the US and Japan. In the General Assembly they represent 27 of the 192
304 Matthias Nass, ‘Wir wollen da rein!’, Die Zeit, 39/2004.
305 Deutschlandfunk, 23 September 2004.
306 Peter Muller, ‘Die Ilusion von der Weltmacht’, Welt am Sonntag, 17 October 2004.
307 John Vinocur, ‘German ‘prestige’ tour less than boffo in Asia’, International Herald Tribune, 27 July 
2004.
308 Interview with Andreas Schockenhoff, Berlin, September 2000.
208
member states which make up more than one-eighth of all votes in the UN General 
Assembly. According to the EU, ‘EU candidate, potential candidate, and accession 
countries usually align themselves with EU statements. Commonly, almost one-sixth of 
UN Member States now align themselves with EU statements at the UNGA.’309 This 
suggests that a common position between the twenty-seven member states could 
strengthen the EU’s role in the world.
The pursuit of a permanent UN Security Council seat highlights the 
contradictions of Berlin’s foreign policy. It illustrates a persistent EU-German 
incongruence, accentuating the incompatibility between arguing for a single European 
Union foreign policy and pursuing a German seat unilaterally. On the one hand the aim 
for a European seat is repeatedly stated in German government coalition agreements, 
suggesting the use of a logic of ‘European’ appropriateness of action; on the other hand, 
Berlin sustains its claim for a German seat on the basis of Germany being the second 
largest country to send troops abroad after the US, and the third largest contributor to 
the UN’s budget, arguing then according to a logic of consequentiality. In UN politics 
German policy-makers have been using the second policy lane (German interests and 
role as a key player in global politics) while discarding the first one (Germany as a 
Europeanized state with multilateral interests towards CFSP). Stating, as the German 
UN Ambassador Gunter Pleuger did in 2002, that with a permanent German seat Berlin 
would ‘be as much European as possible in its SC membership (...) and coordinate 
everything that we do, plan and present with our [European] partners’ (Pleuger 2002) 
was a shallow promise, because in case of serious disagreement there would be no 
means of preventing Germany from following its own interests, and the UK and France 
from doing exactly the same.
It was also a paradox that at a time when countries were slowly empowering the 
EU with effective CFSP instruments, and adopting the first European Security Strategy 
in December 2003, Germany was raising its voice to obtain a national seat in the 
Security Council. Ultimately, German policy does not promote European foreign policy 
at the level of UN politics since it intrinsically discredits possibilities for a European 
seat, and the EU’s image as a global foreign policy actor. As one observer noted, ‘by 
campaigning for its own accession, Germany has demoted to insignificance any serious 
prospect for the European Union’s long-held hope of representation on a Security 
Council made over to reflect the geopolitics of the new century’ (Vinocur 2004).
Finally, Germany’s insistence on its own seat affects the inner cohesion of the
309 http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/articleslist_s30_en.htm
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EU itself since states like Italy, Spain and Sweden criticize Germany’s claim, and view 
Berlin’s goal as incompatible with a CFSP, a view shared by the European Commission 
and the European Parliament. Javier Solana, the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner 
for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, have both argued for a 
common seat for the European Union. The dilemma for German foreign policy may 
grow stronger as Germany’s continuous refusal to participate in combat missions in 
southern Afghanistan with other NATO partners only highlights the contradictions of its 
wish to become a power with global responsibility.
While from 1997 to 2007 there was much rhetoric in favour o f a common 
European seat, Germany did not pursue it. If Germany were serious about elevating the 
EU as a credible international actor in international relations with a coherent approach 
in foreign policy, it had significant credibility within the EU to present a policy 
initiative instead of pursuing its own individualist goal. This would have raised the 
support of many EU countries, with the exception of Britain and France and Berlin’s 
profile within the EU and contributed to a stronger Europeanization. Furthermore, 
considering that Italy had been a staunch supporter of a European seat and had 
repeatedly campaigned for one in the UN Germany and Italy could have launched a 
joint initiative within the EU. Thus it was a considerable difference between not 
pursuing a strategy for a European seat at all, and retreating into a national strategy 
aiming for a German seat. This reveals a unilateralist policy, which goes against its 
foreign policy tradition of institutionalised multilateralism, and suggests a path more 
inclined towards power politics and a realist reading of German diplomacy. It was thus 
hardly convincing that Gerhard Henze, German Ambassador to the UN in 1997, tried to 
downplay the significance of the veto right for Germany by saying that he could ‘not imagine 
a situation in which there would be the necessity for Germany to use the veto power, at least
A
not on [its] own.’ Certainly the will to make use of the veto right is decisive, but the legal 
possession of such a right in itself is already a powerful policy mechanism.
In fairness to Germany’s position it must be said that there are several obstacles 
to the EU becoming a serious contender for a permanent seat and which help explain 
why there has been no joint proposal for a UNSC reform. First, there are the obvious 
complexities of the EU acting as a global foreign policy actor. To have an effective 
international voice, a European seat would presuppose a convergent if not common
310 Quoted in Andreas Zumach, ‘Reform or collapse: Is there a future for the UN in a unipolar world 
order?’, 29 June 1997, http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/radiorep.htm
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position on issues of international peace and security and a consensual voting position. 
That a common EU seat in the Security Council remains highly implausible derives first 
and foremost from the lack of political will on the part of the EU member states.
Secondly, France and Britain are unwilling to relinquish their national seats. 
They enjoy a status as nuclear powers making it highly unlikely that they would hand 
over national control of their nuclear weapons to a European command, in which they 
would not retain some sort of veto power. Since a UN Charter amendment needs the 
vote of all permanent members, it was always possible for France and Britain to veto 
any decision they considered harmful to their interests as permanent SC members.
Finally, there is the technical-legal obstacle in that the UN Charter does not 
allow for an international organization becoming a UN member.311 That is why in the 
foreseeable future, a European seat seems unlikely. This suggests that German 
governments conveniently hid behind the formula o f a European seat in order to buffer 
their own claim for an increase in status and power, well aware of the obvious 
improbability of such a seat. It is thus no surprise that the contradictions inherent to a 
common European seat are noted by outside observers such as Kishore Mahbubani who 
recently argued that the SC lacks legitimacy considering that the U.S., Britain and 
France, three Western states with just 15% of the world population retain 60% of the 
voting rights within the SC (Mahbubani 2007:55).
This shows that despite the degree of Europeanization of German politics in the 
Euro-Atlantic area shown in chapter 5, at the level of global politics German 
governments opt to assert German as opposed to purely European interests.
Still, the recently signed Reform Treaty of the EU has tried to further a more 
coherent European approach towards future SC votes. The Treaty o f Lisbon has 
reformed article 19 of the TEU whose approach had not been far-reaching enough 
because of British and French reluctance to see other EU members constrain their status 
as permanent SC members.312 The added paragraph to article 19 states that ‘[w]hen the 
Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security 
Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request 
that the High Representative be asked to present the Union’s position.’313 If Germany
311 This notwithstanding, the EU has a presence at the United Nations. It is represented by the European 
Commission, which has permanent observer status at the General Assembly. http://www.europa-eu- 
un.org/articles/articleslist_s30_en.htm
312 ‘Member States which are also members o f  the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep 
the other Member States folly informed. Member States which are permanent members o f  the Security 
Council will, in the execution o f their functions, ensure the defence o f  the positions and the interests o f  
the union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions o f the United Nations Charter.’
313 ‘Treaty o f Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
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remains as Europeanist in the European foreign policy as it proclaims, it now stands a 
better chance to upload a European position into the Security Council.
7.5. The German quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat: transatlantic 
and European reactions
7.5.1. The position of the United States
After German unification, the United States was the first of the Security Council’s 
permanent members to support Germany’s bid for a permanent seat. According to 
Gunter Pleuger, Germany’s Ambassador at the UN from 2001 to 2006 it was the US 
under president George Bush Senior, not Germany, which first put forward the idea that 
Germany should become a permanent SC member in the early 1990s (Pleuger 2002 and 
2006).314 This goes in line with the overall bilateral approach of US of the Bush 
administration for a leadership role for Germany. The Clinton administration also 
supported Germany’s quest for a permanent seat (Gordon 1994:239). In 1993, the 
American Ambassador in Germany, Richard Holbrooke, said the U.S not only 
supported a greater world role for Germany, but also wanted it to join the Security 
Council as a permanent member.315
For the United States, the inclusion of Germany and also of Japan was a sine qua 
non for the enlargement of the SC’s permanent membership not least because of the financial 
input that both were expected to produce as permanent members. However, this did 
not mean that the United States accepted a change in the existing veto right. As Cameron 
Hume, US minister for political affairs, stated in 1996, a change in the veto right was ‘not a 
matter [the United States was] prepared to submit to negotiation or vote in a general 
conference or other venue.'317 Because the veto right was considered sacrosanct, successive 
American administrations refused to address the issue of granting it to new members.
In April 2000 the United States agreed to a larger membership than the twenty- 
one seats it had previously advocated. The US maintained that Germany and Japan
Community’ (13 December 2007), 40. http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf
314 Moscow also considered a new role for Germany. On 16 September 1990 Nikolai Portugalow, foreign 
policy adviser o f  Soviet leader Gorbachev, put forward a proposal suggesting that Germany should 
become the sixth permanent member o f the UNSC. Deutsche Aussenpolitik 1990/91. A uf dem Weg zu 
einer europaischen Friedensordmmg. Bonn: Auswartiges Amt, 1991, p. 39.
3,5 ‘US-Botschafter begrusst neue Rolle Deutschlands’, Die Welt, 9 December 1993, p. 2.
316 GA A/51/PV.46. See press release GA/9147 (30 October 1996) http://www.un.org/search/ (accessed 11 May 
2002).
317 Statement by Cameron R. Hume, US minister counselor for political affairs on 23 May 1996 to the open-ended 
working-group.
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should be given permanent Council seats and also backed seats for nations from Africa, 
Asia and Latin America.318 No progress was made on the American position regarding 
the veto right.
In the wake of the transatlantic disagreement over the handling of the war in Iraq 
in 2002-2003, President George W. Bush stopped endorsing Germany’s accession, 
while continuing to favour Japan’s entrance. During the crisis both the American and 
the German-French sides tried to manipulate the Security Council to develop a blocking 
force against each other. The countries which had prevented a second resolution 
authorizing the use of force in Iraq, in February 2003, Germany, France, Russia and 
China, valued the Security Council as a blocking instrument against Washington 
forming a tentative diplomatic alliance (Schwarz 2003:23). But it was naive for the Red- 
Green government to believe that Germany could try to turn the United Nations into a 
counterforce to the US without expecting US reprisals. Washington’s withdrawal of its 
hitherto support was a reaction to Germany’s lack of support for US policies in Iraq but 
also indicated the wider US approach towards European politics in an attempt to isolate 
Germany and France in their bilateral opposition to the war.
In the debate on the reform of the Security Council in July 2005 the United 
States rejected the proposal of the G4 for SC enlargement and any veto rights for new
11 A
members. This was a setback for Germany. Russia, which in 2003 had backed all four 
countries, China, Italy, Pakistan and Mexico opposed the G4 proposal. The German 
newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung noted the irony of the Bush administration’s 
siding with Beijing’s leadership in their joint opposition to including Germany and 
Japan in the Security Council as permanent members.321 This was a change in China’s 
position, since in December 2004 during a visit of Chancellor Schroder to Beijing the 
Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao had explicitly supported Berlin’s quest. China’s 
changing position is best explained by the deteriorating diplomatic relations between 
Beijing and Tokyo during the summer of 2005 due to Japan’s intransigence in
318 Reuters, 27 June 2000. Global Policy Forum.
319 Frankfurter A llgemeine Zeitung, 16 May 2005.
320 In 2003 the Russian Ambassador to the United Nation Sergej Lavrov had given Russia’s support: ‘the 
Russian Federation believes that Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, as well as a State representing Africa, 
would be worthy candidates for any additional permanent seats as might be created in the Security 
Council.’ On the question o f attributing the veto right to new permanent members Lavrov said that ‘it 
would be wise to leave any such consideration until after agreement has been reached on the specific 
membership o f an expanded Security Council.’ S. Lavrov (2003). Speech before the 58,h General 
Assembly o f the United Nations, 30th plenary meeting, 14 October, p. 21. UN Document A/58/PV.30.
321 ‘China sperrt sich gegen Erweiterung des Sicherheitsrats’, FAZ, 3 June 2005.
http://www.faz.net/s7RubDDBD ABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc~EB6754E8979D44703A09 
442BDA2487DBE~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html
322 ‘Schroder und Wen fiir Ende des EU-Waffenembargos’, FAZ, 6 December 2004.
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recognizing its aggressive role towards China in the Second World War.
On 10 November 2005 the US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton stated that 
the US would not support the attempts of Germany, Brazil and India to enlarge the 
Security Council. This was addressed to the new German coalition government and 
signalled that Merkel and Steinmeier would have to make an effort to regain American 
support.
7.5.2. The position of France
France has been supportive of Germany joining a restructured Security Council as a 
permanent member, albeit evading the question of whether a veto right should be part of 
that restructuring. At the German-French summit in Nuremberg in December 1996, 
Chancellor Kohl and French president Jacques Chirac adopted the ‘common strategic 
concept’ regarding a common defence policy. According to Alistair Cole, as a quid pro 
quo for Germany’s acceptance of the French objectives, France indicated that it would 
support Germany’s claim for a permanent seat (Cole 2001:120). In June 2000 
recognising Germany’s successful participation in the NATO-led Kosovo intervention 
and willingness to play a decisive international role Chirac stated that France favoured a 
permanent seat on the Security Council. ‘Germany's engagement’, he said before the 
Bundestag, ‘its ranking as a great power, its international influence - France would like 
to see this recognised with a permanent seat on the Security Council’.323 But again, 
whether the veto right should be given to Germany was not tackled. During the 
transatlantic divide Chirac kept his support for a German seat. Before the GA in 
September 2003, Chirac reiterated France’s support for Germany and Japan to become 
permanent SC members.324
France kept its support during the 2005 election campaign.325 With the new 
German coalition government in November 2005 France continued to express its 
support, with Chirac and also with the new French president Nicolas Sarkozy after May 
2007. In reality, in light of the ever more distant possibility of true UN Security Council 
reform, and the hypothesis of a German permanent Security Council seat France is in no 
need of changing its position and can use this pro-Berlin stance to barter on another 
diplomatic matter, knowing that any amendment of the Charter and a reform of the SC 
composition depends on the votes (and vetoes) of the present permanent members.
323 Jacques Chirac before the German Bundestag, 27 June 2000.
324 Jacques Chirac before the 58th General Assembly o f the United Nations, 30th plenary meeting, 23 
September, p. 16. UN Document A/58/PV.7.
325 ‘Standiger deutscher Sitz liegt in weiter Feme’, Andreas Rinke, Handelsblatt, 14 September 2005.
214
7.53. The case of Italy’s continuous opposition
As early as September 1990, Italy’s foreign minister De Michaelis, proposed that the 
EC should become a UN and a SC member. Italy wanted to prevent unifying Germany 
from becoming a permanent member, which would risk a demotion of its own 
international standing to a secondary ranking. Thus Italy was in the forefront of making 
proposals for the reform of the SC and has taken an active stance against the creation of 
new permanent seats. 326 Paolo Fulci, the Italian Ambassador to the UN opposed 
Germany’s quest very effectively. When the Razali proposal for an increase o f nine 
members, was voted in December 1997, it was rejected by Italy, because of its 
opposition to Germany’s bid. Italy’s foreign minister Lamberto Dini asserted that 
permanent seats were not 4up for sale’, and there could be no link between member 
states’ contributions and the granting of a permanent seat (Drifte 2000:167). While it 
was not eager to reform the composition of the Security Council, Italy supported a limited 
increase of non-permanent members only, and a seat for the European Union. This proposal 
appealed to developing countries, which would be the main candidates for non-permanent 
membership, but was rejected by France and Britain, which would lose their veto rights. 
Overall, however, Italy’s active stance in the Working Group on SC reform, most 
visibly through Ambassador Paolo Fulci, should be understood as a continuous attempt 
to avoid a change of Germany’s status. This concern over status had, of course, to do 
with Italy’s own status. A permanent seat would have meant a relative loss for Italy’s 
own diminished rank internationally. The problem was that There is always someone 
coming next’, argued foreign minister Fischer, and Italy’s objection was due to it 
considering itself closest to a permanent seat after Germany (Fischer 2004). Ultimately, 
within the European Union it would have upgraded Germany to become one of the big 
three inner group of the CFSP worldwide and on the European stage, thus reinforcing 
the notion of the directoire without Italy, as had happened with the Contact Group in the 
Balkans in the mid-1990s.
In 2003 the Italian Ambassador to the UN, Marcello Spatafora, was clear in his 
criticism. He argued that Italy believed that The creation of new permanent seats would 
(...) create new centres of privilege. This would go against the tide of history [of] an 
ongoing process of democratization in the handling and the management of
326 For example, Britain and France should be replaced by an EC seat and Japan, thus solving the problem 
of over representation by countries of the Western world. The Economist, 29 August 1992.
327 Ambassador Paolo Fulci on Equitable Representation and Increase in the membership o f the SC, 20
May 1996. http://www.globalpolicy.org/securitv/docs/italv5.htm
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international relations through multilateral institutions (...) New permanent members 
endowed with veto power would undoubtedly make it more difficult for the Council to 
swiftly define and implement collective actions, impairing the effectiveness of the 
Council’s decision-making process and increasing the risk of inaction.’ Spatafora 
continued: ‘the proposal aired by some to add new permanent members without the 
right to veto also entails serious drawbacks and would not increase the cohesion of 
United Nations membership. It would create further division in the Council membership 
and establish a new layer of hierarchy that would be detrimental to the United Nations. 
Do we really want to have a first-class membership, a second-class membership and a 
third-class membership?’ The Italian representative concluded that ‘the only realistic 
formula would be a limited increase in the number of non-permanent members’ 
(Spatafora 2003:18).
On 26 July 2005 Italy again criticized the G4’s behaviour. In Spatafora’s blunt 
words it was unethical for the G4 to resort to ‘financial leverage and to financial 
pressures in order to induce a government to align, or not to align, itself with a certain 
position, or to cosponsor or vote in favour of a certain draft.’328 Together with eleven 
other states Italy made a counter proposal which foresaw an increase of ten new states, 
all of which should become non-permanent members thus rejecting any additional 
permanent members.
More than fifteen years after discussions on Security Council reform began the 
difficulties in getting agreement between 192 member states and the acceptance of 
reform by the current permanent SC members make the prospect for UNSC reform in 
the near future remain bleak. So it is likely, as Paul Kennedy suggests, that ‘the U.N. 
will limp along, caught between the ambitiousness of its original design and the blunt 
fact that the world order remains one in which egotistical great powers still play a 
disproportionate role, especially in protecting their own interests (Kennedy 2006).
Part of what makes a permanent seat so appealing is that prestige comes with 
little responsibility. As one observer noted regarding SC reform
‘The one great mistake (...) made in 1945 was to give away the privilege of 
the veto power without attaching any responsibilities to that privilege. 
Consequently, we face a very strange situation today. When there is a crisis 
in the world and one turns to the major Powers and the middle Powers to ask 
them to help resolve it, they tend to run away; very few of them will 
volunteer to help to resolve it. On the other hand, when one says that there
328 Statement by Italian Ambassador Marcello Spatafora at the 59th Session of the General Assembly, 26 
July 2005. http://www.globalpolicv.org/security/reform/statements/2005/0726italv.htm
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are permanent seats available on the Security Council - which gives one 
primary responsibility for handling threats to international peace and 
security - there are many volunteers. The reason why there are many 
volunteers for permanent membership is that there are no responsibilities 
attached to permanent membership’ (Mahbubani 2003:20-21).
7.6. Conclusion: The pursuit of a permanent SC seat and Germany’s transformed 
multilateralism
Germany’s quest for permanent membership still lacks embeddedness in a wider global 
foreign policy strategy. Such a strategy, if it is to be coherent with a permanent SC seat 
cries out for a political concept of global leadership and a clear perception of world 
order. Instead, German policy-makers have developed their arguments around the size 
of Germany’s material and financial contributions and linked them to the question of the 
effectiveness of the Security Council. Whereas Germany has at times revealed a 
strategy for European leadership, it lacks the necessary global strategy for its foreign 
policy to assert any kind of moral global leadership it seems to aspire to. As a result, 
Germany’s diplomacy is still shaped by an Europeanised and transatlanticsed identity, 
whereas the sources of a more global identity emerged in the domestic political 
discourse only recently. It lacks the necessary linkage concept between its European 
role and its ambitioned global role, and this lacuna only weakens its legitimacy and 
credibility as a power with European leadership potential, let alone with global 
pretensions. But the Schroder government was unable to provide Germany with the 
necessary global strategy to ensure that German foreign policy remained credible and 
effective. As Volker Ruhe, CDU member and previous defense minister noted ‘should 
Germany obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council it would have to adopt a 
fundamental position on every conflict in the world and could not be as selective as 
before’ (Lohse 2005).
Germany’s quest for a permanent SC seat has revealed an intricate dialectic of 
two contrasting foreign policy narratives. Schroder’s more assertive policies on the 
global stage were the antithesis of Kohl’s more voluntarily constrained policies on the 
European arena. By doing so Schroder, more than Fischer, moved away from the 
‘aversion to power politics and active diplomacy’ (Wallace 2007:8) which characterised 
Germany’s behaviour during the Cold War, since the permanent UNSC membership 
and the veto right that goes along with it are (still) considered one of the few 
prerogatives of power politics.
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This led to ambiguities in Germany’s foreign policy identity, based on a loose 
set of foreign policy principles and goals which were sometimes hard to combine. While 
Kohl clung on to continuity in the face of inevitable change, Schroder often induced it 
in an unusually assertive manner. All of Schroder’s foreign policy discourse about 
German self-confidence (Selbstbewusstsein) gave Germany a false sense of security in 
that the normality which he claimed Germany had already achieved was artificial, 
leading him to make decisions on the basis of the expected consequences rather than on 
their appropriateness. Kohl was eager to maintain the self-contained behaviour and 
loosen constraints only through gradual Europeanization and in coherence with 
Germany’s partners. This led him to misjudge the changing international context and 
the expectations of its neighbours for Germany to play a more assertive international 
role. Schroder, by contrast, was conditioned by the thought of releasing Germany from 
its constraints that he often went ahead unilaterally, failing to take partners’ doubts and 
anxieties sufficiently into account. These contrasting positions have allowed Chancellor 
Merkel to follow a more balanced approach even though her government has not 
relinquished the demand for a German seat. But its pursuit has been less pressing and it 
can be argued that the Chancellor herself has not defined this as a priority between 2005 
and 2007.
On the question of how this change has affected the logics for political action, 
the appropriateness of the mles that Germany follows has evolved from 1997 to 2007. 
Schroder has coded the foreign policy experiences of the previous government into a 
new set of rules. As March and Olsen have argued, ‘appropriate rules, in both technical 
and normative terms, are assumed to evolve over time as new experiences are 
interpreted and coded into rules, or less attractive alternatives are eliminated through 
competition’ (March and Olsen 2004:12). The German Chancellor deliberately initiated 
a new public discourse and a process of change in Germany’s foreign policy identity, 
presenting the norm of international parity as legitimate to claim a permanent Security 
Council seat. Schroder believed it appropriate for Germany to act on the world stage 
with the ‘self-confidence of a grown-up nation which does not have to feel inferior to 
anyone and which looks ahead despite its preparedness to ‘confront its history and its 
responsibility’ (Schroder 1998). The result of this Schroderian formula was an ongoing 
learning process aimed at achieving international parity and peer power category.
However, developing a new discursive narrative to support the aim of 
international parity was not the same as having achieved a new position of power in real 
terms. Germany was far from becoming the global power in material terms. Its
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economic situation in 2004/2005 indicated that it lacked the necessary resources to 
sustain the global role it was claiming, risking over-stretch between ambitions and real 
capabilities. An expectations-capabilities gap (Hill 1998) opened between the claim for 
greater international responsibility and an effective willingness, linked to means, for 
proportional action. This had to do with Germany’s dire domestic economic situation, 
the corresponding dismal national mood and a slowing down of the trend for Germany’s 
military participations.
The case of a permanent German UNSC seat shows how Schroder’s deliberate 
attempt to change German foreign policy identity was projected into the international 
dimension of German foreign policy in what was the pursuit of German interests on the 
second policy lane as an individual policy actor. The old Genscherian dichotomy 
between Machtpolitik (power politics) and Verantwortungspolitik (politics of 
responsibility) had been blurred. While during the Kohl government, Kinkel’s pursuit of 
a permanent seat stood out against Kohl’s wider foreign policy design, and seemed the 
exception to a multilateral European and transatlantic foreign policy, with the Schroder 
government this blurring occurred consciously. The simultaneous use of these concepts 
revealed the ambiguities among alternative concepts (March and Olsen 2004) of 
German identity. Chancellor Schroder chose to evoke international parity as a new norm 
for German foreign policy. This change was largely unopposed, showing that the terrain 
was ripe for Germany to look for new parameters for action. The Schroder/Fischer 
government was successful in making this new norm socially acceptable in domestic 
politics, and the pursuit for a seat was supported by the broader German spectrum. It 
revealed that for policy-makers the question of power status had become as valid for 
Germany as it was for France and Britain (Frankenberger and Nonnenmacher 2004). 
This in part also explains why the Merkel government, even if  it has handled the issue 
thus far less enthusiastically, has not set it aside restating the claim for a German seat in 
the 2005 coalition government treaty and why the Chancellor herself, despite following 
a different foreign policy approach has supported it.
More significantly, Germany’s normative power was weakened. Berlin, together 
with Paris (and looking towards Moscow) challenged America’s preponderance in 
shaping international order. In this as in other policy domains like Berlin’s bilateral 
relations with Paris and Washington and its European policy the Schroder government 
raised the stakes too high, was too loud in putting its demands forward -  acting more 
like the elephant in a china shop than Kohl had ever done -  and got too little in return. 
In the end, therefore, after eight years of Red-Green foreign policy the insistent pursuit
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for a national seat had weakened Germany’s normative power and sat uneasily with the 
country’s traditional logic of appropriateness as a foreign policy guideline.
More recently, Germany’s domestic debate on the nature of the Bundeswehr’s 
mission in Afghanistan with repeated hints by members of the grand coalition 
government that Germany is not prepared to fight combat missions in southern 
Afghanistan is revealing of how difficult all political parties find it to engage the 
Bundeswehr in offensive military operations at the same time as maintaining broad 
public support for them. This reluctance would not sit well with the status of permanent 
membership whose main purpose is to act responsibly according to a power with global 
commitments. A global power does not have the ‘pick and choose’ options for peace 
operations which Germany currently still enjoys. This dilemma also highlights the 
practical difficulties in projecting a civilian-normative power conception into the realm 
of international politics and the limits on Germany’s ability to introduce a new power 
conception among great powers and international institutions.
At the same time, however, Germany had raised its voice and demanded to be 
part of a more exclusive group of states acting in international politics. Albeit having 
been unsuccessful in the bid, and despite the untraditional foreign policy style that 
Schroder pursued, Berlin’s increased logic of consequentially did bear some fruit. 
Berlin has unofficially become part of the P5+1 group dealing with Iran. The cases of 
the Iran nuclear crisis and the war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 have shown that 
Germany has become the sixth power at the negotiating table even if  it lacks a veto 
power. Without UN reform, Germany has been unofficially promoted to a higher power 
status. The Merkel government has managed to locate Germany on a higher 
international standing and perhaps this would not have happened without the Schroder 
governments’ at times unilateral insistence. In its striving to join other powers 
Germany’s participation in groups like the P5+1 will increasingly constrain its room for 
maneuvering normative power in international diplomacy. This reinforces the initial 
argument of the chapter that Germany’s United Nations diplomacy is increasingly 
moving towards a more pragmatic multilateralism, only occasionally turning back to its 
normative power.
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CHAPTER 8: Germany’s foreign policy identity and European order
‘Some say foreign policy is essentially about the defence o f  your 
material and security interests around the world. Others say that, to 
explain how countries behave, you just need to look at their place within 
the structure o f  the international system. There is truth in both points.
First, we do have European interests to defend. Other countries defend 
theirs as well, so there is no need to be apologetic about this. And 
second, given the distribution o f power in the world today, Europeans 
can only make an impact i f  they work together. But this is not the whole 
story. These 'realist' and 'structuralist' accounts miss out one crucial 
factor. And that is the impact o f identity on foreign policy. For what you 
do on the international stage is surely also a function o f  your identity -  
o f how you define yourself and the values you seek to promote 
abroad. ’ 29
8.1. Germany’s changed foreign policy identity: the enlargement of the faces of 
German power
Germany’s second unification was not brought about by Realpolitik. The first one, in 
1871, was based on calculations of power and the national interest and achieved through 
war and change (Kissinger 1994:137). In contrast, in 1990, Germany had a considerable 
amount of normative power. This was the opposite of classical power politics in that 
Europe’s new security system was ‘able to incorporate large and potentially powerful 
states. The peaceful reunification of Germany is in itself a proof that the system has 
changed’ (Cooper 2003:32). In the last eighteen years Germany has changed its foreign 
policy significantly, and normative power has facilitated Germany’s changing 
international identity and its new standing in international politics as one of the main 
powers. This shows that a country’s rise in power need not rely exclusively on a power 
politics approach.
This thesis has argued that Germany’s international identity has been 
characterised by normative power, a different and less onerous but effective sort of 
power within the Euro-Atlantic constitutional order. This, in turn, has decisively shaped 
Germany’s foreign policy. Because normative power is seen as legitimate by others, it 
will remain a substantial resource for Germany. But the role of power has been enlarged 
by more utilitarian elements of multilateralism and the odd recourse to unilateralism,
329 Javier Solana, ESDP Newsletter, January 2007, Solana speech at IISS, December 2006.
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with foreign policy increasingly being driven by a logic of consequentialism. The 
gradual transformation of the nature of German power, combining the normative with 
such traditional attributes as ‘deliberate’ power, according to Bulmer’s typology, shows 
that the two forms of power are not mutually exclusive, and have both accompanied 
Germany’s changing position in international politics. As a consequence, on some 
occasions, foreign policy decisions reflected instances where normative power was the 
primary reason for action. On other occasions, new motivations led German policy­
makers to behave differently. In other words, the path towards Germany asserting itself 
as a European power was substantially facilitated by keeping normative and more 
deliberate power closely intertwined.
This concluding chapter summarizes the empirical findings of the thesis as a 
whole and emphasises the implications of Germany’s normative power for the existing 
European order.
First, as chapter 3 has shown, the sources of German conduct and its changing 
foreign policy identity derived mostly from domestically induced changes by policy­
makers and from a new foreign policy discourse, particularly between the years 1998 
and 2005. The Schroder government practised a more utilitarian multilateralism 
supported by a new foreign policy identity, so as to enhance Germany’s international 
status through parity with other powers. This has produced a less normative foreign 
policy, with conflicting norms explaining the end of the old German foreign policy 
consensus.
Secondly, while Germany’s security policy has adapted to major changes in the 
realm of international security it has done so by keeping, to a large extent, to the logic 
of appropriateness in the conduct of international military operations, as examined in 
chapter 4. Still, participation in peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and post-conflict 
reconstruction missions was also politically instrumental, in that the Schroder 
government expected international recognition and claimed political returns on its new 
security commitments.
Third, Germany’s foreign policy identity as a multilateralist and Europeanized 
actor mitigated the burden of expectations and reduced the unpredictability that comes 
at times of major power shifts. Germany’s European policy showed the increasing use 
of a more deliberate articulation of interests when it began to conceptualise integration 
much more from the point of view of Berlin rather than of Brussels. Germany is 
increasingly combining its Europeanism with a more clustered approach, using 
multilateral groupings which unite for a specific foreign policy purpose, such as the EU-
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3+1 approach regarding Iran.
Fourthly, in Germany’s bilateral relationships with France and the United States, 
examined in chapter 6, Berlin attempted to increase the margin of manoeuvrability of its 
diplomacy, challenging some of its traditional parameters. The double bilateral 
dissonances undermined NATO’s and the EU’s internal cohesion and was in part the 
result of Germany’s new assertiveness. Because the United States stands with one foot 
in the ‘liberal world’ and with the other in the ‘realist world’, it was inevitable that a 
more assertive Germany would at one point clash with Washington. The renegotiation 
of status with France also led to temporary intra-European disagreements with Paris, 
albeit that Berlin emerged, in the long run, as the more powerful player in the bilateral 
relationship.
Finally, Berlin has been assertive in its pursuit of a permanent UNSC seat, not 
shying away from the manifest exposure of a more forceful articulation of its interests. 
With regard to the UN’s reform and the composition of the UN Security Council Berlin 
pursued a logic of consequentialism through a strong emancipatory impulse, claiming 
Germany’s right to sit at the top table as an independent player.
The context was propitious for change due to the combination of a critical 
juncture for change, of policy-makers willing to forge change in institutional 
memberships and renegotiate Germany’s power status. This change did not reflect a 
return to traditional power politics, but the adaptation of a pattern of foreign policy 
which increasingly combined the logic o f appropriateness with a logic of expected 
consequences. Thus from 1997 to 2007 Germany’s commitment to the principles of an 
international constitutional order, to European integration and to the transatlantic 
community oscillated between normative and deliberate power, and between normative 
allegiance, an emancipatory impulse and a pragmatic reorientation.
8.2. The policy of de-linkage
The remaking of Germany’s foreign policy identity was intimately linked to Chancellor 
Schroder’s dissatisfaction with the post-1990 status quo Germany was locked into, and 
his determination to rearrange the basic coordinates o f foreign policy. This partly 
reflected the unprecedented emotional disentanglement between Europe and the U.S. 
during the 1990s. Germany was no longer strategically or emotionally dependent on the 
United States. Step by step Schroder tried to de-link Germany’s carefully-knit web of a 
multilayered foreign policy so as to achieve power parity within the Euro-Atlantic area.
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In so doing, Germany has come of age and lost its normative innocence.
First, the Schroder government loosened the traditionally close German-French 
relationship. Germany’s attempt at a new leadership role in Europe was done at the 
expense of the Franco-German relationship. Secondly, Schroder set about disentangling 
Germany from what he perceived to be its subservience to the United States. But in the 
summer of 2002, when Germany began to contest Washington’s plans for Iraq, 
Schroder began to back-pedal. He found it impossible for Berlin to pursue open 
disagreements simultaneously with Washington and Paris, over different issues and in 
the acknowledgment that Germany alone did not have the diplomatic weight to oppose 
Washington. It thus fostered a joint Franco-German approach, proposing a multipolar 
international order instead of the perceived American unipolarity. This was, of course, 
close to France’s own traditional foreign policy. Yet however much the German-French 
position tried to assert its anti-hegemonic position with regard to Washington, the fact that 
CEE countries shortly afterwards joined the EU and simultaneously sided with 
Washington not only revealed the fragility of the German-French position, but also the 
continuous influence the United States has on Europe.
Thirdly, while shaking up the contours of its two most important bilateral 
relationships, the government did not maintain the intensity of the European 
integrationist policy of previous governments, and voiced its opposition to Berlin’s 
continuous role as a net contributor to the EU’s finances, seeking a redistribution of 
power to the national level. Fourthly, the Chancellor attempted to forge a closer bilateral 
relationship with Russia, engaging in symbolic acts of rapprochement which annoyed 
several European partners, apart from not helping to forge a European common 
approach to Moscow. The government’s willingness to advocate lifting the EU arms 
embargo against China, together with France, also stood in stark contrast to a more 
normative foreign policy.
Finally, Germany underwent its worst economic recession, certainly a 
consequence of the high burdens of unification, but which stood in contrast with the will 
towards a more assertive foreign policy, since the latter required the necessary means to 
empower its new ambitions. Shrinking foreign policy resources raised the gap between 
the lack of financial and human resources at the Foreign Ministry and the increased 
expectations towards a new foreign policy role. Germany’s foreign policy ministries, 
viz. the Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Development have 
seen resources decrease sharply from 21.5 percent of the federal budget in 1990 to 12 
percent in 2006. (Kamp and Masala 2006). In addition, Germany had ‘a very limited
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potential in terms of foreign policy expertise. The Bundestag, the Auswartige Amt and 
the think tanks all lack a sufficient number of experts.330 In other words, the 
transformation of Germany’s normative power into a more consequentialist player only 
made sense if  it had a high international approval rate, i.e. if  it had the necessary allies, 
and if it had the economic and financial means to deploy. As it happened, Germany had 
little of the former, and even less of the latter.
Thus the remaking of identity was more successful in dismantling the old 
parameters of that identity than in forging a new one. Such a significant attempt to 
redefine German identity, however, presupposed a strategic vision in which to embed 
such major changes. While Chancellor Schroder began by opening political construction 
sites regarding the bilateral relationships with France and the U.S., European and 
transatlantic politics, a German permanent UNSC seat, and by rebuilding new 
relationships with Russia and China, these initiatives lacked an overall linkage strategy 
which would have presented a new and coherent foreign policy identity. This rendered 
German foreign policy less predictable between 1998 and 2005, and helped to make 
established institutions and alliances less robust. As a result, the transformation of 
German foreign policy shows that while some successes can be ascribed to Schroder’s 
dismantling of the Kohlean approach to foreign policy, no alternative coherent foreign 
policy identity developed. Germany’s normative power decreased and foreign policy 
lacked a strategic vision supported by a foreign policy concept (aussenpolitisches 
Konzept). This is particularly important in a country where ideas matter, and 
pragmatism is not enough.
Notwithstanding that the critical juncture for German foreign policy was mainly 
domestically induced, the enlargement of the faces of German power, to reinforce the 
deliberate power associated with a logic of consequentialism, was accelerated by the 
structural changes in the Euro-Atlantic area which coincided with the international 
upheaval after the attacks of September 11, 2001. To handle these strategic international 
changes the Schroder government, no less than any other German government, lacked 
the institutional propensity towards thinking in terms of world order. The ‘geographical 
order most politicians thought about was the triad of Europe, the transatlantic area, and 
Russia’, as Christoph Betram suggests.
While Berlin felt it had achieved a new status as one of the leading powers in 
European politics by the turn of the century, the transatlantic crisis shortly afterwards
330 Conversation with a German diplomat.
331 Conversation with the author, Lisbon, October 2005.
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revealed the limits of Germany’s new assertiveness and the absence of any real 
receptivity among other European countries towards German leadership -  especially if 
this was at the expense of a cooperative multilateral transatlanticism. Berlin’s unilateral 
stance in 2002 was therefore also a reflection of Germany’s emotional detachment not 
only from the U.S. - in terms of greater autonomy - but also from its traditional 
institutionalist instincts in European integration. Thus what started out as a transatlantic 
crisis became also a European one, for Germany’s automatic commitment towards 
strengthening the EU institutions could no longer be taken for granted.
8.3. What kind of international player?
It was no coincidence that the unprecedented 2003 transatlantic crisis was followed so 
shortly afterwards by the 2005 European constitutional crisis. The latter was, in part, a 
reflection of the former, in which Germany had played a key part. The constitutional crisis 
was also a sign that Germany, together with France, was unable to convince the EU, 
and the French and Dutch people in particular, that Germany and France could be the 
natural leaders of an enlarging Europe which could become an international actor in its 
own right and with its own legitimacy (and without the need to achieve a false 
legitimacy simply from opposing the U.S.).
While in 2005 most commentators argued that the transatlantic crisis had been 
overcome, it was uncertain that the Euro-Atlantic community and its transatlantic Western 
liberal order had recovered. While this showed that the European project continued to be 
closely tied to the Atlantic Alliance community, it also indicated that the two might 
become increasingly incompatible. It is perhaps historically unfortunate for Europe that at 
a time when Europe is trying to initiate an assertive international actomess, and project the 
normative elements of its CFSP and ESDP beyond its boundaries, the U.S. is also pursuing 
a more pro-active policy of democratization, in order to enlarge its zone of peace. In 
strategic terms both the NSS of 2002 and the ESS of 2003 point in the direction of 
America’s and Europe’s greater international assertiveness. In this, neither Europe nor the 
United States are any longer status quo powers. The projection of their ideals, and the will 
to see them implemented, has transformed the Euro-Atlantic space into a revisionist locus 
of international politics. This is more likely to produce occasional disagreements than a 
common Euro-Atlantic approach. The lessons learnt from the transatlantic and European 
crises is that Germany’s emergence towards becoming a more assertive player 
internationally cannot be achieved at the expense of its traditional European and
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transatlantic pillars - for intra Euro-Atlantic reasons, as we have seen, but also because, 
in the wider normative struggle which can be envisaged for a new international order, 
attempts to revise this order by emerging powers such as India and China, will help 
Germany realise that the core of its own normative power still resides firmly within the 
West.
If ‘the power to define norms may be as important in the [XXIst] century as the 
power to draw the boundaries of colonies was in the [19th century]’ (Pastor 1999:18) 
one key question is whether emerging powers such as India and China will rise within 
the existing Western constitutional order, accepting its foundations, or whether they will 
promote the definition of a new one, either by softly substituting established norms or 
by contesting it in a more hostile manner (Mahbubani 2007). China and India are 
increasingly non status quo powers themselves. How Western relationships develop with 
these two Asian countries will contribute to the cohesion or the lack of it of the 
transatlantic relationship. This will produce two consequences for German foreign 
policy. First, while Germany is firmly embedded in the Western order, and interested in 
preserving it, it will have to define a strategy, together with the U.S. and other powers to 
respond to these potential challenges, which, in a legitimate form, or through open 
dispute, are defying the old established order of norms and institutions. Secondly, at the 
same time as it shares with the U.S. a commitment to the Western order, Germany, 
together with the rest of the EU members, can no longer accept dependence on 
American leadership, and will increasingly have to play a more active role in relation to 
extended security issues, for example in the Middle East.
The Middle East has become the new platform where transatlantic relations are 
being redefined. After September 11, 2001 the Middle East has substituted the Balkans 
as the new testing ground for NATO alliance cohesion and the future of EU-NATO 
relations. Alliance members do not share the same interests and strategic perceptions on 
how to deal with the Israel-Palestinian problem, relations with Lebanon and Syria, with 
Iraq and, more decisively, with Iran’s nuclear crisis. The future of the Atlantic Alliance 
will depend on how the U.S. and Europe deal with these problems on its borders and the 
wider Middle East, and on how willing NATO member states are to continue 
engagement in the war on terror and post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. While 
their joint interest in the region may suggest a convergence of interests, it is far from 
certain that Europe and the U.S. will find a way to cooperate on stability in the long 
term and agree on the instruments needed to do so. Former foreign minister Fischer 
articulated the strategic dimension of Europe's responsibility when he argued that
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‘whether the Mediterranean will evolve into a sea of cooperation or of confrontation 
(...) is the security question for us in the 21st century’ (Fischer 2004).
But if  the Middle East is the stage where different transatlantic perceptions are 
played out, in the long term more is at stake. America’s and Europe’s definition of the 
norms and rules which define an international order, and the position of power or 
merely player are being discerned in the politics of the Middle East. It is at the 
intersection between this ‘liberal world’ of a normative setting in which EU members 
exist and the more ‘realist world’ outside of it that the success or failure of German 
foreign policy and ultimately of a future common European foreign policy will be 
decided.
The Unites States will maintain its ambiguous position with regard to Europe. 
For the U.S., Europe needs to adopt one of two positions: either a Europe which follows 
Washington, or a Europe which is divided. The first case accepts the American 
supremacy in and outside the Atlantic Alliance. The second case entails the rejection of 
this supremacy by some EU members and the refocusing of other more Atlanticist 
members on a continued American presence on the European continent. Thus the 
contours of the future transatlantic relationship are still uncertain. Where does this leave 
Germany’s remade identity and Germany’s changed foreign policy? Germany can say it 
has regained self-confidence. This act of emancipation, as Schroder called it, of 
ensuring that foreign policy was made in Berlin and nowhere else, involved much 
rejection of Germany’s past, including its successful past. As the chapters of this thesis 
have shown, Schroder engaged in dismantling the various cornerstones of traditional 
post-1949 West German foreign policy. His policy of de-linkage, however, has left 
Germany, seven years later, in a weaker position in terms of its normative power and 
‘with less diplomatic influence than it had seven years ago’ (Grant 2Q05).
Stating a new international assertiveness was not the same as practising it 
effectively. Assertiveness implies a will to responsible action and the projection of 
influence. Between 2000 and 2003 Germany lost influence and the strength to forge 
coalitions through the self-inflicted weakening of its normative power when Berlin’s 
position in transatlantic relations and European integration diminished considerably. 
There was a gap between Germany’s claim to power parity and the sense of 
responsibility that a great power should exert in foreign policy. Berlin seemed less 
preoccupied with influencing international politics than with demanding a respected 
status for itself. Schroder acted irresponsibly when he jeopardized the centrality of 
Germany’s position in the Euro-Atlantic community. If Schroder’s intention had been to
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exercise German leadership he failed: in Europe’s world leadership has to be exercised 
in an integrative manner, through the inclusion of all involved, the big and the smaller 
countries. In that sense, Berlin began to change its position when in 2003 it supported 
the trilateral initiatives with Paris and London which at least seemed to reassure the 
smaller Atlanticist European members.
In other words, if  we consider that Germany moves within what Robert Cooper 
has termed the ‘post-modem world’, the normative framework of the constitutional 
order assures the effectiveness of Germany’s normative power. In this post-modem 
world, where sovereignty and the balance of power have been superseded by a new 
security system and new norms of international diplomacy, traditional states remain the 
fundamental units, even though "they might have ceased to behave in traditional 
ways’. Yet in dealing with the modem world, where the classical state system 
remains intact, or with the pre-modem world, characterised by pre-state, post-imperial 
chaos, the exclusive use of normative power is of little practical effect, and can, in 
situations of crises, initially be more of a hindrance than a sign of strength.
While during the Cold War Germany’s normative power was effectively 
employed within what was mostly a Euro-Atlantic area of norm projection, in the 
present world, the real test for German foreign policy will be for policy-makers to 
define to what extent they are willing to make use of other forms of power, including 
military means, for more than merely humanitarian and reconstruction purposes, in 
interventions to create regional stability. It is then a thin line between power politics and 
upholding the validity and legitimacy of the norms and institutions to which the Federal 
Republic has contributed.
Yet, in this undefined new system, falling between global unipolarity with 
American preponderance and multipolarity among regional great powers, Germany will 
only succeed as long as it stays firmly embedded in the European Union, where it is a 
main player, together, increasingly, with a role as a Euro-Atlantic power in close 
cooperation with Washington. Merkel’s international approach seems to be heading in 
the latter direction. Merkel managed to transform the German-American post-crisis 
reconciliation into a strengthening of the wider trans-Atlantic community. The attempt 
to forge a new trans-Atlantic economic partnership was essentially Merkel’s initiative
332 Robert Cooper (2003). The Breaking o f  Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, 
London: Atlantic Books, p. 32. The pre-modem world belongs, according to Cooper, in a different time 
zone: ‘as in the ancient world, the choice is again between empire and chaos.’ (p. 17) The modem world 
is characterised by nation states in a system o f balance o f power or hegemonic states which are willing to 
resort to the use o f force to maintain the status quo (p. 22)
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followed during the German presidency of the European Union.333 Indirectly this had a 
beneficial outcome through ending the EU’s own constitutional impasse.
This suggests that Merkel’s pragmatic style has led to the enlargement of the 
realm of Germany’s foreign policy projection. It has revealed a more strategic global 
vision, in fact one, where former foreign minister Fischer would have better pursued its 
own strategic framework for security around the EU, especially around the 
Mediterranean basin and Middle East. In forging a rebuilt transatlantic partnership, 
Germany aims to position itself as Washington’s new indispensable partner. This 
represents a change from previous policies and attests to Germany’s affirmation not 
only as a European but increasingly also as a transatlantic power, and the aspiration to 
be a global player. However, the means towards exerting a more global foreign policy 
will depend, first, on its capacity in maintaining its normative power, especially within 
its own area of policy-making. Secondly, its new role will depend on Germany’s ability 
to support the EU’s will to act internationally.
With the present grand coalition government Germany has entered a more 
pragmatic phase of its emergence as a European power. The Merkel government 
relinquished the attempt to reconcile deeper integration with enlargement, as it has 
moved away from the automatism of ever increasing Europeanisation seen in the Kohl 
years. At the same time Merkel rejected Schroder’s emancipation politics which risked 
eroding the traditional pillars of a successful foreign policy. With regard to the first, 
Merkel stated her preference for institutional reform and resolving the European 
constitutional crisis; with regard to the second, she reaffirmed Germany’s policy of 
Euro-Atlantic linkage. Parallel to this readjustment a more assertive German foreign 
policy is taking shape through a strengthening of the instruments of multilateralism, but 
through a lessening of its Europeanised policy-making style; while Berlin maintains a 
highly multilateral policy approach with other countries and powers, the context for 
multilateralism has been gradually enlarged. In policy terms, Berlin maintains its 
integrationist stance but has increased its diplomatic manoeuvrability by participating in 
selective multilateral initiatives like the EU3+1 approach towards Iran, together with 
Britain and France.
In the global competition for power, and in the political struggle for 
multipolarity, Germany has experienced the limits of its ability to contest American 
primacy. In the aftermath of the German-American row over the Iraq war, Berlin’s 
unilateralism did not pay off, and furthermore contributed to Europe’s own
333 It led to the signing o f a transatlantic economic treaty on 30 April 2007. D er Spiegel, 30 April 2007.
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constitutional crisis in 2005. The Merkel government has therefore repositioned Berlin’s 
diplomacy in European and transatlantic institutional structures and embarked on the 
enlargement of the transatlantic normative area.
To the extent that the member countries of the European Union want to develop 
a joint European foreign policy and a credible European defence structure, Germany, as 
one of its main supporters, will have to make continuous adjustments. First, it will have 
to ensure the necessary resources and means to make this policy viable. Secondly, it will 
have to contribute to a multilateral European strategic ambition in defining the purpose 
of such a foreign and defence policy. While the ESS gives an indication of what 
Europe’s strategy should be, the means of its implementation still leaves room for 
manoeuvre for the member states, which can make a common strategic approach 
difficult.
The acceptance of a more utilitarian, deliberate power and the use of a logic of 
consequentialism have led Germany to be active in building coalitions and forging 
initiatives with other big powers. It is precisely regarding the Middle East that these 
great power initiatives have materialised. To deal with Iran’s ambition to become a 
nuclear power, Germany has been accepted as the sixth element at the negotiating table 
of the Security Council’s permanent members (P5+1). In EU politics, Germany has also 
applied this selective initiative together with Britain and France, and the CFSP’s foreign 
policy chief, Javier Solana (EU3+1) in the continuous attempt to stop Iran from 
acquiring offensive nuclear power. These initiatives have been a much more effective 
way for Germany to translate its increased power into effective action than the previous 
unilateral initiatives earlier this decade, or the failed attempts to forge a German- 
French-Russian triangular relationship with a specific anti-American tone as was 
attempted in 2003. These more recent initiatives, which began during the Schroder 
government have been diplomatically more productive and have increased Germany’s 
deliberate power. In its selective multilateralist approach Germany can return to a 
mediating role within these initiatives. Thus, given divergences between the five 
members of the UNSC as to how to deal with Iran, Berlin can play a mediating role 
between the U.S., Britain and France, which support a harder approach towards 
Teheran, and Russia and China, which are more inclined towards a less coercive line, 
refusing to threaten Iran with the use of force. Thus while to the outside world these 
initiatives reflect big power exclusiveness, within these groupings members can mediate 
between them and seek to contain less acceptable outcomes. Germany’s position within 
this grouping, where it can argue just as much for an anti-war stance, thus plays a more
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constructive role and stands in direct opposition to Berlin’s unilateral anti-war stance in 
2002. And even if  the outcome of a change in Iran’s position has not yet been able to 
materialise, the cohesiveness of a European position can be more productively 
attempted through this core group or leadership group position rather than through 
unilateral positions.
Between 1997 and 2007 Germany has adopted a new international identity as a 
more assertive power. To achieve this new position its leaders have attempted four 
different power routes. Chancellor Kohl wanted to avoid change by maintaining the 
institutional continuities in the hope of a gradual increase of power. Chancellor 
Schroder pursued unilateral stances against Washington and new relationships with 
Russia and France. Seeing the failure of both attempts the Schroder government 
followed a different, more selective and utilitarian multilateralism through concerted 
action within given institutional structures (Germany, Britain and France on defence 
initiatives or Iran). The Merkel government has maintained the utilitarian multilateralist 
approach through concerted action and coalition building with different EU partners, 
while returning to the more traditional role of mediating between big and smaller 
member states. The first two routes no longer serve Germany’s interests, while the 
second two are now Berlin’s preferred diplomatic instrument.
Despite Germany’s strong embeddedness in European institutional structures, 
changes in foreign policy were a direct consequence of domestic change which was 
induced by policy-makers and the political and cultural elite (e.g. Martin Walser) ready 
to challenge normative core values, such as the meaning of history for Germany’s 
foreign actions. Norms and ideas remain important, but policy-makers loosened 
ideational structures and Germany has lost the inhibition to articulate its interests more 
forcefully and in different institutional arenas. Because of Germany’s receptiveness 
towards the realm of ideas, its foreign policy continues to be shaped by its identity, by 
what sort of country it wants to be recognised as internationally, and by what sort of 
power it projects when it exteriorizes its identity. Thus the use of normative power has 
become more selective, since policy-makers no longer feel as constrained as before to 
invoke new justifications.
Javier Solana’s statement at the beginning of the chapter remains valid. Identity 
has an impact on foreign policy. For what European powers -  and the EU - do on the 
international stage is also a function of their identity and of how they define themselves 
and the values they seek to promote abroad. Germany’s identity as a reflexive 
multilateralist was constructed through its European policy and through the location of
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its foreign policy mostly in the normative anti-hegemonic foundation of the European 
Union where realism was ‘too noimatively unacceptable’ (Hill 2002:88) to have an 
impact on decisions taken. But the EU’s normative motivation to become an 
international actor and Germany’s increased engagement outside the realm of the Euro- 
Atlantic area, suggest that realism may be more necessary than German politicians are 
willing to accept to uphold the normative order. German diplomacy is confronted with 
this reality the more it engages in an assertive foreign policy, as the EU 3+1 initiative 
and the ESDP and other operations have revealed. There is an increasing willingness on 
the part of Germany to maintain the normative power approach, but to combine it with 
more effective capabilities. Thus the decision to make use of military power remains 
contingent on the framing of the issues according to the normative power perspective.
The challenge for German foreign policy-makers is not to reject the normative or 
the realist approach, but to combine the strengths of Germany’s new foreign policy 
identity and not to feel inhibited to act according to a combined logic of appropriateness 
and consequentiality. But the German political class has to reveal more boldness in 
preparing the German electorate for the inevitable costs and risks involved in regained 
prestige and power. The ongoing debate on Germany’s military involvement in 
Afghanistan, for example, and the growing public scepticism surrounding such 
operations, suggests that Germany’s remaking of foreign policy identity is far from over 
and the hard tests of a more assertive international commitment have not yet won over 
the hearts and minds of Germany’s citizens.
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Appendices
Charter of the United Nations334
Article 53
CHAPTER VIII: REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of 
measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, 
provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against 
renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the 
Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with 
the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state 
which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the 
present Charter.
Article 77
CHAPTER XII: INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories 
as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:
a. territories now held under mandate;
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second 
World War; and
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their 
administration.
It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing 
categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.
Article 107
CHAPTER XVII: TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state 
which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present 
Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having 
responsibility for such action.
334 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
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